Encyclopædia Metropolitana.

On the 31st of May, 1823, was Published,

PART IX.

OF THE

ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA.

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I. THIS Work will consist of 25 Volumes, 4to. in four principal divisions: 1. *Philosophy.* 2. *Science.* 3. *Biography,* political and literary, *arranged chronologically.* 4. *Miscellaneous knowledge.* The 25th being a Volume of *Index* to the whole Work, which will, from the nature of the arrangement, contain many words not found in the *Miscellaneous division.*

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published five Parts. Among the contributors to these will be found several of the most distinguished names which are now known to the Literature and Science of England: and engagements have been entered into, by which the regular and permanent support of the most eminent writers, in all departments, has been substantially ensured for the future.

It is not necessary to repeat here the *plan*, which exhibits a feature entirely new in Literature, of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA. The Proprietors rather wish, at present, to invite attention to its *execution*. The Treatise on GRAMMAR, which is completed, presents a valuable mass of original matter. Those on the MATHEMATICS, which are finished, or are now in progress, contain the received principles of that science, together with all such discoveries as the most recent investigations have opened. In HISTORY the period has been already gained in which the mighty course of ROME swallows up all smaller streams, and from which the modern distributions of nations and of society begin to unfold themselves. In the MISCELLANEOUS DIVISION particular attention has been paid to *methodical arrangement*, as far as it is possible to obtain it: and, instead of swelling the list of minor and detached articles, all such as appeared capable of concentration have been gathered under general heads. For this novel arrangement unusual facility is afforded by the INDEX OF REFERENCE, which will be given at the conclusion of the work. It precludes the necessity of perpetual repetition of the

same matter in different forms: and it classifies words according to their legitimate association with each other, instead of permitting them to find places solely according to the accident of their initial letter. In the articles on ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN GEOGRAPHY this system has been largely adopted; and it may be observed of the MISCELLANEOUS DIVISION at large, that whenever a word is not found in its regular ALPHABETICAL order, it is not to be supposed that it is excluded or omitted, but that it is intentionally connected with others in some more appropriate place.

The ENGLISH LEXICON unites in itself the two branches of ETYMOLOGY and ILLUSTRATION, which hitherto have always been disjoined. Each word is first diligently traced to its sources in other languages, and its various applications in our own are then copiously and chronologically elucidated by citations from writers of *all* dates. In preceding Dictionaries (and the remark will apply not less to the great work of JOHNSON than to every other) either the Etymological branch has been carelessly dismissed, or the illustrative quotations have been confined to a very limited range of authors. In the LEXICON which is offered in the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA, every acknowledged authority is sedulously consulted for the derivation of words, and our literature, from its earliest dawn till our own times, is ransacked to supply examples of their various usages.

With these pretensions the Proprietors of the ENCYCLOPÆDIA METROPOLITANA cannot but anticipate a still farther

addition to the support and patronage which hitherto they have found daily increasing. On their part neither labour nor expense is spared to produce a work, which shall be honourable not only to themselves but to their country: and they consider that such intentions (coupled with that execution of them which they have already exhibited) form ample grounds for the claims which they now advance to the liberal encouragement of the PUBLIC.

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LOGIC.

INTRODUCTORY SECTION.

Logic.

Logic in the most extensive sense which it can with propriety be made to bear, may be considered as the Science and also as the Art of Reasoning. It investigates the principles on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions. Its most appropriate office, however, is that of instituting an analysis of the process of the mind in Reasoning: and in this point of view it is, as has been stated, strictly a Science: while considered in reference to the practical rules above mentioned, it may be called the Art of Reasoning. This distinction, as will hereafter appear, has been overlooked, or not clearly pointed out by most writers on the subject, Logic having been in general regarded as merely an Art; and its claim to hold a place among the Sciences having been expressly denied.

Considering how early Logic attracted the attention of philosophers, it may appear surprising that so little progress should have been made, as is confessedly the case, in developing its principles, and perfecting the detail of the system: and this circumstance has been brought forward as a proof of the barrenness and futility of the study. But a similar argument might have been urged with no less plausibility, in past ages, against the study of Natural Philosophy, and very recently against that of Chemistry. No Science can be expected to make any considerable progress, which is not cultivated on right principles. Whatever may be the inherent vigour of the plant, it will neither be flourishing nor fruitful till it meet with a suitable soil and culture: and in no case is the remark more applicable than in the present; the greatest mistakes having always prevailed respecting the nature of Logic, and its province having in consequence been extended by many writers to subjects with which it has no proper connection. Indeed, with the exception of Aristotle, (who is himself not entirely exempt from the errors in question,) hardly a writer on Logic can be mentioned who has clearly perceived, and steadily kept in view throughout, its real nature and object. Before his time, no distinction was drawn between the Science of which we are speaking, and that which is now usually called Metaphysics: a circumstance which alone shews how small was the progress made in earlier times. Indeed those who first turned their attention to the subject, hardly thought of inquiring into the process of Reason itself, but confined themselves almost entirely to certain preliminary points, the discussion of which is (if logically considered) subordinate to that of the main inquiry.

Introductory Section.

Zeno the Eleatic, whom most accounts represent as the earliest systematic writer on the subject of Logic, or as it was then called, Dialectics, divided his work into three parts; the first of which (upon Consequences) is censured by Socrates [Plato, *Parmen.*] for obscurity and confusion. In his second part, however, he furnished that interrogatory method of disputation [ἐρώτησις] which Socrates adopted, and which has since borne his name. The third part of his work was devoted to what may not improperly be termed the art of wrangling, [ἐριστικὴ] which supplied the disputant with a collection of sophistical questions, so contrived that the concession of some point which seemed unavoidable, immediately involved some glaring absurdity. This, if it is to be esteemed as at all falling within the province of Logic, is certainly not to be regarded (as some have ignorantly or heedlessly represented it) as its principal or proper business. The Greek philosophers generally have unfortunately devoted too much attention to it: but we must beware of falling into the vulgar error of supposing the ancients to have regarded as a serious and intrinsically important study, that which in fact they considered as an ingenious recreation. The disputants diverted themselves in their leisure hours by making trial of their own and their adversary's acuteness, in the endeavour mutually to perplex each other with subtle fallacies; much in the same way as men amuse themselves with propounding and guessing riddles, or with the game of chess; to each of which diversions the sportive disputations of the ancients bore much resemblance. They were closely analogous to the wrestling and other exercises of the gymnasium, these last being reckoned conducive to bodily vigour and activity, as the former were to habits of intellectual acuteness; but the *immediate* object in each was a sportive, not a serious contest; though doubtless fashion and emulation often occasioned an undue importance to be attached to success in each.

Zeno then is hardly to be regarded as any further a logician than as to what respects his erotetic method of disputation; a course of argument constructed on this principle being properly an hypothetical sorites, which may easily be reduced into a series of syllogisms.

To Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes, both pupils of Socrates. The former of these prosecuted the subject of the third part of his predecessor's treatise, and is said to have been the author of many of the fallacies attributed to the Stoical school.

Of the writings of the latter nothing certain is known: if, however, we suppose the above mentioned sect to be his disciples in this study, and to have retained his principles, he certainly took a more correct view of the subject than Euclid. The Stoics divided all λεκτὰ, every thing that could be said, into three classes: 1st, the simple term; 2d, the proposition; 3d, the syllogism; viz. the *hypothetical;* for they seem to have had little notion of a more rigorous analysis of argument than into that familiar form.

We must not here omit to notice the merits of Archytus, to whom we are indebted for the doctrine of the categories. He, however, (as well as the other writers on the subject,) appears to have had no distinct view of the proper object and just limits of the science of Logic; but to have blended with it Metaphysical discussions not strictly connected with it, and to have dwelt on the investigation of the nature of terms and propositions, without maintaining a constant reference to the principles of Reasoning, to which all the rest should be made subservient.

The state then in which Aristotle found the Science, (if indeed it can properly be said to have existed at all before his time,) appears to have been nearly this: the division into simple terms, propositions and syllogisms, had been slightly sketched out; the doctrine of the categories, and perhaps that of the opposition of propositions, had been laid down; and, as some believe, the analysis of species into genus and differentia, had been introduced by Socrates. These, at best, were rather the materials of the system than the system itself; the foundation of which indeed he distinctly claims the merit of having laid; and which remains fundamentally the same as he left it.

It has been remarked, that the Logical system is one of those few theories which have been begun and perfected by the same individual. The history of its discovery, as far as the main principles of the science are concerned, properly commences and ends with Aristotle. And this may perhaps in part account for the subsequent perversions of it. The brevity and simplicity of its fundamental truths, (to which indeed all real science is perpetually tending,) has probably led many to suppose that something much more complex, abtruse, and mysterious, remained to be discovered. The vanity by which all men are prompted unduly to magnify their own pursuits, has led unphilosophical minds, not in this case alone, but in many others, to extend the boundaries of their respective Sciences, not by the patient developement and just application of the principles of those Sciences, but by wandering into irrelevant subjects. The mystical employment of numbers by Pythagoras, in matters utterly foreign to Arithmetic, is perhaps the earliest instance of the kind. A more curious and important one is the degeneracy of Astronomy into judicial Astrology; but none is more striking than the misapplication of Logic, by those who have treated of it as "the art of rightly employing the rational faculties," or who have intruded it into the province of Natural Philosophy, and regarded the syllogism as an engine for the investigation of nature: overlooking the boundless field that was before them within the legitimate limits of the Science; and not perceiving the importance and difficulty of the task of completing and properly filling up the masterly sketch before them.

The writings of Aristotle were not only absolutely lost to the world for about two centuries, but seem to have been but little studied for a long time after their recovery. An Art, however, of Logic, derived from the principles traditionally preserved by his disciples, seems to have been generally known, and was employed by Cicero in his philosophical works; but the pursuit of the science seems to have been abandoned for a long time. Early in the Christian era, the Peripatetic doctrines experienced a considerable revival; and we meet with the names of Galen and Porphyry as Logicians: but it is not till the fifth century that Aristotle's Logical works were translated into Latin by the celebrated Boethius Not one of these seems to have made any considerable advances in developing the Theory of Reasoning. Of Galen's labours little is known; and Porphyry's principal work is merely on the *predicables.* We have little of the Science till the revival of learning among the Arabians, by whom Aristotle's treatises on this as well as on other subjects were eagerly studied.

Passing by the names of some Byzantine writers of no great importance, we come to the times of the Schoolmen, whose waste of ingenuity and frivolous subtilty of disputation need not be enlarged upon. It may be sufficient to observe, that their fault did not lie in their diligent study of Logic, and the high value they set upon it, but in their utterly mistaking the true nature and object of the science; and by attempting to employ it for the purpose of physical discoveries, involving every subject in a mist of words, to the exclusion of sound philosophical investigation. Their errors may serve to account for the strong terms in which Bacon sometimes appears to censure Logical pursuits; but that this censure was intended to bear against the extravagant perversions, not the legitimate cultivation of the Science, may be proved from his own observations on the subject, in his *Advancement of Learning.*

His moderation, however, was not imitated in other quarters. Even Locke confounds in one sweeping censure the Aristotelic theory, with the absurd misapplications and perversions of it in later years. His objection to the Science, as unserviceable in the *discovery* of truth, (which has of late been often repeated) while it holds good in reference to many (misnamed) Logicians, indicates that with regard to the true nature of the Science itself he had no clearer notions than they have, of the proper province of Logic, viz. Reasoning; and of the distinct character of that operation from the observations and experiments which are essential to the study of nature.

An error apparently different, but substantially the same, pervades the treatises of Watts and other modern writers on the subject. Perceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic theory to the vast purposes to which others had attempted to apply it, he still craved after the attainment of some equally comprehensive and all-powerful system; which he accordingly attempted to construct, under the title of *The Right Use of Reason;* which was to be a method of invigorating and properly directing all the powers of the mind: a most magnificent object indeed, but one which not only does not fall under the province of Logic, but cannot be accomplished by any *one* Science or system that can even be conceived to exist. The attempt to comprehend so wide a field is no extension of Science, but a mere verbal generalization, which

leads only to vague and barren declamation. In every pursuit, the more precise and definite our object, the more likely we are to attain some valuable result; if, like the Platonists, who sought after the *αὐτάγαθον*, the abstract idea of good, we pursue some specious but ill-defined scheme of universal knowledge, we shall lose the substance while grasping at a shadow, and bewilder ourselves in empty generalities.

It is not perhaps much to be wondered at, that in still later times several ingenious writers, forming their notions of the Science itself from professed masters in it, such as have just been alluded to, and judging of its value from their failures, should have treated the Aristotelic system with so much reprobation and scorn. Too much prejudiced to bestow on it the requisite attention for enabling them clearly to understand its real character and object, or even to judge correctly from the little they did understand, they have assailed the study with a host of objections, so totally irrelevant, and consequently impotent, that, considering the talents and general information of those from whom they proceed, they might excite astonishment in any one who did not fully estimate the force of very early prejudice.

Logic has usually been considered by these objectors as professing to furnish a peculiar method of Reasoning, instead of a method of analyzing that mental process which must *invariably* take place in all correct Reasoning; and accordingly they have contrasted the ordinary mode of reasoning with the syllogistic; and have brought forward with an air of triumph the argumentative skill of many who never learned the system: a mistake no less gross than if any one should regard Grammar as a peculiar language, and contend against its utility on the ground that many speak correctly who never studied the principles of Grammar; whereas Logic, which is, as it were, the Grammar of Reasoning, does not bring forward the regular syllogism as a distinct mode of argumentation, designed to be substituted for any other mode; but as the form to which all correct Reasoning may be ultimately reduced, and which consequently serves the purpose (when we are employing Logic as an Art) of a test to try the validity of any argument, in the same manner as by chemical analysis we develope and submit to a distinct examination the elements of which any compound body is composed, and are thus enabled to detect any latent sophistication and impurity.

Complaints have also been made that Logic leaves untouched the greatest difficulties, and those which are the sources of the chief errors in Reasoning; viz. the ambiguity or indistinctness of terms, and the doubts respecting the degrees of evidence in various propositions: an objection which is not to be removed by any such attempt as that of Watts to lay down "rules for forming clear ideas, and for guiding the judgment;" but by replying that no Art is to be censured for not teaching more than falls within its province, and indeed more than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a system of universal knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning of every term, and the truth or falsity, certainty or uncertainty, of every proposition, thus superseding all other studies, it is most unphilosophical to expect or even to imagine. And to find fault with Logic for not performing this is as if one should object to the Science of Optics for not giving sight to the blind; or as if (like the man of whom Warburton tells a story in his *Div. Leg.*) one should complain of a reading glass for being of no service to a person who had never learned to read.

In fact, the difficulties and errors above alluded to are *not* in the process of Reasoning itself, (which alone is the appropriate province of Logic,) but in the subject matter about which it is employed. This process will have been correctly conducted if it have conformed to the Logical rules which preclude the possibility of any error creeping in between the principles from which we are arguing, and the conclusions we deduce from them. But still that conclusion may be false, if the principles we start from are so. In like manner, no Arithmetical skill will secure a correct result to a calculation, unless the data are correct from which we calculate; nor does any one on that account undervalue Arithmetic; and yet the objection against Logic rests on no better foundation.

There is in fact a striking analogy in this respect between the two Sciences. All numbers (which are the subject of Arithmetic) must be numbers *of some things*, whether coins, persons, measures, or any thing else; but to introduce into the Science any notice of the *things* respecting which calculations are made, would be evidently irrelevant, and would destroy its scientific characters: we proceed therefore with arbitrary signs representing numbers in the abstract. So also does Logic pronounce on the validity of a regularly-constructed argument equally well, though arbitrary symbols may have been substituted for the terms, and consequently without any regard to the things signified by those terms. And the probability of doing this (though the employment of such arbitrary symbols has been absurdly objected to, even by writers who understood not only Arithmetic but Algebra) is a proof of the strictly scientific character of the system. But many professed Logical writers, not attending to the circumstances which have been just mentioned, have wandered into disquisitions on various branches of knowledge; disquisitions which must evidently be as boundless as human knowledge itself, since there is no subject on which Reasoning is not employed, and to which consequently Logic may not be *applied*. The error lies in regarding every thing as the *proper province* of Logic, to which it is *applicable*. A similar error is complained of by Aristotle, as having taken place with respect to Rhetoric; of which indeed we find specimens in the arguments of several of the interlocutors in *Cic. de Oratore*.

From what has been said, it will be evident that there is hardly any subject to which it is so difficult to introduce the student in a clear and satisfactory manner, as the one we are now engaged in. In any other branch of knowledge, the reader, if he have any previous acquaintance with the subject, will usually be so far the better prepared for comprehending the exposition of the principles; or if he be entirely a stranger to it, will at least come to the study with a mind unbiassed, and free from prejudices and misconceptions; whereas in the present case it cannot but happen that many who have given some attention to Logical pursuits, (or what are usually considered as such) will frequently have rather been bewildered by fundamentally erroneous views, than prepared by the acquisition of just principles for ulterior progress; and that not a few who pretend not to any acquaintance whatever with the Science, will yet

have imbibed either such prejudices against it, or such false notions respecting its nature, as cannot but prove obstacles in their study of it.

There is, however, a difficulty which exists more or less in all abstract pursuits, though it is perhaps more felt in this, and often occasions it to be rejected by beginners as dry and tedious; viz. the difficulty of perceiving to what ultimate end,—to what practical or interesting application the abstract principles lead which are first laid before the student; so that he will often have to work his way patiently through the most laborious part of the system before he can gain any clear idea of the drift and intention of it.

This complaint has often been made by chemical students, who are wearied with descriptions of oxygen, hydrogen, and other invisible elements, before they have any knowledge respecting such bodies as commonly present themselves to the senses. And accordingly some teachers of Chemistry obviate in a great degree this objection, by adopting the analytical instead of the synthetical mode of procedure, when they are first introducing the subject to beginners; i. e. instead of synthetically enumerating the elementary substances, proceeding next to the simplest combinations of these, and concluding with those more complex substances which are of the most common occurrence, they begin by *analyzing* these last, and resolving them step by step into their simple elements; thus presenting the subject at once in an interesting point of view, and clearly setting forth the object of it. The synthetical form of teaching is indeed sufficiently interesting to one who has made considerable progress in any study; and being more concise, regular, and systematic, is the form in which our knowledge naturally arranges itself in the mind, and is retained by the memory: but the analytical is the more interesting, easy, and natural kind of introduction, as being the form in which the first invention or discovery of any kind of system must originally have taken place.

It may be advisable, therefore, to begin by giving a slight sketch, in this form, of the Logical system, before we enter regularly upon the details of it. The reader will thus be presented with a kind of imaginary history of the course of inquiry by which the Logical system may be conceived to have occurred to a philosophical mind.

In every instance in which we *reason*, in the strict sense of the word, i. e. make use of arguments, whether for the sake of refuting an adversary, or of conveying instruction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain process takes place in the mind, which is one and the same in all cases, provided it be correctly conducted.

Of course it cannot be supposed that every one is even conscious of this process in his own mind, much less is competent to explain the principles on which it proceeds; which indeed is, and cannot but be, the case with every other process respecting which any system has been formed; the practice not only may exist independently of the theory, but must have preceded the theory; there must have been language before a system of Grammar could be devised; and musical compositions previous to the science of Music. This by the way will serve to expose the futility of the popular objection against Logic, that men may reason very well who know nothing of it. The parallel instance adduced, shews that such an objection might be applied in many other cases, where its absurdity would be obvious; and that there is no reason for deciding thence, either that the system has no tendency to improve practice, or that even if it had not, it might not still be a dignified and interesting pursuit.

One of the chief impediments to the attainment of a just view of the nature and object of Logic, is the not fully understanding, or not sufficiently keeping in mind, the SAMENESS of the Reasoning process in all cases; if, as the ordinary mode of speaking would seem to indicate, Mathematical Reasoning, and Theological, and Metaphysical, and Political, &c. were essentially different from each other, i. e. different *kinds of reasoning*, it would follow, that supposing there could be at all any such Science as we have described Logic, there must be so many different species, or at least different branches of Logic. And such is perhaps the most prevailing notion. Nor is this much to be wondered at; since it is evident to all that some men converse and write in an argumentative way, very justly on one subject, and very erroneously on another, in which again others excel, who fail in the former. This error may be at once illustrated and removed, by considering the parallel instance of Arithmetic, in which every one is aware that the process of a calculation is not affected by the nature of the objects whose numbers are before us: but that (e. g.) the multiplication of a number is the very same operation, whether it be a number of men, of miles, or of pounds; though nevertheless men may perhaps be found who are accurate in calculations relative to Natural Philosophy, and incorrect in those of Political Economy, from their different degrees of skill in the subjects of these two Sciences; not surely because there are different arts of Arithmetic applicable to each of these respectively.

Others again, who are aware that the simple system of Logic may be applied to all subjects whatever, are yet disposed to view it as a peculiar method of Reasoning, and not as it is, a method of unfolding and analyzing our Reasoning: whence many have been led (e. g. the author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric) to talk of comparing syllogistic Reasoning with moral Reasoning, and to take it for granted that it is possible to reason correctly without reasoning Logically; which is in fact as great a blunder as if any one were to mistake Grammar for a peculiar language, and to suppose it possible to speak correctly without speaking Grammatically. They have in short considered Logic as *an* Art of Reasoning; whereas, so far as it is an Art, it is *the* Art of Reasoning: the Logician's object being, not to lay down principles by which one *may* reason, but by which all *must* reason, even though they are not distinctly aware of them: to lay down rules, not which may be followed with advantage, but which cannot possibly be departed from in sound reasoning. These misapprehensions and objections being such as lie on the very threshold of the subject, it would have been hardly possible, without noticing them, to convey any just notion of the nature and design of the Logical system.

Supposing it then to have been perceived that the operation of Reasoning is in all cases the same, the analysis of that operation could not fail to strike the

mind as an interesting matter of inquiry: and moreover, since (apparent) arguments which are unsound and inconclusive, are so often employed either *from* error or *from* design; and even those who are not misled by these fallacies, are so often at a loss to detect and expose them in a manner satisfactory to others, or even to themselves, it could not but appear desirable to lay down some general rules of Reasoning, applicable to all cases, by which a person might be enabled the more readily and clearly to state the grounds of his own conviction, or of his objection to the arguments of an opponent, instead of arguing at random without any fixed and acknowledged principles to guide his procedure. Such rules would be analogous to those of Arithmetic, which obviate the tediousness and uncertainty of calculations in the head, wherein, after much labour, different persons might arrive at different results, without any of them being able distinctly to point out the error of the rest. A system of such rules, it is obvious, must, instead of deserving to be called the Art of wrangling, be more justly characterised as "the Art of cutting short wrangling," by bringing the parties to issue at once, if not to agreement, and thus saving a waste of ingenuity.

In pursuing the supposed investigation, it will be found that every conclusion is deduced, in reality, from two other propositions, (thence called premises;) for though one of these may be, and commonly is, suppressed, it must nevertheless be understood as admitted; as may easily be made evident by supposing the DENIAL of the suppressed premiss, which will at once invalidate the argument: e. g. if any one from perceiving that the world exhibits marks of design, infers that "it must have had an intelligent author," though he may not be aware in his own mind of the existence of any other premiss, he will readily understand, if it be denied that "whatever exhibits marks of design must have had an intelligent author," that the affirmative of that proposition is necessary to the validity of the argument. An argument thus stated regularly and at full length is called a Syllogism; which therefore is evidently not a peculiar *kind of argument*, but only a peculiar *form* of expression, in which every argument may be stated. When one of the premises is suppressed, (which for brevity's sake it usually is) the argument is called an Enthymeme. And it may be worth while to remark, that when the argument is in this state, the objections of an opponent are (or rather appear to be) of two kinds; viz. either objections to the *assertion* itself, or objections to its *force* as an argument; e. g. in the above instance, an atheist may be conceived either denying that the world does exhibit marks of design, or denying that it *follows* from thence that it had an intelligent author. The only difference in the two cases is, that in the one the *expressed* premiss is denied, in the other the *suppressed*; for the *force as an argument* of either premiss depends on the other premiss: if both be admitted, the conclusion legitimately connected with them cannot be denied.

It is evidently immaterial to the argument whether the conclusion be placed first or last; but it may be proper to remark, that a premiss placed *after* its conclusion is called the *reason* of it, and is introduced by one of those conjunctions which are called causal; viz. "since," "because," &c. which may indeed be employed to designate a premiss, whether it came first or last; the illative conjunctions, "therefore," &c. designate the conclusion. It is a circumstance which often occasions error and perplexity, that both these classes of conjunctions have also another signification, being employed to denote, respectively, cause and effect, as well as premiss and conclusion: e. g. if I say, (to use an instance employed by Aristotle) "yonder is a fixed star, *because* it twinkles," or, "it twinkles, and therefore is a fixed star," I employ these conjunctions to denote the connection of premiss and conclusion; for it is plain that the twinkling of the star is not the cause of its being fixed, but only the cause of *my knowing* that it is so: but if I say, "it twinkles because it is a fixed star," or it is a fixed star, and therefore twinkles," I am using the same conjunctions to denote the connection of cause and effect; for in this case the twinkling of the star, being evident to the eye, would hardly need to be *proved*, but might need to be accounted for. There are, however, many cases in which the cause is employed to *prove* the existence of its effect; especially in arguments relating to *future* events: the *cause* and the reason, in that case, coincide; and this contributes to their being so often confounded together in other cases. In an argument, such as the example above given, it is, as has been said, impossible for any one, who admits both premises, to avoid admitting the conclusion; but there will be frequently an apparent connection of premises with a conclusion which does not in reality follow from them, though to the inattentive or unskilful the argument may appear to be valid: and there are many other cases in which a doubt may exist whether the argument be valid or not; i. e. whether it be possible or not to admit the premises, and yet deny the conclusion. It is of the highest importance, therefore, to lay down some regular form to which every valid argument may be reduced, and to devise a rule which shall prove the validity of every argument in that form, and consequently the unsoundness of any apparent argument which cannot be reduced to it:—e. g. if such an argument as this be proposed, "every rational agent is accountable; brutes are not rational agents; therefore they are not accountable:" or again, "all wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their nation; Solon did this; therefore he was a wise legislator:" there are some, perhaps, who would not perceive any fallacy in such arguments, especially if enveloped in a cloud of words; and still more when the conclusion is true, or, which comes to the same point, if they are disposed to believe it; and others might perceive indeed, but might be at a loss to explain the fallacy. Now these (apparent) arguments exactly correspond respectively with the following, the absurdity of the conclusions from which is manifest: "every horse is an animal; sheep are not horses; therefore they are not animals:" and, "all vegetables grow; an animal grows; therefore it is a vegetable." These last examples, it has been said, correspond exactly (considered as arguments) with the former; the question respecting the validity of an argument being, not whether the conclusion be *true*, but whether it follows from the premises adduced. This mode of exposing a fallacy, by bringing forward a similar one whose conclusion is obviously absurd, is often, and very advantageously, resorted to in addressing

those who are ignorant of Logical rules; but to lay down such rules, and employ them as a test, is evidently a safer and more compendious, as well as a more philosophical mode of proceeding. To attain these, it would plainly be necessary to analyze some clear and valid arguments, and to observe in what their conclusiveness consists. Let us suppose, then, such an examination to be made of the syllogism above mentioned: "whatever exhibits marks of design had an intelligent author."

The world exhibits marks of design; therefore the world had an intelligent author. In the first of these premises we find it assumed universally of the *class* of "things which exhibit marks of design," that they had an intelligent author; and in the other premiss, "the world" is referred to that class as comprehended in it: now it is evident, that whatever is said of the whole of a class, may be said of any thing comprehended in that class; so that we are thus authorized to say of the world, that it had an intelligent author. Again, if we examine a syllogism with a negative conclusion, as, e. g. "nothing which exhibits marks of design could have been produced by chance: the world exhibits, &c.; therefore the world could not have been produced by chance." The process of Reasoning will be found to be the same; since it is evident, that whatever is *denied* universally of any class, may be denied of any thing that is comprehended in that class.

On further examination it will be found, that all valid arguments whatever may be easily reduced to such a form as that of the foregoing syllogisms; and that consequently the principle on which they are constructed is the universal principle of Reasoning. So elliptical indeed is the ordinary mode of expression, even of those who are considered as prolix writers, i. e. so much is implied and left to be understood in the course of argument, in comparison of what is actually stated, (most men being impatient, even to excess, of any appearance of unnecessary and tedious formality of statement,) that a single sentence will often be found, though perhaps considered as a single argument, to contain, compressed into a short compass, a chain of several distinct arguments; but if each of these be fully developed, and the whole of what the author intended to imply be stated expressly, it will be found that all the steps even of the longest and most complex train of Reasoning, may be reduced into the above form.

It is a mistake (which might appear scarcely worthy of notice had not so many, even esteemed writers, fallen into it) to imagine that Aristotle and other Logicians meant to propose that this prolix form of unfolding arguments should universally supersede, in argumentative discourses, the common forms of expression; and that to reason Logically, means, to state all arguments at full length in the syllogistic form: and Aristotle has even been charged with inconsistency for not doing so; it has been said, that "in his *Treatises of Ethics, Politics*, &c. he argues like a rational creature, and never attempts to bring his own system into practice:" as well might a Chemist be charged with inconsistency for making use of any of the compound substances that are commonly employed, without previously analyzing and resolving them into their simple elements; as well might it be imagined that, to speak grammatically, means, to parse every sentence we utter. The Chemist (to pursue the illustration) keeps by him his tests and his method of analysis, to be employed when any substance is offered to his notice, the composition of which has not been ascertained, or in which adulteration is suspected. Now a fallacy may aptly be compared to some adulterated compound; it consists of an ingenious mixture of truth and falsehood, so entangled, so intimately blended, that the falsehood is (in the chemical phrase) *held in solution*: one drop of sound Logic is that test which immediately disunites them, makes the foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom.

But to resume the investigation of the principles of Reasoning: the maxim resulting from the examination of a syllogism in the foregoing form, and of the application of which every valid argument is in reality an instance, is, "that whatever is predicated (i. e. affirmed or denied) universally, of any class of things, may be predicated, in like manner, (viz. affirmed or denied) of any thing comprehended in that class." This is the principle, commonly called the *dictum de omni et nullo*, for the establishment of which we are indebted to Aristotle, and which is the keystone of his whole Logical system. It is not a little remarkable that some, otherwise judicious writers, should have been so carried away by their zeal against that philosopher, as to speak with scorn and ridicule of this principle, on account of its obviousness and simplicity; though they would probably perceive at once, in any other case, that it is the greatest triumph of philosophy to refer many, and seemingly very various, phenomena to one, or a very few, simple principles; and that the more simple and evident such a principle is, provided it be truly applicable to all the cases in question, the greater is its value and scientific beauty. If, indeed, any principle be regarded as *not* thus applicable, *that* is an objection to it of a different kind. Such an objection against Aristotle's dictum, no one has ever attempted to *establish* by any kind of proof; but it has often been *taken for granted*; it being (as has been stated) very commonly supposed, without examination, that the syllogism is a *distinct kind of argument*, and that the rules of it do not apply, nor were intended to apply, to *all* Reasoning whatever. Under this misapprehension, Campbell (*Philosophy of Rhetoric*) labours, with some ingenuity, and not without an air of plausibility, to shew that every syllogism must be futile and worthless, because the premises virtually assert the conclusion: little dreaming, of course, that his objections, however specious, lie against the *process of Reasoning itself* universally; and will therefore, of course, apply to those very arguments which he is himself adducing.

It is much more extraordinary to find another author (Dugald Stewart) adopting, expressly, the very same objections, and yet distinctly admitting within a few pages, the possibility of reducing every course of argument to a series of syllogisms.

The same writer brings an objection against the dictum of Aristotle; which it may be worth while to notice briefly, for the sake of setting in a clearer light the real character and object of that principle. Its application being, as has been seen, to a regular and conclusive syllogism, he supposes it intended to prove and *make evident* the conclusiveness of such a syllogism; and remarks how unphilosophical it is to

attempt giving a *demonstration of a demonstration.* And certainly the charge would be just, if we could imagine the Logician's object to be, to *increase the certainty* of a conclusion which we are supposed to have already arrived at by the clearest possible mode of proof. But it is very strange that such an idea should ever have occurred to one who had even the slightest tincture of Natural Philosophy: for it might as well be imagined that a Natural Philosopher or a Chemist's design to strengthen the testimony of our senses by *a priori* reasoning, and to convince us that a stone when thrown will fall to the ground, and that gunpowder will explode when fixed, because they shew that according to their principles those phenomena must take place as they do. But it would be reckoned a mark of the grossest ignorance and stupidity, not to be aware that their object is not to *prove* the existence of an individual phenomenon, which our eyes have witnessed, but (as the phrase is) to account for it: i. e. to shew according to what *principle* it takes place;—to refer, in short, the *individual case* to a *general law* of nature. The object of Aristotle's dictum is precisely analogous: he had, doubtless, no thought of adding to the force of any individual syllogism; his design was to point out the *general principle* on which that process is conducted which takes place in each syllogism. And as the laws of nature (as they are called) are in reality merely *generalized facts*, of which all the phenomena coming under them are particular instances; so the proof drawn from Aristotle's dictum is not a distinct demonstration brought to confirm another demonstration, but is merely a generalized and abstract statement of *all* demonstration whatever; and is therefore in fact, *the very demonstration* which (*mutatis mutandis*) accommodated to the various subject matters, is actually employed in each particular case.

In order to trace more distinctly the different steps of the abstracting process, by which any particular argument may be brought into the most general form, we may first take a syllogism stated accurately and at full length, such as the example formerly given, "whatever exhibits marks of design, &c.," and then somewhat generalize the expression, by substituting (as in Algebra) arbitrary unmeaning symbols for the significant terms that were originally used; the syllogism will then stand thus; "every B is A; C is B; therefore C is A." The Reasoning is no less evidently valid when thus stated, whatever terms A, B, and C, respectively may be supposed to stand for: such terms may indeed be inserted as to make all, or any of, the assertions *false*; but it will still be no less impossible for any one who *admits* the truth of the *premises*, in an argument thus constructed, to deny the conclusion; and this it is that constitutes the conclusiveness of an argument.

Viewing then the syllogism thus expressed, it appears clearly, that "A stands for *any thing whatever* that is predicated of a whole class," (viz. of *every* B) "which comprehends or contains in it *something else*," viz. C, of which B is, in the second premiss affirmed; and that consequently the first term (A) is, in the conclusion, predicated of the third C.

Now to assert the validity of this process, now before us, is to state the very dictum we are treating of with hardly even a verbal alteration, viz.:

1. Any thing whatever, predicated of a whole class,
2. Under which class something else is contained,
3. May be predicated of that which is so contained.

The three members into which the maxim is here distributed, correspond to the three propositions of the syllogism to which they are intended respectively to apply.

The advantage of substituting for the terms, in a regular syllogism, arbitrary unmeaning symbols such as letters of the alphabet, is much the same as in Mathematics: the Reasoning itself is then considered, by itself, clearly, and without any risk of our being misled by the truth or falsity of the conclusion, which are, in fact, accidental and variable; the essential point, being, as far as the *argument* is concerned, the *connection between* the premises and the conclusions. We are thus enabled to embrace the general principle of all Reasoning, and to perceive its applicability to an indefinite number of individual cases. That Aristotle, therefore, should have been accused of making use of these symbols for the purpose of *darkening* his demonstrations, and that too, by persons not unacquainted with Geometry and Algebra, is truly astonishing. If a Geometer, instead of designating the four angles of a square, by four letters, were to call them *north*, *south*, *east*, and *west*, he would not render the demonstration of a theorem the easier; and the learner would be much more likely to be perplexed in the application of it.

It belongs then exclusively to a syllogism, properly so called (i. e. a valid argument, so stated that its conclusiveness is evident from the mere *form* of the expression) that if letters or any other unmeaning symbols be substituted for the several terms, the validity of the argument shall still be evident. Whenever this is not the case, the supposed argument is either unsound and sophistical, or else may be reduced, (without any alteration of its meaning) into the syllogistic form; in which form, the test just mentioned may be applied to it.

What is called an unsound or fallacious argument, i. e. an *apparent* argument which is, in reality, none, cannot, of course, be reduced into this form; but when stated in the form most nearly approaching to this that is possible, its fallaciousness becomes more evident, from its nonconformity to the foregoing rule: e. g. "whoever is capable of deliberate crime is responsible; an infant is not capable of deliberate crime; therefore, an infant is not responsible:" here, the term "responsible" is affirmed universally of "those capable of deliberate crime;" it might, therefore, according to Aristotle's dictum, have been affirmed of any thing contained under that class; but in the instance before us nothing is mentioned as contained under that class, only the term infant is *excluded* from that class; and though what is affirmed of a whole class may be affirmed of any thing that *is* contained under it, there is no ground for supposing that it may be *denied* of whatever is *not* so contained; for it is evidently possible that it may be applicable to a whole class and to something else besides: to say, e. g. that all trees are vegetables, does not imply that *nothing else* is a vegetable. It is evident, therefore, that such an apparent argument as the above does not comply with the rule laid down, and is consequently invalid.

Again, in this instance, "food is necessary to life;

corn is food; therefore corn is necessary to life:" the term "necessary to life" is affirmed of food, but *not universally*; for it is not said of *every kind of food*: the meaning of the assertion being manifestly that *some* food is necessary to life: here again therefore the rule has not been complied with, since that which is predicated, (i. e. affirmed or denied,) not of the *whole*, but of a *part* only of a certain class, cannot be predicated of any thing, whatever is contained under that class.

The fallacy in this last case is, what is usually described in Logical language as consisting in the "non-distribution of the middle term." In order to understand this phrase, it is necessary to observe, that a proposition being an expression in which one thing is affirmed or denied of another; e. g. "A is B," both that of which something is said, and that which is said of it, (i. e. both A and B,) are called "Terms," from their being (in their nature) the extremes or *boundaries* of the proposition; and there are, of course, two, and but two, terms in a proposition, (though it may so happen that either of them may consist either of one *word*, or of several;) and a term is said to be "distributed," when it is taken universally, so as to stand for every thing it is capable of being applied to; and consequently "undistributed," when it stands for a part only of the things signified by it; thus, "*all* food," or *every* kind of food, are expressions which imply the distribution of the term "food;" "*some* food" would imply its non-distribution: and it is also to be observed, that the term of which, in one premiss, something is affirmed or denied, and to which in the other premiss something else is referred as contained in it, is called the "middle" term in the syllogism, as standing *between* the other two, (viz. the two terms of the conclusion,) and being the medium of proof. Now it is plain, that if in each premiss a *part* only of this middle term is employed, i. e. if it be not at all distributed, no conclusion can be drawn. Hence, if in the example formerly adduced, it had been merely stated that "*something*" (not "*whatever*," or "*every thing*") "which exhibits marks of design, is the work of an intelligent author," it would not have followed, from the world's exhibiting marks of design, that that is the work of an intelligent author.

It is to be observed, also, that the words "all," and "every," which mark the distribution of a term, and "some," which marks its non-distribution, are not always introduced: they are frequently understood, and left to be supplied by the context; e. g. "food is necessary:" viz. "*some* food;" "man is mortal;" viz. "*every* man." Propositions thus expressed are called by Logicians "*indefinite*," because it is left undetermined by the form of the expression whether the "subject," (the term of which something is affirmed or denied being called the "subject" of the proposition, and that which is said of it, the "predicate") be distributed or not. Nevertheless it is plain that in every proposition the subject either is, or is not, distributed, though it be not declared whether it is or not; consequently every proposition, whether expressed indefinitely or not, must be either "universal" or "particular;" those being called universal, in which the predicate is said of the whole of the subject, (or in other words, where the subject is distributed;) and those, particular, in which it is said only of a part of the subject: e. g. "All men are sinful," is universal; "some men are sinful," particular: and this division of propositions is in Logical language said to be according to their "*quantity*."

But the distribution or non-distribution of the *predicate* is entirely independent of the *quality* of the proposition; nor are the signs "all" and "some" ever affixed to the predicate; because its distribution depends upon, and is indicated by the "*quality*" of the proposition; i. e. its being affirmative or negative; it being a universal rule, that the predicate of a negative proposition is distributed, and, of an affirmative, undistributed. The reason of this may easily be understood, by considering that a term which stands for a whole class may be applied to (i. e. *affirmed* of) any thing that is comprehended under that class, though the term of which it is thus affirmed may be of much narrower extent than that other, and may, therefore, be far from coinciding with the *whole* of it: thus it may be said with truth, that "the Negroes are uncivilized," though the term uncivilized be of much wider extent than "Negroes," comprehending, besides them, Hottentots, &c.: so that it would not be allowable to assert, that "*all* who are uncivilized are Negroes;" it is evident, therefore, that it is a *part* only of the term "uncivilized" that has been affirmed of "Negroes:" and the same reasoning applies to every affirmative proposition; for though it may so happen that the subject and predicate coincide, i. e. are of equal extent, as, e. g. "all men are rational animals," (it being equally true, that "all rational animals are men,) yet this is not *implied by the form of the expression*; since it would be no less true, that "all men are rational animals," even if there were other rational animals besides man.

It is plain, therefore, that if *any part* of the predicate is applicable to the subject, it may be affirmed, and, of course, cannot be denied of that subject; and consequently, when the predicate *is denied* of the subject, it is implied that *no part* of that predicate is applicable to that subject; i. e. that the *whole* of the predicate is denied of the subject: for to say, e. g. that "no beasts of prey ruminate," implies that beasts of prey are excluded from the *whole class* of ruminant animals, and consequently that "no ruminant animals are beasts of prey. And hence results the above mentioned rule, that the distribution of the predicate is implied in negative propositions, and its non-distribution in affirmatives.

It is to be remembered, therefore, that it is not sufficient for the middle term to *occur* in a universal proposition, since if that proposition be an affirmative, and the middle term be the *predicate* of it, it will not be distributed: e. g. if in the example formerly given it had been merely asserted, that "all the works of an intelligent author shew marks of design," and that "the universe shows marks of design," nothing could have been proved; since, though both these propositions are universal, the middle term is made the predicate in each, and both are affirmative; and accordingly the rule of Aristotle is not here complied with, since the term, "work of an intelligent author," which is to be proved applicable to "the universe," is not affirmed of the middle term, ("what shows marks of design,") under which "universe" is contained; but the middle term on the contrary is affirmed of it.

If, however, one of the premises be negative,

the middle term may then be made the predicate of it, and will thus, according to the above remark, be distributed: e. g. "no ruminant animals are predacious; the lion is predacious; therefore the lion is not ruminant:" this is a valid syllogism; and the middle term (predacious) is distributed by being made the predicate of a negative proposition. The form, indeed, of the syllogism, is not that prescribed by the dictum of Aristotle, but it may easily be reduced to that form, by stating the first proposition thus; no predacious animals are ruminant; which is manifestly implied (as was above remarked) in the assertion, that "no ruminant animals are predacious." The syllogism will thus appear in the form to which the dictum applies.

It is not every argument, indeed, that can be reduced to this form by so short and simple an alteration as in the case before us: a longer and more complex process will often be required; and rules will hereafter be laid down to facilitate this process in certain cases: but there is no sound argument but what *can* be reduced into this form, without at all departing from the real meaning and drift of it: and the form will be found (though more prolix than is needed for ordinary use) the most perspicuous in which an argument can be exhibited.

All reasoning whatever, then, rests on the one simple principle laid down by Aristotle; that, "what is predicated, either affirmatively or negatively, of a term distributed, may be predicated, in like manner, (i. e. affirmatively or negatively) of any thing contained under that term." So that when our object is to prove any proposition, i. e. to shew that one term may rightly be affirmed or denied of another, the process which really takes place in our minds is, that we refer that term (of which the other is to be thus predicated,) to some class, (i. e. middle term) of which that other may be affirmed, or denied, as the case may be. Whatever the subject matter of an argument may be, the Reasoning itself, considered by itself, is in every case the same process; and if the writers against Logic had kept this in mind, they would have been cautious of expressing their contempt of what they call "syllogistic Reasoning," which is in truth *all* Reasoning; and instead of ridiculing Aristotle's principle for its obviousness and simplicity, would have perceived that these are in fact its highest praise: the easiest, shortest, and most evident theory, provided it answer the purpose of explanation, being ever the best.

If we conceive an inquirer to have reached, in his investigation of the theory of Reasoning, the point to which we have now arrived, a question which would be likely next to engage his attention, is, that of predication; i. e. since in Reasoning we are to find a middle term, which may be predicated affirmatively of the subject in question, we are led to inquire what terms may be affirmed, and what denied, of what others.

It is evident that proper names, or any other terms, which denote each but a single individual, as "Cæsar," "the Thames," "the Conqueror of Pompey," "this river," (hence called in Logic, "singular terms") cannot be affirmed of any thing besides themselves, and are therefore to be denied of any thing else; we may say, "this river is the Thames," or "Cæsar was the conqueror of Pompey;" but we cannot say of any thing else that it is the Thames.

On the other hand, those terms which are called "common," as denoting any one individual of a whole class, as "river," "conqueror," may of course be affirmed of any, or all that belong to that class; as, "the Thames is a river;" "the Rhine and the Danube are rivers."

Common terms, therefore, are called "predicables," (viz. affirmatively predicable,) from their capability of being affirmed of others: a singular term on the contrary may be subject of a proposition, but never the predicate, unless it be of a negative proposition; (as, e. g. the first-born of Isaac was not Jacob;) or, unless the subject and predicate be only two expressions for the same individual object, as in some of the above instances.

The process by which the mind arrives at the notions expressed by these "common" (or in popular language, "general") terms, is properly called generalization; though it is usually (and truly) said to be the business of *abstraction*; for generalization is one of the purposes to which abstraction is applied: when we *draw off*, and *contemplate separately*, any part of an object presented to the mind, disregarding the rest of it, we are said to *abstract* that part. Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eyes or mind, make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought of the colour, form, &c.; and thus, though it were the only rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of abstraction; but if, in contemplating several objects, and finding that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of agreement, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement, i. e. a common name, (as "rose,") we are then said to generalize. Abstraction, therefore, does not necessarily imply generalization, though generalization implies abstraction

Much needless difficulty has been raised respecting the results of this process; many having contended, and perhaps more having taken for granted, that there must be some really existing *thing*, corresponding to each of these general or common terms, and of which such term is the name, standing for and representing it: e. g. that as there is a really existing being corresponding to the proper name Ætna, and signifying it, so the common term "mountain," must have some one really existing thing corresponding to it, and of course *distinct* from each individual mountain, (since the term is not singular, but common,) yet existing *in* each, since the term is applicable to each of them. "When many different men," it is said, "are at the same time thinking or speaking about a mountain, i. e. not any particular one, but a mountain generally, their minds must be all employed on *something*; which must also be *one* thing, and not several, and yet cannot be any one individual:" and hence a vast train of mystical disquisitions about ideas, &c. has arisen, which are at best nugatory, and tend to obscure our view of the process which actually takes place in the mind.

The fact is, the notion expressed by a common term is merely an inadequate (or incomplete) notion of an individual; and from the very circumstance of its inadequacy, it will apply equally well to any one of several individuals: e. g. if I omit the mention and the consideration of every circumstance which

distinguishes Ætna from any other mountain, I then form a notion (expressed by the common term mountain) which inadequately designates Ætna, and is equally applicable to any one of several other individuals.

Generalization, it is plain, may be indefinitely extended by a further abstraction applied to common terms: e. g. as by abstraction from the term Socrates we obtain the common term philosopher; so from "philosopher," by a similar process, we arrive at the more general term "man;" from "man" to "animal," &c.

The employment of this faculty at pleasure has been regarded, and perhaps with good reason, as the characteristic distinction of the human mind from that of the brutes. We are thus enabled, not only to separate, and consider singly, one part of an object presented to the mind, but also to fix arbitrarily upon whatever part we please, according as may suit the purpose we happen to have in view: e.g. any individual person to whom we may direct our attention, may be considered either in a political point of view, and accordingly referred to the class of merchant, farmer, lawyer, &c. as the case may be; or physiologically, as negro, or white man; or theologically, as Pagan or Christian, Papist or Protestant; or geographically, as European, American, &c. &c. And so, in respect of anything else that may be the subject of our Reasoning: we arbitrarily fix upon and abstract that point which is essential to the purpose in hand; so that the same object may be referred to various different classes, according to the occasion. Not, of course, that we are allowed to refer anything to a class to which it does *not* really belong; which would be pretending to abstract from it something that was *no* part of it; but that we arbitrarily fix on *any part* of it which we choose to abstract from the rest. It is important to notice this, because men are often disposed to consider each object as really and properly belonging to some one class alone, from their having been accustomed, in the course of their own pursuits, to consider in one point of view only things which may with equal propriety be considered in other points of view also: i. e. referred to various classes, (or predicates.) And this is that which chiefly constitutes what is called narrowness of mind: e. g. a mere Botanist might be astonished at hearing such plants as clover and lucerne included, in the language of a farmer, under the term "grasses," which he has been accustomed to limit to a tribe of plants widely different in all Botanical characteristics; and the mere farmer might be no less surprised to find the troublesome "weed," (as he has been accustomed to call it,) known by the name of couch grass, and which he has been used to class with nettles and thistles, to which it has no *Botanical* affinity, ranked by the Botanist as a species of wheat, (*Triticum Repens.*) And yet neither of these classifications is in itself erroneous or irrational; though it would be absurd in a Botanical treatise to class plants according to their Agricultural use; or in an Agricultural treatise, according to the structure of their flowers.

The utility of these considerations, with a view to the present subject, will be readily estimated, by recurring to the account which has been already given of the process of Reasoning; the analysis of which shews, that it consists in referring the term we are speaking of to some class, viz. a middle term; which term again is referred to or excluded from (as the case may be) another class, viz. the term which we wish to affirm or deny of the subject of the conclusion. So that the quality of our Reasoning in any case must depend on our being able, correctly, clearly, and promptly, to *abstract* from the subject in question that which may furnish a middle term suitable to the occasion.

The imperfect and irregular sketch which has here been attempted, of the Logical System, may suffice (even though some parts of it should not be at once fully understood by those who are entirely strangers to the study) to point out the general drift and purpose of the Science, and to render the details of it both more interesting and more intelligible. The analytical form, which has here been adopted, is, generally speaking, the best suited for *introducing* any science in the plainest and most interesting form; though the synthetical, which will henceforth be employed, is the most regular and the most compendious form for storing it up in the memory.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND AND OF TERMS.

THERE are three operations of the mind which are concerned in argument: 1st. Simple Apprehension; 2d. Judgment; 3d. Discourse or Reasoning. 1st. Simple apprehension is the notion (or conception) of any object in the mind, analogous to the perception of the senses. It is either incomplex or complex: incomplex apprehension is of one object, or of several without any *relation* being perceived between them, as of "a man," "a horse," "cards:" complex is of several *with* such a relation, as of "a man on horseback," "a pack of cards."

2d. Judgment is the comparing together in the mind two of the notions, (or ideas) whether complex or incomplex, which are the objects of apprehension, and pronouncing that they *agree* or *disagree* with each other; (or that one of them *belongs* or does not belong to the other.) Judgment therefore is either *affirmative* or *negative*.

3d. Reasoning (or discourse) is the act of proceeding from one judgment, to another *founded* upon it, (or the result of it.)

§ 2. Language affords the *signs* by which these operations of the mind are expressed and communicated. An act of *Apprehension* expressed in language, is called a *Term*; an act of *Judgment*, a *Proposition*; an act of *Reasoning*, an *Argument* or Syllogism; as e.g.

"Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial;
Afflictions are dispensations of Providence,
Therefore they are beneficial:" is a Syllogism;

(the act of Reasoning being indicated by the word "*therefore*,") it consists of three *Propositions*, each of which has (necessarily) two *Terms*, as "beneficial," "dispensations of Providence," &c.

Language is employed for various purposes, e. g. the province of an historian is to *convey information*; of an orator, to *persuade*, &c. Logic is concerned with it only when employed for the purpose of *Reasoning*, (i. e. in order to *convince*;) and whereas, in reasoning, *Terms* are liable to be *indistinct*, (i. e. without any clear determinate meaning,) *Propositions*, to be *false*, and *Arguments*, *inconclusive*, Logic undertakes directly and completely to guard against *this last* defect, and incidentally and in a certain degree against the others, as far as can be done by the *proper use of language*: it is, therefore, (when regarded as an *art**) "the art of employing language properly for the purpose of Reasoning." Its importance no one can rightly estimate who has not long and attentively considered how much our thoughts are influenced by words, and how much error, perplexity, and labour, are occasioned by a faulty use of language.

A Syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable into three Propositions, and each Proposition containing two Terms; of these Terms, that which is spoken of, is called the *Subject*; that which is said of it, the *Predicate*; and these two together are called the *Terms*, (or extremes,) because, logically, the subject is placed *first*, and the predicate *last*: and, in the middle, the Copula, which indicates the act of Judgment, as by it, the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the Subject. It must be either IS or IS NOT; the substantive verb being the only *verb* recognised by Logic: all others are resolvable, by means of the verb, "to be," and a participle or adjective; e. g. "the Romans conquered:" the word "conquered" is both Copula and Predicate, being equivalent to "*were* (Cop.) *victorious*" (Pred.)†

§ 3. IT is evident that a Term may consist either of one word or of several; and that it is not every word that is capable of being employed by itself as a Term; e. g. adverbs, prepositions, &c. and also nouns in any other case besides the nominative. A noun may be by itself a Term; a verb (all except the substantive verb used as the Copula,) is resolvable into the Copula and Predicate, to which it is equivalent, and indeed is often so resolved in the mere rendering out of one language into another; as "*ipse adest*," he is present. It is to be observed, however, that under "verb," we do not include the infinitive, which is properly a noun substantive, nor the participle, which is a noun adjective. They are *verbals*, being related to their respective verbs in respect of *the things they signify*; but not *verbs*, inasmuch as they differ entirely in their *mode of signification*. It is worth observing, that an infinitive (though it often comes last in the sentence) is *never the Predicate*, except when another infinitive is the Subject. It is to be observed, also, that in English there are two infinitives, one, in "*ing*," the same in sound and spelling as the participle present, from which, however, it should be carefully distinguished; e. g. "rising early is healthful," and "it is healthful to rise early," are equivalent.

An adjective (including participles) cannot, by itself, be made the Subject of a Proposition; but is often employed as a Predicate; as "Crassus was rich;" though some choose to consider some substantives as understood in every such case, (e. g. rich man) and consequently do not reckon adjectives among simple Terms; i. e. words which are capable, simply, of being employed as Terms. This, however, is a question of no practical consequence.

Of simple Terms, then, (which are what the first part of Logic treats of) there are many divisions;* of which, however, one will be sufficient for the present purpose; viz. into *singular* and *common*; because, though any Term whatever may be a *Subject*, none but a *common* Term can be affirmatively *predicated* of *several* others. A singular Term stands for *one individual*, as "Cæsar," "the Thames;" (these, it is plain, cannot be said [or predicated] *affirmatively*, of any thing but themselves.) A common Term stands for several individuals: i. e. can be *applied* to any of them, as comprehending them in its *single signification*; as "man," "river," "great." The notions expressed by these common Terms, we are enabled to form, by the faculty of *abstraction*: for by it, in contemplating any object (or objects,) we can attend exclusively to some particular circumstances belonging to it, [some certain parts of its nature as it were] and quite withhold our attention from the rest. When, therefore, we are thus contemplating several individuals which *resemble* each other in some *part* of their nature, we can (by attending to *that part alone*, and not to those points in which they differ) assign them *one common name*, which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all *agree*; and which of course will be applicable to all or any of them; (which process is called *generalization*,) and each of these names is called a *common* Term, from its belonging to them *all alike*; or a *Predicable*, because it may be predicated affirmatively of them, or of any one of them.

Generalization (as has been remarked) implies abstraction, but it is not the same thing; for there may be abstraction without generalization: when we are speaking of an individual, it is usually an abstract notion that we form; e. g. suppose we are speaking of the present King of France; he must actually be

* It is to be observed, however, that as a *science* is conversant about *knowledge only*, an *art* is the *application* of knowledge to *practice*; hence Logic (as well as any other system of knowledge) becomes, when applied to practice, an *art*; while confined to the *theory* of Reasoning, it is strictly a *science*: and it is as such that it occupies the higher place in point of dignity, since it professes to develope some of the most interesting and curious intellectual phenomena.

† It is proper to observe, that the Copula, as such, has no relation to *time*; but expresses merely the agreement or disagreement of two given terms: hence, if any other *tense* of the substantive verb, besides the present, is used, it is either to be understood as the same in sense, (the difference of tense being regarded as a matter of grammatical convenience only;) or else, if the circumstance of time really do *modify the sense* of the whole proposition, so as to make the use of that tense an essential, then this circumstance is to be regarded as a part of one of the terms: "*at that time*," or some such expression, being understood. Sometimes the substantive verb is both Copula and Predicate; i. e. where existence only is predicated: e. g. *Deus est*.

* The usual divisions of words into univocal, equivocal, and analogous, and into words of the first and second intention, however, are not, strictly speaking, divisions of *words*, but divisions of the *manner of employing* them. the *same* word may be employed either univocally, equivocally, or analogously; either in the first intention or in the second.

either at Paris or elsewhere; sitting, standing, or in some other posture; and in such and such a dress, &c. Yet many of these circumstances, (which are *separable* accidents, (vide § 7.) and consequently) which are regarded as *non-essential to the individual,* are quite disregarded by us; and we *abstract* from them what we consider as essential; thus forming an *abstract* notion of the individual. Yet there is here no generalization.

§ 4. Whatever Term can be affirmed of several things, must express either their *whole essence,* which is called the *Species;* or a *part* of their essence, (viz. either the material part, which is called the *Genus,* or the *formal* and *distinguishing part,* which is called *Differentia,*) or in common discourse, *characteristic,* or something *joined to the essence,* whether *necessarily,* which is called a *property,* or *contingently,* which is an *accident.*

Every Predicable expresses either



It is evident from what has been said, that the Genus and Difference put together make up the Species: e. g. "rational" and "animal" constitute "man;" so that, *in reality,* the Species contains the Genus (i. e. implies it;) and when the Genus is called a *whole,* and is said to *contain* the Species, this is only a *metaphorical* expression, signifying that it *comprehends* the Species, in its own more *extensive* signification: e. g. if I predicate of Cæsar that he is an *animal,* I say the truth indeed, but not the *whole* truth; for he is *not only* an animal, but a man; so that "man" is a more *full and complete* expression than "animal;" which for the same reason is more *extensive,* as it contains, (or rather comprehends) and may be predicated of, several other Species, i. e. "beast," "bird," &c. In the same manner the name of a *Species* is a more *extensive,* but less *full and complete* term than that of an *individual,* (viz. a singular term;) since the Species may be predicated of each of these. [Note, that Genus and Species are commonly said to be *predicated in quid,* (τι) (i. e. to answer to the question "what?" as, "what is Cæsar?" Answer, "a man:" "what is a man?" Answer, "an animal.") Difference, in "*quale quid;*" (ποιον τι) Property and Accident in *quale* (ποιον).]

§ 5. A *Genus, which is also a Species,* is called a *subaltern* Genus or Species; as "bird," which is the Genus of "pigeon, (i. e. of which "pigeon" is a Species) is itself a *Species* of "animal." A Genus which is *not* considered as a *Species* of anything, is called *summum* (the highest) Genus; a Species which is *not* considered as a *Genus* of any thing, i. e. is regarded as containing under it only *individuals,* is called *infima* (the lowest) Species.

When I say of a magnet, that it is "a kind of *iron ore,*" that is called its *proximum* Genus, because it is the closest (or lowest) Genus that can be predicated of it: "mineral" is its more *remote* Genus.

When I say that the *Differentia* of a magnet is its "*attracting iron,*" and that its *Property* is "*polarity,*" these are called respectively a specific Difference and Property; because magnet is an *infima Species,* (i. e. *only* a Species.)

When I say that the *Differentia* of iron ore is its "*containing iron,*" and its Property "*being attracted by the magnet,*" these are called respectively, a *generic* Difference and Property, because iron ore is a *subaltern* Species or Genus, being both the *Genus* of *magnet,* and a *Species* of *mineral.*

That is the most strictly called a Property, which belongs to the *whole* of a Species, and to that Species *alone;* as polarity to the magnet. [And such a *property,* it is often hard to distinguish from the *Differentia;* but whatever you *consider* as the most *essential to the nature* of a Species with respect to the matter you are engaged in, you must call the *Differentia;* as "rationality" to "man;" and whatever you consider as rather an *accompaniment* (or result) of that Difference, you must call the *Property;* as the "use of speech" seems to be a result of rationality.] But very many Properties which belong to the *whole* of a Species are not peculiar to it; as, "to breathe air" belongs to every *man,* but not to man alone; and it is, therefore, strictly speaking, not so much a Property of the Species "man," as of the higher, i. e. more comprehensive, Species, which is the Genus of that, viz. of "land animal." Other Properties, as some Logicians call them, are *peculiar* to a Species, but do not belong to the whole of it: e. g. man *alone* can be a poet, but it is not *every* man that is so. These, however, are more commonly and more properly reckoned as *Accidents.*

For that is most properly called an Accident, which may be absent or present, the essence of the Species continuing the same; as, for a man to be "*walking,*" or a "*native of Paris:*" of these two examples, the former is what Logicians call a *separable* Accident, because it may be separated from the *individual:* (e. g. he may sit down;) the latter is an *inseparable* Accident, being not separable from the individual, (i. e. he who is an individual of Paris can never be otherwise;) "from the individual," I say, because *every Accident* must be separable from the *Species,* else it would be a *Property.*

Let it here be observed, that both the general name "Predicable," and each of the classes of Predicables, (viz. Genus, Species, &c.) are *relative;* i. e. we cannot say *what Predicable* any Term is, or whether it is any at all, unless it be specified *of what* it is to be predicated: e. g. the Term "red" would be considered a *Genus,* in relation to the Terms "pink," "scarlet," &c. it might be regarded as the *Differentia,* in relation to "red rose;"—as a property of "blood;"—as an Accident of "a house," &c.

And universally, it is to be steadily kept in mind, that no "common Terms" have, as the names of individuals have, any *real thing existing in nature* corresponding to them; (τοδε τι, as Aristotle expresses it, though he has been represented as the champion of

the opposite opinion: vide *Categ.* c. 3.) but is merely a name denoting a certain *inadequate notion* which our minds have formed of an individual, and which, consequently, not including any thing wherein that individual differs from certain others, is applicable equally well to all or any of them: thus "man" denotes no real thing (as the sect of the Realists maintained,) distinct from each individual, but merely, *any* man, viewed *inadequately*, i. e. so as to omit and abstract from all that is peculiar to each individual; by which means the Term becomes applicable alike to any one of several individuals, or (in the plural) to several together; and we arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we thus choose to abstract and consider separately, disregarding all the rest; so that the same individual may thus be referred to any of several different Species, and the same Species to several Genera, as suits our purpose. Thus it suits the farmer's purpose to class his cattle with his ploughs, carts, and other possessions, under the name of "*stock*:" the naturalist, suitably to *his* purpose, classes them as "*quadrupeds*," which Term would include wolves, deer, &c., which to the farmer would be a most improper classification: the commissary, again, would class them with corn, cheese, fish, &c. as "*provision*." That which is most essential in one view, being subordinate in another.

§ 6. An *individual* is so called because it is incapable of *logical Division*; which is a metaphorical expression to signify "the distinct (i. e. separate) enumeration of several things signified by one common name." This operation is directly opposite to *generalization*, (which is performed by means of abstraction;) for as in that, you *lay aside* the *difference* by which several things are distinguished, so as to call them all by one *common name*, so, in Division, you *add on* the differences, so as to enumerate them by their *several particular* names. Thus, "mineral" is said to be divided into "stones, metals," &c.; and metals again into "gold, iron," &c. and these are called the parts (or members) of the Division.

The rules for Division are three: 1st. each of the parts, or any of them short of *all*, must *contain less* (i. e. have a narrower signification) than the thing divided. 2d. All the parts together must be exactly equal to the thing divided; (therefore we must be careful to ascertain that the *summum Genus* may be predicated of *every* Term placed under it, and of nothing else.) 3d. The parts or members must be *opposed*; i. e. must not be contained in one another: e. g. if you were to divide "book" into "poetical, historical, folio, quarto, French, Latin," &c. the members would be contained in each other; for a French book may be a quarto, and a quarto, French, &c. You must be careful, therefore, to keep in mind the *principle of Division* with which you set out: e. g. whether you begin dividing books according to their *matter*, their *language*, or their *size*, &c. these being also so many *cross Divisions*. And when any thing is capable (as in the above instance) of being divided in several different ways, we are not to reckon one of these as the true, or real, or right one, without specifying what the object is which we have in view: for one mode of dividing may be the most suitable for one purpose, and another, for another; as e. g. one of the above modes of dividing books would be the most suitable to a bookbinder; another in a philosophical, and the other in a philological view.

It must be carefully remembered, that the word "Division," as employed in Logic, is, as has been observed already, *metaphorical*; for to divide, means originally and properly to separate the component parts of any thing, each of which is of course absolutely less than the whole: e. g. a tree (i. e. *any individual tree*) might be divided "physically," as it is called, into root, trunk, branches, leaves, &c. Now it cannot be said that a root or a leaf is a tree: whereas in a logical Division each of the members is, in reality, *more* than the whole: e. g. if you divide tree (i. e. *the Genus, tree*) into oak, ash, elm, &c. we may say of the oak, or of any individual oak, that "it is a tree;" for by the very word "oak," we express not only the general notion of a tree, but *more*, viz. the peculiar characteristic (i. e. difference) of that kind of tree.

It is plain, then, that it is *logically* only, i. e. in our mode of speaking, that a Genus is said to contain (or rather, *comprehend*) its Species; while metaphysically, i. e. in our conceptions, a Species contains, i. e. *implies*, its Genus.

Care must be taken not to confound a *physical* Division with a *Logical*, against which a caution is given under R. 1.

§ 7. *Definition* is another metaphorical word, which literally signifies, "laying down a boundary;" and is used in Logic to signify an expression which explains any term, so as to *separate* it from every thing else, as a boundary separates fields. A nominal Definition (such as are those usually found in a *dictionary* of one's own language) explains only the *meaning of the term*, by giving some equivalent expression, which may happen to be better known. Thus you might define a "Term," that which forms one of the *extremes* or *boundaries* of a "Proposition;" and a "Predicable," that which may be predicated; "decalogue," "ten commandments;" "telescope," an instrument for viewing distant objects, &c. A real *Definition* is one which explains and unfolds the *nature of the thing*; and each of these kinds of Definition is either *accidental* or *essential*. An *essential* Definition assigns (or lays down) the *constituent parts of the essence*, (or nature.) An *accidental* Definition (which is commonly called a *Description*) assigns the circumstances *belonging* to the essence, viz. Properties and Accidents, (e. g. causes, effects, &c.) thus, "man" may be *described* as "an animal that uses fire to dress his food," &c. [And here note, that in *describing a Species*, you cannot mention any thing which is strictly an *Accident*, because if it does not belong to the *whole* of the Species, it cannot define it: in describing an *individual*, on the contrary, you enumerate the *Accidents*, because by them it is that one individual differs from another, and in this case you add *the Species*: e. g. "Philip was a *man* of Macedon, who subdued Greece," &c. Individuals, it is evident, can be defined in this way alone.]

Lastly, the essential Definition is divided into *physical* (i. e. natural) and *Logical* or *Metaphysical*: the *physical* Definition lays down the *real parts of the essence* which are actually separable; the *logical*, lays down the *ideal* parts of it, which cannot be separated except in *the mind*: thus, a plant would be defined *physically*, by enumerating the leaves, stalks, roots,

&c. of which it is composed: *logically*, it would be defined an organized being, destitute of sensation; the former of these expressions expressing the Genus, the latter, the Difference: for a *logical Definition* must always consist of the *Genus* and *Differentia*, which are the parts of which Logic considers every thing as consisting, and which evidently are separable in the *mind alone*. Thus "man" is defined "a rational animal," &c. So also a "Proposition" might be defined, physically, a Subject and Predicate combined by a Copula: the parts here enumerated being actually separable; but logically it would be defined "a sentence which affirms or denies;" and these two parts of the essence of a Proposition (which are the *Genus* and *Differentia* of it) can be separated in the mind only. And note, that the difference is not always *one* quality, but is frequently *compounded* of several together, no one of which would alone suffice.

Definitions are divided into nominal and real, according to the *object accomplished* by them; whether to explain, merely, the meaning of the word, or the nature of the thing: they were divided into accidental, physical, and logical, according to the *means employed* by each for accomplishing their respective objects, whether it be the enumeration of attributes, or of the physical or the metaphysical parts of the essence. These, therefore, are evidently two cross divisions. In this place we are concerned with nominal Definitions only, (except, indeed, of logical Terms,) because all that is requisite for the purposes of *Reasoning* (which is the proper province of Logic,) is, that a Term shall not be used in *different senses*: a real Definition of any thing belongs to the science or system which is employed about that thing. It is to be noted, that in Mathematics the nominal and real Definition exactly coincide; the *meaning of the word*, and the *nature of the thing*, being exactly *the same*. This holds good also with respect to logical Terms, most legal, and many ethical terms.

It is scarcely credible how much confusion has arisen from the ignorance of these distinctions which has prevailed among logical writers.

The principal rules for Definition are three; viz. 1st. The Definition must be *adequate*; i. e. neither too extensive nor too narrow for the thing defined: e. g. to define "fish," "an animal that lives in the water," would be too *extensive*, because many insects, &c. live in the water; to define it, "an animal that has an air-bladder," would be too *narrow*; because many fish are without any.

2d. The Definition must be in itself plainer than the thing defined, else it would not *explain it*: I say, "in itself," (i. e. generally) because, to some particular person, the term defined may happen to be even more familiar and better understood, than the terms of the definition.

3d. It must be couched in a *convenient number* of *appropriate* words, (if such can be found suitable for the purpose:) for *figurative* words (which are opposed to appropriate) are apt to produce ambiguity or indistinctness: too great *brevity* may occasion *obscurity*; and too great *prolixity*, *confusion*.

CHAPTER II.

OF PROPOSITIONS.

§ 1. The second part of Logic treats of the *Proposition*; which is, "*Judgment expressed in words.*"

A proposition is defined logically "*a sentence indicative*," i. e. affirming or denying; (this excludes *commands* and *questions*.) "Sentence" being the *Genus*, and "indicative" the *Difference*, this definition expresses the whole essence; and it relates entirely to the *words* of a Proposition. With regard to the *matter*, its Property is to be *true* or *false*, and therefore it must not be *ambiguous*, (for that which has more than one *meaning*, is in reality *several* Propositions;) nor *imperfect*, nor *ungrammatical*, for such an expression has no meaning at all.

Since the *Substance* (i. e. *Genus*, or material part) of a Proposition is, that it is a *sentence*; and since every *sentence* (whether it be a *Proposition* or not) may be expressed either *absolutely*, (as "Cæsar deserved death;" "did Cæsar deserve death?") or under an *hypothesis*, (as, "if Cæsar was a tyrant, what did he deserve?" "Was Cæsar a hero or a villain?" "If Cæsar was a tyrant, he deserved death;" "he was either a hero or a villain,") on this we found the division of Propositions according to their *substance*; viz. into *categorical* and *hypothetical*. And as Genus is said to be *predicated in quid* (what,) it is by the members of this division that we answer the question, *what* is this Proposition? *(quæ est propositio.)* Answer, categorical or hypothetical.

Categorical Propositions are subdivided into *pure*, which asserts *simply* or *purely*, that the Subject does or does not agree with the predicate, and modal, which expresses in what *mode* (or manner) it agrees; e. g. "an intemperate man will be sickly;" "Brutus killed Cæsar;" are *pure*. "An intemperate man will *probably* be sickly;" "Brutus killed Cæsar *justly*;" are *modal* At present we speak only of *pure categorical* Propositions.

It being the *Differentia* of a *Proposition*, that it *affirms or denies*, and its *Property* to be *true or false*; and Differentia being predicated in *quale quid*; Property in *quale*, we hence form another division of Propositions, viz. according to their *quality*, into *affirmative*, and *negative*, (which is the *quality of the expression*, and therefore (in Logic) essential;) and into true and false, (which is the quality of the *matter*, and therefore *accidental*.) An affirmative Proposition is one whose *Copula* is affirmative, as "birds fly;" "not to advance is to go back;" a negative proposition is one whose *Copula* is negative, as "man is not perfect;" no "miser is happy."

Another division of Propositions is according to their *quantity*, (or extent;) if the Predicate is said of the *whole* of the Subject, the Proposition is *universal*: if of a *part* of it only, the Proposition is *particular*, (or partial;) e. g. "England is an island;" "all tyrants are miserable;" "no miser is rich;" are *universal* Propo-

sitions, and their Subjects are therefore said to be *distributed*, being understood to stand, each, for *the whole* of its significates: but, "*some* islands are fertile;" "all tyrants are not assassinated;" are *particular*, and their Subjects, consequently not *distributed*, being taken to stand for a part only of their significates.

As every Proposition must be either *affirmative* or *negative*, and must also be either *universal* or *particular*, we reckon in all, four kinds of pure categorical Propositions, (i. e. considered as to their quantity and quality *both*;) viz. universal affirmative, whose symbol (used for brevity,) is *A*; universal negative, *E*; particular affirmative, *I*; particular negative, O.

§ 2. When the subject of a Proposition is a common Term, the *universal signs* ("all, no, every,") are used to indicate that it is distributed, (and the Proposition consequently is universal;) the *particular signs*, ("some, &c.") the contrary; should there be *no sign* at all to the common Term, the quantity of the Proposition (which is called an *indefinite* Proposition) is ascertained by the *matter*; i. e. the nature of the connection between the extremes; which is either necessary, impossible, or contingent. In necessary and in impossible matter, an indefinite is *understood as a universal*: e. g. "birds have wings;" i. e. *all*: "birds are not quadrupeds;" i. e. *none*: in contingent matter, (i. e. where the terms partly (i. e. sometimes) agree, and partly not,) an indefinite is understood as a particular; e. g. "food is necessary to life;" "birds sing;" i. e. *some* do; "birds are not carnivorous;" i. e. "*some* are not," or, "all are not."

As for *singular* Propositions, (viz. those whose Subject is either a *proper name*, or a common Term with a *singular* sign,) they are reckoned as universals, (see ch. iv. § 2.) because in them we speak of the *whole* of the subject; e. g. when we say, "Brutus was a Roman," we mean, the *whole* of Brutus: this is the general rule; but some singular Propositions may fairly be reckoned *particular*; i. e. when some qualifying word is inserted, which indicates that you are not speaking of the *whole* of the subject; e. g. "Cæsar was not *wholly* a tyrant;" "this man is *occasionally* intemperate;" "*non omnis moriar*." It is evident that the *Subject* is *distributed* in every universal Proposition, and never in a *particular*; (that being the very difference between universal and particular Propositions;) but the distribution or non-distribution of the *Predicate*, depends (not on the *quantity*, but) on the *quality*, of the Proposition; for, if any *part of the Predicate* agrees with the Subject, it must be *affirmed* and not *denied* of the Subject; therefore, for an affirmative Proposition to be true, it is *sufficient* that some *part of the Predicate* agree with the Subject; and (for the same reason) for a negative to be true, it is necessary that the *whole* of the Predicate should *disagree* with the Subject: e. g. it is true that "learning is useful," though the whole of the Term "useful" does not agree with the Term "learning," (for many things are useful besides learning,) but "no vice is useful," would be false, if any part of the Term "useful" agreed with the Term "vice;" (i. e. if you could find any one useful thing which was a vice.) The two practical rules then to be observed respecting distribution, are,

1st. All universal Propositions (and no particular) distribute the *Subject*.

2d. All *negative*, (and no affirmative) the Predicate.

It *may happen* indeed, that the whole of the Predicate in an affirmative may agree with the Subject; e. g. it is equally true, that "all men are rational animals;" and "all rational animals are men:" but this is merely *accidental*, and is not at all *implied* in the *form of expression*, which alone is regarded in Logic.

Of Opposition.

§ 3. Two Propositions are said to be opposed to each other, when having the same Subject and Predicate; they differ in *quantity*, or *quality*, or *both*. It is evident, that with any given Subject and Predicate, you may state four distinct Propositions, viz. A, E, I, and O; and any two of these are said to be *opposed*; hence there are four different kinds of opposition, viz. 1st. the two universals (A and E) are called *contraries* to each other; 2d. the two particular, (I and O,) *subcontraries*; 3d. A and I, or E and O, *subalterns*; 4th. A and O, or E and I, *contradictories*. As it is evident that the truth or falsity of any Proposition (its quantity and quality being known,) must depend on the *matter* of it, we must bear in mind that, "*in necessary matter all affirmatives are true and negatives false; in impossible matter, vice versâ; in contingent matter, all universals false, and particulars true;*" (e. g. "*all* islands, (or, *some* islands,) are surrounded by water," must be true, because the *matter is necessary*: to say, "*no* islands, or some —*not*, &c." would have been false; again, "*some* islands are fertile; "*some* are not fertile," are both true, because it is contingent matter: put "*all*" or "no" instead of "*some*," and the propositions will be false.) Hence it will be evident, that contraries will be *both false* in contingent matter, but never *both true*: subcontraries, *both true* in contingent matter, but never *both false*: contradictories, always *one true* and *the other false*, &c. with other observations, which will be immediately made on viewing the scheme? in which the four Propositions are denoted by their symbols; the different kinds of *matter*, by the initials n, i, c, and the *truth* or *falsity* of each Proposition in each matter, by the letter v. for (*verum*) true, f. for (*falsum*) false.



By a careful study of this scheme, bearing in mind, and applying the above rule concerning matter, the learner will easily elicit all the maxims relating

to Opposition; as that, in the subalterns, the truth of the particular (which is called the *subalternate*) follows from the truth of the universal *(subalternans)* and the falsity of the universal from the falsity of the particular: that subalterns differ in *quantity alone;* contraries, and also subcontraries in *quality alone;* contradictories, in both: and hence, that if any Proposition is known to be true, we infer that its contradictory is false; if false, its contradictory true, &c.

Of Conversion.

§ 4. A Proposition is said to be *converted* when its Terms are *transposed:* when nothing more is done, this is called *simple* Conversion. No Conversion is of any use, unless it be *illative;* i. e. *when the truth of the converse follows from* the truth of the exposita, (or proposition given;) e. g.

"No virtuous man is a rebel, *therefore*
No rebel is a virtuous man."

"Some boasters are cowards, *therefore*
Some cowards are boasters."

Conversion can then only be illative when *no Term is distributed in the converse, which was not distributed in the exposita:* (for if that be done, you will employ a Term *universally* in the converse, which was only used *partially* in the exposita.) Hence, as E distributes both Terms, and I neither, these Propositions may be illatively converted in the simple manner; (vid. Rule 2.) But as A does not distribute the Predicate, its simple Conversion would not be illative; (e. g. from "all birds are animals," you cannot infer that "all animals are birds,") as there would be a Term distributed in the converse, which was not before. We must therefore *limit its quantity* from universal to particular, and the Conversion will be illative: (e. g. "some animals are birds;") this might be fairly named Conversion by *limitation;* but is commonly called "*Conversion per accidens.*" E may thus be converted also. But in O, whether the quantity be changed or not, there will still be a Term (the Predicate of the converse) distributed, which was not before: you can therefore only convert it by changing the quality; i. e. considering the negative as attached to the *Predicate instead of to the Copula,* and thus regarding it as I. One of the Terms will then not be the same as before; but the Proposition will be æquipollent; (i. e. convey the same meaning,) e. g. "some members of the University are not learned:" you may consider "*not learned*" as the Predicate, instead of "*learned;*" the Proposition will then be I, and of course may be simply converted, "some who are not learned are members of the University." This may be named Conversion by negation; or as it is commonly called, by contra-position. A may also be fairly converted in this way, e. g.

"Every poet is a man of genius; *therefore*
He who is not a man of genius, is not a poet:"
(or, "None but a man of genius can be a poet.")

For (since it is the same thing, to *affirm* some Attribute of the Subject, or to *deny* the *absence* of that Attribute,) the original Proposition is precisely æquipollent to this,

subj. pred.
"No poet is not a man of genius;"

which, being E, may of course be simply converted. Thus, in one of these three ways, every Proposition may be illatively converted: viz. "*E, I, simply; A, O, by negation;* A, E, limitation." Note, that as it was remarked, that in some affirmatives, the whole of the Predicate does actually agree with the Subject; so, when this is the case, A may be illatively converted, simply; but this is an accidental circumstance. In a *just definition,* this is always the case; for there the Terms being *exactly equivalent,* (or, as they are called, *convertible Terms)* it is no matter which is made the Subject, and which the Predicate, e. g. "a good government is that which has the happiness of the governed for its object;" if this be a *right definition,* it will follow that "a government which has the happiness of the governed for its object, is a good one." Most Propositions in Mathematics are of this description: e. g.

"All equilateral triangles are equiangular;" and
"All equiangular triangles are equilateral."

CHAPTER III.

OF ARGUMENTS.

§ 1. The third operation of the mind, viz. *Reasoning* (or discourse) expressed in words, is *Argument;* and an Argument stated *at full length,* and in its *regular form* is called a *Syllogism:* the third part of Logic therefore treats of the *Syllogism.* Every Argument consists of two parts; that which *is to be proved;* and that *by means of which* it is proved: the former is called *before* it is proved the *Question;* *when proved,* the *Conclusion,* (or *inference;*) that which is used to prove it, if stated *last,* (as is often done in *common discourse,)* is called the *Reason,* and is introduced by "*because,*" or some other casual conjunction; (e. g. "Cæsar deserved death, *because* he was a tyrant, and all tyrants deserve death.") If the Conclusion be stated *last,* (which is the strict *logical form,* to which all Reasoning may be reduced,) then that which is employed to prove it is called the *Premises;* and the Conclusion is then introduced by some *illative* conjunction, as "therefore" e. g.

"All tyrants deserve death;
Cæsar was a tyrant;
therefore he deserved death."

Since then an Argument is an expression in which "*from something laid down and granted as true, (i. e. the Premises) something else, (i. e. the Conclusion) beyond this, must be admitted to be true, as following necessarily, (or resulting) from the other;*" and since Logic is

wholly concerned in the use of language, it follows that a Syllogism (which is an Argument stated in a regular logical form,) must be "an Argument so expressed, that the conclusiveness of it is manifest from *the mere force of the expression*," i. e. without considering the *meaning of the Terms:* e. g. in this syllogism, "B is A, C is B, therefore C is A:" the Conclusion is inevitable, whatever Terms A, B, and C, respectively, are understood to stand for. And to this form, all legitimate Arguments may ultimately be brought.

§ 2. The rule or axiom, (commonly called "*dictum de omni et nullo*,") by which Aristotle proves the validity of this Argument is this: "*whatever is predicated of a Term distributed, whether affirmatively or negatively, may be predicated in like manner, of every thing contained under it.*" Thus, in the examples above, A is predicated of B distributed, and C is *contained under* B, (i. e. is its Subject;) therefore A is predicated of C: so "all tyrants, &c." (p. 208.) This rule may be *ultimately* applied to all Arguments; (and their validity ultimately rests on their conformity thereto;) but it cannot be *directly and immediately* applied to *all*, even of pure *categorical* Syllogisms; for the sake of brevity therefore some other axioms are commonly applied in practice, to avoid the occasional tediousness of reducing all Syllogisms to that form in which Aristotle's *dictum* is applicable.

We will speak first of pure categorical Syllogisms; and the axioms or canons by which their validity is to be proved: viz. first, *if two Terms agree with one and the same third, they agree with each other:* second, *if one Term agrees and another disagrees with one and the same third, these two disagree with each other.* On the former of these canons rests the validity of *affirmative* conclusions; on the latter, of *negative:* for no Syllogism can be faulty which does not violate these canons; none correct which does: hence on these two canons are built the rules or cautions which are to be observed with respect to Syllogisms, for the purpose of ascertaining whether those canons have been strictly observed or not.

1st. *Every Syllogism has three, and only three Terms;* viz. the two Terms (or *extremes*, as they are commonly called) of the Conclusion, (or question;) (whereof first, the *Subject* is called the *minor Term;* second, the *Predicate*, the *major;*) and third, the *middle Term*, with which each of them is separately compared, in order to judge of their agreement or disagreement with each other. If therefore there were *two* middle Terms, the *extremes*, (*or Terms of the Conclusion*) not being both compared to the *same*, could not be compared to each other.

2d. Every syllogism has three, and only three Propositions; viz. first, the *major Premiss*, (in which the major Term is compared with the *middle;*) second, the *minor Premiss*, (in which the minor Term is compared with the *middle;*) and third, the Conclusion, in which the minor Term is compared with the major.

3d. Note, that if the *middle Term is ambiguous, there are in reality two middle Terms, in sense*, though but one in *sound*. An ambiguous middle Term is either an equivocal Term, used in different senses in the two Premises; (e. g.

"*Light* is contrary to darkness;
Feathers are *light;* therefore
Feathers are contrary to darkness.")

Or a Term *not distributed;* for as it is then used to stand for a *part* only of its signification, it may happen that one of the extremes may have been compared with *one part* of it, and the other, with another part of it; e. g.

"White is a colour,
Black is a colour; therefore
Black is white."—Again,
"Some animals are beasts,
Some animals are birds; therefore
Some birds are beasts."

The middle Term therefore must be distributed once, at least, in the Premises; (i. e. by being the Subject of an universal, or Predicate of a negative, Ch. II. § 2. p. 207.) and once is sufficient; since if one extreme has been compared to a *part* of the middle Term, and another to the *whole* of it, they must have been both compared to the *same*.

4th. *No Term must be distributed in the Conclusion which was not distributed in one of the Premises;* for that (it is called an *illicit* process, either of the major or the minor Term) would be to employ the *whole* of a Term in the Conclusion, when you had employed only a *part* of it in the Premiss; and thus, in reality, to introduce a fourth Term; e. g.

"All quadrupeds are animals,
A bird is not a quadruped; therefore
It is not an animal."—Illicit process of the major.

5th. *From negative Premises you can infer nothing.* For in them the middle is pronounced *to disagree with both extremes;* not to *agree with both;* or to agree with one, and *disagree* with the other; therefore they cannot be compared together; e. g.

"A fish is not a quadruped,"
"A bird is not a quadruped," proves nothing.

6th. *If one Premiss be negative, the conclusion must be negative;* for in that Premiss the middle Term is pronounced to disagree with one of the extremes, and in the other Premiss, (which of course is affirmative, by the preceding rule) to agree with the other extreme; therefore the extremes disagreeing with each other, the conclusion is negative. In the same manner it may be shewn, that *to prove a negative conclusion one of the Premises must be a negative.*

By these six rules, all Syllogisms are to be tried; and from them it will be evident; first, that *nothing can be proved from two particular Premises;* (for you will then have *either the middle Term undistributed*, or an *illicit process;* e. g.

"Some animals are sagacious;
Some beasts are not sagacious;
Some beasts are not animals.")

And for the same reason secondly, that if one of the Premises be particular, the Conclusion must be particular; e. g. from

"All who fight bravely deserve reward;
Some soldiers fight bravely;" you can only infer that some soldiers deserve reward.

For to infer a universal Conclusion, would be an illicit process of the minor. But from two universal

Premises you cannot always infer a universal Conclusion; e. g.

> "All gold is precious,
> All gold is a mineral; therefore
> *Some* mineral is precious."

And even when we *can* infer a universal, we are always *at liberty* to infer a particular; since what is predicated of *all* may *of course be* predicated of some.

Of Moods.

§ 3. When we designate the three Propositions of a Syllogism in their order, according to their respective quantity and quality, (i. e. their *symbols*) we are said to determine the *Mood* of the Syllogism; e. g. the example just above, "all gold, &c." is in the Mood A, A, I. As there are four kinds of Propositions, and three Propositions in each Syllogism, all the possible ways of combining these four, (A, E, I, O,) by threes, are sixty-four. For any one of these four may be the major Premiss; each of these four majors may have four different minors, and of these sixteen pairs of Premises, each may have four different Conclusions. $4 \times 4 (=16) \times 4 = 64$. This is a mere arithmetical calculation of the Moods, without any regard to the Logical rules: for many of these Moods are inadmissible in practice, from violating some of those rules; e. g. the Mood E, E, E, must be rejected, as having *negative Premises;* I, O, O, for *particular Premises;* and many others for the same faults. By examination then of all, it will be found that of the sixty-four, there remain but twelve Moods, which can be used in a legitimate Syllogism, viz. A, A, A, A, A, I, A, E, E, A, E, O, A, I, I, A, O, O, E, A, E, E, A, O, E, I, O, I, A, I, I, E, O, O, A, O.

Of Figure.

§ 4. The Figure of a Syllogism consists in the situation of the middle Term with respect to the extremes of the conclusion, (*i. e. the major and minor term.*) When the middle Term is made the *subject of the major Premiss, and the Predicate of the minor,* that is called the first Figure; (which is far the most natural and clear of all, as to this alone, Aristotle's dictum may be *at once* applied.) In the second Figure the middle Term is the Predicate of *both* Premises: in the third, *the Subject* of both: in the fourth, the Predicate of the major Premiss, and the Subject of the minor. (This is the most awkward and unnatural of all, being the very reverse of the first.) Note, that the *proper order* is to place the major Premiss *first,* and the minor *second;* but this does not *constitute* the major and minor Premises; for that Premiss (wherever placed) is the major which *contains the major Term,* and the minor, the minor, (v. R. 2. p. 209.) Each of the allowable Moods mentioned above, will not be allowable in every Figure; since it may violate some of the foregoing rules, in one Figure, though not in another: e. g. I, A, I, is an allowable Mood in the third Figure; but in the first, it would have an *undistributed middle.* So A, E, E, would in the first Figure have an *illicit process of the major,* but is allowable in the second; and A, A, A, which in the first Figure is allowable, would in the third have an *illicit process of the minor:* all which may be ascertained by trying the different Moods in each Figure, as per scheme.

Let A represent the major Term, C the minor, B the middle.

1st Fig.	2d Fig.	3d Fig.	4th Fig.
B, A,	A, B,	B, A,	A, B,
C, B,	C, B,	B, C,	B, C,
C, A,	C, A,	C, A,	C, A.

The Terms alone being here stated, the *quantity and quality* of each Proposition (and consequently the Mood of the whole Syllogism) is left to be filled up: (i. e. between B, and A, I may place either a negative or affirmative Copula; and I may prefix either a *universal* or *particular* sign to B.) By applying the Moods then to each Figure, it will be found that each Figure will admit six Moods only, as not violating the rules against *undistributed middle,* and against *illicit process:* and of the Moods so admitted, several (though valid) are *useless,* as having a particular Conclusion, when a *universal might have* been drawn; e. g. A, A, I, in the first Figure,

> "All human creatures are entitled to liberty;
> All slaves are human creatures; therefore
> *Some* slaves are entitled to liberty."

Of the twenty-four Moods then (six in each Figure) five are for this reason neglected: for the remaining nineteen, Logicians have devised names to distinguish both the Mood itself, and the Figure in which it is found; since when one Mood (i. e. *one in itself,* without regard to Figure) occurs in two different Figures, (as E, A, E, in the first and second) the mere letters denoting the Mood would not inform us concerning the Figure. In these names then, the *three vowels* denote the Propositions of which the Syllogism is composed; the consonants (besides their other uses, of which hereafter) serve to keep in mind the Figure of the Syllogism.

Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArII, fErIOque prioris.

Fig. 2. cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEstInO, bArOkO, secundæ.

Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtIsI, fElAptOn, bOkArdO, fErIsO, habet: quarta insuper addit.

Fig. 4. brAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArIs, fElApo, frEsIsOn.

By a careful study of these mnemonic lines (which must be committed to memory) you will perceive that A can only be proved in the first Figure, in which also every other Proposition may be proved; that the second proves only *negatives;* the third only *particulars,* &c.; with many other such observations, which will readily be made, (on trial of several Syllogisms, in different Moods) and the reasons for which will be found in the foregoing rules. E. G. to shew why the second Figure has only negative Conclusions, we have only to consider, that in it the middle Term being the *Predicate in both Premises,* would not be *distributed* unless one Premiss were *negative;* (v. R. 2. p. 205.) therefore the conclusion must be negative also, by R. 6. p. 209. One Mood in each Figure may suffice in this place by way of example; first, *Barbara,* viz. (bAr.)

Every B is A; (bA) every C is B; therefore (rA) every C is A, e. g. let the major Term (which is represented by A) be "one who possesses all virtue;"

the minor term (C) "every man who possesses one virtue;" and the middle term (B) "every one who possesses prudence;" and you will have the celebrated argument of Aristotle, *Eth.* sixth book, to prove that the virtues are inseparable; viz.

"He who possesses prudence, possesses all virtue;
He who possesses one virtue, must possess prudence; therefore
He who possesses one, possesses all."

Second, *Camestres,* (cAm) every A is B; (Es) no C is B; (trES) no C is A. Let the major term (A) be "true philosophers," the minor (C) "the Epicureans;" the middle (B) "reckoning virtue a good in itself;" and this will be part of the reasoning of Cicero, *Off.* book first and third, against the Epicureans. Third, *Darapti,* viz. (*dA*) every B is A; (*rAp*) every B is C; therefore (*tI.*) Some C is A. e. g.

"Prudence has for its object the benefit of individuals;
But prudence is a virtue; therefore
Some virtue has for its object the benefit of the individual," is part of Adam Smith's reasoning, (*Moral Sentiments,*) against Hutcheson and others, who placed all virtue in benevolence. Fourth, Camenes, viz. (c*Am*) every A is B; (*En,*) no B is C; therefore (Es,) no C is A, e. g.

"Whatever is expedient, is conformable to nature;
Whatever is conformable to nature, is not hurtful to society; therefore
What is hurtful to society is never expedient,"

is part of Cicero's argument in *Off.* third book: but it is an inverted and clumsy way of stating what would much more naturally fall into the first Figure; for if you examine the propositions of a Syllogism in the fourth Figure, *beginning* at the *Conclusion,* you will see that as the major Term is predicated of the minor, so is the minor of the middle, and that again of the major: so that the major appears to be merely *predicated of itself.* Hence the five Moods in this Figure are seldom or never used; some one of the fourteen (*Moods with names*) in the first three Figures, being the forms into which all Arguments may most readily be thrown; but of these, the four in the first Figure are the clearest and most natural; as to them, Aristotle's dictum will *immediately* apply. And as it is on this dictum that all Reasoning *ultimately* depends, so all Arguments may be somehow or other brought into some one of these four Moods; and a Syllogism is, in that case, said to be *reduced:* (i. e. *to the first Figure.*) These four are called the *perfect* Moods, and all the rest, *imperfect.*

Ostensive Reduction.

§ 5. In reducing a Syllogism, we are not of course allowed to introduce any new Term or Proposition, having nothing granted but the truth of the Premises; but these Premises are allowed to be *illatively converted,* (because the truth of any Proposition *implies* that of its illative converse) *or transposed:* by taking advantage of this liberty, where there is need, we deduce in Figure one, from the Premises originally given, either the *very same Conclusion* as the original one, or another from which the *original Conclusion* follows, by illative Conversion; e. g. *Darapti.*

"All wits are dreaded;
All wits are admired;
Some who are admired are dreaded."

Into *Darii,* by converting by limitation (*per accidens*) the minor Premiss.

"All wits are dreaded;
Some who are admired are wits; therefore
Some who are admired are dreaded."

Camestres.

"All true philosophers account virtue a good in itself;
The advocates of pleasure do not account, &c.
Therefore they are not true philosophers."

Reduced to *Celarent,* by simply converting the minor, and then transposing the Premises.

"Those who account virtue a good in itself, are not advocates of pleasure;
All true philosophers account virtue, &c.; therefore
No true philosophers are advocates of pleasure."

This Conclusion may be *illatively converted* into the original one.

Baroko, e. g.

"Every true patriot is a friend to religion;
Some great statesmen are not friends to religion;
Some great statesmen are not true patriots."

To *Ferio,* by converting the major *by negation* (contraposition) vide Ch. II. § 4.

"He who is not a friend to religion, is not a true patriot;
Some great statesmen, &c."

and the rest of the Syllogism remains the same; only that the minor Premiss must be considered as affirmative, because you take "not a friend to religion" as the middle Term. In the same manner *Bokardo* to *Darii;* e. g.

"Some slaves are not discontented;
All slaves are wronged; therefore
Some who are wronged are not discontented."

Convert the major by negation (contraposition) and then transpose them; the Conclusion will be the *converse by negation of the original one,* which therefore may be inferred from it; e. g.

"All slaves are wronged;
Some who are not discontented are slaves;
Some who are not discontented are wronged."

In these ways (which are called *Ostensive Reduction,* because you prove in the first Figure, either the *very same* conclusion as before, or one *which implies it*) all the imperfect Moods may be reduced to the four perfect ones. But there is also another way, called *reductio ad impossibile,*

§ 6. By which we prove (in the first Figure) not directly that the original Conclusion is *true,* but that it *cannot be false;* i. e. that an absurdity would follow from the supposition of its being false; e. g.

"All true patriots are friends to religion;
Some great statesmen are not friends to religion;
Some great statesmen are not true patriots.

If this conclusion be not true, its contradictory must be true; viz.

"All great statesmen are true patriots."

Let this then be assumed, in the place of the minor Premiss of the original Syllogism, and a false conclusion will be proved; e. g. bAr.

"All true patriots are friends to religion;
bA, All great statesmen are true patriots;
rA, *All great statesmen are friends to religion:*"

for as this Conclusion is the contradictory of the original minor Premiss, it must be false, since the Premises are always supposed to be granted; therefore one of the *Premises* (by which it has been correctly proved) must be false also; but the major Premiss (being one of those originally granted) is *true;* therefore the *falsity must be in the minor Premiss;* which is the *contradictory* of the original Conclusion; therefore the original Conclusion must be true. This is the *indirect* mode of Reasoning.

§ 7. This kind of Reduction is seldom employed but for *Baroko* and *Bokardo*, which are thus reduced by those who confine themselves to *simple* Conversion, and Conversion by limitation, (*per accidens;*) and they framed the names of their Moods with a view to point out the manner in which each is to be reduced; viz. B, C, D, F, which are the initial letters of all the Moods, indicate to which Mood of the first Figure, (*Barbara, Celarent, Darii,* and *Ferio,*) each of the others is to be reduced: *m,* indicates that the Premises are to be *transposed; s,* and *p,* that the Proposition denoted by the vowel immediately preceding, is to be *converted; s,* simply, *p, per accidens,* (by limitation:) thus, in *Camestres,* (see example, p. 211,) the *C,* indicates that it must be reduced to *Celarent;* the two *ss,* that the minor Premiss and Conclusion must be *converted simply;* the *m,* that the Premises must be *transposed. K,* (which indicates the reduction *ad impossibile*) is a sign that the Proposition denoted by the vowel immediately before it, must be left out, and the contradictory of the Conclusion substituted; viz. for the *minor* premiss in *Baroko,* and the *major* in *Bokardo.* But it has been already shewn, that the Conversion by contraposition, (by negation,) will enable us to reduce these two Moods, *ostensively.*

CHAPTER IV.

OF MODAL SYLLOGISMS, AND OF ALL ARGUMENTS BESIDES REGULAR AND PURE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISMS.

Of Modals.

§ 1. HITHERTO we have treated of *pure* categorical Propositions, and the Syllogisms composed of such: a *Modal* Proposition may be stated as a *pure* one, by *attaching the Mode to one of the Terms:* and the Proposition will in all respects fall under the foregoing rules; e. g. "John killed Thomas *wilfully and maliciously;*" here the Mode is to be regarded as part of the Predicate. "It is *probable* that all knowledge is useful;" "probably useful" is here the Predicate; but when the Mode is only used to express the necessary, contingent, or impossible connection of the Terms, it may as well be attached to the *Subject:* e. g. "man is *necessarily* mortal;" is the same as, "*all* men are mortal:" and "this man is *occasionally* intemperate," has the force of a *particular:* (vide Part II. § 2. p. 207.) It is thus that two singular Propositions may be contradictories; e. g. "this man is *never* intemperate," will be the *contradictory* of the foregoing. Indeed every sign (of universality or particularity) may be considered as a *Mode.* Since, however, in all Modal Propositions, you assert that the dictum (i. e. the *assertion itself*) and the *mode,* agree together, or disagree, so, in some cases, this may be the most convenient Way of stating a Modal, purely: e. g. "It (subj. cop.) *is* (pred.) *impossible* (subject.) that all men should be virtuous" (subject.). Such is a proposition of St. Paul's: "This (subj. cop.) is (pred.) a faithful saying, &c. (subject.) that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners" (subject.). In these cases, one of your *Terms* (the Subject) is itself *an entire Proposition.* Thus much for Modal Propositions.

Of Hypotheticals.

§ 2. A hypothetical Proposition is defined to be, *two or more categoricals united by a Copula,* (or conjunction;) and the different kinds of hypothetical Propositions are named from their respective conjunctions; viz. conditional, disjunctive, causal, &c.

When a hypothetical Conclusion is inferred from a hypothetical Premiss, so that the force of the Reasoning does not turn on the hypothesis, then the hypothesis (as in Modals) must be considered *as part of one of the Terms;* so that the *Reasoning* will be, in effect, categorical: e. g.

"Every conqueror (predicate.) is either a hero or a villain:
Cæsar was a conqueror; therefore
He was either *a hero or a villain* (predicate.)."

"Whatever comes from God is entitled to reverence;
If the Scriptures are not wholly false, (subject.) they must come from God;
If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reverence."

But when the *Reasoning* itself *rests* on the hypothesis, (in which way a categorical Conclusion may be drawn from a hypothetical Premiss,) this is what is called a *hypothetical Syllogism;* and rules have been devised for ascertaining the validity of such Arguments, at once, without bringing them into the categorical form. (And note, that in these Syllogisms the *hypothetical Premiss* is called the *major,* and the *categorical one,* the *minor.*) They are of two kinds, *conditional* and *disjunctive.*

Of Conditionals.

§ 3. A *Conditional* Proposition has in it an *illative force;* i.e. it contains two, and only two categorical Propositions, whereof one *results* from the other, (or, follows from it,) e. g.

antecedent.
"If the Scriptures are not wholly false,
consequent.
they are entitled to respect."

That from which the other results, is called the *antecedent; that which results from it,* the *consequent,* (*consequens;*) and the *connection* between the two, (expressed by the word "if") the *consequence,* (*consequentia.*) The natural order is, that the antecedent should come *before* the consequent; but this is frequently reversed: e. g. "the husbandman is well off if he knows his own advantages;" Virg. *Geor.* And note, that the truth or falsity of a conditional Proposition depends entirely on the *consequence:* e. g "if Logic is useless, *it* deserves to be neglected;" here both antecedent and consequent are *false:* yet the whole proposition is *true;* i.e. it it true that the consequent *follows* from the antecedent. "If Cromwell was an Englishman, he was an usurper," is just the reverse case: for though it is true that "Cromwell was an Englishman," and also that "he was an usurper," yet it is not true that the latter of these Propositions *depends on* the former; the whole Proposition, therefore, is false, though both antecedent and consequent are true. A Conditional Proposition, in short, may be considered as an assertion of the *validity* of a certain Argument; since to assert that an Argument is *valid,* is to assert that the Conclusion necessarily results from the Premises, whether those Premises be *true* or not. The meaning, then, of a Conditional Proposition is this; that, *the antecedent being granted, the consequent* is granted: which may be considered in two points of view: first, if the antecedent *be* true, the consequent *must* be true; hence the first rule; *the antecedent being granted, the consequent may be inferred:* secondly, if the antecedent *were* true, the consequent *would* be true; hence the second rule; *the consequent being denied, the antecedent may be denied;* for the antecedent must in that case be false; since if it were true, the consequent (which is granted to be false) would be true also: e. g. "if this man has a fever, he is sick;" here, if you *grant the antecedent,* the first rule applies, and you infer the truth of the consequent; "he has a fever, therefore he is sick:" if A is B, C is D; but A is B, therefore C is D, (and this is called a *constructive* Conditional Syllogism;) but if you *deny the consequent* (i. e. grant its *contradictory,*) the second rule applies, and you infer the *contradictory of the antecedent:* "he is not sick, therefore he has not a fever:" this is the *destructive* Conditional Syllogism: if A is B, C is D; C is not D, therefore A is not B. Again, "if the crops are not bad, corn must be cheap:" for a major; then, "but the crops are not bad, therefore corn must be cheap," is constructive. "Corn is not cheap, therefore the crops are bad," is destructive. "If every increase of population is desirable, some misery is desirable; but no misery is desirable, therefore, some increase of population is not desirable," is destructive. But if you *affirm* the *consequent,* or *deny* the *antecedent,* you can infer nothing; for the same consequent may *follow from other* antecedents: e. g. in the example above, a man may be sick *from other* disorders besides a fever; therefore it does not follow from his being sick, that he has a fever; nor (for the same reason) from his *not* having a fever, that he is *not* sick. There are, therefore, two, and only two kinds of Conditional Syllogisms; the *constructive,* founded on the first rule, and answering to *direct* Reasoning; and the *destructive* on the second, answering to *indirect.* And note, that a conditional Proposition may (like the categorical A,) be *converted by negation;* i. e. you may take the *contradictory of the consequent,* as an *antecedent,* and the *contradictory of the antecedent,* as a *consequent:* e. g. "if this man is not sick, he has not a fever." By this conversion of the major Premiss, a constructive Syllogism may be reduced to a destructive, and vice versa. (See § 6. Ch. IV. p. 214.)

Of Disjunctives.

§ 4. A disjunctive Proposition may consist of any number of categoricals; and, of these, *some one,* at least, must be *true,* or the whole Proposition will be false: if, therefore, one or more of these categoricals be denied, (i. e. granted to be false,) you may infer that the remaining one, or (if several) *some one* of the remaining ones is true: e. g. "either the earth is eternal, or the work of chance, or the work of an intelligent being; it is not eternal, nor the work of chance; therefore it is the work of an intelligent being." "It is either spring, summer, autumn, or winter; but it is neither spring nor summer, therefore it is either autumn or winter." Either A is B, or C is D: but A is not B, therefore C is D. Note, that in these two examples (as well as very many others,) it is implied not only that *one* of the members (the categorical Propositions) must be *true,* but that *only one* can be true; so that, in such *cases,* if one or more members be *affirmed,* the rest may be *denied;* [the members may then be called *exclusive:*] e. g. "it is summer, therefore it is neither spring, autumn, nor winter;" "either A is B, or C is D; but A is B, therefore C is not D." But this is by no means universally the case; e. g. "virtue tends to procure us either the esteem of mankind or the favour of God:" here both members are true, and consequently from one being affirmed, we are not authorized to deny the other. It is evident that a disjunctive Syllogism may easily be reduced to a *conditional:* e. g. if it is not spring or summer, it is either autumn or winter, &c.

The Dilemma.

§ 5. Is a complex kind of Conditional Syllogism.

1st. If you have in the *major* Premiss *several antecedents* all with the *same consequent,* then these antecedents, being (in the *minor*) *disjunctively granted,* (i. e. it being granted that *some one* of them is true,) the one *common consequent* may be inferred, (as in the case of a simple constructive syllogism:) e.g. if A is B, C is D; and if X is Y, C is D; but either A is B, or X is Y; therefore C is D. "If the blest in heaven have no desires, they will be perfectly content; so they will, if their desires are fully gratified; but

either they will have no desires, or have them fully gratified; therefore they will be perfectly content." Note, in this case, the two conditionals which make up the major Premiss may be united in one Proposition by means of the word "*whether*:" e. g. "whether the blest, &c. have no desires, or have their desires gratificd, they will be content."

2d. But if the *several antecedents* have each a *different consequent*, then the antecedents, being as before, disjunctively granted, you can only *disjunctively* infer the consequents: e. g. if A is B, C is D; and if X is Y, E is F: but either A is B, or X is Y; therefore either C is D, or E is F. "If Æschines joined in the public rejoicings, he is inconsistent; if he did not, he is unpatriotic; but he either joined, or not, therefore he is either inconsistent or unpatriotic." (Demost. *For the Crown*) This case, as well as the foregoing, is evidently *constructive*. In the destructive form, whether you have one antecedent with several consequents, or several antecedents, either with one, or with several consequents; in all these cases, if you deny the *whole* of the consequent or consequents, you may in the conclusion, deny the *whole* of the antecedent or antecedents: e. g. "if this fact be true, it must be recorded either in Herodotus, Thucydides, or Xenophon: it is not recorded in any of the three, therefore it is not true." "If the world existed from eternity there would be records prior to the Mosaic; and if it were produced by chance, it would not bear marks of design: there are no records prior to the Mosaic; and the world does bear marks of design; therefore it neither existed from eternity, nor is the work of chance." These are commonly called Dilemmas, but hardly differ from *simple* conditional Syllogisms. Nor is the case different if you have *one* antecedent with several consequents, which consequents you *disjunctively* deny; for that comes to the same thing as *wholly* denying them; since if they be not *all* true, the *one antecedent* must equally fall to the ground; and the Syllogism will be equally simple: e. g. "if we are at peace with France by virtue of the treaty of Paris, we must acknowledge the sovereignty of Buonaparte; and also we must acknowledge that of Louis: but we cannot do both of these; therefore we are not at peace," &c.; which is evidently a plain destructive. The true dilemma is, "*a conditional Syllogism with several antecedents in the major, and a disjunctive minor*;" hence,

3d. That is most properly called a *destructive Dilemma*, which has (like the constructive ones) a *disjunctive minor Premiss*; i. e. when you have several antecedents with each a different consequent; which consequents, (instead of wholly denying them, as in the last case,) you *disjunctively* deny; and thence, in the Conclusion, deny disjunctively the antecedents: e. g. if A is B, C is D; and if X is Y, E is F: but either C is not D, or E is not F; therefore, either A is not B, or X is not Y. "If this man were wise, he would not speak irreverently of Scripture in jest; and if he were good he would not do so in earnest; but he does it, either in jest or in earnest; therefore he is either not wise or not good." Every Dilemma may be reduced into two or more simple Conditional Syllogisms: e. g. "if Æschines joined, &c. he is inconsistent; he *did* join, &c. therefore he is inconsistent: and again, if Æschines did not join, &c. he is unpatriotic; he *did not*, &c. therefore he is unpatriotic."

Now an opponent might deny *either* of the minor Premises in the above Syllogisms, but he could not deny *both*; and therefore he must admit one or the other of the Conclusions: for, when a Dilemma is employed, it is supposed that *some one* of the antecedents must be true, (or, in the destructive kind, *some one* of the consequents false,) but that we cannot tell *which* of them is so; and this is the reason why the argument is stated in the form of a Dilemma. From what has been said, it may easily be seen that all Dilemmas are in fact *conditional syllogisms*; and that disjunctive Syllogisms may also be reduced to the same form: but as it has been remarked, that all Reasoning whatever may *ultimately* be brought to the one test of Aristotle's "dictum," it remains to shew how a Conditional Syllogism may be thrown into such a form that that test will at once apply to it; and this is called the

Reduction of Hypotheticals.

§ 6. For this purpose we must consider every Conditional Proposition as a universal affirmative categorical Proposition, of which the Terms are entire Propositions, viz. the antecedent answering to the *Subject*, and the consequent to the *Predicate*; e. g. to say, "if Louis is a good king, France is likely to prosper;" is equivalent to saying, "the case of Louis being a good king, is a case of France being likely to prosper:" and if it be granted, as a minor Premiss to the Conditional Syllogism, that "Louis is a good king;" that is equivalent to saying, "the present case is the case of Louis being a good king:" from which you will draw a conclusion in *Barbara*, (viz. "the present case is a case of France being likely to prosper,") exactly equivalent to the original Conclusion of the Conditional Syllogism; viz. "France is likely to prosper." As the constructive condition may thus be reduced to *Barbara*, so may the destructive in like manner, to *Celarent*, e. g. "if the Stoics are right, pain is no evil: but pain is an evil; therefore, the Stoics are not right;" is equivalent to, "the case of the Stoics being right, is the case of pain being no evil; the present case is not the case of pain being no evil; therefore the present case is not the case of the Stoics being right." This is *Camestres*, which of course is easily reduced to *Celarent*. Or, if you will, all Conditional Syllogisms may be reduced to *Barbara*, by considering them all as constructive; which may be done, as mentioned above, by converting by negation the major Premiss, (see p. 212. § 3. Ch. IV.) The reduction of Hypotheticals may always be effected in the manner above stated; but as it produces a circuitous awkwardness of expression, a more convenient form may in some cases be substituted: e. g. in the example above, it may be convenient to take, "*true*," for one of the Terms: "that pain is no evil is not true; that pain is no evil is asserted by the Stoics; therefore something asserted by the Stoics is not true." Sometimes again it may be better to unfold the argument into two Syllogisms: e. g. in a former example; first, "Louis is a good king; the governor of France is Louis; therefore the governor of France is a good king." And then, second, "every country governed by a good king is likely to prosper," &c. [A Dilemma is generally to be reduced into two or more categorical Syllogisms.] And when the antecedent and consequent have each the *same* Subject, you may sometimes reduce the Conditional by merely

substituting a categorical major Premiss for the conditional one: e. g. instead of "if Cæsar was a tyrant, he deserved death; he was a tyrant, therefore he deserved death;" you may put for a major, "all tyrants deserve death," &c. But it is of no great consequence, whether Hypotheticals are reduced in the most *neat and concise* manner or not; since it is not intended that they should be reduced to categorical, in *ordinary practice*, as the *readiest way* of trying their validity, (their own rules being quite sufficient for that purpose;) but only *that we should be able*, if required, to subject any argument whatever to the test of Aristotle's dictum, in order to shew that all Reasoning turns upon one simple principle.

Of Enthymeme, Sorites, &c.

§ 7. There are various abridged forms of Argument which may be easily expanded into regular Syllogisms: such as, first, the Enthymeme, which is a Syllogism with one Premiss suppressed. As all the Terms will be found in the remaining Premiss and Conclusion, it will be easy to fill up the Syllogism by supplying the Premiss that is wanting, whether major or minor: e. g. "Cæsar was a tyrant; therefore he deserved death." "A free nation must be happy; therefore the English are happy."

This is the ordinary form of speaking and writing. It is evident that Enthymemes may be filled up hypothetically.

2d. When you have a string of Syllogisms, in which the Conclusion of each is made the Premiss of the next, till you arrive at the main and ultimate Conclusion of all, you may sometimes state these briefly, in a form called *Sorites;* in which the Predicate of the first proposition is made the Subject of the next; and so on, to any length, till finally the Predicate of the last of the Premises is predicated (in the Conclusion) of the Subject of the first: e. g. A is B, B is C, C is D, D is E; therefore A is E. "The English are a brave people; a brave people are free; a free people are happy; therefore the English are happy." A Sorites then has as many middle Terms as there are intermediate Propositions between the first and the last; and consequently it may be drawn out into as many separate Syllogisms; of which the first will have, for its *major Premiss*, the second; and for its *minor*, the *first* of the Propositions of the Sorites; as may be seen by the example. It is also evident, that in a Sorites you cannot have more than *one* negative Proposition, and one particular; for else, one of the Syllogisms would have its Premises both negative or both particular, (vid. p. 209.) A string of Conditional Syllogisms may in like manner be abridged into a Sorites; e. g. if A is B, C is D; if C is D, E is F; if E is F, G is H; but A is B, therefore G is H. "If the Scriptures are the word of God, it is important that they should be well explained; if it is important, &c. they deserve to be diligently studied; if they deserve, &c. an order of men should be set aside for that purpose: but the Scriptures are the word, &c.; therefore an order of men should be set aside for the purpose, &c." Hence, it is evident, how injudicious an arrangement has been adopted by former writers on Logic, who have treated of the Sorites and Enthymeme before they entered on the subject of Hypotheticals.

Those who have spoken of induction or of example, as a distinct kind of Argument in a Logical point of view, have fallen into the common error of confounding *Logical* with *Rhetorical* distinctions, and have wandered from their subject as much as a writer on the orders of Architecture would do, who should introduce the distinction between buildings of stone and of marble. Logic takes no cognizance of induction, for instance, or of *a priori* reasoning, &c. as distinct *Forms* of argument; for when thrown into the syllogistic form, and when letters of the alphabet are substituted for the Terms (and it is thus that Argument is properly to be brought under the cognizance of Logic,) there is no distinction between them; e. g. a Property which belongs to the ox, sheep, deer, goat, and antelope, belongs to all horned animals; rumination belongs to these; therefore, to all. This, which is an inductive argument, is evidently a Syllogism in *Barbara*. The essence of an inductive argument (and so of the other kinds which are distinguished for it,) consists, not in the *form of the Argument*, but in the relation which the *Subject matter* of the Premises bears to that of the Conclusion.

3d. There are various other abbreviations commonly used, which are so obvious as hardly to call for explanation: as, where one of the Premises of a Syllogism is itself the Conclusion of an Enthymeme which is expressed at the same time: e. g. "all useful studies deserve encouragement; Logic is such, (*since it helps us to reason accurately,*) therefore it deserves encouragement;" here, the minor Premiss is what is called an *Enthymematic sentence*. The *antecedent* in that minor Premiss, (i. e. that which *makes* it Enthymematic,) is called by Aristotle the *Prosyllogism*.

It is evident that you may for brevity substitute for any term an *equivalent;* as in the last example, "*it*" for "Logic;" "*such*" for "a useful study," &c.

4th. And many Syllogisms, which at first appear faulty, will often be found, on examination, to contain correct reasoning, and, consequently, to be reducible to a regular form; e. g. when you have, *apparently*, *negative Premises*, it may happen, that by considering one of them as *affirmative*, (see Ch. II. § 4. p. 208.) the Syllogism will be regular: e. g. "no man is happy who is not secure; no tyrant is secure; therefore no tyrant is happy," is a Syllogism in *Celarent*.* Sometimes there will appear to be too many terms; and yet there will be no fault in the Reasoning, only an irregularity in the expression: e. g. "no irrational agent could produce a work which manifests design; the universe is a work which manifests design; therefore no irrational agent could have produced the universe." Strictly speaking, this Syllogism has five Terms; but if you look to the meaning, you will see, that in the first Premiss (considering it *as a part of this Argument,*) it is not, properly, "an irrational agent" that you are speaking of, and of which you predicate that it could not produce a work manifesting design; but rather it is this "work," &c. of which you are speaking, and of which it is predicated that it could

* If this experiment be tried on a Syllogism which has *really* negative Premises, the only effect will be to change that fault into another: viz. an excess of Terms, or, (which is substantially the same) an undistributed middle; e. g. "an enslaved people is not happy; the English are not enslaved; therefore they are happy:" if "enslaved" be regarded as one of the Terms, and "not enslaved" as another, there will manifestly be four. Hence you may see how very little difference there is in reality between the different faults which are enumerated.

not be produced by an irrational agent; if then you state the Propositions in that form, the Syllogism will be perfectly regular.

Thus, such a Syllogism as this, "every true patriot is disinterested; few men are disinterested; therefore few men are true patriots;" might appear at first sight to be in the second Figure, and faulty; whereas it is *Barbara*, with the *Premises transposed;* for you do not really predicate of "few men," that they are "disinterested," but of "*disinterested persons*," that they are "few." Again, "none but candid men are good reasoners; few infidels are candid; few infidels are good reasoners." In this it will be most convenient to consider the major Premiss as being "all good reasoners are candid," (which of course is precisely æquipollent to its illative converse by negation;) and the minor Premiss and Conclusion may in like manner be fairly expressed thus —"most infidels are not candid; therefore most infidels are not good reasoners:" which is a regular Syllogism in *Camestres*. Or, if you would state it in the first Figure, thus—those who are not candid (or uncandid) are not good reasoners; most infidels are not candid; most infidels are not good reasoners.

§ 8. The foregoing rules enable us to develope the principles on which all Reasoning is conducted, whatever be the Subject matter of it, and to ascertain the validity or fallaciousness of any apparent argument, as far as the *form of expression* is concerned; that being alone the proper province of Logic.

But it is evident that we may nevertheless remain liable to be deceived or perplexed in Argument by the assumption of false or doubtful Premises, or by the employment of indistinct or ambiguous terms; and, accordingly, many Logical writers, wishing to make their systems appear as perfect as possible, have undertaken to give rules "for attaining clear ideas," and for "guiding the judgment;" and fancying or professing themselves successful in this, have consistently enough denominated Logic, the "Art of using the Reason;" which in truth it would be, and would supersede all other studies, if it could alone ascertain the meaning of every Term, and the truth or falsity of every Proposition, in the same manner as it actually can the validity of every Argument. And they have been led into this, partly by the consideration that Logic is concerned about the three operations of the mind—simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning; not observing that it is not equally concerned about all; the last operation being alone its appropriate province; and the rest being treated of only in reference to that.

The contempt justly due to such pretensions has most unjustly fallen on the Science itself, much in the same manner as Chemistry was brought into disrepute among the unthinking by the extravagant pretensions of the Alchemists. And those Logical writers have been censured, not (as they should have been) for *making* such professions, but for *not fulfilling* them. It has been objected, especially, that the rules of Logic leave us still at a loss as to the most important and difficult point in Reasoning; viz. the ascertaining the sense of the terms employed, and removing their ambiguity. A complaint resembling that made (according to a story told by Warburton in his *Div. Leg.*) by a man who found fault with all the reading-glasses presented to him by the shopkeeper; the fact being that he had never *learnt to read*. In the present case, the complaint is the more unreasonable, inasmuch as there neither is, nor ever *can possibly be*, any such system devised as will effect the proposed object of clearing up the ambiguity of Terms. It is, however, no small advantage, that the rules of Logic, though they cannot alone, ascertain and clear up ambiguity in any Term, point out in *which* Term of an Argument it is to be songht for, directing our attention to the middle Term, as the one on the ambiguity of which a fallacy is likely to be built.

It will be useful, however, to class and describe the different kinds of ambiguity which are to be met with; and also the various ways in which the insertion of false, or, at least, unduly assumed Premises, is most likely to elude observation. And though the remarks which will be offered on these points may not be considered as strictly forming a *part* of Logic, they cannot be thought out of place, when it is considered how essentially they are connected with the application of it.

CHAPTER V.

OF FALLACIES.

Introduction.

Logic.

By a Fallacy is commonly understood, "any unsound mode of arguing, which appears to demand our conviction, and to be decisive of the question in hand, when in fairness it is not so." As we consider the ready detection and clear exposure of Fallacies to be both more extensively important, and also more difficult than many are aware of, we propose to take a Logical view of the subject; referring the different Fallacies to the most convenient heads, and giving a scientific analysis of the procedure which takes place in each.

After all, indeed, in the practical detection of each individual Fallacy, much must depend on natural and acquired acuteness; nor can any rules be given, the mere learning of which will enable us to apply them with mechanical certainty and readiness: but still we shall find that to take correct general views of the subject, and to be familiarized with scientific discussions of it, will tend, above all things, to *engender such a habit of mind* as will best fit us for practice.

Indeed the case is the same with respect to Logic in general; scarce any one would in ordinary practice, state to himself either his own or another's reasoning in Syllogisms in *Barbara* at full length; yet a familiarity with Logical principles, tends very much, (as all feel, who are really well acquainted with them,) to beget a habit of clear and sound Reasoning. The truth is, that in this, as in many other things, there are processes going on in the mind (when we are practising any thing quite familiar to us) with such rapidity as to leave no trace in the memory; and we often apply principles which did not, as far as we are conscious, even occur to us at the time.

It would be foreign, however, to the present purpose, to investigate fully the manner in which certain studies operate in remotely producing certain effects on the mind: it is sufficient to establish the *fact*, that habits of scientific analysis (besides the intrinsic beauty and dignity of such studies) lead to practical advantage. It is on Logical principles therefore that we propose to discuss the subject of Fallacies: and it might, indeed, seem to be unnecessary to make any apology for so doing, after what has been formerly said, generally, in defence of Logic: if the majority of Logical writers had not usually followed a very opposite plan. Whenever they have to treat of any thing that is beyond the mere elements of Logic, they totally lay aside all reference to the principles which they have been occupied in establishing and explaining, and have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular kind of language; such as would be the best suited indeed to an exoterical discourse, but seems strangely incongruous in a professed Logical treatise. What should we think of a Geometrical writer, who, after having gone through the Elements with strict definitions and demonstrations, should, on preceding to Mechanics, totally lay aside all reference to scientific principles,—all use of technical terms,—and treat of the subject in undefined terms, and with probable and popular arguments? It would be thought strange, if even a Botanist, when addressing those whom he had been instructing in the principles and the terms of his system, should totally lay these aside when he came to describe plants, and should adopt the language of the vulgar. Surely it affords but too much plausibility to the cavils of those who scoff at Logic altogether, that the very writers who profess to teach it, should never themselves make any application of, or reference to its principles, on those very occasions, when, and *when only*, such application and reference are to be expected. If the principles of any system are well laid down,—if its technical language is well framed,—then, surely those principles and that language will afford, (for those who have once thoroughly learned them,) the best, the most clear, simple, and concise method of treating any subject connected with that system. Yet even the accurate Aldrich, in treating of the Dilemma and of the Fallacies, has very much forgotten the Logician, and assumed a loose and rhetorical style of writing, without making any application of the principles he had formerly laid down, but on the contrary, sometimes departing widely from them.

Chap. V.

The most experienced teachers, when addressing those who are familiar with the elementary principles of Logic, think it requisite, not indeed to lead them, on each occasion, *through the whole detail* of those principles, when the process is quite obvious, but always to *put them on the road*, as it were, to those principles, that they may plainly see their own way to the end, and take a scientific view of the subject: in the same manner as Mathematical writers, avoid indeed the occasional tediousness of going all through a very simple demonstration which the learner, if he will, may easily supply; but yet always speak in strict Mathematical language, and with reference to Mathematical principles, though they do not always state them at full length. We would not profess, therefore, any more than they do, to write (on subjects connected with the science,) in a language intelligible to those who are ignorant of its first rudiments; to do so, indeed, would imply that we were not taking a scientific view of the subject, nor availing ourselves of the principles which had been established, and the accurate and concise technical language which had been framed.

§ 1. The division of Fallacies into those in the words, IN DICTIONE, and those in the matter EXTRA DICTIONEM, has not been, by any writers hitherto, grounded on any distinct principle; at least, not on any that they have themselves adhered to. The confounding together, however, of these two classes is highly detrimental to all clear notions concerning Logic; being obviously allied to the prevailing erroneous views which make Logic the *art of employing the intellectual faculties in general*, having the *discovery of truth* for its object, and all kinds of knowledge for its proper subject matter; with all that train of vague and groundless speculations which have led to such interminable confusion and mistakes, and afforded a pretext for such clamorous censures.

It is important, therefore, that rules should be given for a division of Fallacies into Logical, and Non-logical, on such a principle as shall keep clear of all this indistinctness and perplexity.

If any one should object that the division we adopt is in some degree arbitrary, placing under the one head Fallacies, which many might be disposed to place under the other, let him consider not only the indistinctness of all former divisions, but the utter impossibility of framing *any* that shall be completely secure from the objection urged, in a case where men have formed such various and vague notions, from the very want of some clear principle of division. Nay, from the elliptical form in which all Reasoning is usually expressed, and the peculiarly involved and oblique form in which Fallacy is for the most part conveyed, it must of course be often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbitrary *choice*, not only to which genus each *kind* of Fallacy should be referred, but even to which kind to refer any *one individual* Fallacy: for since in any course of argument, one Premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently happens, in the case of a Fallacy, that the hearers are left to the alternative of supplying *either* a Premiss which is *not true*, or *else*, one which *does not prove* the conclusion; e. g. if a man expatiates on the distress of the country, and thence argues that the government is tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume *either* that "every distressed country is under a tyranny," which is a manifest falsehood, *or*, merely that "every country under a tyranny is distressed," which, however true, proves nothing, the middle term being undistributed. Now, in the former case, the Fallacy would be referred to the head of "*extra dictionem*;" in the latter, to that of "*in dictione*:" which are we to suppose the speaker meant us to understand? surely just whichever each of his hearers might happen to prefer: some might assent to the false Premiss; others, allow the unsound Syllogism: to the Sophist himself it is indifferent, as long as they can but be brought to admit the conclusion.

Without pretending then to conform to every one's mode of speaking on the subject, or to lay down rules which shall be, in themselves, (without any call for labour or skill in the person who employs them,) readily applicable to, and decisive on each individual case; we propose a division which is at least perfectly clear in its main principle, and coincides, perhaps, as nearly as possible with the established notions of Logicians on the subject.

§ 2. In every Fallacy, the conclusion either *does*, or *does not follow from the Premises:* where the conclusion does not follow from the Premises, it is manifest that the fault is in the *Reasoning*, and in that alone; these, therefore, we call Logical Fallacies,* as being properly violations of those rules of Reasoning which it is the province of Logic to lay down. Of these, however, one kind are more *purely Logical*, as exhibiting their fallaciousness by the bare *form* of the expression, without any regard to the meaning of the terms: to which class belong: 1st. undistributed middle; 2d. illicit process; 3d. negative Premises, or affirmative conclusion from a negative Premiss, and *vice versâ:* to which may be added, 4th. those which have palpably (i. e. *expressed*) more than three terms. The other kind may be most properly called semi-logical; viz. all the cases of ambiguous middle term except its non-distribution: for though in such cases the Conclusion does not follow, and though the rules of Logic shew that it does not, *as soon as the ambiguity of the middle term is ascertained*, yet the discovery and ascertainment of this ambiguity requires attention to the *sense of the term*, and knowledge of the subject matter; so that here, Logic "teaches us not *how to find* the Fallacy, but only *where to search* for it," and on what principles to condemn it. Accordingly it has been made a subject of bitter complaint against Logic, that it presupposes the most difficult point to be already accomplished, viz. the sense of the terms to be ascertained. A similar objection might be urged against every other art in existence; e. g. against Agriculture, that all the precepts for the cultivation of land presuppose the possession of a farm; or against Perspective, that its rules are useless to a blind man. The objection is indeed peculiarly absurd when urged against Logic, because the object which it is blamed for not accomplishing, *cannot possibly* be within the province of *any one* art whatever. Is it indeed possible or conceivable that there should be any method, science, or system, that should enable one to know the full and exact meaning of every term in existence? The utmost that can be done is to give some general rules that may assist us in this work; which is done in the two first parts of Logic.

The very author of the objection says, "this (the comprehension of the meaning of general terms) is a study which every individual must carry on for himself; and of which no rules of Logic (how useful soever they may be in directing our labours) can supersede the necessity." D. Stewart, *Phil.* vol. ii. ch. ii. s. 2.

Nothing perhaps tends more to conceal from men their imperfect conception of the meaning of a term, than the circumstance of their being able fully to comprehend a *process of Reasoning* in which it is involved, without attaching any distinct meaning, or perhaps any meaning at all to that term; as is evident when A B C, are used to stand for terms, in a regular Syllogism: thus a man may be *familiarized* with a term, and never find himself *at a loss* from not comprehending it; from which he will be very likely to infer that he *does* comprehend it, when perhaps he does not, but employs it vaguely and incorrectly, which leads to fallacious reasoning and confusion. It must be owned, however, that many Logical writers have, in great measure, brought on themselves the reproach in question, by calling Logic "the right use of Reason," laying down "rules for gaining clear ideas," and such-like ἀλαζονεία, as Aristotle calls it. *Rhet.* book i. ch. ii.

§ 3. The remaining class (viz. where the Conclusion does follow from the Premises) may be called the Material, or Non-logical Fallacies: of these there are two kinds; 1st. when the Premises are such as ought not to have been assumed; 2d. when the Conclusion is not the one required, but irrelevant; which Fallacy is called "*ignoratio elenchi*," because your argument is not the *elenchus*, (i. e. proof of the *contradictory*) of your opponent's assertion, which it should be; but proves, instead of that, some other proposition resembling it. Hence, since Logic defines what Contradiction is, some may choose rather to range this with the *Logical* Fallacies, as it seems, so far, to come under the jurisdiction of that art: nevertheless, it is perhaps better to adhere to the original

* Just as we call that a *criminal* Court in which crimes are judged.

 division, both on account of its clearness, and also because few would be inclined to apply to the Fallacy in question the accusation of being *inconclusive*, and consequently illogical reasoning: besides which, it seems an artificial and circuitous way of speaking, to suppose in all cases an *opponent* and a *contradiction*; the simple statement of the matter being this,—I am required, by the circumstances of the case, (no matter why) to prove a certain Conclusion; I prove, not that, but one which is likely to be mistaken for it;—in this lies the Fallacy.

It might be desirable therefore to lay aside the name of "*ignoratio elenchi*," but that is so generally adopted as absolutely to require some mention to be made of it. The other kind of Fallacies in the matter will comprehend, (as far as the vague and obscure language of Logical writers will allow us to conjecture,) the Fallacy of "*non causa pro causâ*," and that of "*petitio principii*:" of these, the former is by them distinguished into "*a non verâ pro verâ*, and "*a non tali pro tali*;" this last would appear to be arguing from a case *not parallel* as if it *were* so; which, in Logical language, is, having the *suppressed* Premiss false; (for it is in *that* the *parallelism* is affirmed) and the "*a non verâ pro verâ*" will in like manner signify the *expressed* Premiss being false; so that this Fallacy will turn out to be, in plain terms, neither more nor less than falsity, (or unfair assumption) of a Premiss.

The remaining kind, "*petitio principii*," (begging the question) takes place when a Premiss, whether true or false, is either plainly equivalent to the Conclusion, or depends on it for its own reception. It is to be observed, however, that in all correct Reasoning the Premises must, virtually, imply the conclusion; so that it is not possible to mark precisely the distinction between the Fallacy in question and fair argument; since that may be correct and fair Reasoning to one person, which would be, to another, begging the question, since to one the Conclusion might be more evident than the Premiss, and to the other, the reverse. The most plausible form of this Fallacy is arguing in a circle; and the greater the circle, the harder to detect.

§ 4. There is no Fallacy that may not properly be included under some of the foregoing heads; those which in the Logical Treatises are separately enumerated, and contradistinguished from these, being in reality instances of them, and therefore more properly enumerated in the subdivision thereof; as in the scheme annexed.



§ 5. On each of the Fallacies which have been thus enumerated and distinguished, we propose to offer some more particular remarks: but before we proceed to this, it will be proper to premise two general observations, 1st. on the *importance*, and 2d. the *difficulty*, of detecting and describing Fallacies; both have been already slightly alluded to, but it is requisite that they should here be somewhat more fully and distinctly set forth.

1st. It seems by most persons to be taken for granted

 that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by a skilful Sophist: or if they allow that a man may with honest intentions slide into one, unconsciously, in the heat of *argument*, still they seem to suppose that where there is no *dispute*, there is no cause to dread Fallacy; whereas there is much danger, even in what may be called *solitary Reasoning*, of sliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far deceived as even to *act upon* the Conclusion thus obtained. By solitary Reasoning is meant the case in which we are not seeking for *arguments* to prove a *given question*, but labouring to elicit from our previous stock of knowledge *some useful inference*. To select one from innumerable examples which might be cited, and of which some more will occur in the subsequent part of this Essay; it is not improbable that many indifferent sermons have been produced by the ambiguity of the word "*plain*:" a young divine perceives the truth of the maxim, that "for the lower orders one's language cannot be too *plain*;" (i. e. *clear* and *perspicuous*, so as to require no learning nor ingenuity to understand it,) and when he proceeds to practice, the word "*plain*" indistinctly flits before him, as it were, and often checks him in the use of *ornaments* of style, such as metaphor, epithet, antithesis, &c. which are opposed to "plainness" in a totally different sense of the word, being by no means necessarily adverse to *perspicuity*, but rather, in many cases, conducive to it; as may be seen in several of the clearest of our Lord's discourses, which are of all others the most richly adorned with figurative language. So far indeed is an ornamented style from being unfit for the vulgar, that they are pleased with it even in excess. Yet the desire to be "plain," combined with that dim and confused notion which the ambiguity of the word produces in such as do not separate in their minds, and set distinctly before themselves, the two meanings, often causes them to write in a dry and bald style, which has no advantage in point of perspicuity, and is least of all suited to the taste of the vulgar. The above instance is not drawn from mere conjecture, but from actual experience of the fact.

Another instance of the strong influence of words on our ideas may be adduced from a widely different subject: most persons feel a certain degree of *surprise* on first hearing of the result of some late experiments of the agricultural Chemists, by which they have ascertained that universally what are called *heavy* soils are specifically the lightest; and *vice versâ*. Whence this *surprise?* for no one ever *distinctly believed* the established names to be used in the literal and *primary* sense, in consequence of the respective soils having been *weighed* together; indeed it is obvious on a moment's reflection that *tenacious clay* soils (as well as muddy roads) are *figuratively* called heavy from the difficulty of ploughing or passing over them, which produces an *effect like* that of bearing or dragging a heavy weight; yet still the terms, "light" and "heavy," though used figuratively, have most undoubtedly introduced into men's minds something of the ideas expressed by them in their primitive sense. So true is the ingenious observation of Hobbes, that "words are the counters of wise men, and the money of fools."

More especially deserving of attention is the influence of analogical terms in leading men into erroneous notions in Theology; where the most important terms are analogical; and yet, they are continually employed in Reasoning without due attention (oftener through want of caution than by unfair design) to their analogical nature; and most of the errors into which Theologians have fallen may be traced, in part, to this cause.

Thus much, as to the extensive practical influence of Fallacies, and the consequent high importance of detecting and exposing them.

§ 6. 2dly. The second remark is, that while sound Reasoning is ever the more readily admitted, the more clearly it is perceived to be such, Fallacy, on the contrary, being rejected as soon as perceived, will, of course be the more likely to obtain reception, the more it is obscured and disguised by obliquity and complexity of expression: it is thus that it is the most likely either to slip accidentally from the careless reasoner, or to be brought forward deliberately by the Sophist. Not that he ever wishes that obscurity and complexity to be perceived; on the contrary it is for his purpose that the expression should *appear* as clear and simple as possible, while in reality it is the most tangled net he can contrive. Thus, whereas it is usual to express our Reasoning elliptically, so that a Premiss, (or even two or three entire steps in a course of argument) which may be readily supplied, as being perfectly obvious, shall be left to be understood, the Sophist in like manner suppresses what is *not* obvious, but is in reality the weakest part of the argument; and uses every other contrivance to withdraw our attention (his art closely resembling the juggler's) from the quarter where the Fallacy lies. Hence the uncertainty before mentioned, to which class any individual Fallacy is to be referred: and hence it is that the *difficulty* of detecting and exposing Fallacy, is so much greater than that of comprehending and developing a process of sound argument. It is like the detection and apprehension of a criminal in spite of all his arts of concealment and disguise; when this *is accomplished*, and he is *brought to trial* with all the evidence of his guilt produced, his conviction and punishment are easy; and this is precisely the case with those Fallacies which are given as examples in Logical Treatises; they are in fact already detected, by being stated in a plain and regular form, and are, as it were, only brought up to *receive sentence*. Or again, fallacious Reasoning may be compared to a perplexed and entangled mass of *accounts*, which it requires much sagacity and close attention to clear up, and display in a regular and intelligible form; though *when this is once accomplished*, the whole appears so perfectly *simple*, that the unthinking are apt to undervalue the skill and pains which have been employed upon it.

Moreover, it should be remembered that a very *long* discussion is one of the most effectual veils of Fallacy. Sophistry, like poison, is at once detected, and nauseated when presented to us in a concentrated form; but a Fallacy which when stated barely, in a few sentences, would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world if *diluted* in a quarto volume. To speak therefore of all the Fallacies that have ever been enumerated as too glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned, because the simple instances given in books, and there stated in the plainest and consequently most easily detected form, are such as would (in that form) deceive no one; this, surely, shews

 either extreme weakness, or else unfairness. It may readily be allowed, indeed, that to detect *individual* Fallacies, and *bring them under* the general rules, is a harder task than to *lay down* those general rules; but this does not prove that the latter office is trifling or useless, or that it does not essentially conduce to the performance of the other: there may be more ingenuity shewn in detecting and arresting a malefactor, and convicting him of the fact, than in laying down a law for the trial and punishment of such a person; but the latter office, i. e. that of a legislator, is surely neither unnecessary nor trifling.

It should be added that a close observation and Logical analysis of fallacious arguments, as it tends (according to what has been already said) to form a habit of mind well suited for the practical detection of Fallacies; so, for that very reason, it will make us the more careful in making *allowance* for them; i. e. bearing in mind how much men in general are liable to be influenced by them: e. g. a *refuted argument ought* to *go for nothing*; but in *fact* it will generally prove *detrimental* to the cause, from the Fallacy which will be presently explained. No one is more likely to be practically aware of this, and to take precautions accordingly, than he who is most versed in the whole theory of Fallacies; for the best Logician is the least likely to calculate *on men in general being such.*

Of Fallacies in form.

§ 7. Enough has already been said in the preceding compendium; and it has been remarked above, that it is often left to our *choice* to refer an individual Fallacy to this head or to another.

To the present class we may the most conveniently refer those Fallacies, so common in practice, of supposing the Conclusion false, because the Premiss is false, or because the argument is unsound; and inferring the truth of the Premiss from that of the Conclusion; e. g. if any one argues for the existence of a God, from its being universally believed, a man might perhaps be able to refute the argument by producing an instance of some nation destitute of such belief; the argument *ought* then (as has been observed above) to *go for nothing*: but many would go further, and think that this refutation had *disproved* the existence of a God; in which they would be guilty of an *illicit process* of the major term; viz. "whatever is universally believed must be true; the existence of a God is not universally believed; therefore it is not true." Others again from being convinced of the truth of the Conclusion would infer that of the Premises; which would amount to the Fallacy of *undistributed middle*: viz. "what is universally believed, is true; the existence of a God is true; therefore it is universally believed." Or, these Fallacies might be stated in the hypothetical form; since the one evidently proceeds from the denial of the antecedent to the denial of the consequent; and the other from the establishing of the consequent to the inferring of the antecedent; which two Fallacies correspond respectively with those of *illicit process* of the major, and *undistributed middle*.

Fallacies of this class are very much kept out of sight, being seldom perceived even by those who employ them; but of their practical importance there can be no doubt, since it is notorious that a weak argument is always, in practice, *detrimental*; and that there is no absurdity so gross which men will not readily admit, if it appears to lead to a Conclusion of what they are already convinced. Even a candid and sensible writer is not unlikely to be, by this means, misled, when he is seeking for arguments to support a Conclusion which he has long been fully convinced of himself; i. e. he will often use such arguments as would never have *convinced* himself, and are not likely to convince others, but rather (by the operation of the converse Fallacy) to *confirm* in their dissent those who before disagreed with him.

It is best therefore to endeavour to put yourself in the place of an *opponent* to your own arguments, and consider whether you could not find some objection to them. The applause of *one's own party* is a very unsafe ground for judging of the real force of an argumentative work, and consequently of its real utility. To satisfy those who were doubting, and to convince those who were opposed, is the only sure test; but *these* are seldom very loud in their applause, or very forward in bearing their testimony.

Of Ambiguous middle.

§ 8. That case in which the middle is undistributed, belongs of course to the preceding head, the fault being perfectly manifest from the mere form of the expression: in that case the extremes are compared with *two parts of the same* term; but in the Fallacy which has been called semi-logical, (which we are now to speak of) the extremes are compared with *two different* terms, the middle being used in two different senses in the two Premises.

And here it may be remarked, that when the argument is brought into the form of a *regular Syllogism*, the contrast between these two senses will usually appear very striking, from the two Premises being *placed together*; and hence the scorn with which many have treated the very mention of the Fallacy of equivocation, deriving their only notion of it from the *exposure* of it in Logical Treatises; whereas, in practice it is common for the two Premises to be placed very far apart, and discussed in different parts of the discourse; by which means the inattentive hearer overlooks any ambiguity that may exist in the middle term. Hence the advantage of Logical habits, to fix our attention strongly and steadily on the *important* terms of an argument.

One case which may be regarded as coming under the head of Ambiguous middle, is, what is called "*Fallacia Figuræ-Dictionis*," the Fallacy built on the grammatical structure of language, from men's usually taking for granted that *paronymous* words, (i. e. those belonging to each other, as the substantive, adjective, verb, &c. of the same root) have a precisely correspondent meaning: which is by no means universally the case. Such a Fallacy could not indeed be even exhibited in strict Logical form, which would preclude even the attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in sound as well as sense; but nothing is more common in practice than to vary continually the terms employed, with a view to grammatical convenience; nor is there any thing unfair in such a practice, as long as the *meaning* is preserved unaltered: e. g. "murder should be punished with death; this man is a murderer; therefore he deserves to die;" &c. &c. Here we proceed on the assumption (in this case just) that to commit murder and to be a murderer,—to deserve death and to be one who ought to

die, are, respectively, equivalent expressions; and it would frequently prove a heavy inconvenience to be debarred this kind of liberty; but the abuse of it gives rise to the Fallacy in question: e. g. *projectors* are unfit to be trusted; this man has formed a *project*, therefore he is unfit to be trusted:* here the Sophist proceeds on the hypothesis that he who forms a *project* must be a *projector*; whereas the bad sense that commonly attaches to the latter word, is not at all implied in the former.

This Fallacy may often be considered as lying not in the middle, but in one of the terms of the Conclusion; so that the Conclusion drawn shall not be, in reality, at all warranted by the Premises, though it will appear to be so, by means of the grammatical affinity of the words: e. g. "to be acquainted with the guilty is a *presumption* of guilt; this man is so acquainted; therefore we may *presume* that he is guilty:" this argument proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspondence between "*presume*" and "*presumption*," which however does not really exist; for "presumption" is commonly used to express a kind of *slight suspicion*; whereas "to presume" amounts to *absolute belief*.

The above remark will apply to some other cases of ambiguity of term; viz. the Conclusion will often contain a term, which (though not as here, different *in expression* from the corresponding one in the Premiss, yet) is *liable* to be understood in a sense different from that which it bears to the Premiss; though of course such a Fallacy is less common, because less likely to deceive, in *those* cases, than in *this*; where the term used in the Conclusion, though professing to correspond with one in the Premiss, is not the very *same in expression*, and therefore is more *certain* to convey a different sense; which is what the Sophist wishes.

There are innumerable instances of a non-correspondence in paronymous words, similar to that above instanced; as between *art* and *artful*, *design* and *designing*, *faith* and *faithful*, &c.; and the more slight the variation of meaning, the more likely is the Fallacy to be successful; for when the words have become so widely removed in sense as "pity" and "pitiful," every one would perceive such a Fallacy, nor could it be employed but in jest.

This Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted, by stating merely the impossibility of reducing such an argument to the strict Logical form; (unless indeed you are addressing regular Logicians,) you must find some way of pointing out the non-correspondence of the terms in question; e. g. with respect to the example above, it may be remarked, that we speak of *strong* or *faint* "presumption," but yet we use no such expression in conjunction with the verb "presume," because the word itself *implies strength*.

No Fallacy is more common in controversy than the present, since in this way the Sophist will often be able to misinterpret the propositions which his opponent admits or maintains, and so employ them against him: thus in the examples just given, it is natural to conceive one of the Sophist's Premises to have been borrowed from his opponent.

Perhaps a dictionary of such paronymous words as do not regularly correspond in meaning, would be nearly as useful as one of synonyms; i. e. properly speaking, of *pseudo-synonyms*. The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or rather perhaps may be regarded as a branch of that founded on *Etymology*; viz. when a term is used, at one time, in its customary, and at another, in its Etymological sense. Perhaps no example of this can be found that is more extensively and mischievously employed than in the case of the word *representative*: assuming that its right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and original sense of the verb represent, the Sophist persuades the multitude, that a member of the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the opinion of his constituents; and, in short, to be merely their *spokesman*: whereas law and custom, which in this case may be considered as fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representative to act according to the best of his *own* judgment, and on his own responsibility. H. Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of such weapons for any Sophist who may need them, and has furnished some specimens of the employment of them.

§ 9. It is to be observed, that to the head of *Ambiguous middle* should be referred what is called "*Fallacia plurium Interrogationum*," which may very properly be named, simply, "the Fallacy of Interrogation;" viz. the Fallacy of asking several questions which appear to be but one; so that whatever *one* answer is given, being of course applicable to one only of the implied questions, may be interpreted as applied to the other; the refutation is, of course, to reply *separately* to each question, i. e. to detect the ambiguity.

We have said several "questions which *appear to be but one*, for else there is no *Fallacy*; such an example therefore, as "*estne homo animal et lapis?*" which Aldrich gives, is foreign to the matter in hand; for there is nothing unfair in asking two distinct questions, or asserting two distinct propositions, *distinctly and avowedly*.

This Fallacy may be referred, as has been said, to the head of *Ambiguous middle*: in all Reasoning it is very common to state one of the Premises in form of a question, and when that is admitted, or supposed to be admitted, then to fill up the rest; if then one of the terms of that question be ambiguous, whichever sense the opponent replies to, the Sophist assumes the *other* sense of the term in the remaining Premiss. It is therefore very common to state an unequivocal argument, in form of a question so worded, that there shall be *little doubt which* reply will be given: but if there *be* such doubt, the Sophist must have *two* Fallacies of equivocation ready: e. g. the question "whether any thing vicious is expedient," discussed in Cic. *Off.*, book iii. (where, by the bye, he seems not a little perplexed with it himself,) is of the character in question, from the ambiguity of the word "*expedient*," which means sometimes, "conducive to temporal prosperity," sometimes, "conducive to the greatest good:" whichever answer therefore was given, the Sophist might have a Fallacy of equivocation founded on this term; viz. if the answer be in the negative, his argument Logically developed, will stand thus,—"what is vicious is not expedient; whatever conduces to wealth and aggrandizement is expedient, therefore it cannot be vicious:" if, in the affirmative, then thus, "whatever is expedient is desirable; something vicious is expedient, therefore desirable."

* *Wealth of Nations*, A. Smith: Usury.

This kind of Fallacy is frequently employed in such a manner, that the uncertainty shall be, not about the *meaning*, but the *extent* of a term, i. e. whether it is *distributed* or not: e. g. "did A B in this case act from such and such a motive?" which may imply either, "was it his *sole* motive?" or "was it one of his motives?" in the former case the term "that which actuated A B" is distributed; in the latter not: now if he acted from a mixture of motives, whichever answer you give, may be misrepresented and thus disproved.

§ 10. In some cases of *Ambiguous middle*, the term in question may be considered as having *in itself*, from its own equivocal nature, two significations; (which apparently constitutes the "*Fallacia equivocationis* of Logical writers;) others again have a middle term which is ambiguous from the context, i. e. from what is *understood in conjunction* with it: this division will be found useful, though it is impossible to draw the line accurately in it.

There are various ways in which words come to have two meanings; 1st. by *accident*; (i. e. when there is no perceptible connection between the two meanings) as "*light*" signifies both the contrary to "heavy," and the contrary to "dark." Thus, such proper names as John or Thomas, &c. which happen to belong to several different persons, are ambiguous, because they have a different signification in each case where they are applied. Words which fall under this first head are what are the most strictly called *equivocal*.

2dly. There are several terms in the use of which it is necessary to notice the distinction between *first* and *second intention*: the "first intention" of a term, (according to the usual acceptation of this phrase,) is a certain *vague* and *general* signification of it, as opposed to one more *precise* and *limited*, which it bears in some particular art, science, or system, and which is called its "second intention." Thus, among farmers in some parts, the word "beast" is applied particularly and especially to the ox kind; and "bird," in the language of many sportsmen is in like manner appropriated to the partridge: the common and general acceptation (which every one is well acquainted with) of each of those two words, is the first intention of each; the other, its second intention.

It is evident that a term may have several second intentions, according to the several systems into which it is introduced, and of which it is one of the technical terms: thus line signifies, in the Art Military, a certain form of drawing up ships or troops; in Geography, a certain division of the earth; to the fisherman, a string to catch fish, &c. &c.; all which are so many distinct second intentions, in each of which there is a certain signification of "extension in length" which constitutes the first intention, and which corresponds pretty nearly with the employment of the term in Mathematics.

It will sometimes happen, that a term shall be employed always in some one or other of its second intentions; and never, strictly, in the first, though that first intention is a *part of its signification* in each case. It is evident, that the utmost care is requisite to avoid confounding together, either the first and second intentions, or the different second intentions with each other.

3dly. When two or more things are connected by *resemblance* or *analogy*, they will frequently have the same name. Thus a "*blade* of grass," and the contrivance in building called a "*dove-tail*," are so called from their *resemblance* to the *blade** of a sword, and the *tail* of a real dove: but two things may be connected by *analogy*, though they have in *themselves* no *resemblance*: for analogy is the resemblance of *ratios*, (or relations) thus,—as a *sweet* taste *gratifies* the palate, so does a *sweet* sound *gratify* the ear; and hence the same word, "*sweet*," is applied to both, though no flavour can resemble a sound in itself: so, the *leg of a table*, does not resemble that of an animal; nor the foot of a mountain that of an animal: but *the leg answers the same purpose* to the table, as the leg of an animal to that animal; the foot of a mountain has the *same situation* relatively to the mountain, as the foot of an animal, to the animal; this analogy therefore may be expressed like a Mathematical analogy; (or proportion) leg: animal:: supporting stick: table.—In all these cases, (of this 3d head) one of the meanings of the word is called by Logicians *proper*, i. e. original or primary; the other *improper*, secondary or transferred: thus, *sweet*, is originally and properly applied to *tastes*; secondarily and *improperly* (i. e. by analogy,) to sounds: thus also, dove-tail is applied secondarily though not by analogy, but by direct resemblance to the contrivance in building so called. When the secondary meaning of a word is founded on some *fanciful* analogy, and especially when it is introduced for ornament sake, we call this a *metaphor*; as when we speak of "a ship's *ploughing* the deep." The turning up of the surface being essential indeed to the plough, but incidental only to the ship; but if the analogy be a more important and essential one, and especially if we have no other word to express our meaning but this transferred one, we then call it *merely* an *analogous* word, (though the *metaphor* is analogous also;) e. g. one would hardly call it *metaphorical* or *figurative* language to speak of the leg of a table, or mouth of a river.

4thly. Several things may be called by the same name, (though they have no connection of resemblance or analogy) from being *connected by vicinity of time or place*; under which head will come the connection of *cause and effect*, or of part and whole, &c. Thus a *door* signifies both an opening in the wall, (more strictly called the door-way,) and a board which closes it: which are things neither similar nor analogous. When I say, "the rose *smells* sweet" and "I smell the rose:" the word "smell" has two meanings: in the latter sentence, I am speaking of a certain *sensation* in my own mind; in the former, of a certain *quality* in the flower, which produces that sensation, but which of course cannot in the least resemble it: and here the word *smell*, is applied with equal propriety to both. Thus we speak of Homer, for "the works of Homer;" and this is a secondary or transferred meaning: and so it is when we say, "a good shot," for a good marksman: but the word "*shot*" has two other meanings, which are both equally proper; viz. *the thing put into a gun* in order to be discharged from it, and the *act* of discharging it.

* Unless indeed the primary application of the term be to the leaf of grass, and the secondary, to cutting instruments; which is perhaps more probable; but the question is unimportant in the present case.

Thus, "*learning*" signifies either the act of acquiring knowledge, or the knowledge itself; e. g. "he neglects his learning." "Johnson was a man of learning." *Possession* is ambiguous in the same manner; and a multitude of others. Much confusion often arises from ambiguity of this kind, when unperceived; nor is there any point in which the copiousness and consequent precision of the Greek language is more to be admired than in its distinct terms for expressing an act, and the result of that act; c. g. πρᾶξις "the doing of anything;" πρᾶγμα, "the thing done;" so, δόσις and δῶρον, λῆψις and λῆμμα, &c. It will very often happen, that two of the meanings of a word will have no connection with one another, but will each have some connection with a third. Thus "martyr," originally siguified a *witness*, thence it was applied to those who *suffered* in bearing testimony to Christianity; and thence again it is often applied to sufferers in general: the first and third significations are not the least connected. Thus "*post*" signifies originally a pillar, (*pŏstum*, from *pono*;) then a distance marked out by posts; and then the carriages, messengers, &c. that travelled over this distance.

Innumerable other ambiguities might be brought under this fourth head, which indeed comprehends all the cases which do not fall under the three others.

The remedy for ambiguity is a definition of the term which is suspected of being used in two senses; viz. a verbal, not necessarily a real definition; as was remarked in the Compendium.

But here it may be proper to remark, that for the avoiding of Fallacy or of verbal controversy, it is only requisite that the term should be employed uniformly in the same sense *as far as the existing question is concerned*. Thus, two persons might, in discussing the question, whether Buonaparte was a GREAT man, have some difference in their acceptation of the epithet "great," which would be non-essential to that question; e. g. one of them might understand by it nothing more than eminent intellectual, and moral *qualities*; while the other might conceive it to imply the performance of splendid *actions*: this abstract difference of meaning would not produce any disagreement in the existing question, because both those circumstances are united in the case of Buonaparte; but if one of the parties understood the epithet "great" to imply GENEROSITY of character, &c. then there *would* be a disagreement. Definition, the specific for ambiguity, is to be employed and demanded with a view to this principle; it is sufficient on each occasion to define a term *as far as regards the question in hand*.

Of those cases in which the ambiguity arises *from the context*, there are many species; several of which Logicians have enumerated, but have neglected to refer them, in the first place, to one common class, (viz. the one under which they are here placed;) and have even arranged some under the head of Fallacies "*in dictione*," and others, "*extra dictionem*."

We may consider, as the first of these species, the Fallacy of "Division" and that of "Composition," taken together, since in each of these the middle term is used in one Premiss *collectively*, in the other, *distributively*: if the former of these is the major Premiss, and the latter the minor, this is called the "Fallacy of division;" the term which is first taken collectively being afterwards divided; and *vice versâ*. The ordinary examples are such as these; all the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles: A B C, is an angle of a triangle; therefore A B C, is equal to two right angles. Five is one number; three and two are five; therefore three and two are one number; or, three and two are two numbers, five is three and two, therefore five is two numbers: it is manifest that the middle term, three and two, (in this last example) is ambiguous, signifying, in the major Premiss "taken distinctly," in the minor, "taken together:" and so of the rest.

To this head may be referred the Fallacy by which men have sometimes been led to admit, or pretend to admit, the doctrine of necessity; e. he who necessarily goes or stays (i. e. in reality, "who *necessarily goes*, or who *necessarily stays*") is not a free agent; you must necessarily go or stay; (i. e. "you must necessarily *take the alternative*,") therefore you are not a free agent. Such also is the Fallacy which probably operates on most adventurers in lotteries; e. g. the gaining of a high prize is no uncommon occurrence; and what is no uncommon occurrence may reasonably be expected; therefore the gaining of a high prize "may reasonably be expected:" the conclusion when applied to the individual, (as in practice it is) must be understood in the sense of "reasonably expected *by a certain individual*;" therefore for the major Premiss to be true the middle term must be understood to mean, "no uncommon occurrence to some one *particular* person;" whereas for the minor (which has been placed first) to be true, you must understand it of "no uncommon occurrence to *some one or other*;" and thus you will have the Fallacy of Composition.

There is no Fallacy more common, or more likely to deceive than the one now before us: the form in which it is most usually employed, is, to establish some truth, *separately*, concerning *each single* member of a certain class, and thence to infer the same of the *whole collectively*: thus some infidels have laboured to prove concerning *some one* of our Lord's miracles, that it might have been the result of an accidental conjuncture of natural circumstances; next, they endeavour to prove the same concerning *another*; and so on; and thence infer that *all* of them might have been so. They might argue in like manner, that because it is not very improbable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hundred throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes a hundred times running.

This Fallacy may often be considered as turning on the ambiguity of the word "all;" which may easily be dispelled by substituting for it the word "each" or "every," where that is its signification; e. g. "all these trees make a thick shade" is ambiguous, meaning, either "every one of them," or "all together."

This is a Fallacy with which men are extremely apt to deceive *themselves*: for when a multitude of particulars are presented to the mind, many are too weak or too indolent to take a comprehensive view of them; but confine their attention to each single point, by turns; and then decide, infer, and act, accordingly; e. g. the imprudent spendthrift, finding that he is able to afford this, *or* that, *or* the other expense, forgets that *all of them together* will ruin him.

To the same head may be reduced that fallacious reasoning by which men vindicate themselves to their own conscience and to others, for the neglect of those *undefined* duties, which though indispensable, and

therefore not left to our choice *whether* we will practise them or not, are left to our discretion as to the *mode*, and the particular occasions of practising them; e. g. "I am not bound to contribute to this charity in particular; nor to that; nor to the other:" the *practical* conclusion which they draw, is, that *all* charity may be dispensed with.

As men are apt to forget that any two circumstances (not naturally connected) are more rarely to be met with combined than separate, though they be not at all incompatible; so also they are apt to imagine from finding that they *are* rarely combined, that there is an incompatibility; e. g. if the chances are ten to one against a man's possessing strong reasoning powers, and ten to one against exquisite taste, the chances against the combination of the two (supposing them neither connected nor opposed) will be a hundred to one. Many therefore, from finding them so rarely united, will infer that they are in some measure incompatible; which Fallacy may easily be exposed in the form of Undistributed middle: "qualities unfriendly to each other are rarely combined; excellence in the reasoning powers and in taste are rarely combined; therefore they are qualities unfriendly to each other."

§ 11. The other kind of ambiguity arising from the context, and which is the last case of Ambiguous middle that we shall notice, is the "*fallacia accidentis*," together with its converse "*fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*;" in each of which the middle is used in one Premiss to signify something considered simply, in itself, and as to its essence; and in the other Premiss, so as to imply that its accidents are taken into account with it: as in the well-known example, "what is bought in the market is eaten; raw meat is bought in the market; therefore raw meat is eaten." Here the middle has understood in conjunction with it, in the major Premiss "*as to its substance merely*:" in the minor, "*as to its condition and circumstances*."

To this head perhaps, as well as to any, may be referred the Fallacies which are frequently founded on the occasional, partial, and temporary variations in the acceptation of some term, arising from circumstances of person, time, and place, which will occasion something to be understood in conjunction with it beyond its strict literal signification; e. g. the phrase "Protestant ascendancy," having become a kind of watch-word or gathering-cry of a party, the expression of good wishes for it would commonly imply an adherence to certain measures not literally expressed by the words; to assume therefore that one is unfriendly to "Protestant ascendancy" in the literal sense, because he has declared himself unfriendly to it when implying and connected with such and such other sentiments, is a gross Fallacy; and such an one as perhaps the authors of the above would much object to, if it was assumed of *them* that they were adverse to "the cause of liberty throughout the world," and to "a fair representation of the people," from their objecting to join with the members of a factious party in the expression of such sentiments.

Such Fallacies may fairly be referred to the present head.

§ 12. Of the Non-logical (or material) Fallacies, and first of begging the question.

The indistinct and unphilosophical account which has been given by Logical writers of the Fallacy of "*non-causâ*," and that of "*petitio principii*," makes it very difficult to ascertain wherein they conceived them to differ, and what, according to them, is the nature of each; without therefore professing to conform exactly to their meaning, and with a view to distinctness only, which is the main point, let us confine the name "*petitio principii*" to those cases in which the Premiss either appears manifestly to be the same as the Conclusion, or is actually proved from the Conclusion, or is such as would naturally and properly so be proved; (as if one should attempt to prove the being of a God from the authority of holy writ;) and to the other class be referred all other cases, in which the Premiss (whether the expressed or the suppressed one) is either proved false, or has no sufficient claim to be received as true. Let it however be observed, that in such cases (apparently) as this, we must not too hastily pronounce the argument fallacious; for it may be perfectly fair at the *commencement* of an argument to assume a Premiss that is not more evident than the Conclusion, or is even ever so paradoxical, provided you proceed to prove fairly that Premiss: and in like manner it is both usual and fair to *begin* by deducing your Conclusion from a Premiss exactly equivalent to it; which is merely throwing the proposition in question into the form in which it will be most conveniently proved. Arguing in a circle however must necessarily be unfair; though it frequently is practised undesignedly; e. g. some Mechanicians, attempt to prove, (what they ought to lay down as a probable but doubtful hypothesis,) that every particle of matter gravitates equally; "why?" because those bodies which contain more particles ever gravitate more strongly, i. e. are heavier: "but (it may be urged) those which are heaviest are not always more bulky;" "no, but still they contain more particles, though more closely condensed;" "how do you know that?" "because they are heavier;" "how does that prove it?" "because all particles of matter gravitating equally, that mass which is specifically the heavier, must needs have the more of them in the same space."

Obliquity and disguise being of course most important to the success of the *petitio principii*, as well as of other Fallacies, the Sophist will in general either have recourse to the circle, or else not venture to *state* distinctly his assumption of the point in question, but will rather assert some other proposition which *implies* it; thus keeping out of sight (as a dexterous thief does stolen goods) the point in question, at the very moment when he is taking it for granted: hence the frequent union of this Fallacy with "*ignoratio elenchi*:" vide § 14. The English language is perhaps the more suitable for the Fallacy of *petitio principii*, from its being formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in synonymous expressions which have no resemblance in sound, and no connection in etymology; so that a Sophist may bring forward a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it, the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin; e. g. "to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech, must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it is highly conducive to the interest of the community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited of expressing his sentiments."

§ 13. The next head is, the falsity, or at least, undue assumption of a Premiss when it is not equivalent to, or dependent on the Conclusion; which, as has

been before said, seems to correspond nearly with the meaning of Logicians, when they speak of "*non causa pro causâ*:" this name indeed would seem to apply a much narrower class, there being one species of arguments which are *from cause to effect*, in which of course two things are necessary; 1st. the *sufficiency* of the cause, 2d. its establishment; these are the two Premises; if therefore the *former* be unduly assumed, we are arguing from that which is *not* a sufficient cause as if it *were* so; c. g. as if one should contend from such a man's having been unjust or cruel, that he will certainly be visited with some heavy temporal judgment, and come to an untimely end. In this instance the Sophist, from having assumed in the Premiss, the (granted) existence of a pretended cause, infers in the conclusion the existence of the pretended effect, which we have supposed to be the Question: or *vice versâ*, the pretended effect may be employed to establish the cause; e. g. inferring sinfulness from temporal calamity: but when *both* the pretended cause, and effect are *granted*, i. e. granted to exist, then the Sophist will infer something from their pretended *connection*; i. e. he will assume as a Premiss, that "of these two admitted facts, the one is the cause of the other;" as the opponents of the Reformation assumed that it was the cause of the troubles which took place at that period, and thence inferred that it was an evil. Such an argument as either of these might strictly be called "*non causa pro causâ*;" but it is not probable, that the Logical writers intended any such limitation, (which indeed would be wholly unnecessary and impertinent,) but rather that they were confounding together *cause and reason*; the sequence of *Conclusion* from *Premises* being perpetually mistaken for that of *effect* from physical *cause*. It is indeed a very necessary caution in *philosophical investigation* not to assume too hastily that one thing is the *cause* of another, when perhaps it is only an *accidental concomitant*; (as was the case in the assumption of the Premises of the last mentioned examples:) but *investigation* is a perfectly distinct business from *argumentation*; and to mingle together the rules of the two, (as Logical writers have generally done, especially in the present case,) tends only to produce confusion in both. It may be better therefore to drop the name which tends to perpetuate this confusion, and simply state (when such is the case) that the Premiss is unduly assumed; i. e. without being either self-evident, or satisfactorily proved.

The contrivances by which men may deceive themselves or others, in assuming Premises unduly, *so that that undue assumption shall not be perceived*, (for it is in *this* the *Fallacy* consists) are of course infinite. Sometimes (as was before observed) the *doubtful Premiss* is *suppressed*, as if it were too evident to need being proved, or even stated, and as if the whole question turned on the establishment of the other Premiss.

Thus H. Tooke proves, by an immense induction, that all particles were originally nouns or verbs; and thence concludes, that in reality they are so still, and that the ordinary division of the parts of speech is absurd; keeping out of sight, as self-evident, the other Premiss, which is absolutely false; viz. that the meaning and force of a term, now and for ever, must be that, which it, or its root originally bore.

Sometimes men are shamed into admitting an unfounded assertion, by being assured, that it is so evident it would argue great weakness to doubt it. In general, however, the more skilful Sophist will avoid a *direct assertion* of what he means unduly to assume; since that might direct the reader's attention to the consideration of the question whether it be *true* or not, since that which is indisputable does not so often need to be asserted: it succeeds better, therefore, if you *allude* to the proposition as something *curious* and remarkable; just as the Royal Society were imposed on by being asked to *account for* the fact that a vessel of water received no addition to its weight by a live fish put into it; while they were seeking for the *cause*, they forgot to ascertain the *fact*, and thus admitted without suspicion a mere fiction. Thus an eminent Scotch writer, instead of *asserting* that "the advocates of Logic have been worsted and driven from the field in every controversy," (an assertion, which if made, would have been the more readily ascertained to be perfectly groundless,) merely *observes*, that "it is a circumstance not a little *remarkable*."

Frequently the Fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi* is called in to the aid of this; i. e. the Premiss is assumed on the ground of another proposition, *somewhat like it*, having been proved; thus in arguing by example, &c. the parallelism of two cases is often assumed from their being in *some respects* alike, though perhaps they differ in the very point which is *essential* to the argument; e. g. from the circumstance that some men of humble station, who have been well educated, are apt to think themselves above low drudgery, it is argued that universal education of the lower order, would beget general idleness: this argument rests of course on the assumption of *parallelism* in the two cases, viz. the past and the future; whereas there is a circumstance that is absolutely essential, in which they differ; for when education is *universal* it must cease to be a *distinction*; which is probably the very circumstance that renders men too proud for their work.

This very same Fallacy is often resorted to on the opposite side; an attempt is made to invalidate some argument from example, by pointing out a difference between the two cases, though they agree in every thing that is essential to the question. Lastly, it may be here remarked, conformably with what has been formerly said, that it will often be left to your choice whether to refer this or that fallacious argument to the present head, or that of Ambiguous middle; "*if* the middle term is here used in *this* sense, there is an *ambiguity*; *if* in *that* sense, the proposition is *false*."

§ 14. The last kind of Fallacy to be discussed is that of Irrelevant Conclusion, commonly called *ignoratio elenchi*. Various kinds of propositions are, according to the occasion, substituted for the one of which proof is required.

Sometimes the particular for the universal; sometimes a proposition with different terms: and various are the contrivances employed to effect and to conceal this substitution, and to make the Conclusion which the Sophist has drawn, answer, practically, the same purpose as the one he *ought* to have established. We say, "practically the same purpose," because it will very often happen that some *emotion* will be excited—some sentiment impressed on the mind—(by a dexterous employment of this Fallacy) such as shall bring men into the *disposition* requisite for your purpose, though they may not have assented to, or even stated distinctly in their own minds the *proposition* which it was your business to establish. Thus if a Sophist has to

defend one who has been guilty of some *serious* offence, which he wishes to extenuate, though he is unable distinctly to prove that it is not such, yet if he can succeed in *making the audience laugh* at some casual matter, he has gained practically the same point. So also if any one has pointed out the extenuating circumstances in some particular case of offence, so as to shew that it differs widely from the generality of the same class, the Sophist, if he find himself unable to disprove these circumstances, may do away the force of them, by simply *referring the action to that very class*, which no one can deny that it belongs to, and the very name of which will excite a feeling of disgust sufficient to counteract the extenuation; e. g. let it be a case of peculation, and that many mitigating circumstances have been brought forward which cannot be denied; the sophistical opponent will reply, "well, but after all, the man is a *rogue*, and there is an end of it;" now in reality this was (by hypothesis) never the question; and the mere assertion of what was never denied, *ought* not, in fairness, to be regarded as decisive; but, practically, the odiousness of the word, arising in great measure from the *association of those very circumstances* which belong to *most of the class*, but which we have supposed to be *absent* in *this particular* instance, excites precisely that *feeling of disgust*, which in effect destroys the force of the defence. In like manner we may refer to this head all cases of improper appeals to the passions, and every thing else which is mentioned by Aristotle as extraneous to the matter in hand, (ἔξω τῆ πράγματος.)

In all these cases, as has been before observed, if the Fallacy we are now treating of be employed for the apparent establishment, not of the *ultimate* Conclusion, but (as it very commonly happens) of a *Premiss*, (i. e. if the Premiss required be assumed on the ground that some proposition resembling it has been proved,) then there will be a combination of this Fallacy with the last mentioned. A good instance of the employment and exposure of this Fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus concerning the Mitylenæans: the former (over and above his appeal to the angry passions of his audience,) urges the *justice* of putting the revolters to death; which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to the purpose, since the Athenians were not sitting in *judgment*, but in *deliberation*, of which the proper end is *expediency*.

It is evident that *ignoratio elenchi* may be employed as well for the apparent *refutation* of your opponent's proposition, as for the apparent establishment of your own; for it is substantially the same thing to *prove* what was not denied, or to *disprove* what was not asserted: the latter practice is not less common, and it is more offensive, because it frequently amounts to a personal affront, in attributing to a person opinions, &c. which he perhaps holds in abhorrence. Thus, when in a discussion one party vindicates, on the ground of general expediency, a particular instance of resistance to Government in a case of intolerable oppression, the opponent may gravely maintain that "we ought not to do evil that good may come:" a proposition which of course had never been denied, the point in dispute being "whether resistance in this particular case *were* doing evil or not." In this example it is to be remarked, (and the remark will apply very generally,) that the Fallacy of *petitio principii* is combined with that of *ignoratio elenchi*, which is a very common and successful practice; viz. the Sophist proves, or disproves, not the proposition which is really in question, but one which so implies it as to proceed on the supposition that it is already decided, and can admit of no doubt; by this means his "assumption of the point in question" is so indirect and oblique, that it may easily escape notice; and he thus establishes, practically, his Conclusion, at the very moment when he is withdrawing your attention from it to another question.

There are certain kinds of argument recounted and named by Logical writers, which we should by no means universally call Fallacies; but which *when unfairly* used, and *so far as they* are fallacious, may very well be referred to the present head; such as the "*argumentum ad hominem*," or personal argument, "*argumentum ad verecundiam*," "*argumentum ad populum*," &c. all of them regarded as contradistinguished from "*argumentum ad rem*," or according to others (meaning probably the very same thing) "*ad judicium*." These have all been described in the lax and popular language before alluded to, but not scientifically: the "*argumentum ad hominem*" they say, "is addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a reference to him only, and does not bear directly and absolutely on the real question, as the '*argumentum ad rem*' does:" in like manner the "*argumentum ad verecundiam*" is described as an appeal to our reverence for some respected authority, some venerable institution, &c. and the "*argumentum ad populum*," as an appeal to the prejudices, passions, &c. of the multitude, and so of the rest. Along with these is usually enumerated "*argumentum ad ignorantiam*," which is here omitted as being evidently nothing more than the employment of some kind of Fallacy, in the widest sense of that word, towards such as are likely to be deceived by it. It appears then, (to speak rather more technically,) that in the "*argumentum ad hominem*" the Conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one in question, but relative and particular; viz. not that "such and such is the fact," but that "*this man* is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of Reasoning, or in consistency with his own conduct, situation, &c." Such a Conclusion it is often both fair and necessary to establish, in order to silence those who will not yield to fair general argument; or to convince those whose weakness and prejudices would not allow them to assign to it its due weight: it is thus that our Lord on many occasions silences the cavils of the Jews; as in the vindication of healing on the Sabbath, which is paralleled by the authorized practice of drawing out a beast that has fallen into a pit. All this, as we have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be done plainly, *knowingly*, and *avowedly*; but if you attempt to *substitute* this partial and relative Conclusion for a more general one—if you triumph as having established your proposition absolutely and universally, from having established it, in reality, only as far as it relates to your opponent, then you are guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we are now treating of: your Conclusion is not in reality that which was, by your own account, proposed to be proved: the fallaciousness depends upon the *deceit* or attempt to deceive. The same observations will *apply* to "*argumentum ad verecundiam*," and the rest.

It is very common to employ an ambiguous term for the purpose of introducing the Fallacy of Irrelevant Conclusion; i.e. when you cannot prove your proposition in the sense in which it was maintained, to prove it in some other sense; e. g. those who contend against the efficacy of *faith*, usually employ that word in their arguments in the sense of mere belief, unaccompanied with any moral or practical result, but considered as a mere intellectual process; and when they have thus proved their Conclusion, they oppose it to one in which the word is used in a widely different sense.

§ 15. The Fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi* is no where more common than in protracted controversy, when one of the parties, after having attempted in vain to maintain his position, *shifts his ground* as covertly as possible to another, instead of honestly giving up the point. An instance occurs in an attack made on the system pursued at one of our Universities. The objectors finding themselves unable to maintain their charge of the *present* neglect of Mathematics in that place, (to which neglect they had attributed the late *general decline* in those studies,) they shifted their ground, and contended that that University was *never* famous for Mathematicians; which not only does not establish, but absolutely overthrows their own original assertion; for if it *never* succeeded in those pursuits, it could not have caused their late *decline*.

A practice of this nature is common in oral controversy especially; viz. that of combating *both* your opponent's Premises *alternately*, and shifting the attack from the one to the other, without waiting to have either of them decided upon before you quit it.

It has been remarked above, that one class of the propositions that may be, in this Fallacy, substituted for the one required, is the *particular* for the *universal*: nearly akin to this is the very common case of proving something to be *possible* when it ought to have been proved highly *probable*; or *probable*, when it ought to have been proved *necessary*; or, which comes to the very same, proving it to be *not necessary*, when it should have been proved *not probable*; or *improbable*, when it should have been proved *impossible*. Aristotle, (*in Rhet.* book ii.) complains of this last branch of the Fallacy, as giving an undue advantage to the respondent: many a guilty person owes his acquittal to this; the jury considering that the evidence brought does not demonstrate the absolute impossibility of his being innocent, though perhaps the chances are innumerable against it.

§ 16. Similar to this case is that which may be called the *Fallacy of objections*; i. e. shewing that *there are* objections against some plan, theory or system, and thence inferring that it should be rejected; when that which ought to have been proved, is, that there are *more*, or *stronger* objections against the receiving than the rejecting of it. This is the main, and almost universal Fallacy of infidels, and is that of which men should be first and principally warned. This is also the stronghold of bigoted anti-innovators, who oppose all reforms and alterations indiscriminately; for there never was, nor will be, any plan executed or proposed, against which strong and even unanswerable objections may not be urged; so that unless the opposite objections be set in the balance on the other side, we can never advance a step. "There are objections," said Dr. Johnson, "against a *plenum*, and objections against a *vacuum*; but one of them must be true."

The very same Fallacy indeed is employed on the other side, by those who are for overthrowing whatever is established as soon as they can prove an objection against it, without considering whether more and weightier objections may not lie against their own schemes: but their opponents have this decided advantage over them, that they can urge with great plausibility, "we do not call upon you to *reject* at once whatever is objected to, but merely to *suspend your judgment* and not come to a decision as long as there are reasons on both sides:" now since there always *will be* reasons on both sides, this *non*-decision is practically the very same thing as a *decision in favour of the existing state* of things; the *delay* of trial becomes equivalent to an *acquittal*.*

§ 17. Another form of *ignoratio elenchi*, which is also rather the most serviceable on the side of the respondent, is, to prove or disprove *some part* of that which is required, and dwell on *that*, suppressing all the rest.

Thus, if a University is charged with cultivating *only* the mere elements of Mathematics, and in reply a list of the books studied there is produced, should even *any one* of those books be *not elementary*, the charge is in fairness refuted; but the Sophist may then earnestly contend that *some* of those books *are* elementary; and thus keep out of sight the real question, viz. whether they are *all* so.

Hence the danger of ever advancing more than can be well maintained; since the refutation of *that* will often quash the whole: a guilty person may often escape by having too much laid to his charge: so he may also by having too much evidence against him, i. e. some that is not in itself satisfactory: thus, a prisoner may sometimes obtain acquittal by shewing that one of the witnesses against him is an infamous informer and spy; though perhaps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, the rest would have been sufficient for conviction.

Cases of this nature might very well be referred also to the Fallacy formerly mentioned, of inferring the Falsity of the Conclusion from the Falsity of a Premiss, which indeed is very closely allied to the present Fallacy: the real question is "whether or not this Conclusion *ought to be admitted*;" the Sophist confines himself to the question, "whether or not it is *established by this particular argument*;" leaving it to be inferred by the audience, if he has carried his point as to the latter question, that the former is thereby decided.

§ 18. It will readily be perceived that nothing is less conducive to the success of the Fallacy in question than to state clearly, in the outset, either the proposition you are about to prove, or that which you ought to prove; it answers best to *begin* with the *Premises*, and to introduce a pretty long chain of argument before you arrive at the Conclusion. The careless hearer takes for granted, at the beginning, that this chain

* "Not to resolve, is to resolve." Bacon.

How happy it is for mankind that in the most momentous concerns of life their decision is generally formed *for* them by external circumstances; which thus saves them not only from the perplexity of doubt and the danger of delay, but also from the pain of regret, since we acquiesce much more cheerfully in that which is unavoidable.

will lead to the Conclusion required; and by the time you are come to the end, he is ready to take for granted that the Conclusion which you draw *is* the one required; his idea of the question having gradually become indistinct. This Fallacy is greatly aided by the common practice of suppressing the Conclusion and leaving it to be supplied by the hearer, who is of course less likely to perceive whether it be really that "which was to be proved," than if it were distinctly stated. The practice therefore is at best suspicious; and it is better in general to avoid it, and to give and require a distinct statement of the Conclusion intended.

§ 19. Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, it may not be improper to mention the just and ingenious remark, that Jests are Fallacies; i. e. Fallacies so palpable as not to be likely to deceive any one, but yet bearing just that resemblance of argument which is calculated to amuse by the contrast; in the same manner that a parody does, by the contrast of its levity with the serious production which it imitates. There is indeed something laughable even in Fallacies which are intended for serious conviction, when they are thoroughly exposed. There are several different kinds of joke and raillery, which will be found to correspond with the different kinds of Fallacy: the pun (to take the simplest and most obvious case) is evidently a mock argument founded on a palpable equivocation of the middle term: and the rest in like manner will be found to correspond to the respective Fallacies, and to be *imitations* of serious argument. It is probable indeed that all jests, sports, or games, (παιδιαι) properly so called, will be found, on examination, to be *imitative* of serious transactions: but to enter fully into this subject would be unsuitable to the present occasion.

We shall conclude the consideration of this subject with some general remarks on the legitimate province of Reasoning, and on its connection with Inductive philosophy, and with Rhetoric: on which points much misapprehension has prevailed, tending to throw obscurity over the design and use of the Science under consideration.

ESSAY

ON THE

PROVINCE OF REASONING.

Logic being concerned with the theory of Reasoning it is evidently necessary, in order to take a correct view of this Science, that all misapprehensions should be removed, relative to the occasions on which the Reasoning process is employed, the purposes it has in view, and the limits within which it is confined.

Simple and obvious as such questions may appear to those who have not thought much on the subject, they will appear on further consideration to be involved in much perplexity and obscurity, from the vague and inaccurate language of many popular writers. To the confused and incorrect notions that prevail respecting the Reasoning process, may be traced most of the common mistakes respecting the Science of Logic, and much of the unsound and unphilosophical argumentation which is so often to be met with in the works of ingenious writers.

These errors have been incidentally adverted to in the foregoing part of this article; but it may be desirable, before we dismiss the subject, to offer on these points some further remarks, which could not have been there introduced without too great an interruption to the developement of the system. Little or nothing indeed remains to be said that is not *implied* in the principles which have been already laid down; but the results and applications of those principles are liable in many instances to be overlooked if not distinctly pointed out. These supplementary observations will neither require, nor admit of, so systematic an arrangement as has hitherto been arrived at, as they will be such as are suggested principally by the objections and mistakes of those who have misunderstood, partially, or entirely, the nature of the Logical system.

Of Induction.

§ 1. Much has been said by some writers of the superiority of the Inductive to the Syllogistic method of seeking truth, as if the two stood opposed to each other; and of the advantage of substituting the Organon of Bacon for that of Aristotle, &c. &c. which indicates a total misconception of the nature of both. There is, however, the more excuse for the confusion of thought which prevails on this subject, because eminent Logical writers have treated or at least have appeared to treat of Induction as a distinct kind of argument from the Syllogism; which if it were, it certainly might be contrasted with the Syllogism: or rather the whole Syllogistic theory would fall to the ground, since one of the very first principles it establishes, is that all Reasoning, on whatever subject, is one and the same process, which may be clearly exhibited in the form of Syllogisms. It is hardly to be supposed, therefore, that this was the meaning of those writers; though it must be admitted that they have countenanced the error in question, by their inaccurate expressions. This inaccuracy seems chiefly to have arisen from a vagueness in the use of the word Induction, which is sometimes employed to designate the process of investigation and of collecting facts; sometimes the deducing of an inference from those facts. The former of these processes (i. e. that of observation and experiment) is undoubtedly *distinct* from that which takes place in the Syllogism; but then it is not a process of *argument;* the latter again *is* an argumentative process; but then it is, like all other arguments, capable of being Syllogistically expressed. And hence Induction has come to be regarded as a distinct kind of argument from the Syllogism. This Fallacy cannot be more concisely or clearly stated, than in the technical form with which we may now presume our readers to be familiar.

Induction is distinct from Syllogism:
Induction is a process of Reasoning; therefore
There is a process of Reasoning distinct from Syllogism.

Here, "Induction" which is the middle term, is used in different senses in the two Premises.

In the process of Reasoning by which we deduce, from our observation of certain known cases, an inference with respect to unknown ones, we are employing a Syllogism in *Barbara* with the major* Premiss suppressed; that being always substantially the same, as it asserts that "what belongs to the individual or individuals we have examined, belongs to the whole class under which they come:" e. g. from an examination of the history of several tyrannies, and finding that each of them was of short duration, we conclude that "the same is likely to be the case with all tyrannies;" the suppressed major Premiss being easily supplied by the hearer; viz. "that what belongs to the tyrannies in question is likely to belong to all."

Induction, therefore, so far forth as it is an *argument,* may of course he stated Syllogistically; but so far forth as it is a *process of inquiry* with a view to obtain the Premises of that argument, it is of course out of the province of Logic. Whether the Induction (in this last sense) has been sufficiently ample, i. e. takes in a sufficient number of individual cases,—whether the character of those cases has been correctly ascertained—and how far the individuals we have examined are *likely to resemble,* in this or that circumstance, *the rest* of the class, &c. &c. are points that require indeed great judgment and caution; but this judgment and caution are not to be aided by Logic, because they are, in reality, employed in deciding whether or not it is fair and allowable to *lay down your Premises;* i. e. whether you are authorized or not, to assert that "what is true of the individuals you

* Not the minor, as Aldrich represents it.

have examined, is true of the whole class:" and that this or that *is* true of those individuals. Now the rules of Logic have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of the Premises, but merely teach us to decide (not whether the Premises are *fairly laid down*, but) whether the Conclusion *follows fairly from* the Premises or not.

Whether the Premises may fairly be assumed, or not, is a point which cannot be decided without a competent knowledge of the *nature of the subject*, e. g. in Natural Philosophy, in which the circumstances which in any case affect the result, are usually far more clearly ascertained, a *single instance* is often accounted a sufficient Induction: e. g. having once ascertained that an individual magnet will attract iron, we are authorized to conclude that this property is universal: in the affairs of human life, a much fuller Induction is required; as in the former example. In short the *degree of evidence* for any proposition we originally assume as a Premiss, (whether the expressed, or the suppressed one) is not to be learned from Logic, nor indeed from *any one distinct* Science; but is the province of whatever Science furnishes the subject matter of your argument. None but a Politician can judge rightly of the degree of evidence of a proposition in Politics; a Naturalist, in Natural History, &c. &c. e. g. from examination of many horned animals, as sheep, cows, &c. a Naturalist finds that they have cloven feet; now his *skill as a Naturalist* is to be shewn in judging whether these animals are likely to resemble in the form of their feet all other horned animals; and it is the exercise of this judgment, together with the examination of individuals, that constitutes what is usually meant by the *Inductive process;* which is that by which we gain *new truths*, and which is not connected with Logic; being not what is strictly called *Reasoning*, but *Investigation*. But when this major Premiss is *granted* him, and is combined with the minor, viz. that the animals he has examined have cloven feet, then he *draws the conclusion Logically:* viz. that "the feet of all horned animals are cloven." Again, if from several times meeting with ill-luck on a Friday, any one concluded that Friday, universally, is an unlucky day, one would object to his *Induction;* and yet it would not be, as an *argument, illogical;* since the conclusion *follows* fairly, *if* you *grant* his implied Premiss, that the events which happened on those particular Fridays are such as must happen on all Fridays;" but we should object to his *laying down this* Premiss; and therefore should justly say that his *Induction* was faulty, though his *argument* was correct.

And here it may be remarked that the ordinary rule for fair argument, viz. that in an Enthymeme the suppressed Premiss should be always the one of whose truth least doubt can exist, is not observed in Induction; for the Premiss which is usually the more doubtful of the two, is, in that, the major; it being in few cases quite certain that the individuals respecting which some point has been ascertained are to be fairly regarded as a sample of the whole class; the major Premiss nevertheless is seldom expressed, for the reason just given, that it is easily understood, as being *mutatis mutandis*, the same in every Induction.

What has been said of Induction will equally apply to Example, which differs from it only in having a singular instead of a general conclusion: e. g. in the instance above, if the conclusion had been drawn, not respecting tyrannics in general, but respecting this or that tyranny, that it was not likely to be lasting, each of the cases adduced to prove this, would have been called an Example.

On the Discovery of Truth.

§ 2. Whether it is by a process of Reasoning that New Truths are brought to light, is a question which seems to be decided in the negative by what has been already said, though many eminent writers seem to have taken for granted the affirmative. It is perhaps, in a great measure, a dispute concerning the use of words; but it is not for that reason either uninteresting or unimportant, since an inaccurate use of language may often, in matters of Science, lead to confusion of thought, and to erroneous conclusions. And in the present instance much of the undeserved contempt which has been bestowed on the Logical system may be traced to this source; for when any one has laid down that "Reasoning is important in the discovery of Truth," and that "Logic is of no service in the discovery of Truth," each of which propositions is true in a certain sense of the terms employed, but not in the *same* sense; he is naturally led to conclude that there are processes of Reasoning to which the Syllogistic theory does not apply, and of course to misconceive altogether the nature of the Science.

In maintaining the negative side of the above question, three things are to be premised: first, that it is not contended that Discoveries of any kind of Truth can be made (or at least are usually made) *without* Reasoning; only that Reasoning is not the *whole* of the process, nor the whole of that which is important therein: secondly, that Reasoning shall be taken in the sense, not of every exercise of the Reason, but of *Argumentation*, in which we have all along used it, and in which it has been defined by all the Logical writers, viz. "from certain granted propositions to infer another proposition as the consequence of them:" thirdly, that by a "New Truth," be understood something neither expressly nor virtually asserted before,—not implied and involved in any thing already known.

To prove then this point demonstratively becomes in this manner perfectly easy; for since all Reasoning (in the sense above defined) may be resolved into Syllogisms; and since even the objectors to Logic make it a subject of complaint, that in a Syllogism the Premises do virtually assert the Conclusion, it follows at once that no New Truth (as above defined) can be elicited by any process of Reasoning.

It is on this ground indeed, that the justly celebrated author of the *Philosophy of Rhetoric* objects to the Syllogism altogether, as necessarily involving a *petitio principii;* an objection which, of course, he would not have been disposed to bring forward, had he perceived that, whether well or ill founded, it lies against all arguments whatever.

Had he been aware that a Syllogism is no distinct kind of argument otherwise than in form, but is, in fact, any argument whatever stated regularly and at full length, he would have obtained a more correct view of the object of all Reasoning, which is merely to expand and unfold the assertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied in those with which we set out, and to

Logic.

bring a person to perceive and acknowledge the full force of that which he has admitted,—to contemplate it in various points of view,—to admit in one shape what he has already admitted in another, and to give up and disallow whatever is inconsistent with it.

Nor is it always a very easy task even to bring before the mind the several bearings,—the various applications,—of any one proposition. A common term comprehends several, often numberless individuals, and these often, in some respects, widely differing from each other; and no one can be, on each occasion of his employing such a term, attending to and fixing his mind on each of the individuals, or even of the species so comprehended. It is to be remembered too, that both Division and Generalization are in a great degree arbitrary; i. e. that we may both divide the same genus on several different principles, and may refer the same species to several different classes, according to the nature of the discourse and drift of the argument; each of which classes will furnish a distinct middle term for an argument, according to the question: e. g. if we wished to prove that "a horse feels," (to adopt an ill-chosen example from the above writer,) we might refer it to the genus "animal;" to prove that "it has only a single stomach," to the genus of "non-ruminants;" to prove that it is "likely to degenerate in a very cold climate," we should class it with "original productions of a hot climate, &c. &c." Now each of these, and numberless others to which the same thing might be referred, are implied by the very term "horse;" yet it cannot be expected that they all be at once present to the mind whenever that term is uttered. Much less, when instead of such a term as that, we are employing terms of a very abstract, and perhaps complex signification,* as "government, justice, &c."

The ten Categories† or Predicaments which Aristotle and other Logical writers have treated of, being certain general heads or *summa-genera*, to one or more of which every term may be referred, serve the purpose of marking out certain tracks, as it were, which are to be pursued in searching for middle terms in each argument respectively; it being essential that we should generalize on a right principle, with a view to the question before us; or, in other words, that we should abstract that portion of any object presented to the mind, which is important to the argument in hand. There are expressions in common use which have a reference to this caution; such as "this is a question, not as to the nature of the object, but the magnitude of it:" "this is a question of time, or of place, &c." i. e. "the subject must be referred to this or to that Category."

With respect to the meaning of the terms in question, "Discovery," and "New Truth;" it matters not whether we confine ourselves to the narrowest sense, or admit the widest, provided we do but *distinguish*; there certainly *are* two kinds of "New Truth, and of "Discovery," if we take those words in the widest sense in which they are ever used. First, such Truths as were, before they were discovered, *absolutely* unknown, being not implied by any thing we previously knew, though we might perhaps suspect them as probable; such are all *matters of fact* strictly so called, when first made known to one who had not any such previous knowledge, as would enable him to ascertain them *a priori*; i. e. by Reasoning; as if we inform a man that we have a colony at Botany Bay; or that the earth is at such a distance from the sun; or that platina is heavier than gold. The communication of this kind of knowledge is most usually and most strictly called *information:* we gain it from *observation*, and from *testimony*; no *mere internal workings* of our own minds, (except when the mind itself is the very object to be observed,) or *mere* discussions in words, will make these known to us; though there is great room for sagacity *in judging what testimony to admit*, and forming *conjectures* that may *lead* to *profitable observation*, and to experiments with a view to it. The other class of Discoveries is of a very different nature; that which may be elicited by Reasoning, and consequently is implied in that which we already know, we assent to on that ground, and not from observation or testimony: to take a Geometrical truth upon *trust*, or to attempt to ascertain it by *observation*, would betray a total ignorance of the nature of the Science. In the longest demonstration the Mathematical teacher seems only to lead us to make use of our own stores, and point out to us how much we had already admitted; and in the case of many Ethical propositions, we assent at first hearing, though perhaps we had never heard or thought of the proposition before; so also do we readily *assent* to the *testimony* of a respectable man who tells us that our troops have gained a victory; but how different is the nature of the assent in the two cases. In the latter, we are ready to thank the person for his information, as being such as no wisdom or learning would have enabled us to ascertain; in the former we usually exclaim "*very true!*" "that is a valuable and just remark; that never *struck* me before!" implying at once our practical ignorance of it, and also our consciousness that we possess, in what we already know, the means to ascertain the truth of it.

Essay on the Province of Reasoning.

To all practical purposes, indeed, a Truth of this description may be as completely unknown to a man as the other; but as soon as it is set before him, and the argument by which it is connected with his previous notions is made clear to him, he *recognises* it as something conformable to, and contained in his former belief.

It is not improbable that Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence arose from a hasty extension of what he had observed in this class, to all acquisition of knowledge whatever.

His Theory of ideas served to confound together *matters of fact* respecting the nature of things, (which may be perfectly new to us,) with propositions *relating to our own notions*, and modes of thought; (or to speak perhaps more correctly, our own arbitrary signs) which propositions must be contained and implied in those very complex notions themselves; and whose truth is a conformity, not to the nature of things, but to

* On this point there are some valuable remarks in the *Philosophy of Rhetoric* itself, book iv. ch. vii.

† The Categories enumerated by Aristotle, are οὐσία, πόσον, ποῖον, πρός τι, ποῦ, πότε, κεῖσθαι, ἔχειν, ποιεῖν, πάσχειν; which are usually rendered, as adequately as perhaps they can be in our language, Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Situation, Possession, Action, Suffering. The catalogue has been by some writers enlarged, as it is evident may easily be done by subdividing some of the heads; and by others curtailed, as it is no less evident that all may ultimately be referred to the two heads of Substance and Attribute, or in the language of some Logicians, Accident.

our own hypothesis. Such are all propositions in pure Mathematics, and many in Ethics, viz. those which involve no assertion as to real matters of fact. It has been rightly remarked, that Mathematical propositions are not properly true or false in the same sense as any proposition respecting real fact is so called; and hence the truth (such as it is) of such propositions is necessary and eternal; since it amounts only to this, that any complex notion which you have arbitrarily framed, must be exactly conformable to itself. The proposition that "the belief in a future state, combined with a complete devotion to the present life, is not consistent with the character of prudence," would be not at all the less true if a future state were a chimera, and prudence a quality which was nowhere met with; nor would the truth of the Mathematician's conclusion be shaken, that "circles are to each other as the squares of their diameters," should it be found that there never had been a circle or a square, conformable to the definition, in *rerum naturâ*.

The Ethical proposition just instanced, is one of those which Locke calls "trifling," because the Predicate is merely a part of the complex idea implied by the subject; and he is right, if by "trifling" he means that it gives not, strictly speaking, any *information*; but he should consider that to *remind* a man of what he had not, and what he would have thought of, may be, practically, as valuable as giving him information; and that most propositions in the best sermons, and all in pure Mathematics, are of the description which he censures.

It is indeed rather remarkable that he should speak so often of building Morals into a demonstrative Science, and yet speak so slightingly of those very propositions to which we must absolutely *confine* ourselves, in order to give to Ethics even the appearance of such a Science; for the instant you come to an assertion respecting a *matter of fact*, as that "men (i. e. *actually* existing men) are bound to practise virtue," or "are liable to many temptations," you have stepped off the ground of strict demonstration, just as when you proceed to practical Geometry.

But to return: it is of the utmost importance to distinguish these two kinds of Discovery of Truth; to the former, as we have said, the word "*information*" is most strictly applied; the communication of the latter is more properly called "*instruction*." We speak of the *usual* practice; for it would be going too far to pretend that writers are uniform and consistent in the use of these, or of any other term. We say that the Historian gives us *information* respecting past times; the Traveller, respecting foreign countries: on the other hand, the Mathematician gives *instruction* in the principles of his Science; the Moralist *instructs* us in our duties; and we generally use the expressions "a well-informed man," and "a well-instructed man," in a sense conformable to that which has been here laid down. However, let the words be used as they may, the things are evidently different, and ought to be distinguished. It is a question comparatively unimportant, whether the term "Discovery" shall or shall not be extended to the eliciting of those Truths, which, being implied in our previous knowledge, may be established by mere strict Reasoning. Similar verbal questions indeed might be raised respecting many other cases: e. g. one has forgotten (i. e. cannot *recollect*) the name of some person or place; perhaps we even try to think of it, but in vain; at last some one reminds us, and we instantly *recognise* it as the one we wanted to recollect; it may be asked, was this in our mind or not? The answer is, that in one sense it was, and in another sense, it was not. Or, again, suppose there is a vein of metal on a man's estate which he does not know of; is it part of his possessions or not? and when he finds it out and works it, does he then *acquire* a *new* possession or not? Certainly not, in the same sense as if he has a fresh estate bequeathed to him, which he had formerly no *right* to; but to all practical purposes, it *is* a new possession. This case indeed may serve as an illustration of the one we have been considering; and in all these cases, if the real distinction be understood, the verbal question will not be of much consequence. To use one more illustration; Reasoning has been aptly compared to the piling together blocks of stone; on each of which, as on a pedestal, a man can raise himself a small, and but a small, height above the plain; but which, when skilfully built up, will form a flight of steps, which will raise him to a great elevation. Now (to pursue this analogy) when the materials are all ready to the builder's hand, the blocks ready dug and brought, his work resembles one of the two kinds of Discovery just mentioned, viz. that to which we have assigned the name of *instruction*: but if his materials are to be entirely, or in part, provided by himself,—if he himself is forced to dig fresh blocks from the quarry,—this corresponds to the other kind of Discovery.

We have hitherto spoken of the employment of argument in the establishment of those hypothetical Truths (as they may be called) which relate only to our own abstract notions; it is not, however, meant to be insinuated that there is no room for Reasoning in the establishment of a matter of fact; but the other class of Truths have first been treated of, because in discussing subjects of that kind the process of Reasoning is always the *principal*, and often the *only* thing to be attended to, if we are but certain and clear as to the meaning of the terms; whereas, when assertions respecting real existence are introduced, we have the additional and more important business of ascertaining and keeping in mind the *degree* of *evidence* for those facts, since, otherwise, our Conclusions could not be relied on, however accurate our Reasoning; but, undoubtedly, we may by Reasoning arrive at matters of fact, *if* we have *matters* of *fact to set out with as data;* only that it will very often happen that "from certain facts," as Campbell remarks, "we draw only probable Conclusions;" because the other Premiss introduced (which he overlooked) is only probable. He observed that in such an instance, for example, as the one lately given, we infer from the *certainty* that such and such tyrannies have been short-lived, the *probability* that others will be so; and he did not consider that there is an understood Premiss which is essential to the argument; (viz. that all tyrannies will resemble those we have already observed) which being only of a probable character, must attach the same degree of uncertainty to the Conclusion. An *individual* fact is not unfrequently elicited by skilfully combining, and Reasoning from, those already known; of which many curious cases occur in the detection of criminals by officers of justice and Barristers, who acquire by practice such dexterity in that particular depart-

ment, as sometimes to draw the right Conclusion from data, which might be in the possession of others, without being applied to the same use. In all cases of the establishment of a *general* fact from Induction, that *general* fact (as has been formerly remarked) is *ultimately* established by Reasoning; e. g. Bakewell, the celebrated cattle-breeder, observed, in a great number of individual beasts, a tendency to fatten readily, and in a great number of others the absence of this constitution; in every individual of the former description, he *observed* a certain peculiar *make*, though they differed widely in size, colour, &c. Those of the latter description differed no less in various points, but agreed in being of a different make from the others: these facts were his data; from which, combining them with the general principle that Nature is steady and uniform in her proceedings, he *Logically* drew the conclusion that beasts of the specified make have universally a peculiar tendency to fattening: but then his principal merit consisted in *making* the observations, and in so *combining* them as to *abstract* from each a multitude of cases, differing widely in many respects, the circumstances in which they all agreed; and also in conjecturing skilfully how far those circumstances were likely to be found in the whole class; the making such observations, and still more the combination, abstraction, and judgment employed, are what men commonly mean (as was above observed) when they speak of *Induction;* and these operations are certainly distinct from Reasoning. The same observations will apply to numberless other cases, as, for instance, to the Discovery of the law of "*vis inertiæ*," and the other principles of Natural Philosophy.

But to what class, it may be asked, should be referred the Discoveries thus made? All would agree in calling them, when first ascertained, "New Truths," in the strictest sense of the word; which would seem to imply their belonging to the class which may be called, by way of distinction, "*Physical Discoveries:*" and yet their being ultimately established by Reasoning, would seem, according to the foregoing rule, to refer them to the other class, viz. what may be called "*Logical* Discoveries;" since whatever is established by Reasoning, must have been contained and virtually asserted in the Premises. In answer to this, it is to be observed, that they certainly do belong to the latter class, *relatively*, to a person who is *in possession of the data;* but to him who is *not*, they are New Truths of the other class; for it is to be remembered, that the words "Discovery" and "New Truths" are necessarily *relative:* there may be a proposition which is to one person absolutely *known;* to another, (viz. one to whom it has never *occurred*, though he is in possession of all the data from which it may be *proved*) it will be, when he comes to perceive it, by a process of *instruction*, what we have called a *Logical Discovery;* to a third, (viz. one who is ignorant of these data,) it will be absolutely *unknown*, and will have been, when made known to him, a perfectly and properly New Truth,—a piece of information,—a *Physical Discovery* as we have called it. To the Philosopher, therefore, who arrives at the Discovery by Reasoning from his observations, and from established principles combined with them, the Discovery is of the former class; to the multitude, probably of the latter, as *they* will have been most likely not possessed of all his data. It follows from what has been said, that in Mathematics, and in such Ethical propositions as we were lately speaking of, we do not allow the possibility of *any* but a Logical Discovery; i. e. no proposition, of that class, can be true, which was not implied in the definitions we set out with, which are the first principles: for since these propositions do not profess to state any matter of fact, the only Truth they *can* possess, *consists* in conformity to the original principles; to one, therefore, who *knows* these principles, such propositions are Truths already implied, since they may be developed to him by Reasoning, if he is not defective in the discursive faculty; to one who does *not* understand those principles, (i. e. is not master of the definitions) such propositions are absolutely unmeaning. On the other hand, propositions relating to matters of fact, *may be*, indeed, implied in what he already knew; (as he who knows the climate of the Alps, the Andes, &c. &c. has virtually admitted the general fact, that "the tops of mountains are comparatively cold;") but as these possess an absolute and physical Truth, they *may* also be absolutely "new," their Truth not being *implied by the mere terms of the propositions.* The truth or falsity of any proposition concerning a triangle, is implied by the meaning of that and of the other Geometrical terms; whereas, though one may *understand* (in the ordinary sense of that word) the full meaning of the terms, "moon" and "inhabited," and of all the other terms in the language, he cannot thence be certain that the moon is, or is not, inhabited.

It has probably been the source of much perplexity that the term "*true*" has been applied *indiscriminately* to two such different classes of propositions. The term *definition* is used with the same laxity; and much confusion has thence resulted.

Such Definitions as the Mathematical, must imply every attribute that belongs to the thing defined; because that *thing* is merely *our meaning*, which meaning the Definition lays down; whereas, real substances, having an independent existence, may possess innumerable qualities (as Locke observes) not implied by the meaning we attach to their names, or, as Locke expresses it, by our ideas of them. "Their *nominal essence* (to use his language) is not the same as their *real essence:*" whereas the nominal essence, and the real essence, of a circle, &c. are the same. A Mathematical Definition, therefore, cannot properly be called *true*, since it is not properly a *proposition*, (any more than an article in a Dictionary,) but merely an explanation of the meaning of a term. Perhaps in Definitions of this class, it might be better to substitute (as Aristotle usually does) the *imperative* mood for the indicative; thus bringing them into the form of postulates; for the Definitions and the postulates in Mathematics differ in little or nothing but the form of expression: e. g. "let a four-sided figure, of equal sides and right angles, be called a square," would clearly imply that such a figure is conceivable, and that the writer intended to employ that term to signify such a figure; which is precisely all that is intended to be asserted. If, indeed, a Mathematical writer mean to assert that the *ordinary* meaning of the term is that which he has given, *that*, certainly, *is* a proposition, which must be either true or false; but in defining a *new* term, the term indeed may be ill-chosen and improper, or the Definition may be self-contradictory, and consequently unintelligible;

but the words, "true," and "false," do not apply. The same may be said of what are called *nominal* Definitions of other things, i. e. those which merely explain the meaning of the word; viz. they can be true or false only when they profess (and so far as they profess) to give the ordinary and established meaning of the term. But those which are called *real* Definitions, viz. which unfold the nature of the thing, (which they may do in *various degrees,*) to these the epithet "true" may be applied; and to make out such a Definition will often be the very *end* (not as in Mathematics the *beginning*) of our study.

In Mathematics there is no such distinction between nominal and real Definition; *the meaning of the term,* and the *nature of the thing,* being one and the same: so that *no correct Definition whatever* of any Mathematical term can be devised, which shall not imply every thing which belongs to the term.

When it is asked, then, whether such great Discoveries, as have been made in Natural Philosophy, were accomplished, or can be accomplished by *Reasoning?* the inquirer should be reminded, that the question is ambiguous; it may be answered in the affirmative, if by "Reasoning" is meant to be included the assumption of Premises; to the right performance of *that* work, is requisite, not only in many cases, the ascertainment of facts, and of the degree of evidence for doubtful propositions, (in which observation and experiment will often be indispensable,) but also a skilful *selection* and *combination* of known facts and principles; such as implies, amongst other things, the exercise of that powerful *abstraction* which seizes the common circumstances—the point of agreement—in a number of, otherwise dissimilar, individuals: it is in this that the greatest genius is shewn. But if "Reasoning" be understood in the limited sense in which it is usually defined, then we must answer in the negative; and reply that such Discoveries are made by means of Reasoning *combined* with other operations.

In the process we have been speaking of, there *is* much Reasoning throughout; and thence the whole has been carelessly called a "Process of Reasoning."

It is not, indeed, any just ground of complaint that the word Reasoning is used in two senses; but that the two senses are perpetually confounded together: and hence it is that some Logical writers fancied that Reasoning (viz. that which Logic treats of) was the method of discovering Truth; and that so many other writers have accordingly complained of Logic for not accomplishing that end, urging that "Syllogism (i. e. Reasoning; though they overlooked the coincidence) never established any thing that is, strictly speaking, unknown to him who has granted the Premises: and proposing the introduction of a certain "rational Logic" to accomplish this purpose; i. e. to direct the mind in the progress of investigation. Supposing that some such system could be devised—that it could even be brought into a Scientific form, (which he must be more sanguine than Scientific who expects,) that it were of the greatest conceivable utility, and that it should be allowed to bear the name of "Logic," since it would not be worth while to contend about a word, still it would not, as these writers seem to suppose, have the same object proposed with the Aristotelian Logic; nor be in any respect a rival to that system. A *plough* may be a much more ingenious and valuable instrument than a *flail,* but it never can be substituted for it.

Those Discoveries of general laws of Nature, &c. of which we have been speaking, being of that character which we have described by the name of "Logical Discoveries," *to him who is in possession of all the Premises from which they are deduced;* but being, *to the multitude* (who are unacquainted with many of those Premises) strictly "New Truths;" hence it is, that men in general give to the *general* facts, and to them, most peculiarly, the name of *Discoveries;* for to *themselves* they *are* such, in the strictest sense; the Premises from which they were inferred being not only originally unknown to them, but frequently *remaining unknown to the very last:* e. g. the general conclusion concerning cattle, which Bakewell made known, is what most Agriculturists (and many others also) are acquainted with; but the Premises he set out with, viz. the facts respecting this, that, and the other, individual ox, (the ascertainment of which facts was his first *Discovery*) these are what few know, or care to know, with any exact particularity.

And it may be added, that these discoveries of particular facts, which are the *immediate* result of *observation,* are, in themselves, uninteresting and insignificant, *till* they are combined so as to lead to a grand general result; those who on each occasion watched the motions, and registered the date of a comet, little thought, perhaps, themselves, what magnificent results they were preparing the way for. So that there is an additional cause which has confined the term Discovery to these grand general conclusions; and, as was just observed, they are, to the generality of men, perfectly New Truths in the strictest sense of the word, not being implied in any previous knowledge *they* possessed. Very often it will happen, indeed, that the conclusion thus drawn will amount only to a *probable conjecture;* which conjecture will dictate to the inquirer such an *experiment,* or course of experiments, as will fully establish the fact; thus Sir H. Davy, from finding that the flame of hydrogen gas was not communicated through a long slender tube, conjectured that a shorter, but still slenderer tube, would answer the same purpose; this led him to try the experiments, in which, by continually shortening the tube, and at the same time lessening its bore, he arrived at last at the wire-gauze of his safety-lamp.

It is to be observed also, that whatever *credit* is conveyed by the word "Discovery," to him who is regarded as the author of it, is well deserved by those who skilfully select and combine known Truths, (*especially* such as have been *long* and *generally known,*) so as to elicit important, and hitherto unthought-of, conclusions; theirs is the master mind; *αρχιτεκτονικὴ φρόνησις·* whereas men of very inferior powers may sometimes, by immediate observation, discover perfectly new facts, empirically, and thus be of service in furnishing materials to the others; to whom they stand in the same relation (to recur to a former illustration) as the brickmaker or stonequarrier, to the architect. It is peculiarly creditable to A. Smith, and to Mr. Malthus, that the data from which they drew such important Conclusions had been in every ones hands for centuries.

As for Mathematical Discoveries, they (as we have before said) must *always* be of the description to which

Logic. we have given the name of "Logical Discoveries;" since to him who properly comprehends the meaning of the Mathematical terms, (and to no other are the Truths themselves, properly speaking, intelligible,) those results are implied in his previous knowledge, since they are Logically deducible therefrom. It is not, however, meant to be implied that *Mathematical* Discoveries are effected by pure Reasoning, and by that *singly*. For though there is not here, as in Physics, any exercise of judgment as to the degree of evidence of the Premises, nor any experiments and observations, yet there is the same call for skill in the *selection* and *combination* of the Premises in such a manner as shall be best calculated to lead to a new, that is, *unperceived* and *unthought-of* Conclusion.

In *following*, indeed, and *taking in* a demonstration, nothing is called for but pure Reasoning; but *the assumption of Premises is not a part* of Reasoning, in the strict and technical sense of that term. Accordingly, there are many who can *follow* a demonstration, or any other train of argument, who would not succeed well in *framing* one of their own.*

For both kinds of Discovery then, the Logical, as well as the Physical, certain operations are requisite, beyond those which can fairly be comprehended under the strict sense of the word "Reasoning;" in the Logical, is required a skilful *selection* and *combination of known Truths;* in the Physical we must employ, in *addition* (generally speaking) to that process, *observation* and *experiment*. It will generally happen, that in the study of Nature, and, universally, in all that relates to matters of fact, *both* kinds of investigation will be united; i. e. some of the facts or principles you *reason from* as Premises, must be ascertained by *observation;* or, as in the case of the safety-lamp, the ultimate *Conclusion* will need *confirmation* from experience; so that both Physical and Logical Discovery will take place in the course of the same process: we need not, therefore, wonder, that the two are so perpetually confounded. In Mathematics, on the other hand, and in great part of the discussions relating to Ethics and Jurisprudence, there being no room for any Physical Discovery whatever, we have only to make *a skilful* use of the propositions in our possession, to arrive at every attainable result.

The investigation, however, of the latter class of subjects differs in *other* points also from that of the former; for setting aside the circumstance of our having, in these, no question as to facts,—no room for observation,—there is also a considerable difference in what may be called the process of *Logical investigation;* the *Premises* on which we proceed being of so different a nature in the two cases.

To take the example of Mathematics, the definitions, which are the principles of our Reasoning, are very *few*, and the axioms still fewer; and both are, for the most part, *laid down*, and *placed before the student in the outset;* the introduction of a new definition or axiom, being of comparatively rare occurrence, at wide intervals, and with a *formal* statement; besides which, there is no room for *doubt* concerning either. On the other hand, in all Reasonings which regard matters of fact, we introduce, almost at *every step*, fresh and fresh propositions (to a very great number) which had not been elicited in the course of our Reasoning, but are taken for granted; viz. facts and laws of Nature which are here the principles of our Reasoning, and *maxims*, or "elements of belief," which answer to the axioms in Mathematics. If, at the opening of a Treatise, for example, on Chemistry, on Agriculture, on Political Economy, &c. the author should make, as in Mathematics, a formal statement of all the propositions he intended to assume, as granted throughout the whole work, both he and his readers would be astonished at the number: and, of these, many would be only probable, and there would be much room for doubt as to the *degree* of probability, and for judgment, in ascertaining that degree. Essay on the Province of Reasoning.

Moreover, Mathematical axioms are always employed precisely *in the same simple form;* e. g. the axiom that "things equal to the same, are equal to one another," is cited, whenever there is need, in those very words; whereas the maxims employed in the other class of subjects, admit of, and require, continual modifications in the application of them: e. g. "the stability of the laws of Nature," which is our constant assumption in inquiries relating to Natural Philosophy, assumes many different shapes, and in some of them, does not possess the same absolute certainty as in others: e. g. when from having always observed a certain sheep ruminating, we infer, that this individual sheep will continue to ruminate, we assume that "the property which has hitherto belonged to this sheep, will remain unchanged;" when we infer the same property of all sheep, we assume that "the property which belongs to this individual, belongs to the whole species:" if, on comparing sheep with some other kinds of horned animals, and finding that all agree in ruminating, we infer that, "all horned animals ruminate," we assume that "the whole of a genus or class are likely to agree in any point wherein many species of that genus agree;" or in other words, "that if one of two properties, &c. has *often* been found accompanied by another, and never without it, the former will be *universally* accompanied by the latter;" now all these are merely different forms of the maxim, that "nature is uniform in her operations;" which, it is evident, varies in expression in almost every different case where it is applied, and admits of every degree of evidence, from absolute moral certainty, to mere conjecture.

The same may be said of an infinite number of principles and maxims appropriated to, and employed in each particular branch of study. Hence, all such Reasonings are, in comparison of Mathematics, very complex; requiring so much *more* than that does, beyond the process of merely deducing the Conclusion Logically, from the Premises; so that it is no wonder that the longest Mathematical demonstration should be so much more easily constructed and understood, than a much shorter train of just Reasoning concerning real facts. The former has been aptly compared to a long and steep, but even and regular, flight of steps, which tries the breath, and the strength, and the perseverance, only; while the latter resembles a short, but rugged and uneven, ascent up a precipice, which requires a quick eye, agile limbs, and a firm step; and in which we have to tread now on this side, now on that; ever considering, as we proceed, whether this projection will afford room for our foot, or whether some loose stone may not slide from under us.

* Hence the Student must not confine himself to this passive kind of employment, if he would become truly a Mathematician.

Logic.

As for those Ethical and Legal Reasonings which were lately mentioned, as in some respects resembling those of Mathematics, (viz. such as keep clear of all assertions respecting facts,) they have this difference; that not only men are not so completely *agreed* respecting the maxims and principles of Ethics and Law, but the meaning also of each term cannot be absolutely, and for ever, fixed by an arbitrary definition; on the contrary, a great part of our labour consists in distinguishing accurately the various senses in which men employ each term, ascertaining which is the most proper, and taking care to avoid confounding them together.

Of Inference and Proof.

§ 3. Since it appears, from what has been said, that universally a man must possess something else besides the Reasoning faculty, in order *to apply* that faculty properly to his own purpose, whatever that purpose may be; it may be inquired whether some theory could not be made out, respecting those "*other operations*," and "intellectual processes distinct from Reasoning, which it is necessary for us sometimes to employ in the investigation of truth;"* and whether rules could not be laid down for conducting them.

Something has, indeed, been done in this way by more than one writer; and more might probably be accomplished by one who should fully comprehend and carefully bear in mind the principles of Logic, properly so called; but it would hardly be possible to build up any thing like a regular *Science*, respecting these matters, such as Logic is, with respect to the theory of Reasoning. It may be useful, however, to observe, that these "*other operations*" of which we have been speaking, and which are preparatory to the exercise of Reasoning, are of *two kinds*, according to the nature of the end proposed; for Reasoning comprehends *Inferring* and *Proving*; which are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in *two different points of view:* (like the road from London to York, and the road from York to London,) he who infers,† proves; and he who proves, infers; but the word "infer" fixes the mind *first* on the Premiss, and then on the *Conclusion*; the word "prove," on the contrary, leads the mind *from* the Conclusion *to* the Premiss. Hence, the substantives derived from these words respectively, are often used to express that which, on each occasion, is *last* in the mind; *Inference* being often used to signify the *Conclusion*, (i. e. *Proposition inferred*) and *Proof*, the *Premiss*. We say also "How do you *prove* that?" and "What do you *infer from* that?" which sentences would not be so properly expressed if we were to transpose those verbs. One might, therefore, define *Proving*, "the assigning of a reason or argument for the support of a *given* proposition;" and "*Inferring*," the "deduction of a Conclusion from *given* Premises." In the one case our *Conclusion* is *given*, (i. e. set before us) and we have to *seek* for *arguments;* in the other, our Premises are *given*, and we have to *seek* for a Conclusion; i. e. to put together our own propositions, and try *what* will follow from them; or, to speak more Logically, in the one case, we seek to refer the subject of which we would predicate something, to a class to which that predicate will (affirmatively or negatively) apply; in the other we seek to find comprehended, in the subject of which we have predicated something, some other term to which that predicate had not been before applied. Each of these is a definition of Reasoning.

Essay on the Province of Reasoning.

To *infer*, then, is the business of the *Philosopher;* to *prove*, of the *Advocate;* the former, from the great mass of known and admitted truths, wishes to elicit *any* valuable additional truth whatever, that has been hitherto unperceived; and, perhaps, without knowing, with certainty, what will be the terms of his Conclusion. Thus the Mathematician, e. g. seeks to ascertain *what* is the ratio of circles to each other, or *what* is the line whose square will be equal to a given circle: the Advocate, on the other hand, has a proposition put before him, which he is to maintain as well as he can; his business, therefore, is to *find middle terms*, (which is the *inventio* of Cicero;) the Philosopher's, to combine and select known facts, or principles, suitably for gaining from them conclusions which, though implied in the Premises, were before unperceived; in other words, for making "Logical Discoveries." Such are the respective preparatory processes in these two branches of study. They are widely different;—they arise from, and generate, very different habits of mind; and require a very different kind of training and precept. The Lawyer, or Controversialist, or, in short, the Rhetorician in general, who is, in his own province, the most skilful, may be but ill-fitted for Philosophical investigation, even where there is no *observation* wanted;—when the facts are all *ready ascertained* for him. And again, the ablest Philosopher may make an indifferent disputant; especially, since the arguments which have led *him* to the conclusion, and have, with him, the most weight, may not, perhaps, be the most powerful in controversy. The commonest fault, however, by far, is to forget the Philosopher or Theologian, and to assume the Advocate, improperly. It is therefore of great use to dwell on the distinction between these two branches: as for the bare process of Reasoning, *that* is the same in both cases; but the preparatory processes which are requisite *in order to employ* Reasoning profitably, these we see branch off into two distinct channels. In each of these undoubtedly, useful rules may be laid down; but they should not be confounded together. Bacon has chosen the department of Philosophy, giving rules in his *Organon*, (not only for the conduct of experiments to ascertain new facts, but also for the selection and combination of known facts and principles,) with a view of obtaining valuable *Inferences;* and it is probable that a system of such rules is what some writers mean (if they have any distinct meaning) by their proposed "Logic." In the other department, precepts have been given by Aristotle and other Rhetorical writers, as a part of their plan. How far these precepts are to be considered as belonging to the present system,—whether "method" is to be regarded as a *part* of *Logic*,—whether the matter of Logic is to be included in the system,—whether Bacon's is properly to be reckoned a kind of Logic; all these are merely verbal questions relating to the extension, not of the *Science*, but of the *name*. The bare process of Reasoning, i. e. deducing a Conclusion from Premises,

* D. Stewart.

† We mean, of course, when the word is understood to imply *correct* Inference.

ogic.

must ever remain a distinct operation from the *assumption* of Premises, however useful the rules may be that have been given, or may be given, for conducting this latter process, and others connected with it; and however properly such rules may be subjoined to the precepts of that system to which the name of Logic is applied in the narrowest sense. Such rules as we now allude to may be of eminent service; but they must always be, as we have before observed, comparatively vague and general, and incapable of being built up into a regular demonstrative theory like that of the Syllogism; to which theory they bear much the same relation as the principles and rules of Poetical and Rhetorical criticism, to those of Grammar; or those of practical Mechanics, to strict Geometry. We find no fault with the extension of a term; but we would suggest a caution against confounding together, by means of a common name, things essentially different: and above all we deprecate the sophistry of striving to depreciate what is called "the school Logic," by perpetually *contrasting* it with systems with which it has nothing in common but the *name;* and whose object is essentially different.

It is not a little remarkable that writers whose expressions tend to confound together, by means of a common name, two branches of study which have nothing else in common, (as if they were two different plans for attaining *one and the same* object,) have themselves complained of one of the effects of this confusion, viz. the introduction, early in the career of Academical Education, of a course of *Logic;* under which name, they observe "men now universally comprehend the works of Locke, Bacon, &c." which, as is justly remarked, are unfit for beginners. Now this would not have happened, if men had always kept in mind the meaning or meanings of each name they used. And it may be added, that, however justly the word Logic may be thus extended, we have no ground for applying to the Aristotelian Logic, the remarks above quoted respecting the Baconian; which the ambiguity of the word, if not carefully kept in view, might lead us to do. Grant that Bacon's work is a part of Logic; it no more follows from the unfitness of *that* for *learners,* that the elements of the theory of Reasoning should be withheld from them, than it follows that the elements of Euclid, and common Arithmetic, are unfit for boys, because *Newton's Principia,* which also bears the title of *Mathematical,* is above their grasp. Of two branches of study which bear the same name, or even of two parts of the same branch, the one may be suitable to the commencement, the other to the close, of the Academical career.

At whatever period of that career it may be proper to introduce the study of such as are usually called Metaphysical writers, it may be safely asserted, that those who have had the most experience in the business of giving instruction in Logic, properly so called, together with other branches of knowledge, prefer and generally pursue the plan of letting their pupils *enter* on that study next in order, after the elements of Mathematics.

Of Verbal and Real Questions.

§ 4. The ingenious author of the *Philosophy of Rhetoric* having maintained, or rather assumed, that Logic is applicable to Verbal controversy alone, there may be an advantage, though it has been our aim throughout to shew the application of it to all Reasoning, in pointing out the difference between Verbal and Real Questions, and the probable origin of Campbell's mistake; for to trace any error to its source, will often throw more light on the subject in hand than can be obtained if we rest satisfied with merely detecting and refuting it.

Essay on the Province of Reasoning.

Every Question that can arise, is in fact a Question whether a certain Predicate is or is not applicable to a certain subject; and whatever other account may be given by any writer of the nature of any matter of doubt or debate, will be found, ultimately, to resolve itself into this. But sometimes the Question turns on the meaning and extent of the terms employed; sometimes on the things signified by them. If it be made to appear therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain Question may be held by persons not differing in their opinion of the matter in hand, then that Question may be pronounced Verbal, as depending on the different senses in which they respectively employ the terms. If on the contrary it appears that they employ the terms in the same sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the other, then it may be pronounced that the Question is Real,—that they differ as to the opinions they hold of the things in Question.

If, for instance, two persons contend whether Augustus deserved to be called a great man, then if it appeared that the one included under the term "great," disinterested *patriotism,* and *on that ground* excluded Augustus from the class, as wanting in that quality, and that the other also gave him no credit for that quality, but understood no more by the term "great," than high intellectual qualities, energy of character, and brilliant actions, it would follow that the parties did not differ in opinion except as to the use of a term, and that the Question was Verbal. If again it appeared that the one *did* give Augustus credit for such patriotism as the other denied him, both of them including that idea in the term great, then the Question would be Real. Either kind of Question, it is plain, is to be argued according to Logical principles; but the middle terms employed would be different; and for this reason among others it is important to distinguish Verbal from Real controversy. In the former case, e. g. it might be urged with truth, that the common use of the expression "great and good" proves that the idea of good is not implied in the ordinary sense of the word great; an argument which could have, of course, no place in deciding the other Question.

It is by no means to be supposed that all Verbal Questions are trifling and frivolous; it is often of the highest importance to settle correctly the meaning of a word, either according to ordinary use or according to the meaning of any particular writer, or class of men; but when Verbal Questions are *mistaken* for Real, much confusion of thought and unprofitable wrangling will be generally the result. Nor is it always so easy and simple a task, as might at first sight appear, to distinguish them from each other: for several objects to which one common name is applied will often have many points of difference, and yet that name may perhaps be applied to them all in the same sense, and may be fairly regarded as the genus they come under, if it appear that they all agree in what is designated by that name, and that the differences between them are in points not essential to the

character of the genus. A cow and a horse differ in many respects, but agree in all that is implied by the term "quadruped," which is therefore applicable to both in the same sense. So also the houses of the ancients differed in many respects from ours, and their ships, still more; yet no one would contend that the terms "house" and "ship," as applied to both, were ambiguous, or that οἶκος might not fairly be rendered *house*, and ναῦς, *ship*: because the essential characteristic of a house is, not its being of this or that form or materials, but its being a dwelling for men; these therefore would be called *two different kinds* of houses; and consequently the term "house" would be applied to each, without any equivocation, in the same sense: and so in the other instances. On the other hand, two or more things may bear the same name, and may also have a resemblance in many points, and may from that resemblance have come to bear the same name, and yet if the circumstance which is essential to each be wanting in the other, the term may be pronounced ambiguous: e. g. the word "Priest" is applied to the ministers of the Jewish and of the Pagan religions, and also to those of the Christian: and doubtless the term is so used in consequence of their being both *ministers*, (in some sort) of religion. Nor would every difference that might be found between the Priests of different religions constitute the term ambiguous, provided such differences were non-essential to the idea suggested by the word Priest; as e. g. the Jewish Priest served the true God, and the Pagan, false Gods: this is a most important difference, but does not constitute the term ambiguous, because neither of these circumstances is implied and suggested by the term Ἱερεὺς, which accordingly was applied both to Jewish and Pagan Priests. But the term Ἱερεὺς does seem to have implied the office of offering *sacrifice*, atoning for the sins of the people, and acting as mediator between man and the object of his worship; and accordingly that term is never applied to any one under the Christian system, except to the one great Mediator. The Christian ministers not having that office which was implied as essential in the term Ἱερεὺς, were never called by that name, but by that of πρεσβύτερος. It may be concluded therefore, that the term Priest is ambiguous, as corresponding to the terms Ἱερεὺς and πρεσβύτερος respectively, notwithstanding that there are points in which these two agree. These therefore should be reckoned, not *two different kinds* of Priests, but Priests in two different senses; since, (to adopt the phraseology of Aristotle,) the definition of them so far forth as they are Priests, would be different.

It is evidently of much importance to keep in mind the above distinctions, in order to avoid, on the one hand, stigmatizing as Verbal controversies, what in reality are not such, merely because the Question turns on the applicability of a certain Predicate to a certain subject; or on the other hand, falling into the opposite error of mistaking words for things, and judging of men's agreement or disagreement in opinion in every case, merely from their agreement or disagreement in the terms employed.

Of Realism.

§ 5. Nothing has a greater tendency to lead to the mistake just noticed, and thus to produce *undetected* Verbal Questions and fruitless Logomachy, than the prevalence of the notion of the Realists, that genus and species were some real THINGS, existing independently of our conceptions and expressions, and that, as in the case of singular terms, there is some real individual corresponding to each, so in common terms also there is something corresponding to each, which is the object of our thoughts when we employ any such term.* Few, if any indeed, in the present day avow and maintain this doctrine; but those who are not especially on their guard, are perpetually sliding into it unawares. Nothing so much conduces to this as the transferred and secondary use of the words "same," "one and the same," "identical, &c." when it is not clearly perceived and carefully borne in mind that they *are* employed in a secondary sense, and *that* more frequently even than in the primary. Suppose e. g. a thousand persons are thinking of the sun, it is evident it is one and the same individual object on which all these minds are employed; so far all is clear: but suppose all these persons are thinking of a triangle; not any individual triangle, but triangle in general; and considering perhaps the equality of its angles to two right angles; it would seem as if in this case also, their minds were all employed on "one and the same" object: and this object of their thoughts, it may be said, cannot be the *mere word* triangle, but that which is meant by it; nor again, can it be everything that the word will apply to, for they are not thinking of *triangles*, but of *one* thing: those who do not acknowledge that this "one thing" has an existence independent of the human mind, are in general content to tell us by way of explanation, that the object of their thoughts is the abstract "idea" of a triangle; an explanation which satisfies, or at least silences many, though it may be doubted whether they very clearly understand what sort of a thing an idea is, which may thus exist in a thousand different minds at once, and yet be "one and the same."

The fact is, that "unity" and "sameness" are in such cases employed, not in the primary sense, but to denote perfect *similarity*. When we say that ten thousand different persons have all "one and the same" idea in their minds, or are all of "one and the same" opinion, we mean no more than that they are all *thinking exactly alike*; when we say that they are all in the "same" posture, we mean that they are all *placed alike*: and so also they are said all to have the "same" disease when they are all diseased alike.

The origin of this secondary sense of the words, "same," "one," "identical," &c. (an attention to which would clear away an incalculable mass of confused Reasoning and Logomachy,) is easily to be traced to the use of language and of other signs, for the purpose of mutual communication. If any one utters the "one single" word "triangle," and gives "one single" definition of it; each person who hears him forms a certain notion in his own mind, not differing in any respect from that of each of the rest; they are said therefore to have all "one and the same" notion, because, resulting from, and corresponding with, that which is in the primary sense "one and the same" expression; and there is said to be "one single" idea of every triangle, (considered merely as a triangle,) because one single name or definition is equally applicable to each. In like manner all the coins struck by

* A doctrine commonly, but falsely, attributed to Aristotle, who expressly contradicts it. Categories, περὶ οὐσίας.

Logic. the same single die, are said to have "one and the same" impression, merely because the one description which suits one of these coins will equally suit any other that is exactly like it.

It is not intended to recommend the disuse of the words "same," "identical," &c. in this transferred sense; which, if it were desirable, would be utterly impracticable; but merely, a steady attention to the ambiguity thus introduced, and watchfulness against the errors thence arising. The difficulties and perplexities which have involved the questions respecting personal identity, among others, may be traced principally to the neglect of this caution. But the further consideration of that question would be unsuitable to the subject of this article.

Essay on the Province of Reasoning.

MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO.

FROM U. C. 647. TO 711. A. C. 107. TO 43.

Biography From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

WE now turn to consider the political character, oratorical talents, and philosophical writings of one whose public conduct we have had frequent occasion to mention in our preceding pages, and part of which still remains to be narrated hereafter.

Marcus Tullius Cicero was born at Arpinum, the native place of Marius,* in the year of Rome 647, (A. C. 107.) the same year which gave birth to the Great Pompey. His family was ancient and of Equestrian rank, but had never taken part in the public affairs of Rome,† though both his father and grandfather were persons of consideration in the part of Italy in which they resided.‡ His father, being a man of cultivated mind, determined to educate his two sons on an enlarged and liberal plan, and to fit them for the prospect of those public employments which his weak state of health incapacitated himself from undertaking.

Birth and education.

Marcus, the elder of the two, soon displayed indications of a superior mind, and we are told that his schoolfellows carried home such accounts of his extraordinary parts, that their parents often visited the school for the sake of seeing a youth who gave such promise of future eminence.§ One of his earliest masters was the poet Archias, whom he defended afterwards in his Consular year; under his instructions he made such proficiency as to compose a poem, though yet a boy, on the fable of Glaucus, which had formed the subject of one of the tragedies of Æschylus. Soon after he assumed the manly gown, he was placed under the care of Scævola the celebrated lawyer, whom he introduces so beautifully into several of his philosophical dialogues; and in no long time he gained a thorough knowledge of the laws and political institutions of his country.‖

This was about the time of the Social war; and according to the Roman custom, which made it a necessary part of education to learn the military art by personal service, Cicero took the opportunity of serving a campaign under the Consul Pompeius Strabo, father of Pompey the Great. Returning to pursuits more congenial to his natural taste, he commenced the study of Philosophy under Philo the Academic, of whom we shall speak more particularly hereafter.¶ But his chief attention was reserved for Oratory, to which he applied himself with the assistance of Molo, the first rhetorician of the day; while Diodotus the Stoic exercised him in the argumentative subtilties for which the disciples of Zeno were so celebrated. At the same time he declaimed daily in Greek and Latin with some young noblemen who were competitors in the same race of honours with himself.

Early campaign U. C. 664. A. C. 89.

* *De Legg.* 2, 3. † *Contra Rull.* 2. 1.
‡ *De Legg.* 2. 1. 3. 16. *de Orat.* 2. 66. § Plutarch, *in Vitâ.*
‖ Middleton's *Life*, vol. i. p. 13. 4to. *de clar. Orat.* 89.
¶ Ibid.

Of the two professions,* which from the existence of external and internal disputes are inseparable alike from all forms of government, while that of arms by its splendour and importance secures the almost undivided admiration of a rising and uncivilized people, legal practice on the other hand becomes the path to honours in later and more civilized ages, from the oratorical accomplishments by which it is usually attended. The date of Cicero's birth fell precisely during that intermediate state of things, in which the exclusive glory of military exploits was undermined by the very opulence and luxury which they had been the means of procuring; he was the first Roman who found his way to the highest dignities of the State with no other recommendation than his powers of eloquence, and his merits as a civil magistrate.†

Marcus Tullius Cicero. From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

Choice o professio

The first cause of importance he undertook was his defence of Roscius Amerinus; in which he distinguished himself by his spirited opposition to Sylla, whose favourite Chrysogonus was prosecutor in the action. This obliging him, according to Plutarch, to leave Rome on prudential motives, he employed his time in travelling for two years under pretence of his health, which, he tells us,‡ was as yet unequal to the exertion of pleading. At Athens he met with T. Pomponius Atticus, whom he had formerly known at school, and there renewed with him a friendship which lasted through life in spite of the change of interests and estrangements of affection so commonly attendant on turbulent times.§ Here too he attended the lectures of Antiochus, who, under the name of Academic, taught the dogmatic doctrines of Plato and the Stoics. Though Cicero evinced at first considerable dislike of his philosophical views,‖ he seems afterwards to have adopted the sentiments of the Old Academy, which they much resembled; and not till late in life to have relapsed into the sceptical tenets of his former instructor Philo.¶ After visiting the principal philosophers and rhetoricians of Asia, in his thirtieth year he returned to Rome, so strengthened and improved both in bodily and mental powers, that he soon eclipsed in speaking all his competitors for public favour. So popular a talent speedily gained him the suffrage of the Commons, and being sent to Sicily as Quæstor, at a time when the metropolis itself was visited with a scarcity of corn, he acquitted himself in that delicate situation with such address, as to supply the clamorous wants of the people without oppressing the Province from which the provisions were raised.** Returning thence with greater honours than had ever been before

Defence Roscius Amerinu his first cause.

His trave

Returns Rome. U. C. 677. A. C. 77.

Quæstor Sicily.

Prosecuti of Verre

* *Pro Murænâ*, 14. *de Orat.* 1. 9.
† *In Catil.* 3. 6. *in Pis.* 3. *pro Sylla*, 30. *pro Dom.* 37. *de Harusp. resp.* 23. *ad Fam.* 15. 4. ‡ *De clar. Orat.* 91.
§ Middleton's *Life*, vol. i. p. 42. 4to. ‖ Plutarch, *in Vitâ.*
¶ Warburton, *Div. Leg.* lib. iii. sec. 3. and Vossius, *de Nat. Logic*, c. viii. sec. 22. ** *Pro Planc.* 26. *in Verr.* 5. 14.

Biography. From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

decreed to a Roman Governor, he ingratiated himself still farther in the esteem of the Sicilians, by undertaking his celebrated prosecution of Verres; who, though defended by the influence of the Metelli and the eloquence of Hortensius, was at length driven in despair into voluntary exile.

Ædile.

Five years after his Quæstorship, Cicero was elected Ædile, a post of considerable expense from the exhibition of games connected with it.* In this magistracy he conducted himself with singular propriety;† for it being customary to court the people by a display of splendour in these official shows, he contrived to retain his popularity without submitting to the usual alternative of plundering the Provinces or sacrificing his private fortune. The latter was at this time by no means ample; but, with the good sense and taste which mark his character, he preserved in his domestic arrangements the dignity of a literary and public man, without any of the ostentation of magnificence which often distinguishes the candidate for popular applause.‡

Prætor.

After the customary interval of two years, he was returned at the head of the list as Prætor;§ and now made his first appearance in the rostrum in support of the Mamilian law, which has already come before us in our narrative of the public history of Rome. About the same time he defended Cluentius. At the expiration of his Prætorship, he refused to accept a foreign Province, the usual reward of that magistracy;‖ but having the Consulate full in view, and relying on his interest with Cæsar and Pompey, he allowed nothing to divert him from that career of glory for which he now believed himself to be destined.

Different estimates of Cicero by his contemporaries and by posterity.

It may be doubted, indeed, whether any individual ever rose to power by more virtuous and truly honourable conduct; the integrity of his public life was only equalled by the purity of his private morals; and it may at first sight excite our wonder, that a course so splendidly begun should afterwards so little fulfil its early promise. We have already, in our memoir of Cæsar, traced this course from the period of his Consulate to his Proprætorship in Cilicia, and found each year diminish his influence in public affairs, till it expired altogether with the death of Pompey. This surprise, however, arises in no small degree from measuring Cicero's political importance by his present reputation, and confounding the authority he deservedly possesses as an *author*, with the opinions entertained of him by his contemporaries as a *Statesman*. From the consequence usually attached to passing events, a politician's celebrity is often at its zenith in his own generation; while the author, who is in the highest repute with posterity, may perhaps have been little valued or courted in his own day. Virtue indeed so conspicuous as that of Cicero, studies so dignified, and oratorical powers so commanding, will always invest their possessor with a large portion of reputation and authority; and this is no where more apparent than in the enthusiastic joy displayed on his return from exile. But unless other qualities be added, more peculiarly necessary for a Statesman, they will hardly of themselves carry that weight of political consequence which some writers have attached to Cicero's public life, and which his own self-love led him to appropriate.

* *Pro Planc.* 26. *in Verr.* 5. 14.
† *De Offic.* 2. 17. Middleton.
‡ *Pro Dom.* 58.
§ *In Pis.* 1.
‖ *Pro Muræna*, 20.

Marcus Tullius Cicero. From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

The advice of the Oracle,* which had directed him to make his own genius, not the opinion of the people, his guide to immortality, (which in fact pointed at the above-mentioned distinction between the fame of a Statesman and of an author,) at first made a deep impression on his mind; and at the present day he owes his reputation principally to those pursuits which, as Plutarch tells us, exposed him to the ridicule and even to the contempt of his contemporaries as "a pedant and a trifler."† But his love of popularity overcame this philosophical temper, and he commenced a career which gained him one triumph and ten thousand mortifications.

It is not indeed to be doubted that in his political engagements he was considerably influenced by a sense of duty. To many it may even appear that a public life was best adapted for the display of his particular talents; that, at the termination of the Mithridatic war, Cicero was in fact marked out as the very individual to adjust the pretensions of the rival parties in the Commonwealth, to withstand the encroachments of Pompey, and to baffle the arts of Cæsar. And if the power of swaying and controlling the popular assemblies by his eloquence; if the circumstances of his rank, Equestrian as far as family was concerned, yet almost Patrician from the splendour of his personal honours; if the popularity derived from his accusation of Verres, and defence of Cornelius, and the favour of the Senate acquired by the brilliant services of his Consulate; if the general respect of all parties which his learning and virtue commanded; if these were sufficient qualifications for a mediator between contending factions, Cicero was indeed called upon by the voice of his country to that most arduous and honourable post. And in his Consulate he had seemed sensible of the call: *Ita est à me Consulatus peractus*, he declares in his speech against Piso, *ut nihil sine consilio Senatûs, nihil non approbante populo Romano egerim; ut semper in Rostris Curiam, in Senatu Populum defenderim; ut multitudinem cum Principibus, Equestrem ordinem cum Senatu conjunxerim.*

His Consulate. U. C. 690. A. C. 63.

Want of political firmness.

Yet after that eventful period, we see him resigning his high station to Cato, who, with half his abilities, little foresight, and no address,‡ possessed that first requisite for a Statesman, firmness. Cicero on the contrary was irresolute, timid, and inconsistent.§ He talked indeed largely of preserving a middle course,‖ but he was continually vacillating from one to the other extreme; always too confident or too dejected; incorrigibly vain of success, yet meanly panegyrizing the government of an usurper. His foresight, sagacity, practical good sense, and singular tact in directing men's measures, were lost for want of that strength of mind which points them steadily to one object. He was never decided, never, (as has sometimes been observed,) took an important step without afterwards repenting of it. Nor can we account for the firmness and resolution of his Consulate, unless we discriminate between the case of resisting a party, and that of balancing contending interests. Boldness in opposition differs widely from steadiness in mediation; the latter implying a coolness of judgment, which a direct attack

* Plutarch, *in Vitâ.*
† Γραικὸς καὶ σχολαστικός. Plutarch, *in Vitâ.*
‡ *Ad Atticum*, 1. 18. 2. 1.
§ See Montesquieu, *Grandeur des Romains*, ch. xii.
‖ *Ad Atticum*, 1. 19.

Biography. From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

is so far from requiring, that it even inspires minds naturally timid with unusual excitation.

His Consulate was succeeded by the return of Pompey from the east, and the establishment of the First Triumvirate; which, disappointing his hopes of political greatness, induced him to resume his forensic and literary occupations. From these he was recalled, after an interval of four years, by the threatening measures of Clodius, who at length succeeded in driving him into exile. This event, which considering the circumstances connected with it, was one of the most glorious of his life, filled him with the utmost distress and despondency. He wandered about Greece bewailing his miserable fortune, refusing the consolations which his friends attempted to administer, and shunning the public honours with which the Greek cities were eager to load him.* His return, which took place in the course of the following year, reinstated him in the high station he had filled at the termination of his Consulate, but the circumstances of the times did not allow him to retain it. We have already, in our previous history, described his vacillations between the several members of the Triumvirate; his defence of Vatinius to please Cæsar; and of his bitter political enemy Gabinius, to ingratiate himself with Pompey. His private life in the meanwhile furnishes little worth noticing, except his election into the college of Augurs, a dignity which had been a particular object of his ambition. His appointment to the government of Cilicia, which took place about five years after his return from exile, was in consequence of Pompey's law, which obliged those Senators of Consular or Prætorian rank, who had never held any foreign command, to divide the vacant Provinces among them. This office, which we have above seen him decline, he now accepted with feelings of extreme reluctance, dreading perhaps the military occupations which the movements of the Parthians in that quarter rendered necessary. Yet if we consider the state and splendour with which the Proconsuls were surrounded, and the opportunities afforded him for almost legalized plunder and extortion, we must confess that this insensibility to the common objects of human desire, was the characteristic of no ordinary mind. The singular disinterestedness and integrity of his administration, as well as his success against the enemy, have already come before us in our memoir of Cæsar. The latter he exaggerated from the desire universally felt of appearing to excel in those things for which nature has not adapted us.

First Triumvirate. U. C. 694. A. C. 60.

His exile and return. U. C. 696. A. C. 58.

Governor of Cilicia.

His return to Italy was followed by earnest endeavours to reconcile Pompey with Cæsar, and by very spirited behaviour when Cæsar required his presence in the Senate. On this occasion he felt the glow of self approbation with which his political conduct seldom repaid him: *credo*, he writes to Atticus, *credo hunc (Cæsarem) me non amare; at ego me amavi: quod mihi jam pridem usu non venit.** But this independent temper was but transient. At no period of his public life did he display such miserable vacillation as at the opening of the civil war. We find him first accepting a commission from the Republic;† then courting Cæsar; next, on Pompey's sailing for Greece, resolving to follow him thither; presently determining to stand neuter; then bent on retiring to the Pompeians in Sicily; and, when after all he had joined their camp in Greece, discovering such timidity and discontent, as to draw from Pompey the bitter reproof, *cupio ad hostes Cicero transeat, ut nos timeat.*‡

Marcus Tullius Cicero. From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

On his return to Italy, after the battle of Pharsalia, he had the mortification of learning, that his brother and nephew were making their peace with Cæsar, by throwing the blame of their opposition on himself. And here we see one of those elevated points of character, which redeem the weaknesses of his political conduct; for, hearing that Cæsar had retorted on Quintus the charge which the latter had brought against himself, he wrote a pressing letter in his favour, declaring his brother's safety was not less precious to him than his own, and representing him not as the leader, but as the companion of his voyage.§

General conduct after the battle of Pharsalia.

Now too the state of his private affairs reduced him to great perplexity; the sum he had advanced to Pompey had impoverished him, and he was forced to stand indebted to Atticus for present assistance.‖ These difficulties led him to take a step which it has been customary to regard with great severity; the divorce of his wife Terentia, though he was then in his sixty-second year, and his marriage with his rich ward Publilia, who was of an age disproportionate to his own.¶ Yet in reviewing this proceeding, we must not adopt the modern standard of propriety, forgetful of the character of an age which reconciled actions even of moral turpitude, with a reputation for honour and virtue. Terentia was a woman of a most imperious and violent temper, and (what is more to the purpose) had in no slight degree contributed to his present embarrassments by her extravagance in the management of his private affairs.** By her he had two children, a son, born the year before his Consulate, and a daughter whose loss he was now fated to experience. To Tullia he was tenderly attached, not only from the excellence of her disposition, but from her love of polite literature; and her death tore from him, as he so pathetically laments to Sulpicius, the only comforts which the course of public events had left him.†† At first he was inconsolable; and retiring to a little island near his estate at Antium, buried himself in the woods, to avoid the sight of man.‡‡ His distress was increased by the unfeeling conduct of Publilia; whom he soon divorced for testifying joy at the death of her step-daughter. On this occasion he wrote his Treatise on consolation, with a view to alleviate his mental sufferings; and with the same object, he determined on dedicating a temple to his daughter as a memorial of her virtues and his affection. His friends were assiduous in their attentions; and

Private embarrassments.

Divorces Terentia, and marries Publilia.

His children.

Grief at the loss of Tullia. U. C. 708. A. C. 46.

Secedes from public life.

Divorces Publilia.

* *Ad Atticum*, lib. iii. *ad Fam.* lib. xiv. *pro Sext.* 22. *pro Dom.* 36. Plutarch, *in Vitâ.* It is curious to observe how he converts the alleviating circumstances of his case into exaggerations of his misfortune, he writes to Atticus: *Nam quod me tam sæpe et tam vehementer objurgas, et animo infirmo esse dicis, quæso ecquod tantum malum est quod in meâ calamitate non sit? ecquis unquam ex tam amplo statu*, tam in bonâ causâ, *tantis facultatibus ingenii, consilii, gratiæ*, tantis præsidiis bonorum omnium, *concidit?* 3. 10. Other persons would have reckoned the justice of their cause, and the countenance of good men, alleviations of their distress; and so, when others were concerned, he himself thought; *pro Sext.* 12.

* *Ad Atticum*, 9. 18.
† Ibid. 7. 11. 9. 6. 119. 10. 8 and 9, &c.
‡ Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, 2, 3.
§ *Ad Atticum*, 11. 8, 9, 10 and 12. ‖ Ibid. 11. 13.
¶ *Ad Fam.* 4. 14. Middleton, vol. ii. p. 149. ** Ibid.
†† *Ad Fam.* 4. 6. ‡‡ *Ad Atticum*, 12. 15, &c.

Cæsar, who had treated him with the utmost kindness on his return from Egypt, signified the respect he bore his character, by sending a letter of condolence from Spain,* where the remains of the Pompeian party still engaged him. He had shortly before given a still stronger proof of his favour, by replying to a work which Cicero had drawn up in praise of Cato;† but no attentions, however considerate, could soften Cicero's vexation at seeing the country he had formerly saved by his exertions, now subjected to the tyranny of one master. His speeches, indeed, for Marcellus and Ligarius, exhibit traces of inconsistency; but for the most part he retired from public business, and gave himself up to the composition of those works, which, while they mitigated his political sorrows, have secured his literary celebrity.

The murder of Cæsar, which took place in the following year, once more brought him on the stage of public affairs; but as we intend our present paper to be an account of his private life and literary character, we shall reserve the sequel of his history, including his unworthy treatment of Brutus, his coalition with Octavius, his orations against Antonius, his proscription and death, for our subsequent pages. On the whole, antiquity may be challenged to produce an individual so virtuous, so perfectly amiable as Cicero. None interest more in their life, none excite more painful emotions in their death. Others, it is true, may be found of loftier and more heroic character, who awe and subdue the mind by the grandeur of their views, or the intensity of their exertions. But Cicero engages our affections by the integrity of his public conduct, the purity of his private life, the generosity,‡ placability and kindness of his heart, the playfulness of his temper, the warmth of his domestic attachments. In this respect his letters are invaluable. "Here we may see the genuine man without disguise or affectation, especially in his letters to Atticus; to whom he talked with the same frankness as to himself, opened the rise and progress of each thought; and never entered into any affair without his particular advice."§

His private virtues.

It must however be confessed, that the publication of this correspondence has laid open the defects of his political character. Want of firmness has been repeatedly mentioned as his principal failing; and insincerity will infallibly characterise a timid and irresolute mind. Openness, however, and candour are rare qualities in a statesman; but, while the duplicity of weakness is despised, the insincerity of a powerful, but crafty mind, though incomparably more odious, is too commonly regarded with feelings of indulgence. Cicero was timid, not designing; his disposition too was conciliatory and forgiving; and much which has been referred to inconsistency, should be attributed to the generous temper which induced him to remember the services rather than the neglect of Plancius, and to relieve the exiled and indigent Verres.‖ Much too may be traced to his professional habits as a pleader; which led him to introduce the licence of the Forum into deliberative discussions, and (however inexcusably) even into his correspondence with private friends.

Apologies for his inconsistency in public life.

Some writers, as Lyttleton, have considered it an aggravation of Cicero's inconsistencies, that he was so perfectly aware of what was philosophically upright and correct. It might be sufficient to reply, that there is a wide difference between calmly deciding on an abstract point, and acting on that decision in the hurry of real life; that Cicero in fact was apt to fancy, (as all will fancy when assailed by interest or passion,) that the circumstances of his case constituted it an exception to the broad principles of duty. As he eloquently expresses himself in his defence of Plancius. *Neque enim inconstantis puto, sententiam, tanquam aliquod navigium, et cursum, ex Reipublicæ tempestate moderari. Ego vero hæc didici, hæc vidi, hæc scripta legi; hæc de sapientissimis et clarissimis viris, et in hac Republicâ, et in aliis civitatibus, monumenta nobis literæ prodiderunt; non semper easdem sententias ab iisdem, sed quascunque Reipublicæ status, inclinatio temporum, ratio concordiæ postularet, esse defendendas.**

Thus he seems to consider it the duty of a mediator alternately† to praise and blame both parties more than truth allows, if by these means it be possible either to flatter or to frighten them into an adoption of temperate measures.

But the argument of the objectors proceeds on an entire misconception of the design and purpose with which the ancients prosecuted Philosophical studies. The motives and principles of Morals were not so clearly perceived as to lead to a practical application of them to the conduct of life. Even when they proposed them in the form of precept, they still regarded the perfectly virtuous man, as the creature of their imagination rather than a model for imitation—a character whom it was an amusement rather than a duty to contemplate; and if an individual here or there, as Scipio or Cato, attempted to conform his life to his Philosophical conceptions of virtue, he was sure to be ridiculed for singularity and affectation.

The Philosophy of the ancients, more speculative than practical.

Even among the Athenians, by whom Philosophy was, in many cases, cultivated to the exclusion of every active profession, pleasure, not the discovery of Truth, was the principal object of their discussions. That we must thus account for the ensnaring questions and sophistical reasonings of which their disputations consisted, has been noticed in our article on Logic; and it was their extension of this system to the care of morals, which brought upon their Sophists the irony of Socrates, and the sterner rebuke of Aristotle. But if this took place in a State in which the love of Philosophy pervaded all ranks, much more was it to be expected among the Romans, who busied as they were in political enterprises, and deficient perhaps in intellectual acuteness, had neither time nor inclination for abstruse investigations; and who considered Philosophy simply as one of the many fashions introduced from Greece, "a sort of table furniture," as Warburton well expresses it, a mere refinement in the arts of social enjoyment.‡ This character it bore both among friends and enemies. Hence the popularity which attended the three Athenian philosophers,

* *Ad Atticum*, 13. 20. † Ibid. 12. 40 and 41.

‡ His want of jealousy towards his rivals was remarkable; this was exemplified in his esteem for Hortensius, and still more so in his conduct towards Calvus. See *ad Fam.* 15. 21.

§ Middleton, vol. ii. p. 525. 4to.

‖ *Pro Planc.* Middleton, vol. i. p. 108.

* C. 39. † *Ad Fam.* 6. 6. 7. 3.

Ἰδίᾳ συνεβούλευεν ὁ Κικέρων, πολλὰ μὲν Καίσαρι γράφων, πολλὰ δ'αὐτὸς Πομπηΐῳ δεόμενος, πραΰνων ἑκάτερον καὶ παραμυθέμενος. Plutarch, *in vitâ Cic.* See also *in vitâ Pomp.*

‡ Lactantius, *Inst.* 3. 16.

Biography. From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

who had come to Rome on an embassy from their native city; and hence the inflexible determination with which Cato procured their dismissal, through fear, as Plutarch tells us,* lest their arts of disputation should corrupt the Roman youth. And when at length by the authority of Scipio,† the literary treasures of Sylla, and the patronage of Lucullus, Philosophical studies had gradually received the countenance of the higher classes of their countrymen, we still find them, in consistency with the principle above laid down, determined in the adoption of this or that system, not so much by the harmony of its parts, or by the plausibility of its reasonings, as by its suitableness to the profession and political station to which they respectively belonged. Thus because the Stoics were more minute than other sects in inculcating the moral and social duties, we find the *Jurisconsulti* professing themselves followers of Zeno;‡ the Orators, on the contrary, adopted the disputatious system of the later Academics;§ while Plato and Epicurus were the respective masters of the imaginative recluse, or the careless and selfish voluptuary. Hence too, they confined the profession of Philosophical science to Greek teachers; considering them the sole proprietors, as it were, of a foreign and expensive luxury, which the vanquished might have the trouble of furnishing, but themselves could readily afford to purchase.

Introduction of the Greek Philosophy to Rome.

First application of the Latin language to Philosophical subjects.

Before the works of Cicero, no attempts worth considering had been made for using the Latin tongue in Philosophical subjects. The natural stubbornness of the language, conspired with Roman haughtiness to prevent this application.‖ The Epicureans, indeed, had made the experiment, but their writings were even affectedly harsh and slovenly,¶ and we find Cicero himself, in spite of his inexhaustible flow of rich and expressive diction, making continual apologies for his learned occupations, and extolling Philosophy as the parent of every thing great, virtuous, and amiable.**

Character of Cicero's Philosophical writings.

Yet, with whatever discouragements his design was attended, he ultimately triumphed over the pride of an unlettered people, and the difficulties of a defective language. He was possessed of that first requisite for eminence, an enthusiastic attachment to the studies he was recommending. But occupied as he was with the duties of a Statesman, mere love of literature would have availed little, if separated from the energy and capriciousness of intellect by which he was enabled to pursue a variety of objects at once, with equally persevering and indefatigable zeal. "He suffered no part of his leisure to be idle, or the least interval of it to be lost; but what other people gave to the public shows, to pleasures, to feasts, nay even to sleep and the ordinary refreshments of nature, he generally gave to his books, and the enlargement of his knowledge. On days of business, when he had any thing particular to compose, he had no other time for meditating, but when he was taking a few turns in his walks, where he used to dictate his thoughts to his scribes who attended him. We find many of his letters dated before daylight, some from the Senate, others from his meals, and the crowd of his morning levee." Middleton's *Life*, vol. ii. p. 254. Thus he found time, without apparent inconvenience, for the business of the State, for the bustle of pleading, and for Philosophical studies. During his Consulate he delivered twelve orations in the Senate, Rostrum or Forum. His Treatises *de Oratore* and *de Republicâ*, the most finished perhaps of his compositions, were written at a time when, to use his own words, "not a day passed without his taking part in forensic disputes."* And in the last year of his life, he composed at least eight of his Philosophical works, besides the fourteen orations against Antony, which are known by the name of Philippics. Being thus ardent in the cause of Philosophy, he recommended it to the notice of his countrymen, not only for the honour which its introduction would reflect upon himself, (which itself was a motive of no inconsiderable influence,) but also with the fondness of one who esteemed it "the guide of life, the parent of virtue, the guardian in difficulty, and the tranquillizer in misfortune."† Nor were his mental endowments less adapted to the accomplishment of his object, than the spirit with which he engaged in the work. Gifted with great versatility of talent, with acuteness, quickness of perception, skill in selection, art in arrangement, fertility of illustration, warmth of fancy, and extraordinary taste; he at once seizes upon the most effective parts of his subject, places them in the most striking point of view, and arrays them in the liveliest and most inviting colours. His writings have the singular felicity of combining brilliancy of execution, with never-failing good sense. It must be allowed, that he is deficient in depth; that he skims over rather than dives into the various departments of literature; that he had too great command of the plausible, to be a patient investigator or a sound reasoner. Yet if he has little originality of thought, if he does not grapple with his subject, if he is unequal to a regular and lengthened disquisition, if he is frequently inconsistent in his opinions, we must remember that soundness, without display, has few charms for those who have not yet imbibed a taste even for the outward form of knowledge,‡ that system nearly precludes variety, and depth almost implies obscurity. It was this very absence of uniformity, which constituted in Roman eyes a principal charm of Cicero's compositions.§

Marcus Tullius Cicero. From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

Nor must his profession as a pleader be forgotten in enumerating the circumstances which concurred to give his writings their peculiar character. For however his design of interesting his countrymen in Greek literature, however too his particular line of talent may have led him to explain rather than to invent; yet he expressly informs us it was principally with a view to his own improvement in Oratory that he devoted himself to Philosophical studies.‖ This induced him

* Plutarch, *in vitâ Caton.* See also *de Invent.* 1. 36.
† Paterculus, 1. 12, &c. Plutarch, *in vitâ Lucull. et Syll.*
‡ Gravin. *Origin. Jurisciv.* lib. i. c. 44.
§ Quint. 12. 2. *Auct. de dialog. de Orator.* 31.
‖ *De Nat. Deor.* 1. 4. *de Off.* 1. 1. *de fin. Acad. Quæst.* &c.
¶ *Tusc. Quæst.* 1. 3. 2. 3. *Acad. Quæst.* 1. 2. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 21. *de Fin.* 1. 3, &c. *de clar. Orat.* 35.
** *Lucullus*, 2. *de Fin.* 1. 1—3. *Tusc. Quæst.* 2. 1 2, 3. 2. 5. 2. *de Legg.* 1. 22—24. *de Off.* 2. 2. *de Orat.* 41, &c.

* *Ad Quint. fratr.* 3. 3
† *Tusc. Quæst.* 5. 2. ‡ *De Off.* 1. 5. *init.*
§ Johnson's observations on Addison's writings, may be well applied to those of Cicero; who would have been eminently successful in short miscellaneous essays like those of the Spectators, had the manners of the age allowed it.
‖ *Orat.* 3, 4. *Tusc. Quæst.* 2, 3. *de Off.* 1. 1. *præfat. Paradox. Quint. de Instit.* 12. 2. Lactantius, *Inst.* 3. 16.

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to undertake successively the cause of the Stoic, the Epicurean, or the Platonist, as an exercise for his powers of argument; while the wavering and unsettled state of mind, occasioned by such habits of disputation, led him in his private judgment to prefer the sceptical tenets of the New Academy.

Here then, before examining Cicero's Philosophical writings, an opportunity is presented to us of redeeming the pledge we gave in our memoir of PLATO, by considering the system of doctrine which the reformers (as they thought themselves) of the Academic school introduced about 300 years before the Christian era.

The New Academy.

We have already traced the history of the OLD ACADEMY, and spoken of the innovations on the system of Plato, silently introduced by the austere Polemo. When Zeno, however, who was his pupil, advocated the same rigid tenets in a more open and dogmatic form,* the Academy at length took the alarm, a reaction ensued, Arcesilas, who had succeeded Polemo and Crates, determined to revert to the principles of the elder schools;† but mistaking the profession of ignorance, which Socrates had used against the Sophists on *physical* questions, for an actual scepticism on points connected with *morals*, he fell into the opposite extreme, and declared, first, that nothing could be known, and therefore, secondly, nothing should be advanced.‡

Arcesilas.

Whatever were his private sentiments, (for some authors affirm his esoteric doctrines to have been dogmatic,§) he brought forward these sceptical tenets in so unguarded a form, that it required all the argumentative powers possessed by this eminent individual to maintain them against the obvious objections which were pressed upon him from all quarters. On his death, therefore, as might have been anticipated, his school was deserted for those of Zeno and Epicurus; and during the lives of Lacydes, Evander, and Hegesinus, who successively filled the Academic chair, being no longer recommended by the novelty of its doctrines,‖ or the talents of its masters, it became of little consideration amid the wranglings of more popular Philosophies. Carneades,¶ therefore, who succeeded Hegesinus, found it necessary to use more cautious and guarded language; and by explaining what was paradoxical by reservations and exceptions, in short by all the arts which an acute and active genius could suggest, he contrived to establish its authority, without departing, as far as we have the means of judging, from the principle of universal scepticism which Arcesilas had so pertinaciously advocated.**

Carneades.

* *Acad. Quæst.* 1. 10, &c. *Lucullus*, 5. *de Legg.* 1. 20. 3. 3, &c.

† *Acad. Quæst.* 1. 4. 12, 13. *Lucullus*, 5 and 23. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 5. *de Fin.* 2. 1. *de Orat.* 3. 18. Austin. *contra Acad.* 2. 6. Sext. Emp. *adv. Mathem.* lib. vii. Ὁ Αρκεσίλαος τοσοῦτον ἀπέδει τῆ καινοτομίας τινὰ δόξαν ἀγαπᾷν καὶ ὑποποιεῖσθαι τῶν παλαιῶν, ὥστε ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς τότε σοφιστὰς ὅτι προστρίζεται Σωκράτει καὶ Πλάτωνι καὶ Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὰ περὶ τῆς ἐποχῆς δόγματα καὶ τῆς ἀκαταληψίας, οὐδὲν δεομένοις, ἀλλα οἷον ἀναγωγὴν καὶ βεβαίωσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀνδρας ἐνδόξους ποιούμενος. Plutarch, *in Colot.* 26.

‡ *Arcesilas negabat esse quidquam, quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. Sic omnia latere censebant in occulto, neque esse quicquam quod cerni quod intelligi possit; quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri neque affirmare quenquam, neque assertione approbare, &c. Acad. Quæst.* 1. 12. See also *Lucullus*, 9 and 18. They were countenanced in these conclusions by Plato's doctrine of ideas. *Lucullus*, 46.

§ Sext. Empir. *Pyrrh. Hypot.* 1. 33. Diogenes Laertius, lib. iv. *in Arcesil.*

‖ *Lucullus*, 6. ¶ Austin. *adv. Acad.* 3. 17.

** *Lucullus*, 18. 24. Austin. *in Acad.* 3. 39.

Marcus Tullius Cicero. From U. C. 647. to 711. — A. C. 107. to 43.

The New Academy* then taught with Plato, that all things in their own nature were fixed and determinate; but that, through the constitution of the human mind, it was impossible *for us* to see them in their simple and eternal forms, to separate appearance from reality, truth from falsehood.† For the conception we form of any object is altogether derived from and depends on the sensation, the impression, it produces on our own minds, (*πάθος ενεργείας, φαντασία.*) Reason does but deduce from premises ultimately supplied by sensation. Our only communication then with actual existences being through the medium of our own impressions, we have no means of ascertaining the correspondence of the things themselves with the ideas we entertain of them; and therefore can in no case be certain of the fidelity of our senses. Of their fallibility, however, we may easily assure ourselves; for in cases in which they are detected contradicting each other, all cannot be correct reporters of the object with which they profess to acquaint us. Food, which is the same as far as *sight* and *touch* are concerned, *tastes* differently to different individuals; fire, which is the same to the *eye*, communicates a sensation of *pain* at one time, of *pleasure* at another; the oar *appears* crooked in the water, while the *touch* assures us it is as straight as before it was immersed.‡ Again, in dreams, in intoxication, in madness, impressions are made upon the mind, vivid enough to incite to reflection and action, yet utterly at variance with those produced by the same objects when we are awake, or sober, or in possession of our reason.§

Modified scepticism of the New Academy.

It appears then that we cannot prove that our senses are *ever* faithful; but we do know they *often* produce erroneous impressions. Here then is room for endless doubt; for why may they not deceive us in cases in which we cannot detect the deception? It is certain they *often* act irregularly; is there any consistency *at all* in their operations, any law to which these varieties may be referred?

It is granted that an object often varies in the impression which it makes upon the mind, while on the other hand the same impression may arise from different objects. What limit is to be assigned to this disorder? is there any sensation strong enough to *assure* us of the presence of the object which it seems to intimate, any such as to preclude the possibility of deception? If when we look into a mirror our minds are impressed with the appearance of unreal trees, fields, and houses, how can we ascertain whether the scene we directly look upon has any more substantial existence than the former.‖

From these reasonings the Academics taught that nothing was certain, nothing was to be known, (*καταλητόν.*) For the Stoics themselves, their most deter-

* See Sext. Empir. *adv. Mathem.* lib. vii.

† *Acad. Quæst.* 1. 13. *Lucullus*, 23. 38. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 5. *Orat.* 71.

‡ *Tu autem te negas infracto remo neque columbæ collo commoveri. Primum cur? nam et in remo sentio non esse id quod videatur, et in columbâ plures videri colores, nec esse plus uno, &c. Lucullus*, 25.

§ *Lucullus*, 16—18. 26—28.

‖ *Scriptum est ita: Academicis placere, esse rerum ejusmodi dissimilitudines ut aliæ probabiles videantur, aliæ contra—id autem non esse satis cur alia percipi posse dicas, alia non posse; propterea quod multa falsa probabilia sint, nihil autem falsi perceptum et cognitum possit esse. Itaque ait vehementer errare eos qui dicant ab Academiâ sensus eripi, à quibus nunquam dictum sit aut colorem aut saporem aut sonum nullum esse: illud sit disputatum, non inesse in his propriam, quæ nusquam alibi esset, veri et certi notam. Lucullus*, 32. See also 13. 24. 31. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 5.

mined opponents, defined the *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία* (or impression which led to knowledge,*) to be one that was capable of being produced by no object except that to which it really belonged.†

Since then we cannot arrive at Knowledge, we must suspend our decision, pronounce absolutely on nothing, nay, according to Arcesilas, never even form an opinion.‡ In the conduct of life, however, Probability§ must determine our choice of action; and this admits of different degrees. The lowest kind is that which suggests itself on the first view of the case, (*φαντασία πιθανή*;) but in all important matters we must correct the evidence of our senses by considerations derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, the disposition of the organ, the time, the manner, and other attendant circumstances. When the impression has been thus minutely considered, the *φαντασία* becomes *περιωδευμένη*, or *approved on circumspection*; and if during this examination no objection has arisen to weaken our belief, the highest degree of Probability is attained, and the impression is pronounced *complete*, (*απερίσπαστος*.‖)

Sextus Empiricus illustrates this as follows:¶ If on entering a dark room we discern a coiled rope, our first impression may be that it is a serpent,—this is the *φαντασία πιθανή*. On a closer inspection, however, after *walking round it* (*περιοδεύσαντες*) we observe it does not move, nor has it the proper colour, shape, or proportions; and now we conclude it is not a serpent; here we are determined into our belief by the *περιωδευμένη φαντασία*. For an instance of the third and most accurate kind, viz. that with which no contrary impression interferes, we may refer to the conduct of Admetus on the return of Alcestis from the infernal regions. He believes he sees his wife; every thing confirms it; but he cannot acquiesce in that opinion; his mind is *divided* (*περισπᾶται*) from the impression he has of her death; he asks *ἀλλ' ἦν ἔθαπτον εἰσορῶ δάμαρτ' ἐμήν*; (*Alc.* 1148.) Hercules resolves his difficulty, and his *φαντασία* becomes *απερίσπαστος*.

The suspension then of assent (*ἐποχή*) which the Academics then injoined was, at least from the times of Carneades,** nearly a speculative doctrine;†† and herein lay the chief difference between them and the Pyrrhonists; that the latter altogether denied the existence of the Probable, while the former admitted there was sufficient to allow of action provided we pronounced absolutely on nothing.

Causes which made the New Academy a school of Rhetoric.

Little more can be said concerning the opinions of a sect whose fundamental maxim was that nothing could be known, and nothing should be taught. It lay midway between the other Philosophies; and in the altercations of the various schools it was at once attacked by *all*,* yet appealed to by *each* of the contending parties, if not to countenance its own sentiments, at least to condemn those advocated by its opponents,† and thus to perform the office of an umpire.‡ From this necessity then of being prepared on all sides for attack,§ it became as much a school of Rhetoric as of Philosophy,‖ and was celebrated among the ancients for the eloquence of its masters.¶ Hence also its reputation was continually varying: for requiring the aid of great abilities to maintain its exalted and arduous post, it alternately rose and fell in estimation, according to the talents of the individual who happened to fill the chair.** And hence the frequent alterations which took place in its Philosophical tenets; which, depending rather on the arbitrary determinations of its present head, than on the tradition of settled maxims, were accommodated to the views of each successive master, according as he hoped by sophistry or concession to overcome the repugnance which the mind ever will feel to the doctrines of universal scepticism.

And in these continual changes it is pleasing to observe, that the interests of virtue and good order were uniformly promoted; interests to which the Academic doctrines were certainly hostile, if not necessarily fatal. Thus although we find Carneades, in conformity to the plan adopted by Arcesilas,†† opposing the *dogmatic* principles of the Stoics concerning moral duty,‡‡ and studiously concealing his private views even from his friends;§§ yet, by allowing that the suspense of judgment was not always a duty, that the wise man might sometimes *believe* though he could not *know*;‖‖ he in some measure restored the authority of those great instincts of our nature which his predecessor appears to have discarded. Clitomachus pursued his steps by innovations in the same direction;¶¶ Philo, who followed next, attempting to reconcile his tenets with those of the Platonic school,*** has been accounted the founder of a fourth Academy

Philo and Antiochus.

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* Οἱ γὲν Στωϊκοὶ κατάληψιν εἶνάι φασι καταληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ συγκατάθεσιν. Sext. Empir. *Pyrrh. Hypot.* 3. 25.

† *Verum non posse comprehendi ex illâ Stoici Zenonis definitione arripuisse videbantur, qui ait id verum percipi posse, quod ita esset animo impressum ex eo unde esset, ut esse non posset ex eo unde non esset. Quod brevius planusque sic dicitur, his signis verum posse comprehendi, quæ signa non potest habere quod falsum est.* Austin. *contra Acad.* 2. 5. See also Sext. Empir. *adv. Math.* lib. vii. *περὶ μεταβολῆς*, and of *Lucullus*, 6 with 13.

‡ *Lucullus*, 13. 21. 40.

§ Τοῖς φαινομένοις οὖν προσέχοντες κατὰ τὴν βιωτικὴν τήρησιν ἀδοξάστως βιῶμεν· ἐπεὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἀνενέργητοι παντάπασιν εἶναι. Sext. Empir. *Pyrrh. Hypot.* 1. 11.

‖ Cicero terms these three impressions, *visio probabilis; quæ ex circumspectione aliquâ et accuratâ consideratione fiat; quæ non impediatur. Lucullus*, 11. ¶ *Pyrrh. Hypot.* 1. 33.

** Numen. *apud Euseb. Præp. Evang.* 14. 7.

†† *Lucullus*, 31. 34. *De Off.* 2. 2. *de Fin.* 5. 26. Quint. 12. 1.

* *Lucullus*, 22. *et alibi. Tusc. Quæst.* 2. 2.

† See a striking passage from Cicero's *Academics*, preserved by Austin. *contra Acad.* 3. 7. and *Lucullus*, 18.

‡ *De Nat. Deor. passim. de Div.* 2. 72. *Quorum controversiam solebat tanquam honorarius arbiter judicare Carneades. Tusc. Quæst.* 5. 41.

§ *De Fin.* 2. 1. *de Orat.* 1. 18. *Lucullus*, 3. *Tusc. Quæst.* 5. 11. Numen. *apud Euseb. Præp. Evang.* 14. 6, &c. Lactantius, *Inst.* 3. 4.

‖ *De Nat. Deor.* 1. 67. *de Fat.* 2. *Dialog. de Orat.* 31, 32.

¶ *Lucullus*, 6. 18. *de Orat.* 2. 38. 3. 18. Quint. *Inst.* 12. 2. Plutarch, *in vitâ Caton. et Cic.* Lactantius, *Inst.* Numen. *apud Euseb.*

** *Hæc in philosophiâ ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem apertè judicandi, profecta à Socrate*, repetita *ab Arcesilâ* confirmata *à Carneade, usque ad nostram viguit ætatem; quam* nunc *propemodum* orbam *esse in ipsâ Græciâ intelligo. Quod non Academiæ vitio, sed* tarditate hominum *arbitror contigisse. Nam si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes? quod facere iis necesse est, quibus propositum est, veri reperiendi causâ, et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. De Nat. Deor.* 1. 5.

†† *De Nat. Deor.* 1. 25. Austin. *contra Acad.* 3. 17. Numen. *apud Euseb. Præp. Evang.* 14. 6.

‡‡ *De Fin.* 2. 13. 5. 7. *Lucullus*, 42. *Tusc. Quæst.* 5. 29.

§§ *Lucullus*, 45.

‖‖ *Lucullus*, 21. 24. for an elevated moral precept of his see *de Fin.* 2 18.

¶¶ Ἀνὴρ ἐν ταῖς τριαὶν αἱρέσεσι διατρίψας ἔν τε τῇ Ακαδημαϊκῇ καὶ Περιπατητικῇ καὶ Στωϊκῇ. Diogenes Laertius, lib. iv. *sub fin.*

*** *Philo, magnus vir, negat in libris duas Academias esse; erroremque eorum qui ita putarunt coarguit. Acad. Quæst.* 1. 4.

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—while, to his successor Antiochus, who embraced the doctrines of the Porch,* and maintained the fidelity of the senses, it has been usual to assign the establishment of a fifth.

We have already observed, that Cicero in early life inclined to the systems of Plato and Antiochus, which at the time he composed the bulk of his writings he had abandoned for that of Carneades and Philo.† Yet he was never so entirely a disciple of the New Academy, as to neglect the claims of morality and the laws. He is loud in his protestations, that Truth is the great object of his search;—*Ego enim*, he says, *si aut ostentatione aliquâ adductus, aut studio certandi, ad hanc potissimum Philosophiam me applicavi; non modò stultitiam meam, sed etiam mores et naturam condemnandam puto.... Itaque, nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione id facere, quod, cùm de Republicâ disceptatur, fieri interdum solet, jurarem per Jovem Deosque Penates, me et ardere studio Veri reperiendi, et ea sentire quæ dicerem.*‡ And however inappropriate this boast may appear, he at least pursues the useful and the magnificent in Philosophy; and uses his Academic character as a pretext rather for a judicious selection from each system, than for an indiscriminate rejection of all.§ Thus, in the capacity of a Statesman he calls in the assistance of doctrines which as an Orator he does not scruple to deride; those of Zeno in particular, who maintained the truth of the popular Theology and the divine origin of Augury, and (as we noticed above) was more explicit than the other masters in his views of social duty. This difference of sentiment between the magistrate and the pleader, is strikingly illustrated in the opening of his Treatise *de Legibus;* where, after deriving the principles of law from the nature of things, he is obliged to beg quarter of the Academics, whose reasonings he feels could at once destroy the foundation on which his argument rested. *Ad Respublicas firmandas, et ad stabiliendas vires, sanandos populos, omnis nostra pergit oratio. Quocirca vereor committere, ut non bene provisa et diligenter explorata principia ponantur: nec tamen ut omnibus probentur, (nam id fieri non potest) sed ut iis, qui omnia recta atque honesta per se expetenda duxerunt, et aut nihil omnino in bonis numerandum nisi quod per se ipsum laudabile esset, aut certè nullum habendum magnum bonum, nisi quod verè laudari sud sponte posset.* And then apparently alluding to the arguments of Carneades against justice, which he had put into the mouth of Philus in the third book of his *de Republicâ*, he proceeds; *Perturbatricem autem harum omnium rerum Academiam, hanc ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem* exoremus, ut sileat. *Nam, si invaserit in hæc, quæ* satis scitè *nobis instructa et composita videntur*, nimias edet ruinas. *Quam quidem ego* placare cupio, submovere non audeo.‖

Mixed Philosophy of Cicero.

And as, in questions connected with the interests of society, he thus uniformly advocates the tenets of the Porch, so in discussions of a physical character, we find him adopting the sublime and kindling sentiments of Pythagoras and Plato. Here, however, having no object of expediency in view to keep him within the bounds of consistency, he scruples not to introduce whatever is most beautiful in itself, or most adapted to his present purpose. At one time he describes the Deity as the all-pervading soul of the world, the cause of life and motion.* At another he is the intelligent preserver and governor of every separate part.† At one time the soul of man is in its own nature necessarily eternal, without beginning or end of existence;‡—at another it is represented as reunited on death to the one infinite spirit;§—at another it is to enter the assembly of the Gods, or to be driven into darkness, according to its moral conduct in this life;‖—at another the best and greatest of mankind are alone destined for immortality¶—which is sometimes described as attended with consciousness and the continuance of earthly friendships;** sometimes, as but an immortality of name and glory;†† more frequently however he confuses these separate notions together in the same passage.‡‡

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Though the works of Aristotle were not given to the world till Sylla's return from Greece, Cicero appears to have been a considerable proficient in his Philosophy,§§ and he has not overlooked the important aid it affords in those departments of science which are alike removed from abstract reasoning and fanciful theorizing. To Aristotle he is indebted for most of the principles laid down in his Rhetorical discussions,‖‖ while in his Treatises on morals not a few of his remarks may be traced to the same acute Philosopher.¶¶

His acquaintance with Aristotle.

The doctrines of the Garden alone, though some of his most intimate friends were of the Epicurean school, he regarded with aversion and contempt; feeling no sort of interest in a system which cut at the very root of that activity and fervour of mind for which he himself both in public and private was so honourably distinguished.***

His abhorrence of Epicurus.

Such then was the New Academy, and such the variation of opinion, which in Cicero's judgment, was not inconsistent with the profession of an Academic. And however his adoption of that Philosophy may be in part referred to his oratorical habits, or the natural cast of mind; yet, considering the ambition which he felt to inspire his countrymen with a taste for literature and science,††† we must conclude with Warburton,‡‡‡ that, in acceding to the system of Philo, he was strongly influenced by the freedom of thought and reasoning which it allowed to his compositions; the liberty of developing the principles and doctrines,

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* *De Fin.* 5. 5. *Lucullus*, 22. 43.
† *Acad. Quæst.* 1. 4. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 7.
‡ *Lucullus*, 20. see also *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 7. *de Fin.* 1. 5.
§ *Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcunque maximè probabile occurrat, id nostro jure liceat defendere. De Off.* 3, 4. see also *Tusc. Quæst.* 4. 4. 5. 29. *de Invent.* 2, 3.
‖ *De Legg.* 1. 13.

* *Tusc. Quæst.* 1. 27. *de Div.* 2. 72. *pro Milon.* 31. *de Legg.* 2. 7.
† *Fragm. de Rep.* 3. *Tusc. Quæst.* 1. 29. *de Univ.*
‡ *Tusc. Quæst.* 1. *passim. de Senect.* 21, 22. *Somn. Scip.* 8.
§ *De Div.* 1. 32. 49. *Fragm. de Consolat.*
‖ *Tusc. Quæst.* 1. 30. *Somn. Scip.* 9. *de Legg.* 2. 11.
¶ *De Amic.* 4. *de Off.* 3. 28. *pro Cluent.* 61. *de Legg.* 2. 17. *Tusc. Quæst.* 1. 11. *pro Sext.* 21. *de Nat. Deor.* 1. 17.
** *Cat.* 23. †† *Pro Arch.* 11. 12. *ad Fam.* 5. 21. 6. 21.
‡‡ *Pro Arch.* 11. 12. *ad Fam.* 5. 21. 6. 21.
§§ He seems to have fallen into some misconceptions of Aristotle's meaning. *De Invent.* 1. 35. 36. 2. 14. see Quint. *Inst.* 5. 14.
‖‖ *De Invent.* 1. 7. 2. 51. *et passim. ad Fam.* 1. 9. *de Orat.* 2. 36.
¶¶ *De Off.* 1. 1. *de Fin.* 4, 5. *ad Atticum.*
*** *De Fin.* 2. 21. 3. 1. *de Legg.* 1. 13. *de Orat.* 3. 17. *ad Fam.* 13. 1. *pro Sext.* 10.
††† *De Nat. Deor.* 1. 4. *Tusc. Quæst.* 1. 1. 5. 29. *de Fin.* 1. 3. 4. *de Off.* 1. 1. *de Div.* 2. 1. 2.
‡‡‡ *Div. Legg.* lib. iii. sec. 9

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the strong and weak parts of every Grecian school. Bearing then in mind his design of recommending the study of Philosophy, it is interesting to observe the artifices of style and manner which, with this end, he adopted in his Treatises; and though to enter minutely into this subject would be foreign to our present purpose, it may be allowed us to make some general remarks on the character of works so eminently successful in accomplishing the object for which they were undertaken.

His form of dialogue.

The most obvious peculiarity of Cicero's Philosophical discussions is the form of dialogue in which most of them are conveyed. Plato, indeed, and Xenophon had, before his time, been even more strictly dramatic in their compositions; but they professed to be recording the sentiments of an individual, and the Socratic mode of argument could hardly be displayed in any other shape. Of that interrogative and inductive conversation, however, Cicero affords but few specimens;* the nature of his dialogue being as different from that of the two Athenians, as was his object in writing. His aim was to excite interest; and he availed himself of this mode of composition for the life and variety, the ease, perspicuity, and vigour which it gave to his discussions. His dialogue is of two kinds; according as his subject is, or is not, a controverted point, it assumes the shape of a continued Treatise, or a free disputation; in the latter case imparting clearness to what is obscure, in the former relief to what is clear. Thus his practical and systematic Treatises on Rhetoric and Moral duty are either written in his own person, or merely divided between several speakers who are the organs of his own sentiments; while in questions of a more speculative cast, on the nature of the Gods, on the human soul, on the greatest good, he uses his Academic liberty, and brings forward the theories of contending Schools under the character of their respective advocates. The advantages gained in both cases are evident. In controverted subjects he is not obliged to discover his own views, he can detail opposite arguments forcibly and luminously, and he is allowed the use of those oratorical powers in which, after all, his great strength lay. In those subjects, on the other hand, which are uninteresting because they are familiar, he may pause or digress before the mind is weary and the attention begins to flag; the reader is carried on by easy journies, and short stages, and novelty in the speaker supplies the want of novelty in the matter.

Advantages of it.

Beauty of execution.

Nor does Cicero discover less skill in the execution of these dialogues, than address in their design. It were idle to enlarge upon the beauty, richness, and taste of compositions which have been the admiration of every age and country. In the dignity of his speakers, their high tone of mutual courtesy, the harmony of his groups, and the delicate relief of his contrasts, he is inimitable. The majesty and splendour of his introductions which generally address themselves to the passions or the imagination, the eloquence with which both sides of a question are successively displayed, the clearness and terseness of his statements on abstract points, the warmth of his illustrations, his exquisite allusions to the scene or time of the supposed conversation, his digressions in praise of Philosophy or great men, his quotations from Grecian and Roman poetry, lastly, the melody and fulness of his style, unite to throw a charm round his writings peculiar to themselves. To the Roman reader they especially recommended themselves by their continual and most artful references to the heroes of the old Republic, who now appeared but exemplars, and (as it were) patrons of that eternal Philosophy, which he had before, perhaps, considered as the short-lived reveries of ingenious, but inactive men. Nor is there any confusion, harshness, or appearance of effort in the introduction of the various beauties we have been enumerating, which are blended together with so much skill and propriety, that it is sometimes difficult to point out the particular causes of the delight left upon the mind.

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In proceeding to enumerate Cicero's Philosophical writings,* it may be necessary to premise that our intention is rather to sketch out the plan on which they are conducted, than to explain the doctrines which they recommend; for an account of which the reader is referred to our articles on the Schools by which they were respectively entertained.

Rhetorical works.

The series of his Rhetorical works has been preserved nearly complete, and consists of the *De Inventione, De Oratore, Brutus sive de claris Oratoribus, Orator sive de optimo genere Dicendi, De partitione Oratoriâ, Topica de optimo genere Oratorum.* The last-mentioned, which is a fragment, is understood to have been the proem to his translation (now lost) of the speeches of Demosthenes and Æschines, *De Corond.* These he translated with the view of defending, by the example of the Greek Orators, his own style of eloquence, which, as we shall afterwards find, the critics of the day censured as too Asiatic in its character; and hence the preface, which still survives, is on the subject of the Attic style of Oratory. This composition and his abstracts of his own orations,† are his only Rhetorical works not extant, and probably our loss is not very great. The Treatise on Rhetoric, addressed to Herennius, though edited with his works, and ascribed to him by several of the ancients, is now generally attributed to Cornificius, or some other writer of the same period.

These works consider the art of Rhetoric in different points of view, and thus receive from each other mutual support and illustration, while they prevent the tediousness which might else arise from sameness in the subject of discussion. Three are in the form of dialogue; the rest are written in his own person. In all, except perhaps the *Orator*, he professes to have digested the principles of the Aristotelic and Isocratean Schools into one finished system, selecting what was best in each, and, as occasion might offer, adding remarks and precepts of his own.‡ The subject is considered in three distinct lights;§ with reference to the *case*, the *speaker*, and the *speech*. The *case*, as respects its nature, is definite or indefinite; with reference to the hearer, it is judicial, deliberative, or descriptive; as regards the opponent, the division is fourfold; according as the fact, its nature, its quality, or its propriety is called in question. The art of the *speaker* is directed to five points; the discovery of persuasives,

* See *Tusc. Quæst.* and *de Republ.*

* See Fabricius, *Bibliothec. Latin.*; Olivet. in Cic. *op. omn.*; Middleton's *Life.*

† Quint. *Inst.* 10. 7.

‡ *De Invent.* 2. 2 et 3. *ad Fam.* 1. 9.

§ Confer *de part. Orat.* with *de Invent.*

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(whether ethical, pathetical, or argumentative,) arrangement, diction, memory, delivery. And the *speech*, itself, consists of six parts; introduction, statement of the case, division of the subject, proof, refutation, and conclusion.

His Treatises, *De Inventione* and *Topica*, the first and nearly the last of his compositions, are both on the invention of arguments, which he regards, with Aristotle, as the very foundation of the art; though he elsewhere confines the term *eloquence*, according to its derivation, to denote excellence of diction and delivery, to the exclusion of argumentative skill.* The former of these works was written at the age of twenty, and seems originally to have consisted of four books, of which but two remain.† In the first of these he considers Rhetorical invention *generally*, supplies common places for the six parts of an oration promiscuously, and gives a full analysis of the two forms of argument, syllogism, and induction. In the second book he applies these rules *particularly* to the three subject-matters of Rhetoric, the deliberative, the judicial, and the descriptive, dwelling principally on the judicial, as affording the most ample field for discussion. This Treatise seems nearly entirely compiled from the writings of Aristotle, Isocrates, and Hermagoras;‡ and as such he alludes to it in the opening of his *De Oratore* as deficient in the experience and judgment which nothing but time and practice can impart. Still it is an entertaining, nay useful, work; remarkable, even among Cicero's writings, for its uniform good sense, and less familiar to the scholar, only because the greater part has been superseded by the compositions of his riper years. His *Topica*, or Treatise on common places, has less extent and variety of plan, being little else than a compendium of Aristotle's work on the same subject. It was, as he informs us in its proem, drawn up from memory on his voyage from Italy to Greece, soon after Cæsar's murder, and in compliance with the wishes of Trebatius, who had sometime before urged him to undertake the translation.§

De Invent-ione.

Topica.

De Oratore. Cicero seems to have intended his *De Oratore*, *Brutus*, and *Orator*, to form one complete system.‖ Of these three noble works, the first lays down the principles and rules of the Rhetorical art; the second exemplifies them in the most eminent speakers of Greece and Rome; and the third shadows out the features of that perfect Orator, whose superhuman excellences should be the aim of our ambition. The *De Oratore* was written when the author was fifty-two, two years after his return from exile; and is a dialogue between some of the most illustrious Romans of the preceding age on the subject of Oratory. The principal speakers are the Orators Crassus and Antonius, who are represented unfolding the principles of their art to Sulpicius and Cotta, young men just rising at the Bar. In the first book, the conversation turns on the subject-matter of Rhetoric, and the qualifications requisite for the perfect Orator. Here Crassus maintains the necessity of his being acquainted with the whole circle of the arts, while Antonius confines eloquence to the province of speaking well. The dispute, for the most part, seems verbal; for Cicero himself, though he here sides with Crassus, yet, elsewhere, as we have above noticed, pronounces eloquence, strictly speaking, to consist in beauty of diction. Scævola, the celebrated lawyer, takes part in this preliminary discussion; but in the ensuing meetings makes way for Catulus and Cæsar, the subject leading to such technical disquisitions as were hardly suitable to the dignity of the aged Augur.* The next morning Antonius enters upon the subject of *invention*, which Cæsar completes by subjoining some remarks on the use of humour in Oratory; and Antonius, relieving him, finishes the morning discussion with the principles of *arrangement* and *memory*. In the afternoon the rules for propriety and elegance of *diction* are explained by Crassus, who was celebrated in this department of the art; and the work concludes with his treating the subject of *delivery* and *action*. Such is the plan of the *De Oratore*, the most finished perhaps of Cicero's compositions. An air of grandeur and magnificence reigns throughout. The characters of the aged Senators are finely conceived, and the whole company is invested with an almost religious majesty, from the allusions interspersed to the miserable destinies for which its members were reserved.

His Treatise *De claris Oratoribus*, was written after an interval of nine years, about the time of Cato's death, and is conveyed in a dialogue between Brutus, Atticus, and himself. He begins with Solon, and after briefly mentioning the Orators of Greece, proceeds to those of his own country, so as to take in the whole period from the time of Junius Brutus down to himself. About the same time he wrote his *Orator*; in which he directs his attention principally to diction and delivery, as in his *De Inventione* and *Topica* he considers the matter of an Oration.† This Treatise is of a less practical nature than the rest.‡ It adopts the principles of Plato, and delineates the perfect Orator according to the abstract conceptions of the intellect, rather than the deductions of observation and experience. Hence he sets out with a definition of the perfectly eloquent man, whose characteristic it is to express himself with propriety on all subjects, whether humble, grand, or of an intermediate character;§ and here he has an opportunity of paying some indirect compliments to himself. With this work he was so well satisfied, that he does not scruple to declare, in a letter to a friend, that he was ready to risk his reputation for judgment in Oratory on its merits.‖

De claris Oratoribus.

Orator.

The treatise *De partitione Oratoriâ*, or on the three parts of Rhetoric, is a kind of catechism between Cicero and his son, drawn up for the use of the latter at the same time with the two preceding. It is the most systematic and perspicuous of his Rhetorical works, but seems to be but the rough draught of what he originally intended.¶

De partitione Oratoriâ.

The connection which we have been able to preserve between the Rhetorical writings of Cicero, will be quite unattainable in his Moral and Physical Treatises; partly from the extent of the subject, partly from the

Moral and Physical writings.

* *Orat.* 19.
† Vossius, *de Nat. Rhet.* c. 13. Fabricius, *Bibliothec. Latin.*
‡ *De Invent.* 1. 5. 6. *de clar. Orat.* 76.
§ *Ad Fam.* 7. 19. ‖ *De Div.* 2. 1.

* *Ad Atticum*, 4. 16. † *Orat.* 16.
‡ *Orat.* 14. 31. § Ibid. 21. 29.
‖ *Ad Fam.* 6. 18.
¶ See Middleton, vol. ii. p. 147. 4to.

losses occasioned by time, partly from the inconsistency which we have warned the reader to expect in his sentiments. In our enumeration, therefore, we shall observe no other order than that which the date of their composition furnishes.

De Republicâ.

The earliest now extant, is part of his Treatise *De Legibus*, in three books; being a sequel to his work on Politics. Both were written in imitation of Plato's Treatises on the same subjects.* The latter of these (*De Republicâ*) was composed a year after the *De Oratore*,† and seems to have vied with it in the majesty and interest of the dialogue. It consisted of a series of discussions in six books on the origin and principles of Government, Scipio being the principal speaker; but Lælius, Philus, Manilius, and other personages of like gravity taking part in the conversation.

Recent discovery of additional fragments of his Treatises.

Till lately, but a fragment of the fifth book was understood to be in existence, in which Scipio, under the fiction of a dream, inculcates the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. But within the last two years, Signor Mai, librarian of the Vatican, has published considerable portions of the first and second books, from a palimpsest manuscript of St. Austin's *Commentary on the Psalms.* In the part now recovered, Scipio discourses on the different kinds of Constitutions and their respective advantages; with a particular reference to that of Rome. In the third, the subject of Justice was discussed by Lælius and Philus; in the fourth, Scipio treated of Morals and Education; while in the fifth and sixth, the duties of a Magistrate were explained, and the best means of preventing changes and revolutions in the Constitution itself. In the latter part of the Treatise, allusion was made to the actual posture of affairs in Rome, when the conversation was supposed to have occurred, and the commotions excited by the Gracchi.

De Legibus.

In his treatise *De Legibus*, which was written two years later than the former, and shortly after the murder of Clodius, he represents himself as explaining to his brother Quintus, and Atticus, in their walks through the woods of Arpinum, the nature and origin of the laws, and their actual state, both in other countries and in Rome. The first part only of the subject is contained in the books now extant; the introduction to which we have had occasion to notice, when speaking of his Stoical sentiments on questions connected with State policy. Law he pronounces to be the perfection of Reason, the eternal mind, the divine energy, which, while it pervades and unites in one the whole universe, associates Gods and men by the more intimate resemblance of Reason and Virtue, and still more closely men with men, by the participation of common faculties, affections, and situations. He then proves, at length, that Justice is not merely created by Civil institutions, from the power of conscience, the imperfections of human law, the moral sense, and the disinterestedness of virtue. He next proceeds to unfold the principles, first, of religious law, under the heads of divine worship; the observance of festivals and games; the office of Priests, Augurs, and Heralds; the punishment of sacrilege and perjury; the consecration of land, and the rights of sepulchres; and, secondly, of Civil law, which gives him an opportunity of noticing the respective duties of Magistrate and citizens. In these discussions, though professedly speaking of the abstract question, he does not hesitate to anticipate the subject of the lost books, by frequent allusions to the history and customs of his own country. It may be added, that in no part of his writings do more offensive specimens of his vanity occur than in this treatise, where they are rendered doubly odious by the affectation of putting them into the mouth of his brother and Atticus.*

Here a period of eight years intervenes, during which he composed little of importance besides his orations. He then published the *Brutus* and *Orator*; and the year after, his *Academicæ Quæstiones*, in the retirement from public business, to which he was driven by the Dictatorship of Cæsar. This work had originally consisted of two dialogues, which he entitled *Catulus and Lucullus*, from the names of the respective speakers in each. These he now remodelled and enlarged into four books, dedicating them to Varro, whom he introduced advocating, in the presence of Atticus, the tenets of Antiochus, while he himself defended those of Philo. Of this most valuable composition, only the second book (*Lucullus*) of the first edition, and part of the first of the second are now extant. In the former of the two, Lucullus argues against, and Cicero for, the Academic Sect, in the presence of Catulus and Hortensius; in the latter, Varro pursues the history of philosophy from Socrates to Arcesilas, and Cicero continues it down to the time of Carneades. In the second edition, the style was corrected, the matter condensed, and the whole polished with extraordinary care and diligence.†

Academicæ Quæstiones.

De Finibus.

The same year he published his treatise *De Finibus*, or the chief good, in five books, in which are explained the sentiments of the Epicureans, Stoics, and Peripatetics on the subject. This is the earliest of his works, in which the dialogue is of the *disputatious* kind. It is opened with a defence of the Epicurean tenets, concerning *pleasure*, by Torquatus; to which Cicero replies at length. The scene then shifts from the Cuman villa, to the library of young Lucullus, (his father being dead,) where the Stoic Cato expatiates on the sublimity of the system which maintains the existence of *one only* good, and is answered by Cicero in the character of a Peripatetic. Lastly, Piso, in a conversation held at Athens, enters into an explanation of the doctrine of Aristotle, that happiness is the *greatest* good. The general style of his Treatise is elegant and perspicuous; and the last book in particular has great variety and splendour of diction.

We have already, in our memoir of Cæsar, observed that Cicero was about this time particularly courted by the heads of the Dictator's party, of whom Hirtius and Dolabella went so far as to declaim daily at his house for the benefit of his instructions.‡ A visit of this nature to his Tusculan villa, soon after the publication of the *De Finibus*, gave rise to his work, entitled, *Tusculanæ Quæstiones*, which professes to be the substance of five Philosophical disputes between himself and friends, digested into as many books. He argues throughout on Academic principles, even with an affectation of inconsistency; sometimes making use of the Socratic dialogue, sometimes launching out

Tusculanæ Quæstiones.

* *De Legg.* 1. 5.
† Ang. Mai, *præf. in Remp.* Middleton, i. p. 486.

* Quint. *Inst.* 11. 1. † *Ad Atticum*, 13. 13. 16. 19.
‡ *Ad Fam.* 9. 16. 18.

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into the diffuse expositions which characterise his other Treatises.* He first disputes against the fear of death; and in so doing he adopts the opinion of the Platonic School, as regards the nature of God and the soul. The succeeding discussions, on enduring pain, on alleviating grief, on the other emotions of the mind, and on Virtue, are conducted, for the most part, on Stoical principles.† This is a highly ornamental composition, and contains more quotations from the Poets than any other of Cicero's Treatises.

We have already had occasion to remark upon the singular activity of his mind, which becomes more and more conspicuous as we approach the period of his death. During the ensuing year, which is the last of his life, in the midst of the confusion and anxieties consequent on Cæsar's death, he found time to write the *De Naturâ Deorum, De Divinatione, De Fato, De Senectute, De Amicitiâ, De Officiis,* and *Paradoxa,* besides the treatise on Rhetorical Common Places above considered.

Of these the first three were intended as a full exposition of the opposite opinions entertained on their respective subjects; the *De Fato,* however, was not finished according to this plan.‡ His Treatise *De Naturâ Deorum,* in three books, may be reckoned the most magnificent of all his works, and shows that neither age nor disappointment had done injury to the richness and vigour of his mind. In the first book, Velleius, the Epicurean, sets forth the physical tenets of his sect, and is answered by Cotta, who is of the Academic School. In the second, Balbus, the disciple of the Porch, gives an account of his own system, and is, in turn, refuted by Cotta in the third. The eloquent extravagance of the Epicurean, the solemn enthusiasm of the Stoic, and the brilliant raillery of the Academic, are contrasted with inconceivable vivacity and humour. While the sublimity of the subject itself imparts to the whole composition a grander and more elevated character, and discovers in the author imaginative powers, which, celebrated as he justly is for playfulness of fancy, might yet appear more the talent of the Poet than the Orator.

De Naturâ Deorum.

De Divinatione

His treatise *De Divinatione* is conveyed in a discussion between his brother Quintus and himself, in two books. In the former, Quintus, after dividing Divination into the heads of natural and artificial, argues with the Stoics for its sacred nature, from the evidence of facts, the agreement of all nations, and the existence of Gods. In the latter Cicero questions its authority, with Carneades, from the uncertain nature of its rules, the absurdity and uselessness of the art, and the possibility of accounting from natural causes for the phenomena on which it was founded. This is a curious work, from the numerous cases adduced from the histories of Greece and Rome, to illustrate the subject in dispute.

De Fato.

His treatise *De Fato* is quite a fragment; it purports to be the substance of a dissertation in which he explained to Hirtius (soon after Consul,) the sentiments of Chrysippus, Diodorus, Epicurus, Carneades, and others, upon that abstruse subject. It is supposed to have consisted at least of two books, of which we have but the proem of the first, and a small portion of the second.

* *Tusc. Quæst.* 5. 4. 11. † Ibid. 3. 10. 5. 27.
‡ *De Nat. Deor.* 1. 6. *de Div.* 1. 4. *de Fat.* 1.

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In his beautiful pieces *De Senectute,* and *De Amicitiâ,* Cato the Censor, and Lælius, are respectively introduced delivering their sentiments on those subjects. The conclusion of the former, in which Cato discourses on the immortality of the soul, has been always celebrated; and the opening of the latter, in which Fannius and Scævola come to console Lælius on the death of Scipio, is as exquisite an instance of delicacy and taste, as can be found in his works. In the latter he has borrowed largely from the eighth and ninth books of Aristotle's *Ethics.*

His Treatise *De Officiis,* was finished about the time he wrote his second Philippic, a circumstance which illustrates the great capaciousness and versatility of his mental powers. Of a work so extensively celebrated, it is enough to have mentioned the name. Here he lays aside the less authoritative form of dialogue, and, with the dignity of the Roman Consul, unfolds, in his own person, the principles of Morals, according to the views of the older Schools, particularly of the Stoics. It is written, in three books, with great perspicuity and elegance of style; the first book treats of the *honestum,* the second of the *utile,* and the third adjusts the claims of the two, when they happen to interfere with each other.

De Senectute et de Amicitiâ.

De Officiis.

His *Paradoxa Stoicorum* might have been, more suitably perhaps, included in his Rhetorical works, being six short declamations in support of the positions of Zeno; in which that Philosopher's subtilities are adapted to the comprehension of the vulgar, and the events of the times. The second, fourth, and sixth, are respectively directed against Antony, Clodius, and Crassus. They seem to have suffered from time.* The sixth is the most eloquent, but the argument of the third is strikingly maintained.

Paradoxa Stoicorum.

Besides the works now enumerated, we have a considerable fragment of his translation of Plato's *Timæus,* which he seems to have finished about this time. His remaining Philosophical works, viz. the *Hortensius,* which was a defence of Philosophy; *De Gloriâ, De Consolatione,* written upon Platonic principles on his daughter's death; *De Jure Civili, De Virtutibus, De Auguriis, Chorographia,* translations of Plato's *Protagoras,* and Xenophon's *Œconomics,* works on Natural History, Panegyric on Cato, and some Miscellaneous Writings, are, except a few fragments, entirely lost.

His Epistles, about one thousand in all, are comprised in thirty-six books, sixteen of which are addressed to Atticus, three to his brother Quintus, one to Brutus, and sixteen to his different friends; and they form a history of his life from his fortieth year. Among those addressed to his friends, some occur from Brutus, Metellus, Plancius, Cælius and others. For the preservation of this most valuable department of Cicero's writings, we are indebted to Tyro, the author's freedman, though we possess, at the present day, but a part of those originally published. As his correspondence with his friends belongs to his character as a man and politician, rather than to his powers as an author, we have already noticed it in the first part of this memoir.

Epistles.

His Poetical and Historical works have suffered a heavier fate. The latter class, consisting of his Commentary on his Consulship, and his History of his own

Poetical and Historical works.

* Sciopp. *in Olivet.*

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Times, is altogether lost. Of the former, which consisted of the heroic poems Alcyones, Cimon, Marius, and his Consulate; the elegy of Tamelastes, translations of Homer and Aratus, Epigrams, &c. nothing remains, except some fragments of the *Phænomena* and *Diosemeia* of Aratus. It may, however, be questioned whether literature has suffered much by these losses. We are far, indeed, from speaking contemptuously of the poetical powers of one who possessed so much fancy, so much taste, and so fine an ear.* But his poems were principally composed in his youth; and afterwards, when his powers were more mature, his occupations did not allow even *his* active mind the time necessary for polishing a language still more rugged in metre than it was in prose. His contemporary history on the other hand, can hardly have conveyed more explicit, and certainly would have contained less faithful, information than his private correspondence; while, with all the penetration he assuredly possessed, it may be doubted if his diffuse and graceful style of thought and composition was adapted for the depth of reflection and condensation of meaning, which are the chief excellences of historical composition.

Orations.

The Orations he is known to have composed amount in all to about eighty, of which fifty-nine either entire or in part are preserved. Of these some are deliberative, others judicial, others descriptive, some delivered from the Rostrum, or in the Senate; others in the Forum, or before Cæsar; and, as might be anticipated from the character already given of his talents, he is much more successful in pleading or in panegyric than in debate or invective. In deliberative Oratory, indeed, great part of the effect depends on the confidence placed in the speaker; and, though Cicero takes considerable pains to interest the audience in his favour, yet his style is not simple and grave enough, he is too ingenious, too declamatory, discovers too much personal feeling to attain the highest degree of excellence in this department of the art. His invectives, again, however grand and imposing, yet, compared with his calmer and more familiar productions, have a forced and unnatural air. Splendid as is the eloquence of his Catilinarians and Philippics, it is often the language of abuse rather than of indignation; and even his attack on Piso, the most brilliant and imaginative of its kind, becomes wearisome from want of ease and relief. His laudatory orations, on the other hand, are among his happiest efforts. Nothing can exceed the taste and beauty of those for the Manilian law, for Marcellus, for Ligurius, for Archias, and the ninth Philippic, which is principally in praise of Servius Sulpicius. But it is, in judicial eloquence, particularly on subjects of a lively cast, as in his speeches for Cælius and Muræna, and against Cæcilius, that his talents are displayed to the best advantage. To both kinds his amiable and pleasant turn of mind imparts inexpressible grace and delicacy; Historical allusions, Philosophical sentiments, descriptions full of life and nature, and polite raillery, succeed each other in the most agreeable manner, without appearance of artifice or effort. Of this nature are his pictures of the confusion of the Catilinarian conspirators on detection;† of the death of Metellus;* of Sulpicius undertaking the embassy to Antonius;† the character he draws of Catiline;‡ and his fine sketch of old Appius, frowning on his degenerate descendant Clodia.§

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These, however, are but incidental and occasional artifices to divert and refresh the mind, as his Orations are generally laid out according to the plan proposed in Rhetorical works; the introduction, containing the ethical proof; the body of the speech, the argument and the peroration addressing itself to the passions of the Judge. In opening his case, he commonly makes a profession of timidity and diffidence, with a view to conciliate the favour of his audience; the eloquence, for instance, of Hortensius, is so powerful,‖ or so much prejudice has been excited against his client,¶ or it is his first appearance in the Rostrum,** or he is unused to speak in an armed assembly,†† or to plead in a private apartment.‡‡ He proceeds to entreat the patience of his Judges; drops out some generous or popular sentiment, or contrives to excite prejudice against his opponent. He then states the circumstances of his case, and the intended plan of his oration; and here he is particularly clear. But it is when he comes actually to prove his point, that his Oratorical powers begin to have their full play. He accounts for every thing so naturally, makes trivial circumstances *tell* so happily, so adroitly converts apparent objections into confirmations of his argument, connects independent particulars with such ease and plausibility, that it becomes impossible to entertain a question on the truth of his statement. This is particularly observable in his defence of Cluentius, where prejudices, suspicions, and difficulties are encountered with the most triumphant ingenuity; in the antecedent probabilities of his *Pro Milone*;§§ in his apology for Muræna's public,‖‖ and Cælius's private life,¶¶ and his disparagement of Verres's military services in Sicily;*** it is observable in the address with which the Agrarian law of Rullus,††† and the accusation of Rabirius,‡‡‡ both popular measures, are represented to be hostile to public liberty; with which Milo's impolitic unconcern is made an affecting consideration;§§§ and Cato's attack upon the crowd of clients which accompanied the candidate for office, a tyrannical disregard for the feelings of the poor.‖‖‖ So great indeed is his talent, that (as we have before hinted,) he even hurts a good cause by an excess of plausibility.

General distribution.

But it is not enough to have barely proved his point; he proceeds, either immediately, or towards the conclusion of his speech, to heighten the effect by *exaggeration*.¶¶¶ Here he goes (as it were) round and round his object; surveys it in every light; examines it in all its parts, retires, and then advances; turns and returns it; compares and contrasts it;

* See Plutarch, *in Vitâ*.

† *In Catil.* 3. 3.

* *Pro Cæl.* 10.
‡ *Pro Cæl.* 3.
‖ *Pro Quinct.* and *pro Verr.* 5.
¶ *Pro Cluent.*
†† *Pro Milon.*
§§ *Pro Milon.* 8—10.
¶¶ *Pro Cæl.* 6.
††† *Contra Rull.* 2. 9
§§§ *Pro Milon. init. et alibi.*
‖‖‖ *Pro Muræn.* 14.
¶¶¶ *De Orat. partit.* c. 8. 16, 17.
† *Philipp.* 9. 3.
§ Ibid. 6.
** *Pro Leg. Manil.*
‡‡ *Pro Deiotar.*
‖‖ *Pro Muræn.* 4.
*** *In Verr.* 5. 2. &c.
‡‡‡ *Pro Rabir.* 3.

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illustrates, confirms, enforces his view of the question, till at last the hearer feels ashamed of doubting a position which seems built on a foundation so strictly argumentative. Of this nature is his justification of Rabirius in taking up arms against Saturninus;* his account of the imprisonment of the Roman citizens by Verres, and of the crucifixion of Gavius;† his comparison of Antonius with Tarquin;‡ and his contrasting Verres with Fabius, Scipio, and Marius.§

And now, having established his case, he opens upon his opponent a discharge of raillery, so delicate and good natured, that it is impossible for the latter to maintain his ground against it. Or where the subject is too grave to admit this, he colours his exaggeration with all the bitterness of irony or vehemence of passion. Such are his frequent delineations of Gabinius, Piso, Clodius, and Antonius;‖ particularly his vivid and almost humorous contrast of the two Consuls, who sanctioned his banishment, in his Oration for Sextius.¶ Such the celebrated account (already alluded to) of the crucifixion of Gavius, which it is difficult to read, even at the present day, without having our feelings roused against the merciless Prætor. But the appeal to the softer emotions of the soul is reserved (perhaps with somewhat of sameness) for the close of his oration; as in his defence of Cluentius, Muræna, Cælius, Milo, Sylla, Flaccus, and Rabirius Postumus; the most striking instances of which are the poetical burst of feeling with which he addresses his client Plancius,** and his picture of the desolate condition of the Vestal Fonteia, should her brother be condemned.†† At other times, his peroration contains more heroic and elevated sentiments; as in his invocation of the Alban groves and altars in the peroration of the *Pro Milone*, the panegyric on Patriotism, and the love of Glory in his defence of Sextius, and that on Liberty at the close of the third and tenth Philippics. But we cannot describe his Oratorical merits more accurately than by extracting his own delineation of a perfect Orator: *Sic igitur dicet ille, quem expetimus, ut verset sæpe multis modis eandem et unam rem; et hæreat in eadem, commoreturque sententia: sæpe etiam ut extenuet aliquid, sæpe ut irrideat: ut declinet à proposito deflectatque sententiam: ut proponat quid dicturus sit: ut, cùm transegerit jam aliquid, definiat: ut se ipse revocet: ut, quod dixit, iteret: ut argumentum ratione concludat:.... ut dividat in partes: ut aliquid relinquat ac negligat: ut ante præmuniat: ut in eo ipso, in quo reprehendatur, culpam in adversarium conferat:.... ut hominum sermones moresque describat: ut muta quædam loquentia inducat: ut ab eo, quod agitur, avertat animos; ut sæpe in hilaritatem risumve convertat: ut ante occupet quod videat opponi: ut comparet similitudines: ut utatur exemplis:.... ut liberius quod audeat: ut irascatur etiam: ut objurget aliquando: ut deprecetur, ut supplicet; ut medeatur; ut à proposito declinet aliquantulum: ut optet, ut execretur; ut fiat iis, apud quos dicet, familiaris. Orat.* 40.‡‡

Character of his style

But by the invention of a style, which adapts itself with singular felicity to every class of subjects, whether lofty or familiar, Philosophical or Forensic, Cicero answers even more exactly to his own definition of a perfect Orator,* than by his plausibility, pathos, and vivacity. It is not however here intended to enter upon the consideration of a subject so ample and so familiar to all scholars as Cicero's Oratorical diction, much less to take an extended view of it through the range of his Philosophical writings, and familiar correspondence. Among many excellences, the greatest is its suitableness to the genius of the Latin language; though the diffuseness thence necessarily resulting has exposed it, both in his own days and since his time, to the criticisms of those who have affected to condemn its Asiatic character, in comparison with the simplicity of Attic writers, and the strength of Demosthenes.† Greek, however, is celebrated for copiousness in its vocabulary and perspicuity in its phrases; and the consequent facility of expressing the most novel or abstruse ideas with precision and elegance. Hence the Attic style of eloquence was plain and simple, because simplicity and plainness were not incompatible with clearness, energy, and harmony. But it was a singular want of judgment, an ignorance of the very principles of composition, which induced Brutus, Calvus, Sallust, and others to imitate this terse and severe beauty in their own defective language, and even to pronounce the opposite kind of diction deficient in taste and purity. In Greek, indeed, the words fall, as it were, naturally, into a distinct and harmonious order; and from the exuberant richness of the materials, less is left to the ingenuity of the artist. But the Latin language is comparatively weak, scanty, and unmusical; and requires considerable skill and management to render it expressive and graceful. Simplicity in Latin is scarcely separable from baldness; and justly as Terence is celebrated for chaste and unadorned diction, yet, even he, compared with Attic writers, is flat and heavy.‡ Again, the perfection of strength is clearness united to brevity; but to this combination Latin is utterly unequal. From the vagueness and uncertainty of meaning which characterises its separate words, to be perspicuous it must be full. What Livy, and much more Tacitus have gained in energy, they have lost in perspicuity and elegance; the correspondence of Brutus with Cicero, is forcible indeed, but harsh and abrupt. Latin, in short, is not a Philosophical language, not a language in which a deep thinker is likely to express himself with purity or neatness. *Qui à Latinis exiget illam gratiam sermonis Attici,* says Quintilian, *det mihi in eloquendo eandem jucunditatem et parem copiam. Quod si negatum est, sententias aptabimus iis vocibus quas habemus, nec rerum nimiam tenuitatem, ut non dicam pinguioribus, fortioribus certè verbis miscebimus, ne virtus utraque pereat ipsâ confusione. Nam quo minus adjuvat sermo, rerum inventione pugnandum est. Sensus sublimes variique eruantur. Permovendi omnes affectus erunt; oratio translationum nitore illuminanda. Non possumus esse tam graciles? simus fortiores. Subtilitate vincimur? valeamus pondere. Proprietas penes illos est certior? copiâ vincamus.* This is the very plan on which Cicero has proceeded. He had to deal with a language

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Difference between the Greek and Latin languages

* *Pro Rabir.* 5.
† *In Verr.* 5. 56, &c. and 64, &c.
‡ *Philipp.* 3, 4. § *In Verr.* 5. 10.
‖ *Pro Redit. in Senat.—pro Dom.—pro Sext. Philipp.*
¶ *Pro Sext.* 8—10. ** *Pro Planc.*
†† *Pro Fonteio.* ‡‡ *De clar. Orat.* 93.

* *Orat.* 29.
† *Tusc. Quæst.* 1. 1. *de clar. Orat.* 82, &c. *de opt. gen. Dic.*
‡ *Quint.* 10. 1.

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barren and dissonant; his good sense enabled him to perceive what could be done, and what it was in vain to attempt; and happily his talents answered precisely to the purpose required. Terence and Lucretius had cultivated simplicity; Cotta, Brutus, and Calvus had attempted strength; but Cicero rather made a *language* than a *style*; yet not so much by the invention as by the combination of words. Some terms, indeed, his Philosophical subjects obliged him to coin;* but his great art lies in the application of existing materials, in converting the very disadvantages of the language into beauties,† in enriching it with circumlocutions and metaphors, in pruning it of harsh and uncouth expressions, in systematizing the structure of a sentence.‡ This is that *copia dicendi* which gained Cicero the high testimony of Cæsar to his inventive powers,§ and which, we may add, constitutes him the greatest master of composition the world has ever seen. If the comparison be not thought fanciful, he may be assimilated to a skilful landscape-gardener, who gives depth and richness to narrow and confined premises, by taste and variety in the disposition of his trees and walks.

Roman eloquence.

Such, then, are the principal characteristics of Cicero's Oratory; on a review of which we may, with some reason, conclude that Roman Eloquence stands scarcely less indebted to his compositions than Roman Philosophy. For though in his *De claris Oratoribus* he begins his review from the age of Junius Brutus, yet, soberly speaking, (and as he seems to allow in the opening of the *De Oratore,*) we cannot assign an earlier date to the rise of Eloquence among his countrymen, than that of the same Athenian embassy which introduced the study of Philosophy. To aim indeed at persuasion, by appeals to the reason or passions, is so natural, that no country, whether refined or barbarous, is without its orators. If however Eloquence be the mere power of persuading, it is but a relative term, limited to time and place, connected with a particular audience, and leaving to posterity no test of its merits, but the report of those whom it has been successful in influencing. *Vulgus interdum,* says Cicero, *non probandum oratorem probat, sed probat sine comparatione, cùm à mediocri aut etiam à malo delectatur; eo est contentus: esse melius sentit: illud quod est, qualecunque est, probat.* (*De clar. Orat.* 52.)

Orators before Cicero.

The eloquence of Carneades and his associates made (to use a familiar term,) a great *sensation* among the Roman Orators, who soon split into two parties; the one adhering to the rough unpolished manners of their forefathers, the other favouring the artificial graces which distinguished the Grecian style. In the former class were Cato and Lælius,‖ both men of cultivated minds, particularly Cato, whose opposition to Greek literature was founded solely on political considerations. But, as might be expected, the Athenian cause prevailed; and Carbo and the two Gracchi, who are the principal Orators of the next generation, are related to have been learned, majestic, and harmonious in the character of their speeches.* These were succeeded by Antonius, Crassus, Cotta, Sulpicius, and Hortensius; who, adopting greater liveliness and variety of manner, form a middle age in the history of Roman eloquence. But it was in that which immediately followed, that the art was adorned by an assemblage of orators, which even Greece will find it difficult to match. Of these Cæsar, Cicero, Curio, Brutus, Cælius, Calvus, and Callidius, are the most celebrated. The splendid talents, indeed, of Cæsar, were not more conspicuous in arms than in his Oratory, which was noted for force and purity.† Cælius, who has come before us in the history of the times, excelled in natural quickness, loftiness of sentiment, and politeness in attack;‡ Brutus in Philosophical gravity, though he sometimes indulged himself in a warmer and bolder style.§ Callidius was delicate and harmonious; Curio bold and flowing; Calvus, from studied opposition to Cicero's peculiaritics, cold, cautious, and accurate.‖ Brutus and Calvus have been before noticed as the advocates of the dry sententious mode of speaking, which they dignified by the name of Attic; a kind of eloquence which seems to have been popular from the comparative facility with which it was attained.

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Ciceronian age.

In the Ciceronian age the general character of the Oratory was dignified and graceful. The popular nature of the Government gave opportunities for effective appeals to the passions; and, Greek literature being as yet a novelty, philosophical sentiments were introduced with corresponding success. The Republican Orators were long in their introductions, diffuse in their statements, ample in their divisions, frequent in their digressions, gradual and sedate in their perorations.¶ Under the Emperors, however, the people were less consulted in State affairs; and the Judges, instead of possessing an almost independent authority, being but delegates of the Executive, from interested politicians became men of business; literature, too, was now familiar to all classes; and taste began sensibly to decline. The national appetite felt a craving for stronger and more stimulating compositions. Impatience was manifested at the tedious majesty and formal graces, the parade of arguments, grave sayings, and shreds of Philosophy,** which characterised their fathers; and a smarter and more sparkling kind of Oratory succeeded,†† just as in our own country, the minuet of the last century has been supplanted by the quadrille, and the stately movements of Giardini have given way to the brisker and more artificial melodies of

Decline of Roman Oratory under the Imperial Government.

* *De Fin.* 3. 1 and 4. *Lucull.* 6. Plutarch, *in Vitâ.*

† This, which is analogous to his address in pleading, is nowhere more observable than in his rendering the recurrence of the same word, to which he is forced by the barrenness or vagueness of the language, an elegance.

‡ It is remarkable that some authors attempted to account for the *invention* of the Asiatic style, on the same principle we have here adduced to account for Cicero's *adoption* of in Latin; viz. that the Asiatics had a defective knowledge of Greek, and devised phrases, &c. to make up for the imperfections of their scanty vocabulary. See *Quint.* 12. 10.

§ *De clar. Orat.* 72. ‖ Ibid.—*Quint.* 12. 10.

* *De clar. Orat.*—*pro Harusp. resp.* 19.

† *Quint.* 10. 1 and 2. *de clar. Orat.* 75.

‡ Ibid. § Ibid. *ad Atticum,* 14. 1.

‖ Ibid.

¶ *Dialog. de Orat.* 20 and 22. *Quint.* 10. 2.

** "It is not uncommon for those who have grown wise by the labour of others, to add a little of their own and overlook their master." JOHNSON. We have before compared Cicero to Addison as regards the purpose of inspiring their respective countrymen with literary taste. They resembled each other in the return they experienced.

†† *Dialog.* 18.

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Rossini. Corvinus, even before the time of Augustus, had shown himself more elaborate and fastidious in his choice of expressions.* Cassius Severus, the first who openly deviated from the old style of Oratory, introduced an acrimonious and virulent mode of pleading.† It now became the fashion to decry Cicero as inflated, languid, tame, and even deficient in ornament;* Mecænas and Gallio followed in the career of degeneracy; till flippancy of attack, prettiness of expression, and glitter of decoration prevailed over the bold and manly eloquence of free Rome.

* *Dialog.* 18. † Ibid. 19.

* *Dialog.* 18 and 22. *Quint.* 12. 10.

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which his wife is said to have participated. Nearly all the officers of the Imperial establishment were privy to the intended murder; and finding themselves secure, owing to the number of their confederates, they postponed the execution of their design until they gained the concurrence of Nerva, who had been exiled to Tarentum, and whom they wished to place on the throne when it should be vacant. On the eighteenth of September, in the year of Rome 847, Domitianus was despatched by the dagger of Stephanus, one of the ministers of the palace, who obtained admittance into his bed-closet under pretext of urgent business. The Emperor's body was saved from the indignities with which it was menaced, by the affection of his nurse; who contrived to have it privately removed and buried in the country, at a family villa near the Latin way. Afterwards, she conveyed his ashes to the Flavian Temple, where she mixed them with those of Julia, the daughter of Titus, to whose infancy she had likewise discharged the duties of a mother. But the statues and pictures which fear or courtly adulation had erected to him, were immediately pulled down and trampled under foot; and to this posthumous revenge the Senators added an expression of their indignation and resentment, which they were aware could only be partially realized. They issued a decree that the name of Domitianus should be immediately struck out of the Roman annals, and obliterated from every public monument.

Titus Flavius Domitianus. From A. D. 81. to 96.

APOLLONIUS TYANÆUS.

FROM U. C. 750. A. C. 4. TO A. D. 96.

Biography. From U. C. 750. A. C. 4. to A. D. 96.

Apollonius Tyanæus. From U. C. 750. A. C. 4. to A. D. 96.

His life written by Philostratus

Apollonius, the Pythagorean Philosopher, was born at Tyana, in Cappadocia, in the year of Rome 750, four years before the common Christian era.* His reputation has been raised far above his personal merits, by the attempt made in the early ages of the Church, and since revived,† to bring him forward as a rival to the Author of our Religion. His life was written with this object, about a century after his death, by Philostratus of Lemnos, when Ammonius was systematizing the Eclectic tenets to meet the increasing influence of the Christian doctrines. Philostratus engaged in this work at the instance of his patroness Julia Domna, wife of the Emperor Severus, a Princess celebrated for her zeal in the cause of Heathen Philosophy; who put into his hands a journal of the travels of Apollonius rudely written by one Damis, an Assyrian, his companion.‡ This manuscript, an account of his residence at Ægæ, prior to his acquaintance with Damis, by Maximus of that city, a collection of his letters, some private memoranda relative to his opinions and conduct, and lastly the public records of the cities he frequented, were the principal documents from which Philostratus compiled his elaborate narrative, which is still extant.§ It is written with considerable elegance, but with more ornament and attention to the composition than is consistent with correct taste. Though it is not a professed imitation of the Scripture history of Christ, it contains quite enough to show that it was written with a view of rivalling it; and accordingly, in the following age, it was made use of in a direct attack upon Christianity by Hierocles* Præfect of Bithynia, a disciple of the Eclectic School, to whom a reply was written by Eusebius of Cæsarea. The selection of a Pythagorean Philosopher for the purpose of a comparison with Christ was judicious. The attachment of the Pythagorean Sect to the discipline of the established religion, which most other Philosophies neglected; its austerity, its pretended intercourse with Heaven, its profession of extraordinary power over nature, and the authoritative tone of teaching which this profession countenanced,† were all in favour of the proposed object. But with the plans of the Eclectics in their attack upon Christianity we have no immediate concern.

Birth and education.

Philostratus begins his work with an account of the prodigies attending the Philosopher's birth, which with all circumstances of a like nature we shall for the present pass over, intending to make some observations on them in the sequel. At the age of fourteen he was placed by his father under the care of Euthydemus, a distinguished rhetorician of Tarsus; but being displeased with the dissipation of that city, he removed with his master to Ægæ a neighbouring town, frequented as a retreat for students in Philosophy.‡ Here he made himself master of the Platonic, Stoic, Epicurean, and Peripatetic systems; giving, however, an exclusive preference to the Pythagorean, which he studied with Euxenus of Heraclea, a man whose life ill accorded with the ascetic principles of his Sect. At the early age of sixteen years, according to his Biographer, he resolved on strictly conforming himself to the precepts of Pythagoras, and, if possible, rivalling the fame of his master. He renounced animal food and wine; restricted himself to the use of linen garments,

He adopts the Pythagorean Philosophy.

* Olear. *ad Philostr.* i. 12.
† By Lord Herbert and Mr. Blount.
‡ Philostr. i. 3.
§ Ibid. i. 2, 3.

* His work was called Λόγοι Φιλαλήθους πρὸς Χριστιανούς· on this subject see Mosheim, *Dissertat. de turbatâ per recentiores Platonicos Ecclesiâ*, sec. 25.
† Philostr. i. 17, vi. 11.
‡ Ibid. i. 7.

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and sandals made of the bark of trees; suffered his hair to grow; and betook himself to the Temple of Æsculapius, who is said to have regarded him with peculiar favour.*

On the news of his father's death, which took place not long afterwards, he left Ægæ for his native place, where he gave up half his inheritance to his elder brother, whom he is said to have reclaimed from a dissolute course of life, and the greater part of the remainder to his poorer relatives.†

Prior to composing any Philosophical work, he though it necessary to observe the silence of five years, which was the appointed initiation into the esoteric doctrines of his Sect. During this time he exercised his mind in storing up materials for future reflection. We are told, that on several occasions he hindered insurrections in the cities in which he resided, by the mute eloquence of his look and gestures;‡—a fact, however, which we are able to trace to the invention of his Biographer, who, in his zeal to compare him to his master, forgot that the disciples of the Pythagorean school denied themselves during their silence the intercourse of mixed society.§

Travels,

The period of silence being expired, Apollonius passed through the principal cities of Asia Minor, disputing in the Temples in imitation of Pythagoras, unfolding the mysteries of his Sect to such as were observing their probationary silence, discoursing with the Greek Priests about divine rites, and reforming the worship of Barbarian cities.‖ This must have been his employment for many years; the next incident in his life being his eastern journey, which was not undertaken till he was between forty and fifty years of age.¶

His object in this expedition was to consult the Magi and Brachmans on Philosophical subjects; in which he but followed the example of Pythagoras, who is said to have travelled as far as India for the same purpose. At Nineveh, where he arrived with two companions, he was joined by Damis, already mentioned as his journalist.** Proceeding thence to Babylon, he had some interviews with the Magi, who rather disappointed his expectations; and was well received by Bardanes the Parthian King, who after detaining him at his Court for the greater part of two years, dismissed him with marks of peculiar honour.††

In India.

From Babylon he proceeded to Taxila, the seat of Phraotes, King of the Indians, who is represented as an adept in the Pythagorean Philosophy;‡‡ and passing on, at length accomplished the object of his expedition by visiting Iarchas, Chief of the Brachmans, from whom he is said to have learned many valuable theurgic secrets.* Apollonius Tyanæus.

On his return to Asia Minor, after an absence of about five years, he stationed himself for a time in Ionia; where the fame of his travels and his austere mode of life procured considerable attention to his Philosophical harangues. The cities sent embassies to him, decreeing him public honours; while the Oracles pronounced him more than mortal, and referred the sick to him for relief.† From U. C. 750. A. C. 4. to A. D. 96.

From Ionia he passed over to Greece, and made his first tour through its principal cities;‡ visiting the Temples and Oracles, reforming the divine rites, and sometimes exercising his theurgic skill. Except at Sparta, however, he seems to have attracted little attention. At Eleusis his application for admittance to the Mysteries was unsuccessful; as was, at a later period of his life a similar attempt at the Cave of Trophonius.§ In both places his reputation for Magic was the cause of his exclusion. In Greece.

Hitherto our memoir has given the unvaried life of a mere Pythagorean, which may be comprehended in three words, mysticism, travel, and disputation. From the date of his journey to Rome, which succeeded his Grecian tour, it is in some degree connected with the history of the times; and though much may be owing to the invention of Philostratus, there is neither reason nor necessity for supposing the narrative to be in substance untrue. VisitsRome.

Nero had at this time prohibited the study of Philosophy, alleging that it was made the pretence for Magical practices;‖—and the report of his excesses so alarmed the followers of Apollonius as they approached Rome, that out of thirty-four who had accompanied him thus far, eight only could be prevailed on to proceed. On his arrival the strangeness of his proceedings caused him to be brought successively before the Consul Telesinus and Tigellinus the Minister of Nero;¶ both of whom however dismissed him after examination; the former from a secret leaning towards Philosophy, the latter from fear (as we are told) of his extraordinary powers. He was in consequence allowed to go about at his pleasure from Temple to Temple, haranguing the people, and prosecuting his reforms in the worship paid to the Gods. But here, as before, we discover marks of incorrectness in the Biographer. Had the edict against Philosophers been as severe as he represents, neither Apollonius, nor Demetrius the Cynic, who joined him after his arrival, would have been permitted to remain; certainly not Apollonius, after his acknowledgment of his own Magical powers in the presence of Tigellinus.** Brought before Nero.

Denied by Philostratus all insight into the circum-

* Philostr. i. 8. Apollon. *Epist.* 50.

† Ibid. i. 13.

‡ Ibid. i. 14. 15.

§ Brucker, vol. ii. p. 104.

‖ Philostr. i. 16.

¶ See Olear. *præfat. ad vitam.* As he died U. C. 849, he is usually considered to have lived to a hundred. Since, however, here is an interval of almost twenty years in which nothing important happens, in a part of his life too unconnected with any public events to fix its chronology, it is highly probable that the date of his birth is put too early. Philostratus says, that accounts varied, making him live eighty, ninety, or one hundred years; see viii. 29. See also ii. 12, where, by some inaccuracy, he makes him to have been in India twenty years *before* he was at Babylon. Olear. *ad locum et præfat. ad vit.* The common date of his birth is fixed by his biographer's merely accidental mention of the revolt of Archelaus against the Romans, as taking place before Apollonius was twenty years old; see i. 12.

** Philostr. i. 19.

†† Ibid. i. 26, *ad fin.*

‡‡ Ibid. ii. 1—40. Brucker, vol. ii. p. 110

* Philostr. iii. 51.

† Ibid. iv. 1. It is observable that this is the first distinct mention which his Biographer furnishes of his pretending to extraordinary power. The history of Lucian's Alexander leads us to suspect a secret understanding between him and the Priests, who might not be unwilling to avail themselves of his alliance in opposition to the exertions and miracles of St. Paul about that time in the same parts. That the Apostles were opposed by counter pretensions to miraculous power, we learn from *Acts*, ch. xiii. v. 8; see also *Acts*, ch. viii. and xix.

‡ Philostr. iv. 11, *et seq.*

§ When denied at the latter place, he forced his way in. Ibid. viii. 19.

‖ Ibid. iv. 35. Brucker (vol. ii. p. 118) with reason thinks this prohibition extended only to the profession of magic.

¶ Ibid. iv. 40, &c.

** Brucker, vol. ii. p. 120.

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stances which influenced the movements of Apollonius, we must attend whither he thinks fit to conduct him. We find him next in Spain, taking part in the conspiracy forming against Nero by Vindex and others.* The political partisans of that day seem to have made use of professed jugglers and Magicians to gain over the body of the people to their interests. To this may be attributed Nero's banishing such characters from Rome;† and Apollonius had probably been already serviceable in this way at the Capital, as he was now

Visits Spain, in Spain, and immediately after to Vespasianus; and at a later period to Nerva.

His next expeditions were to Africa, to Sicily, and so to Greece,‡ but as they do not supply any thing of importance to the elucidation of his character, it may

Athens, be sufficient thus to have noticed them. At Athens he obtained the initiation in the Mysteries, for which he had on his former visit unsuccessfully applied.

And Alexandria. The following Spring, the seventy-third of his life according to the common calculation, he proceeded to Alexandria:§ where he attracted the notice of Vespasianus, who had just assumed the purple, and seemed desirous of countenancing his proceedings by the sanction of Religion. Apollonius might be recommended to him for this purpose by the fame of his travels, his reputation for theurgic knowledge, and his late acts in

Introduced to Vespasianus. Spain against Nero. It is satisfactory to be able to bring two individuals into contact, each of whom has in his turn been made to rival Christ and his Apostles in pretensions to miraculous power. Thus, claims which appeared to be advanced on distinct grounds are found to coalesce, and by the union of their separate inconsistencies contribute to expose each other. The celebrated cures by Vespasianus are connected with the ordinary juggles of the Pythagorean School; and Apollonius is found here, as in many other instances, to be the mere tool of political factions. But on the character of the latter we shall have more to say presently.

His Biographer's account of his first meeting with the Emperor, which is perhaps substantially correct, is amusing from the regard which both parties paid to *effect* in their behaviour.‖ The latter, on entering Alexandria was met by the great body of the Magistrates, Præfects, and Philosophers of the city; but not discovering Apollonius in the number, he hastily asked, "whether the Tyanæan was in Alexandria," and when told he was philosophizing in the Serapeum, proceeding thither he suppliantly entreated him to make him Emperor; and, on the Philosopher's answering he had already done so in praying for a just and venerable Sovereign,¶ he avowed his determination of putting himself entirely into his hands, and of declining the supreme power unless he could obtain his countenance in assuming it.* A formal consultation was in consequence held, at which, besides Apollonius, Dio and Euphrates, Stoics in the Emperor's train, were allowed to deliver their sentiments; when the latter Philosopher entered an honest protest against the sanction Apollonius was giving to the ambition of Vespasianus, and advocated the restoration of the Roman State to its ancient republican form.† This difference of opinion laid the foundation of a lasting quarrel between the rival advisers, to which Philostratus makes frequent allusion in the course of his history. Euphrates is mentioned by the ancients in terms of high commendation; by Pliny especially, who knew him well.‡ He seems to have seen through his opponent's character, as we gather even from Philostratus;§ and when so plain a reason exists for the dislike which Apollonius, in his Letters, and Philostratus, manifest towards him, their censure must not be allowed to weigh against the testimony of unbiassed writers.

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Visits Æthiopia. After parting from Vespasianus, Apollonius undertook an expedition into Æthiopia, where he held discussions with the Gymnosophists, and visited the cataracts of the Nile.‖ On his return he received the news of the destruction of Jerusalem; and being pleased with the modesty of the conqueror, wrote to him in commendation of it. Titus is said to have invited him to Argos in Cilicia, for the sake of his advice on various subjects, and obtained from him a promise that at some future time he would visit him at Rome.¶

On the succession of Domitianus, he became once more engaged in the political commotions of the day, exerting himself to excite the countries of Asia Minor against the Emperor.** These proceedings at length occasioned an order from the Government to bring him to Rome; which, however, according to his Biographer's account, he anticipated by voluntarily surrendering himself, under the idea that by his prompt appearance he might remove the Emperor's jealousy, and save Nerva and others whose political interests he had been promoting. On arriving at Rome he was brought before Domitianus; and when, very inconsistently with his wish to shield his friends from suspicion, he launched out into praise of Nerva, he was forced away into prison to the company of the worst criminals, his hair and beard were cut short, and his limbs loaded with chains. After some days he was brought to trial; the charges against him being the singularity of his dress and appearance, his being called a God, his foretelling a pestilence at Ephesus, and his sacrificing a child with Nerva for the purpose of augury.†† Phi-

Imprisoned by Domitianus.

His trial.

* Philostr. v. 10.

† Astrologers were concerned in Libo's conspiracy against Tiberius, and punished. Vespasianus, as we shall have occasion to notice presently, made use of them in furthering his political plans. Tacit. *Hist.* ii. 78. We read of their predicting Nero's accession, the deaths of Vitellius and Domitianus, &c. They were sent into banishment by Tiberius, Claudius, Vitellius, and Domitianus. Philostratus describes Nero as issuing his edict *on leaving the Capital* for Greece, iv. 47. These circumstances seem to imply that astrology, magic, &c. were at that time of considerable service in political intrigues.

‡ Philostr. v. 11, &c.

§ Ibid. v. 20, &c.

‖ Ibid. v. 27.

¶ Tacitus relates, that when Vespasianus was going to the *Serapeum, ut super rebus imperii consuleret*, Basilides an Egyptian, who was at the time eighty miles distant, suddenly appeared to him; from his name the Emperor drew an omen that the God sanctioned his assumption of the Imperial power. *Hist.* iv. 82. This sufficiently agrees in substance with the narrative of Philostratus to give the latter some probability. It was on this occasion that the famous cures are said to have been wrought.

* As Egypt supplied Rome with corn, Vespasianus by taking possession of that country almost secured to himself the Empire. Tacit. *Hist.* ii. 82, iii. 8. Philostratus however insinuates that he was *already* in possession of supreme power, and came to Egypt for the sanction of Apollonius. Τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν κεκτημένος, διαλεξόμενος δὲ τῷ ἀνδρί. v. 27.

† Philostr. v. 31.

‡ Brucker, vol. ii. p. 566, &c.

§ Ibid. v. 37, he makes Euphrates say to Vespasianus, Φιλοσοφίαν, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὴν μὲν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίνει καὶ ἀσπάζου· τὴν δὲ θεοκλυτεῖν φάσκουσαν παραιτοῦ καταψευδόμενοι γὰρ τοῦ θείου πολλὰ καὶ ἀνοήτα, ἡμᾶς ἐπαίρουσι. See Brucker; and Apollon. *Epist.* 8.

‖ Ibid. vi. 1, &c.

¶ Ibid. vi. 29, &c.

** Ibid. vii. 1, &c. see Brucker, vol. ii. p. 128.

†† Ibid. viii. 5, 6, &c. On account of his foretelling the pestilence

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lostratus supplies us with an ample defence, which he *was to have* delivered,* had he not in the course of the proceedings suddenly vanished from the Court, and transported himself to Puteoli, whither he had before sent on Damis.

His pretended miraculous disappearance.

This is the only miraculous occurrence which forces itself into the history as a component part of the narrative; the rest being of easy omission without any detriment to its entireness.† And strictly speaking, even here it is not the miracle of transportation which interferes with its continuity, but his mere liberation from confinement; which, though we should admit the arbitrary assertions of Philostratus, seems very clearly to have taken place in the regular course of business. He allows that just before the Philosopher's pretended disappearance, Domitianus had publicly acquitted him, and that after the miracle he proceeded to hear the cause next in order, as if nothing had happened;‡ and tells us, moreover, that Apollonius on his return from Greece gave out that he had pleaded his own cause and so escaped, no allusion being made to a miraculous preservation.§

After spending two years in the latter country in his usual Philosophical disputations, he passed into Ionia. According to his Biographer's chronology, he was now approaching the completion of his hundredth year. We may easily understand, therefore, that when invited to Rome by Nerva, who had just succeeded to the Empire, he declined the proposed honour with an intimation that their meeting must be deferred to another state of being.‖ His death took place shortly after; and Ephesus, Rhodes, and Crete are variously mentioned as the spot at which it occurred.¶ A Temple was dedicated to him at Tyana,** which was in consequence accounted one of the sacred cities, and permitted the privilege of electing its own Magistrates.††

His death.

His Works.

He is said to have written‡‡ a treatise upon Judicial Astrology, a work on Sacrifices, another on Oracles, a Life of Pythagoras, and an account of the answers he received from Trophonius, besides the memoranda noticed in the opening of our memoir. A collection of Letters ascribed to him is still extant.§§

It may be regretted that so copious a history, as that which we have abridged, should not contain more authentic and valuable matter. Both the secular transactions of the times and the history of Christianity might have been illustrated by the life of one, who, while an instrument of the partisans of Vindex, Vespasianus, and Nerva, was a contemporary, and in some respects a rival of the Apostles; and who, probably, was with St. Paul at Ephesus and Rome.* As far as his personal character is concerned, there is nothing to be lamented in these omissions. Both his Biographer's panegyric and his own Letters convict him of pedantry, self-conceit, and affectation incompatible with the feelings of an enlarged, cultivated, or amiable mind. His virtues, as we have already seen, were temperance and a disregard of wealth; and without them it would have been hardly possible for him to have gained the popularity which he enjoyed. The great object of his ambition was to emulate the fame of his master; and his efforts seem to have been fully rewarded by the general admiration he attracted, the honours paid him by the Oracles, and the attentions shown him by men in power.

Apollonius Tyanæus.

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His character examined.

We might have been inclined, indeed, to suspect that his reputation existed principally in his Biographer's panegyric, were it not mentioned by other writers. The celebrity which he has enjoyed since the writings of the Eclectics, by itself affords but a faint presumption of his notoriety before they appeared. Yet after all allowances, there remains enough to show that, however fabulous the details of his history may be, there was something extraordinary in his life and character. Some foundation there must have been for statements which his eulogists were able to maintain in the face of those who would have spoken out had they been altogether novel. Pretensions never before advanced must have excited the surprise and contempt of the advocates of Christianity.† Yet Eusebius styles him a wise man, and seems to admit the correctness of Philostratus, except in the miraculous parts of the narrative.‡ Lactantius does not deny that a statue was erected to him at Ephesus;§ and Sidonius Apollinaris, who even wrote his life, speaks of him as the admiration of the countries he traversed, and the favourite of Monarchs.‖ One of his works was deposited in the palace at Antium by the Emperor Hadrian, who also formed a collection of his letters;¶ statues were erected to him in the temples, divine honours paid him by Caracalla, Alexander Severus, and Aurelianus, and magical virtue attributed to his name.**

Admissions of the Fathers.

It has in consequence been made a subject of dispute, how far his reputation was built upon that supposed claim to extraordinary power which, as was noticed in the opening of our memoir, has led to his comparison with sacred names. If it could be shown that he did advance such pretensions, and upon the strength of them was admitted as an object of divine honour, a case would be made out, not indeed so strong as that on which Christianity is founded, yet remarkable enough to demand our serious examination. Assuming,

Miraculous pretensions.

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he was honoured as a God by the Ephesians, vii. 21. Hence this prediction appeared in the indictment.

* Εἶτα καὶ λόγον ἀπολογίας ὁ θειότατος μάλα γε συντάττει πιφρεντισμένως, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι δῆτα ἐς μάτην αὐτῷ σπουδασθήσεται ἡ γραφή. Euseb. *in Hier.* 41.

† Perhaps his causing the writing of the indictment to vanish from the paper, when he was brought before Tigellinus, may be an exception, as being the alleged cause of his acquittal. In general, however, no consequence follows from his marvellous actions: *e. g.* when imprisoned by Domitianus, in order to show Damis his power, he is described as drawing his leg out of the fetters, and then—as putting it back again. Εναρμόσαντα αὖ τὸ σκέλος, τὰ τῆ διδεμένῳ πράττειν, vii. 38. A great exertion of power with apparently a small object.

‡ Philostr. viii. 8, 9. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀκῆλθε τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δαιμονιόντι καὶ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν τρόπον, ὡς ἔπαθεν ὁ τύραννος, ὅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φάσκοντο—ἡκροᾶτο μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρας τε καὶ ἐκείνη δίκης.

§ Ibid. viii. 15. ‖ Ibid. viii. 27.

¶ Ibid. viii. 30. ** Ibid. i. 5, viii. 29.

†† A coin of Hadrian's reign is extant with the inscription, Τύανα ἱερὰ, ἄσυλος, αὐτονόμος. Olear. *ad Philostr.* viii. 31.

‡‡ See Bayle, art. *Apollonius;* and Brucker.

§§ Bishop Lloyd considers them spurious, but Olearius and Brucker show that there is good reason from internal evidence to suppose them genuine. See Olear. *Addend. ad præfat. Epistol.;* and Brucker, vol. ii. p. 147.

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* Apollonius continued at Ephesus, Smyrna, &c. from A. D. 50 to about 59, and was at Rome from A. D. 63 to 66. St. Paul passed through Ionia into Greece A. D. 53, and was at Ephesus A. D. 54, and again from A. D. 56 to 58; he was at Rome in A. D. 65 and 66, when he was martyred.

† Lucian and Apuleius speak of him as if his name were familiar to them. Olear. *præf. ad Vit.*

‡ *In Hierocl.* 5. § *Inst.* v. 3.

‖ See Bayle, art. *Apollonius;* and Cudworth, *Intell. Syst.* iv 14.

¶ Philostr. viii. 19, 20.

** See Eusebius, Vopiscus, Lampridius, &c. as quoted by Bayle.

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then, or overlooking this necessary condition, sceptical writers have been forward to urge the history and character of Apollonius as creating a difficulty in the argument for Christianity derived from Miracles; while their opponents have sometimes attempted to account for a phenomenon of which they had not yet ascertained the existence, and most gratuitously have ascribed his supposed power to the influence of the Evil principle.* On examination, we shall find not a shadow of a reason for supposing that Apollonius worked Miracles, in any proper sense of the word; or that he professed to work them; or that he rested his authority on extraordinary works of any kind; and it is strange indeed that Christians, with victory in their hands, should have so mismanaged their cause as to establish an objection where none existed, and in their haste to extricate themselves from an imaginary difficulty, to overturn one of the main arguments for revealed Religion.

Not made by himself.

Enumeration of these miracles.

To state these pretended prodigies is in most cases a refutation of their claim upon our notice,† and even those which are not in themselves exceptionable, become so from the circumstances or manner in which they took place. Apollonius is said to have been an incarnation of the God Proteus; his birth was announced by the falling of a thunderbolt and a chorus of swans; his death signalized by a wonderful voice calling him up to Heaven; and after death he appeared to a youth to convince him of the immortality of the soul.‡ He is reported to have known the language of birds; to have evoked the Spirit of Achilles; to have dislodged a demon from a boy; to have detected an Empusa who was seducing a youth into marriage; when brought before Tigellinus, to have caused the writing of the indictment to vanish from the paper; when imprisoned by Domitianus, to have miraculously released himself from his fetters; to have discovered the soul of Amasis in the body of a lion; to have cured a youth attacked by hydrophobia, whom he pronounced to be Telephus the Mysian.§ In declaring men's thoughts and distant events he indulged most liberally; adopting a brevity, which seemed becoming the dignity of his character, while it secured his prediction from the possibility of an entire failure. For instance: he gave previous intimation of Nero's narrow escape from lightning; foretold the short reigns of his successors; informed Vespasianus at Alexandria of the burning of the Capitol; predicted the violent death of Titus by a relative; discovered a knowledge of the private history of his Egyptian guide; foresaw the wreck of a ship he had embarked in, and the execution of a Cilician Proprætor.‖ We must not omit his first predicting and then removing a pestilence at Ephesus; the best authenticated of his professed Miracles, being attested by the erecting of a statue to him in consequence. He is said to have put an end to the malady by commanding an aged man to be stoned, whom he pointed out as its author, and who when the stones were removed was found changed into the shape of a dog.*

Apollonius Tyanæus. From U. C. 750. A. C. 4. to A. D. 96.

On the insipidity and inconclusiveness of most of these legends, considered as evidences o fextraordinary power, it is unnecessary to enlarge; yet these are the prodigies which some writers have put in competition with the Christian Miracles, and which others have thought necessary to ascribe to Satanic influence. Two indeed there are which must be mentioned by themselves, as being more worthy our attention than the rest: his raising a young maid at Rome, who was being carried to burial, and his proclaiming at Ephesus the assassination of Domitianus at the very time in which it took place.† But, not to speak at present of the want of all satisfactory evidence for either fact, the account of the former, we may observe, bears in its language and detail evident marks of being written in imitation of Scripture Miracles,‡ and the latter has all the appearance of a political artifice employed to excite the people against the tyrant, and exaggerated by the Biographer.§

Their insipidity.

But the trifling character of most of these prodigies is easily accounted for, when we consider the means by which the author professed to work them, and the cause to which he referred them. Of Miracles, indeed, which are asserted to proceed from the Author of nature, sobriety, dignity and conclusiveness may fairly be re-

* See Brucker on this point, vol. ii. p. 141, who refers to various authors. Eusebius takes a more sober view of the question, allowing the substance of the history, but disputing the extraordinary parts. See in *Hierocl.* 5 and 12.

† Most of them are imitations of the miracles attributed to Pythagoras.

‡ See Philostr. i. 4, 5, viii. 30, 31. He insinuates (cf. viii. 29 with 31) that Apollonius was taken up alive. See Euseb. 8.

§ Ibid. iv. 3, 16, 20, 25, 44, v. 42, vi. 43, vii. 38.

‖ Ibid. i. 12, iv. 24, 43, v. 11—13, 18, 30, vi. 3, 32. His prediction of the ruin of the Proprætor is conveyed in the mere exclamation,—*ὦ ἡ δεῖνα ἡμέρα*, meaning the day of his execution; of the short reigns of Nero's successors, in his saying, that many *Thebans* would succeed him; *δι' χρόνον κομιδῆ βραχὺν*, adds Philostratus, *ἠχθησαν ἐς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πράγματα*. A like ambiguity attends, more or less, all his predictions.

* Philostr. iv. 10.

† Ibid. iv. 45, and viii. 26.

‡ This is manifest from the passage: *Κόρη ἐν ὥρᾳ γάμου τεθνάναι ἐδόκει, καὶ ὁ νυμφίος ἠκολούθει τῇ κλίνῃ, βοῶν ὀπίσω ἐπ' ἀτελεῖ γάμῳ. Ξυνωλοφύρετο δὲ καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη, καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανεν οἰκίας ἡ κόρη τελοῦσης ἐς ὑπάτους. Παρατυχὼν ὖν ὁ Ἀπολλώνιος τῷ τάφῳ, κατάθεσθε, ἔφη, τὴν κλίνην. Ἐγὼ γὰρ ὑμᾶς τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δακρύων παύσω. Καὶ ἅμα ἤρετο ὅ τι ὄνομα αὐτῇ εἴη; οἱ μὲν δὴ πολλοὶ ᾠοντο λόγον ἀγορεύειν αὐτὸν, οἷοι τῶν λόγων οἱ ἐπικήδειοί τε καὶ τὰς ὀλοφύρσεις ἐγείροντες. Ὁ δὲ, οὐδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ προσαψάμενος αὐτῆς, καί τι καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐπιπὼν, ἀφύπνισε τὴν κόρην τῶν δοκούντων θανάτῳ. Καὶ φωνήν τε ἡ παῖς ἀφῆκεν, ἐπανῆλθέ τε ἐς τὴν οἰκίαν τὸ πατρὸς ὥσπερ ἡ Ἀλκῆστις ὑπὸ τῷ Ἡρακλέους ἀναζιωθεῖσα.* Cf. Mark, ch. v. v. 39, &c. Luke, ch. vii. v. 11. See also John, ch. xi. v. 41—43. *Acts*, ch. iii. v. 4—6. In the sequel, the parents offer him money, which he gives as a portion to the damsel. See 2 *Kings*, ch. v. v. 15 and 16, and other similar passages of Scripture.

§ As Apollonius was before this busily engaged in promoting Nerva's interests among the Ionians, it seems probable that the words in question were uttered with a similar view. Dion (lib. 67) mentions a person in Germany who predicted the death of Domitianus; and says that the astrologers, (among whom Tzetzes numbers Apollonius) had foretold Nerva's advancement. There is little doubt all these predictions were intended to compass their own accomplishment. Dion confirms Philostratus's account of the occurrence in question; but merely says, that Apollonius *ἀναβὰς ἐπί τινα λίθον ὑψηλὸν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ ἢ καὶ ἑτέρωθι, καὶ συγκαλέσας τὸ πλῆθος*, cried out *καλῶς Στέφανε*, &c. lib. 67. He then adds, *τοῦτο μὲν ὅπως ἐγίνετο, κἂν μυριάκις τις ἀπιστήσῃ*—an assurance truly satisfactory in testimony given 130 years after the event. Allowing, however, for some exaggeration, his account is perfectly consistent with the supposition that the exclamation of Apollonius was intended to subserve a political purpose. Let us now see how Philostratus has embellished the story. *Διαλεγόμενος περὶ τὰ τῶν ζυστῶν ἄλση κατὰ μεσημβρίαν, ὅτε δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις ἐγίγνετο, πρῶτον μὲν ὑφῆκε τῆς φωνῆς, οἷον δείσας· εἶτ' ἐλλιπέστερον ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν, ἠρμήνευσεν, ἴσα τοῖς μεταξὺ λόγων διορῶσί τι ἕτερον. Εἶτα ἐσώπησεν, ὥσπερ οἱ τῶν λόγων ἐκπεσόντες· βλέψας τε δεινὸν ἐς τὴν γῆν, καὶ προσβὰς τρίᾳ ἢ τέτταρα τῶν βημάτων, παῖε τὸν τύραννον, παῖε, εἰδόα· οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐκ κατόπτρου τινὸς εἰδώλου ἀληθείας ἕλκων, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ ὁρῶν καὶ ξυλλαμβάνειν δοκῶν τὰ δρώμενα. Ἐκπεπληγμένης δὲ τῆς Ἐφέσου, παρῆν γὰρ διαλεγομένῳ πᾶσα,* (here he differs from Dion in an essential point) *ἐπισχὼν, ὅσον οἱ διορῶντες ἐστ' ἂν γένηται τι τῶν ἀμφιδόλων τέλος, ἀαρεῖτε, εἶπεν, ὦ ἄνδρες. ὁ γὰρ τύραννος ἀπέσφακται τήμερον*, &c. viii. 26.

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quired; but when an individual ascribes his extraordinary power to his knowledge of some merely human secret, impropriety does but evidence his own want of taste, and ambiguity his want of skill. We have no longer a right to expect a great end, worthy means, or a frugal and judicious application of the Miraculous gift. Now, Apollonius claimed nothing beyond a fuller insight into nature than others had; a knowledge of the fated and immutable laws to which it is conformed, of the hidden springs on which it moves.* He brought a secret from the East and used it; and though he professed to be favoured, and in a manner taught by good Spirits,† yet he certainly referred no part of his power to a Supreme intelligence. Theurgic virtues, or those which consisted in communion with the Powers and Principles of nature, were high in the scale of Pythagorean excellence, and to them it was that he ascribed his extraordinary gift. By temperate living, it was said, the mind was endued with ampler and more exalted faculties than it otherwise possessed; partook more fully of the nature of the One universal Soul, was gifted with Prophetic inspiration, and a kind of intuitive perception of secret things.‡ This power, derived from the favour of the celestial Deities, who were led to distinguish the virtuous and high-minded, was quite distinct from Magic, an infamous, uncertain, and deceitful art, consisting in a compulsory power over infernal Spirits, operating by means of Astrology, Auguries and Sacrifices, and directed to the personal emolument of those who cultivated it.§ To our present question, however, this distinction is unimportant. To whichever principle the Miracles of Apollonius be referred, Theurgy or Magic, in either case they are independent of the First Cause, and not granted with a view to the particular purpose to which they are to be applied.‖

Real nature of his pretensions.

We have also incidentally shown that they did not profess to be Miracles in the proper meaning of the word, that is, *evident exceptions* to the laws of nature. At the utmost they do but exemplify the aphorism "knowledge is power."¶ Such as are within the range of human knowledge are no *Miracles*. Those of them, on the contrary, which are beyond it, will be found on inspection to be unintelligible, and to convey no *evidence*. The prediction of an earthquake (for instance) is not necessarily superhuman, an interpretation of the discourse of birds can never be verified. In understanding languages, knowing future events, discovering the purposes of others, recognising human souls when enclosed in new bodies, Apollonius merely professes extreme penetration and extraordinary acquaintance with nature. The spell by which he evokes Spirits and exorcises Demons, implies the mere possession of a secret;* and so perfectly is his Biographer aware of this, as almost to doubt the resuscitation of the Roman damsel, the only decisive Miracle of them all, *on the ground of its being supernatural*, insinuating, that perhaps she was dead only in appearance.† Hence, moreover, may be understood the meaning of the charge of Magic, as brought against the early Christians by their Heathen adversaries; the Miracles of the Gospels being strictly interruptions of physical order, and incompatible with Theurgic knowledge.‡

Apollonius Tyanæus. From U. C. 750. A. C. 4. to A. D. 96

When Christ and his Apostles declare themselves to be sent from God, this claim to a divine mission illustrates and gives dignity to their profession of extraordinary power. Whereas the divinity,§ no less than the gift of Miracles to which Apollonius laid claim, must be understood in its Pythagorean sense, as referring not to any intimate connection with a Supreme agent, but to his partaking, through his Theurgic skill, more largely than others in the perfections of the animating principle of nature.

Yet, whatever is understood by his Miraculous gift and his divine nature, certainly his works were not adduced as *vouchers* for his divinity, nor were they, in fact, the principal cause of his reputation. *We meet with no claim to extraordinary power in his Letters;* nor when returning thanks to a city for public honours bestowed on him, nor when complaining to his brother of the neglect of his townsmen, nor when writing to his opponent Euphrates.‖ To the Milesians, indeed, he speaks of earthquakes which he had predicted; but without appealing to the prediction in proof of his authority.¶ As, then, he is so far from insisting on his pretended extraordinary powers, and himself connects the acquisition of them with his Eastern expedition,** we may conclude that credit for possessing a Magical secret was a *part* of the reputation which that expedition conferred. A foreign appearance, singularity of manners, a life of travel, and pretences to superior

* Philostr. v. 12; in i. 2, he associates Democritus, a *natural philosopher*, with Pythagoras and Empedocles See viii. 7, sec. 8, and Brucker, vol. i. p. 1108, &c. and p. 1184.

† In his apology before Domitianus, he expressly attributes his removal of the Ephesian pestilence to Hercules, and makes this ascription the test of a divine Philosopher as distinguished from a Magician, viii. 7, sec. 9, *ubi vid.* Olear.

‡ Ἀφ' ὧν τὸ ὕστω διατᾶσθαι λιπτότητα μόνοι ἐργάζεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἢ ἰσχὺν ἐπὶ τὰ μίγιστά τε καὶ θαυμασιώτατα.... τοῦτό μοι, ὦ βασιλεῦ, τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν αἰτίᾳ τινὶ ἀποῤῥήτῳ φυλάττει, καὶ ἃ θολερὸν περὶ αὐτὰς ἐδὲν εἶναι, διορᾶν τε, ὥσπερ ἐν καθάπτρῳ αὐγῇ, πάντα γιγνόμενά τε καὶ σώμενα, viii. 7, sec. 9. See also ii. 37, vi. 11, viii. 5.

§ Philostr. i. 2, and Olear. *ad loc.* note 3. iv. 44, v. 12, vii. 39, viii. 7; Apollon. *Epist.* 8 and 52; Philostr. *Proœm. vit. Sophist.*; Euseb. *in Hier.* 2; Mosheim, *de Simone Mago*, sec. 13. Yet it must be confessed that the views both of the Pythagoreans and Eclectics were very inconsistent on this subject. Eusebius notices several instances of *γοητεία* in Apollonius's miracles; in Hierocl. 10, 28, 29 and 31. See Brucker, vol. ii. p. 447. At Eleusis and the Cave of Trophonius, Apollonius was, as we have seen, accounted a Magician, and so also by Euphrates, Mæragenes, Apuleius, &c. See Olear. *Præf. ad vit.* p. xxxiii.; and Brucker, vol. ii. p. 136, note *k*.

‖ See Mosheim, *Dissertat. de turbatâ Ecclesiâ, &c.* sec. 27.

¶ See *Quæst. ad Orthodox.* xxiv. as quoted by Olearius, in his *Preface*, p. xxxiv.

* Eusebius calls it *θεῖά τις καὶ ἀῤῥήτος σοφία in Hierocl.* 2. In iii. 41, Philostratus speaks of the *κλήσεις αἷς θεοὶ χαίρουσι*, the *spells* for evoking them, which Apollonius brought from India; cf. iv. 16; and in iv. 20 of the *τεκμήριον* used for casting out an Evil Spirit.

† Εἴ τε σπινθῆρα τῆς ψυχῆς ἔθρεψεν ἐν αὐτῇ, ὃς ἐλελήθει τὸν θεραπεύοντας, (λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ψεκάζοι μὲν ὁ Ζεὺς, ἡ δὲ ἀτμίζοι ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου) εἰσ' ἀπεσβηκυῖαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνέβαλψί τε καὶ ἀνέλαβεν, ἀῤῥητος ἡ κατάληψις, &c.

‡ Douglas (*Criterion*, p. 387, note) observes that some heretics affirmed that our Lord rose from the dead *φαντασίωδως*, only in appearance, *from an idea of the impossibility of a resurrection.*

§ Apollon. *Epist.* 17.

‖ See *Epist.* 1, 2, &c. 11, 44, the last-mentioned addressed to his brother begins *τί θαυμαστὸν, εἴ με τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων ἰσόθεον ἡγεμένων, τινῶν δὲ καὶ θεὸν, μόνη μέχρι νῦν ἡ πατρὶς ἀγνοεῖ, δι' ἣν ἐξαιρέτως ἐσπόδασα λαμπρός εἶναι; τουτὶ γὰρ ἔδ' ὑμῖν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, ὡς ὁρῶ, γέγονε φανερὸν, ὡς εἶην πολλῶν ἀμείνων λόγους τε καὶ ἤθος*; that is, he complains that *whereas* he so excels in life and moral teaching, *yet* he is not considered by them as divine.

¶ *Epist.* 68. Claudius, in a message to the Tyanæans, *Epist.* 53, praises him merely as a benefactor to youth.

** Philostr. vi. 11. See Euseb. *in Hierocl.* 26, 27, *καὶ δῆτα ὡς ἐξ Ἀράβων καὶ Μάγων καὶ Ἰνδῶν παραδόξον τινα καὶ θεῖον αὐτὸν ἡμῖν ἀγαγὼν, παραδόξων ἐντεῦθεν ἀφηγημάτων κατάρχεται.*

Biography. From U. C. 750. A. C 4. to A. D. 96.

knowledge, excite the imagination of beholders ;* and, as in the case of a wandering people among ourselves, appear to invite the individuals thus distinguished to fraudulent practices. Apollonius is represented as making converts *as soon as seen*.† It was not, then, his display of wonders, but his Pythagorean dress and mysterious deportment which arrested attention, and made him thought superior to other men, because he was different from them. Like Lucian's Alexander,‡ (who was all but his disciple,) he was skilled in Medicine, professed to be favoured by Æsculapius, pretended to foreknowledge, and was supported by the Oracles ; and being more strict in conduct than the Paphlagonian,§ he established a more lasting celebrity. His usefulness to political aspirants contributed to his success ; perhaps also the real and contemporary Miracles of the Christian teachers would dispose many minds easily to acquiesce in any claims of a similar character.

His story an imitation of Scripture.

In the foregoing remarks we have admitted the general fidelity of the history, because ancient authors allow it, and there was no necessity to dispute it. Tried however on its own merits, it is quite unworthy of serious attention. Not only in the Miraculous accounts, (as we have already seen,) but in the relation of a multitude of ordinary facts, an effort to rival our Saviour's history is distinctly visible. The favour in which Apollonius from a child was held by Gods and men ; his conversations when a youth in the Temple of Æsculapius ; his determination in spite of danger to go up to Rome ;‖ the cowardice of his disciples in deserting him ; the charge brought against him of disaffection to Cæsar ; the Minister's acknowledging, on his private examination, that he was more than man ; the ignominious treatment of him by Domitianus on his second appearance at Rome ; his imprisonment with criminals ; his vanishing from Court and sudden reappearance to his mourning disciples at Puteoli ;¶ these, with other particulars of a similar cast, evidence a history modelled after the narrative of the Evangelists. Expressions, moreover, and descriptions occur, clearly imitated from the sacred volume. To this we must add** the Rhetorical colouring of the whole composition, so contrary to the sobriety of truth ;* the fabulous accounts of things and places interspersed through the history ;† lastly we must bear in mind the principle, recognised by the Pythagorean and Eclectic schools, of permitting exaggeration and deceit in the cause of Philosophy.‡

Apollonius Tyanæus. From U. C. 750. A. C. 4. to A. D. 96.

After all, it must be remembered, that were the pretended Miracles as unexceptionable as we have shown them to be absurd and useless,—were they plain interruptions of established laws, were they grave and dignified in their nature, and important in their object, and were there nothing to excite suspicion in the design, manner, or character, of the narrator,—still the testimony on which they rest is the bare word of an author writing one hundred years after the death of the person panegyrized, and far distant from the places in which most of the Miracles were wrought ; and who can give no better account of his information than that he gained it from an unpublished work,§ professedly indeed composed by a witness of the extraordinary transactions, but passing into his hands through two intermediate possessors. These are circumstances which almost, without positive objections, are sufficient by their own negative force to justify a summary rejection of the whole ac-

Inadequate testimony of Philostratus

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* Hence the first of the charges brought against him by Domitianus was the *strangeness of his dress*. Philostr. viii. 5. By way of contrast, cf. 1 *Cor.* ch. ii. v. 3, 4 ; 2 *Cor.* ch. x. v. 10.

† Philostr. iv. 1, Επειδὴ δὲ εἶδον τὸν ἄνδρα εν Ιωνία, παρελθόντα ες τὴν Ἐφεσον, οὐδὲ οἱ βάναυσοι ἔτι πρὸς ταῖς ἑαυτῶν τέχναις ἦσαν· αλλ' ηκολούθουν, ὁ μὲν σοφίας, ὁ δὲ εἴδους, ὁ δὲ διαίτης, ὁ δὲ σχήματος, οἱ δὲ πάντων ὁμοῦ θαυμασταὶ ὄντες. See also i. 19, 21, iv. 17, 20, 39, vii. 31, &c. and i. 10, 12, &c.

‡ Brucker, vol. ii. p. 144.

§ Brucker supposes that, as in the case of Alexander, gain was his object ; but we seem to have no proof of this, nor is it necessary thus to account for his conduct. We discover, indeed, in his character, no marks of that high enthusiasm which would support him in his whimsical career without any definite worldly object ; yet the veneration he inspired, and the notice taken of him by great men, might be quite a sufficient recompence to a conceited and narrow mind.

‖ Cf. also *Acts*, ch. xx. v. 22, 23, ch. xxi. v. 4, 11—14.

¶ Philostr. i. 8, 11, iv. 36, 38, 44, vii. 34, viii. 5, 11.

** See the description of his raising the Roman maid as above given. Take again the following account of his appearance to Damis and Demetrius at Puteoli, after vanishing from Court, viii. 12. Ανολοφυρομένου δὲ τοῦ Δάμιδος, καὶ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον εισπόντος, ἆρ' οψόμεθά ποτε, ὦ θεοὶ, τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ αγαθὸν εταῖρον ; ακούσας ὁ Απολλώνιος.. ὀψεσθε, εἶπε, μᾶλλον δὲ εωράκατε. Ζῶντα ; ἔφη ὁ Δημήτριος, ει δὲ τεθνειῶτα οὕπω πεπαύμεθα ἐπὶ σοὶ κλαίοντες· προτείνας οὖν ὁ Απολλώνιος τὴν χεῖρα, λαζοῦ μου ἔφη, κἀν μὲν διαφύγω σε, ειδωλόν εμοί σοι εκ Περσεφάτης ἥκον. . . . . ει δὲ υπομείναιμι ἅπτόμενον, τεῖθε καὶ Δάμιν ξῆν τί με καὶ μὴ αποθεῖλοκέναι τὸ σῶμα. Ουκέθ' ὅδοι απιστεῖν ἦσαν, ἀλλ' αναστάντες, &c. . . . . And presently

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Apollonius says, Τὰ δ' ὑπὲρ τῆς δίκης πεύσεσθε μὲν, ου μὴν ενταῦθα· δεῖλη τε γὰρ ικανῶς ἤδη, καὶ βαδίζειν ὥρα ες ἄστυ· ηδίους δ' οἱ καθ' ὁδὸν λόγοι παραπέμψαι βαδίζοντας· ἴωμεν οὖν διαλαλοῦντες, ὑπὲρ ὧν ερωτᾶτε. . . . . ἃ δ' οὑτω ἴστε δίειμι, διείρων ἀπὸ τῆς προρρήσεως, &c. here is much incautious agreement with Luke, ch. xxiv. v. 14—17, 27, 29, 32, 36—40. Also more or less in the following : vii. 30, *init.* and 34, *fin.* with Luke, ch. xii. v. 11, 12 : iii. 38, with Matt. ch. xvii. v. 14, &c. where observe the contrast of the two narratives : viii. 30, *fin.* with *Acts*, ch. xii. v. 7—10 : iv. 44, with John, ch. xviii. v. 33, &c. ; vii. 34, *init.* with Mark, ch. xiv. v. 65 : iv. 34, *init.* with *Acts*, ch. xvi. v. 8—10 : i. 19, *fin.* with Mark, ch. vii. v. 27, 28. Brucker and Douglas notice the following in the detection of the Empusa : Δακρύοντι ἐῴκει τὸ φάσμα, καὶ ἐδεῖτο μὴ βασανίζειν αὐτὸ, μηδὲ αναγκάζειν ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι εἴη, iv. 25, cf. Mark, ch. v. v. 7—9. Olearius compares an expression in vii. 30, with 1 *Cor.* ch. ix. v. 9.

* *E. g.* his ambitious descriptions of countries, &c. In iv. 30, 32, v. 22, vi. 24, he ascribes to Apollonius regular Socratic disputations, and in vi. 11, a long and flowery speech in the presence of theGymnosophists,—modes of Philosophical instruction totally at variance with the genius of the Pythagorean school, the Philosopher's Letters still extant, and the writer's own description of his manner of teaching, i. 17. Some of his exaggerations and misstatements have been noticed in the course of the narrative. As a specimen of the Rhetorical style in which the work is written, we notice a form of expression in his account of the recovery of the Roman damsel, Ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ προσαψάμενος αὐτῆς αφύπνισε,—contrast this with the simplicity of the Scripture narrative. See also the last sentence of v. 17, and indeed *passim*.

† *E. g.* his accounts of Indian and Æthiopian mousters ; of serpents whose eyes were jewels of magical virtue ; of pygmies ; of golden water ; of the speaking tree ; of a woman half white and half black, &c. : he incorporates in his narrative the fables of Ctesias, Agatharchidas, and other writers. His blunders in geography and natural philosophy may be added, as far as they arise from the desire of describing wonders, &c. See also his pompous description of the wonders of Babylon, which were not then in existence. Prideaux, *Connection*, part i. book viii. For his inconsistencies, see Eusebius and Brucker. It must be remembered, that in the age of Philostratus the composition of romantic histories was in fashion.

‡ See Brucker, vol. i. p. 992, vol. ii. p. 378. Apollonius was only one out of several who were set up by the Eclectics as rivals to Christ. Brucker, vol. ii. p. 372. Mosheim, *de turbatâ Ecclesiâ*, &c. sec. 25, 26.

§ Philostr. i. 2, 3. He professes that his account contains much *news*. As to the sources, besides the Journal of Damis, from which he pretends to derive his information, he neither tells us how he met with them, nor what they contained ; nor does he refer to them in the course of his history. On the other hand much (as we have above noticed) of the detail of Apollonius's journey is derived from the writings of Ctesias, &c. &c.

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count. Unless indeed the history had been perverted to a mischievous purpose, we should esteem it impertinent to direct argument against a mere romance, and to subject a work of imagination to a grave discussion.

We are naturally led to pursue the subject which the life of Apollonius has thus introduced, by drawing an extended comparison between the Miracles of Scripture and those elsewhere related, as regards their respective object, nature, and evidence. We shall divide our observations under the following heads:

§ I. On the Nature and general Uses of Miracles.

§ II. On the antecedent Credibility of a Miracle, considered as a Divine Interposition.

§ III. On the Criterion of a Miracle, considered as a Divine Interposition.

§ IV. On the direct Evidence for the Christian Miracles.

§ I. *On the Nature and general Uses of Miracles.*

Definition of a Miracle

A Miracle may be considered as an event inconsistent with the constitution of nature, i. e. the established course of things in which it is found. Or, again, an event in a given system which cannot be referred to any law, or accounted for by the operation of any principle in that system. It does not necessarily imply a *violation* of nature, as some have supposed,—merely the *interposition* of an external cause, which, as we shall hereafter show, can be no other than the agency of the Deity. And the effect produced is that of unusual or increased action in the parts of the system.

A Miracle a relative term.

It is then a relative term, not only as it presupposes an assemblage of laws from which it is a deviation, but also as it has reference to *some one particular system*; for the same event which is anomalous in one, may be quite regular when observed in connection with another. The Miracles of Scripture, for instance, are irregularities in the economy of nature, but with a moral end; and forming one instance out of many, of the *providence* of God, i. e. an instance of occurrences in the natural world with a final cause. Thus, while they are exceptions to the laws of one system, they may coincide with those of another. They profess to be the *evidence of a Revelation*, the criterion of a divine message. To consider them as mere exceptions to physical order, is to take a very incomplete view of them. It is to degrade them from the station which they hold in the plans and provisions of the divine mind, and to strip them of their real use and dignity; for as naked and isolated facts they do but deform an harmonious system.

A Miracle distinguished from a merely extraordinary event.

From this account of a Miracle, it is evident that it may often be difficult exactly to draw the line between uncommon and strictly Miraculous events. The production of ice, *e. g.* might have seemed *at first sight* Miraculous to the Siamese; for it was a phenomenon referable to none of those laws of nature which are in ordinary action in tropical climates. Such, again, might magnetic attraction appear, in ages familiar only with the attraction of gravity.* On the other hand, the extraordinary works of Moses or Paul appear such, even when referred to those simple and elementary principles of nature which the widest experience has confirmed. As far as this affects the *discrimination* of supernatural facts, it will be considered in its proper place; meanwhile let it suffice to state, that those events only are connected with our present subject *which have no assignable second cause or antecedent*, and which, on that account, are from the nature of the case referred to the immediate agency of the Deity.

Apollonius Tyanæus. From U. C. 750. A. C. 4. to A. D 96.

Revelation and all its evidences more or less Miraculous.

A Revelation, i. e. *a direct message from God to man*, itself bears in some degree a Miraculous character; inasmuch as it supposes the Deity actually to present himself before his creatures, and to interpose in the affairs of life in a way above the reach of those settled arrangements of nature to the existence of which universal experience bears witness. And as a Revelation itself, so again the evidences of a Revelation may all more or less be considered Miraculous. Prophecy is an evidence only so far as foreseeing future events is above the known powers of the human mind, or Miraculous. In like manner, if the rapid extension of Christianity be urged in favour of its divine origin, it is because such extension, under such circumstances, is supposed to be inconsistent with the known principles and capacity of human nature. And the pure morality of the Gospel, as taught by illiterate fishermen of Galilee, is an evidence, in proportion as the phenomenon disagrees with the conclusions of general experience, which leads us to believe that a high state of mental cultivation is ordinarily requisite for the production of such moral teachers. It might even be said that, strictly speaking, no evidence of a Revelation is conceivable which does not partake of the character of a Miracle; since nothing but a display of power over the existing system of things can attest the immediate presence of Him by whom it was originally established; or, again, because no event which results entirely from the ordinary operation of nature can be the criterion of one that is extraordinary.*

Miracles commonly so called,

In the present argument we confine ourselves to the consideration of Miracles commonly so called; such events, i. e. for the most part as are inconsistent with the constitution of the physical world.

Contrasted with the other branches of evidence for Revelation.

Miracles, thus defined, hold a very prominent place in the evidence of the Jewish and Christian Revelations. They are the most striking and conclusive evidence; because the laws of matter being better understood than those to which mind is conformed, the transgression of them is more easily recognised. They are the most simple and obvious; because, whereas the freedom of the human will resists the imposition of undeviating laws, the material creation, on the contrary, being strictly subjected to the regulation of its Maker, looks to him alone for a change in its constitution. Yet Miracles are but a branch of the evidences, and other branches have their respective advantages. Prophecy, as has been often observed, is a growing evidence, and appeals more forcibly to those who are acquainted with the Miracles only through testimony. A Philoso-

* Campbell, *on Miracles*, part i. sec. 2.

* Hence it is that in the Scripture accounts of Revelations to the Prophets, &c. a *sensible* Miracle is so often asked and given; as if the vision itself, which was the *medium* of the Revelation, was not a sufficient evidence of it, as being perhaps resolvable into the *ordinary* powers of an excited imagination, e. g. *Judg.* ch. vi. v. 36—40, &c.

phical mind will perhaps be most strongly affected by the fact of the very existence of the Jewish polity, or of the revolution effected by Christianity. While the beautiful moral teaching and evident honesty of the New Testament writers is the most persuasive argument to the unlearned but single-hearted inquirer. Nor must it be forgotten that the evidences for Revelation are *cumulative*, that they gain strength from each other; and that, in consequence, the argument from Miracles is immensely stronger when viewed *in conjunction with the rest*, than when considered separately as in an inquiry of the present nature.

Cogency of separate Miracles, as proofs of supernatural agency, varies.

As the relative force of the separate evidences is different under different circumstances, so again has one class of Miracle more or less weight than another, according to the accidental change of times, places, and persons addressed. As our knowledge of the system of nature, and of the circumstances of the particular case varies, so of course varies our conviction. Walking on the sea, for instance, or giving sight to one born blind, would to us perhaps be a Miracle even more astonishing than it was to the Jews; the laws of nature being at the present day better understood than formerly, and the fables concerning Magical power being no longer credited. On the other hand, stilling the wind and waves with a word may by all but eye-witnesses be set down to accident or exaggeration without the possibility of a full confutation; yet to eye-witnesses it would carry with it an overpowering evidence of supernatural agency by the voice and manner that accompanied the command, the violence of the wind at the moment, the instantaneous effect produced, and other circumstances, the force of which a narration cannot fully convey. The same remark applies to the Miracle of changing water into wine, to the cure of demoniacal possessions, and of diseases generally. From a variety of causes, then, it happens that Miracles which produced a rational conviction at the time when they took place, have ever since proved rather an objection to Revelation than an evidence for it, and have depended on the rest for support; while others, which once were of a dubious and perplexing character, have in succeeding Ages come forward in its defence. It is by a process similar to this that the anomalous nature of the Mosaic polity, which might once be an obstacle to its reception, is now justly alleged in proof of the very Miracles by which it was then supported.* It is important to keep this remark in view, as it is no uncommon practice with those who are ill-affected to the cause of Revealed Religion, to dwell upon such Miracles as at *the present day* rather require than contribute evidence, as if they formed a part of the *present* proof on which it rests its pretensions.†

Miracles do not of themselves prove the being of a Creator:

In the foregoing remarks, the being of an intelligent Maker has been throughout assumed; and, indeed, if the *peculiar* object of a Miracle be to *evidence a message from God*, it is plain that it implies the admission of the fundamental truth, and demands assent to another beyond it. His *particular interference* it directly *proves*, while it only *reminds* of his *existence*. It professes to be the signature of God to a message delivered by human instruments; and therefore supposes that signature in some degree already known, from his ordinary works. It appeals to that moral sense and that experience of human affairs which already bear witness to his ordinary presence. Considered *by itself*, it is at most but the token of a superhuman being. Hence, though an *additional instance*, it is not a *distinct species* of evidence for a Creator from that contained in the general marks of order and design in the Universe. A proof drawn from an *interruption* in the course of nature is in the same *line of argument* as one deduced from the *existence* of that course, and in point of cogency is inferior to it. Were a being who had experience only of a chaotic world suddenly introduced into this orderly system of things, he would have an infinitely more powerful argument for the existence of a designing Mind than a mere interruption of that system can afford. A Miracle is no argument to one who is deliberately, and on principle, an atheist.

Yet lead to belief in that doctrine.

Yet, though not abstractedly the more convincing, it is often so in effect, as being of a more striking and imposing character. The mind, habituated to the regularity of nature, is blunted to the overwhelming evidence it conveys; whereas by a Miracle it may be roused to reflection, till mere conviction of a superhuman being becomes the first step towards the acknowledgment of a Supreme power. While, moreover, it surveys nature *as a whole*, it is not capacious enough to embrace its bearings, and to comprehend what it implies. In Miraculous displays of power the field of view is narrowed; a detached portion of the divine operations is taken as an instance, and the Final Cause is distinctly pointed out. A Miracle, besides, is more striking, inasmuch as it displays the Deity in action; evidence of which is not supplied in the system of nature. It may then *accidentally* bring conviction of an intelligent Creator; for it voluntarily proffers a testimony which we have ourselves to extort from the ordinary course of things, and forces upon the attention a truth which otherwise is not discovered, except upon examination.

They may prove the moral government of God.

And as it affords a more *striking* evidence of a Creator than that conveyed in the order and established laws of the Universe, still more so does it of a Moral Governor. For, while *nature* attests the being of God more distinctly than it does his moral government, a *Miraculous event*, on the contrary, bears more directly on the fact of his moral government, of which it is an immediate instance, while it only implies his existence. Hence, besides banishing ideas of Fate and Necessity, Miracles have a tendency to rouse conscience, to awaken to a sense of reponsibility, to remind of duty, and to direct the attention to those marks of divine government already contained in the ordinary course of events.*

Hitherto, however, we have spoken of solitary Miracles; a *system* of Miraculous interpositions, conducted with reference to a Final Cause, supplies a still more beautiful and convincing argument for the moral government of God.

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* See Sumner's *Records of Creation*, vol. i.

† See Hume, *on Miracles*: "let us examine those Miracles related in Scripture, and, *not to lose ourselves in too wide a field*, let us *confine* ourselves to such as we find in the *Pentateuch*, &c. It gives an account of the state of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present; of our fall from that state; of the age of man extended to near a thousand years," &c. See Berkeley's *Minute Philosopher*, dial. vi. sec. 30.

* Farmer, *on Miracles*, ch. i. sec. 2.

Biography.

§ II. *On the antecedent Credibility of a Miracle, considered as a Divine Interposition.*

Miracles, being facts, can be proved only by means of Testimony.

In proof of Miraculous occurrences, we must have recourse to the same *kind* of evidence as that by which we determine the truth of Historical accounts in general. For though Miracles, in consequence of their extraordinary nature, challenge a fuller and more accurate investigation, still they do not admit an investigation conducted on different principles,—Testimony being the only assignable medium of proof for past events of any kind. And this being indisputable, it is almost equally so that the Christian Miracles are attested by evidence even stronger than can be produced for any of those Historical facts which we most firmly believe. This has been felt by unbelievers; who have been, in consequence, led to deny the *admissibility* of even the strongest Testimony, if offered in behalf of Miraculous events, and thus to get rid of the only means by which they can be proved to have taken place. It has accordingly been asserted, that all events inconsistent with the course of nature bear in their very front such strong and decisive marks of falsehood and absurdity, that it is needless to examine the evidence adduced for them.* "Where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm," says Hume, with a distant but evident allusion to the Christian Miracles, "there is no degree of human Testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity; and those who will be so silly as to examine the affair *by that medium*, and seek particular flaws in the Testimony, are almost sure to be confounded."† Of these antecedent objections, which are supposed to decide the question, the most popular is founded on the frequent occurrence of wonderful tales in every Age and country, generally too connected with Religion; and since the more we are in a situation to examine these accounts, the more fabulous they are proved to be, there would certainly be hence a fair presumption against the Scripture narrative, did it resemble them in its circumstances and proposed object. A more refined argument is that advanced by Hume, in the first part of his *Essay on Miracles*, in which it is maintained against the credibility of a Miracle, that it is more improbable that the Miracle should be true than that the Testimony should be false.

Objections against the admissibility of Testimony.

Divine agency the cause of Miracles.

This latter objection has been so ably met by various writers, that, though prior in the order of the argument to the other, it need not be considered here. It derives its force from the *assumption*, that a Miracle is strictly a *causeless phenomenon*, a *self-originating violation of nature;* and is solved by referring the event to *divine agency*, a principle which (it cannot be denied) has originated works indicative of power at least as great as any Miracle requires. An adequate cause being thus found for the production of a Miracle, the objection vanishes, as far as the mere question of power is concerned; and it remains to be considered whether the anomalous fact be of such a character as to *admit* of being referred to the Supreme Being. For if it cannot with propriety be referred to him, it remains as improbable as if no such agent were known to exist. At this point, then, we propose taking up the argument; and by examining *what* Miracles are in their nature and circumstances referable to divine agency, we shall be providing a reply to the former of the objections just noticed, in which the alleged *similarity* of *all* Miraculous narratives one to another, was made a reason for a common rejection of all. And it is to an inquiry of this nature, that a memoir of Apollonius properly gives rise.

Apollonius Tyanæus.

Miracles.

In examining *what* Miracles may properly be ascribed to the Deity, Hume supplies us with an observation so just, when taken in its full extent, that we shall make it the groundwork of the inquiry on which we are entering. As the Deity, he says, discovers himself to us by his works, we have no rational grounds for ascribing to him attributes or actions dissimilar from those which his works convey. It follows then, that in discriminating between those Miracles which can and those which cannot be ascribed to God, we must be guided by the information with which *experience* furnishes us concerning his wisdom, goodness, and other attributes. Since a Miracle is an act out of the known track of divine agency, as regards the *physical* system, it is almost indispensable to show its consistency with the divine agency, at least, in some *other* point of view; if (i. e.) it is to be recognised as the work of the same power. Now, we contend that this reasonable demand *is* satisfied in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, in which we find a narrative of Miracles altogether answering in their character and circumstances to those general ideas which the ordinary course of divine providence enables us to form concerning the attributes and actions of God.

All Miracles not referable to divine agency.

While writers expatiate so largely on the laws of nature, they altogether forget the existence of a *Moral* system; a system, which though but partially understood, and but general in its appointments as acting upon free agents, is as intelligible in its laws and provisions as the material world. Connected with this Moral government, we find certain instincts of mind; such as conscience, a sense of responsibility, and an approbation of virtue; an innate desire of knowledge, and an almost universal feeling of the necessity of Religious observances: while, in fact, Virtue is on the whole rewarded and Vice punished. And though we meet with many and striking anomalies, yet it is evident they are but anomalies, and possibly but in appearance so, and with reference to our partial information. *

The Scripture Miracles profess to be the result of the Moral system:

These two systems, the Physical and the Moral, sometimes act in unison, and sometimes in opposition to each other; and as the order of nature certainly does in many cases interfere with the operation of Moral laws, (as *e. g.* when good men die prematurely, or the gifts of nature are continued to the bad,) there is nothing to shock probability in the idea that a great Moral object should be effected by an interruption of Physical order. But, further than this, however Physical laws may embarrass the operation of the Moral system, still on the whole they are subservient to it; contributing, as is evident, to the welfare and convenience of Man, providing for his mental gratification as well as animal enjoyment, sometimes even supplying correctives to his Moral disorders. If then the economy of nature has so constant a reference to an ulterior plan, a Miracle is a deviation from the subordinate for the sake of the superior system, and is very far indeed from improbable, when a great Moral end cannot be effected except at the expense of Physical regularity.

Interfering with the Physical:

* *I. e.* it is pretended to try *past* eveuts on the principles used in conjecturing *future;* viz. on antecedent probability and examples. (*Treatise on Rhetoric*, ch. i. sec. 3.) See Leland's *Supplement to View of Deistical Writers*, let. 3.

† *Essays*, vol. ii. note L.

* See Butler's *Analogy*, part i. ch. iii.

Nor can it be fairly said to argue an imperfection in the divine plans, that this interference should be necessary. For we must view the system of Providence *as a whole;* which is not more imperfect because of the mutual action of its parts, than a machine the separate wheels of which affect each other's movements.

That is to be the criterion and evidence of a Revelation.

Now the Miracles of the Jewish and Christian Religions must be considered as immediate effects of divine power beyond the action of nature, for an important Moral end; and are in consequence accounted for by producing not a *physical* but a *final* cause. * We are not left to contemplate the bare anomalies, and from the mere necessity of the case to refer them to the supposed agency of the Deity. The power of displaying them is, according to the Scripture narrative, intrusted to certain individuals, who stand forward as their interpreters, giving them a voice and language, and a dignity demanding our regard; who set them forth as evidences of the greatest of Moral ends, a Revelation from God,—as instruments in his hand of effecting a direct intercourse between himself and his creatures, *which otherwise could not have been effected*,—as vouchers for the truth of a message which they deliver.† This is plain and intelligible; there is an easy connection between the Miraculous nature of their works and the truth of their words; the *fact* of their superhuman power is a reasonable ground for *belief* in their superhuman knowledge. Considering, then, our instinctive sense of duty and moral obligation, yet the weak sanction which reason gives to the practice of Virtue, and withal the uncertainty of the mind when advancing beyond the first elements of right and wrong; considering, moreover, the feeling which wise men have entertained of the need of some heavenly guide to instruct and confirm them in goodness, and that unextinguishable desire for a divine message which has led men in all ages to acquiesce even in pretended Revelations rather than forego the consolation thus afforded them; and again, the possibility (to say the least) of our being destined for a future state of being, the nature and circumstances of which it may concern us much to know, though from nature we know nothing; considering, lastly, our experience of a watchful and merciful Providence, and the impracticability already noticed of a Revelation without a Miracle—it is hardly too much to affirm, that the Moral system points to an interference with the course of nature, and that Miracles wrought in evidence of a divine communication, instead of being antecedently improbable, are, when directly attested, entitled to a respectful and impartial consideration.

When the various antecedent objections which ingenious men have urged against Miracles are brought together, they will be found nearly all to arise from forgetfulness of the existence of Moral laws. * In their zeal to perfect the laws of matter they most unphilosophically overlook a more sublime system, which contains disclosures not only of the *Being* but of the *Will* of God. Thus Hume, in a passage above alluded to, observes, "Though the Being to whom the Miracle is ascribed be Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions *in the usual course of nature*. This still reduces us to past observation, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the *laws of nature* by Miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable." Here the Moral government of God, *with the course of which the Miracle entirely accords*, is altogether kept out of sight. With a like heedlessness of the Moral character of a Miracle, another writer, notorious for his irreligion,† objects that it argues mutability in the Deity, and implies that the Physical system was not created good, as needing improvement. And a recent author adopts a similarly partial and inconclusive mode of reasoning, when he confuses the Christian Miracles with fables of apparitions and witches, and would examine them on the strict principle of those legal forms which from their secular object go far to exclude all *Religious* discussion of the question. ‡ Such reasoners seem to suppose, that when the agency of the Deity is introduced to account for Miracles, it is the illogical introduction of an unknown cause, a reference to a mere name, the offspring perhaps of popular superstition; or, if more than a name, to a cause that can be known only by means of the Physical creation; and hence they consider Religion as founded in the mere weakness or eccentricity of the intellect, not in actual intimations of a divine government as contained in the moral world. From an apparent impatience of investigating a system which is but partially revealed, they esteem the laws of the material system alone worthy the notice of a scientific mind; and rid themselves of the annoyance which the importunity of a claim to Miraculous power occasions them, by discarding all the circumstances which fix its antecedent probability, all in which one Miracle differs from another, the professed author, object, design, character, and human instruments.

Objections to the Scripture Miracles are founded on a forgetfulness of the Moral system

When this partial procedure is resisted, the *à priori* objections of sceptical writers at once lose their force. Facts are only so far improbable as they fall under no general rule; whereas it is as parts of an existing system that the Miracles of Scripture demand our attention, as resulting from known attributes of God, and corresponding to the ordinary arrangements of his providence. Even as detached events they might excite a rational awe towards the mysterious Author of nature. But they are presented to us, not as unconnected and unmeaning occurrences, but as holding a place in an extensive plan of divine government, completing the Moral system, connecting Man with his Maker, and introducing him to the means of securing his happiness in another and eternal state of being. That such is the professed object of the body of Christian Miracles,

Enumeration of circumstances in which the Scripture Miracles fall in with the known attributes of God.

* *Divine Legation*, book ix. ch. v. Vince, *on Miracles*, serm. 1.

† As, for instance, *Exod.* ch. iv. v. 1—9, 29—31; ch. vii. v. 9, 17. *Numb.* ch. xvi. v. 3, 28, 29. *Deut.* ch. iv. v. 36—40; ch. xviii. v. 21, 22. Josh. ch. iii. v. 7—13. 1 Sam. ch. x. v. 1—7; ch. xii. v. 16—19. 1 *Kings*, ch. xiii. v. 3; ch. xvii. v. 24; ch. xviii. v. 36—39. 2 *Kings*, ch. i. v. 6, 10; ch. v. v. 15; ch. xx. v. 8—11. Jer. ch. xxviii. v. 15—17. Ezek. ch. xxxiii. v. 33. Matt. ch. x. v. 1—20; ch. xi. v. 3—5, 20—24. Mark, ch. xvi. v. 15—20. Luke, ch. i. v. 18—20; ch. ii. v. 11, 12; ch. v. v. 24; ch. vii. v. 15, 16; ch. ix. v. 2; ch. x. v. 9. John, ch. ii. v. 22; ch. iii. v. 2; ch. v. v. 36, 37; ch. ix. v. 33; ch. x. v. 24—38; ch. xi. v. 15, 41, 42; ch. xiii. v. 19; ch. xiv. v. 10, 11, 29; ch. xvi. v. 4; ch. xx. v. 30, 31. *Acts*, ch. i. v. 8; ch. ii. v. 22, 33; ch. iii. v. 15, 16; ch. iv. v. 33; ch. v. v. 32; ch. viii. v. 6; ch. x. v. 38; ch. xiii. v. 8—12; ch. xiv. v. 3. *Rom.* ch. xv. v. 18, 19. 1 *Cor.* ch. ii. v. 4, 5. 2 *Cor.* ch. xii. v. 12. *Heb.* ch. ii. v. 3, 4. *Rev.* ch. xix. v. 10.

* Vince, *on Miracles*, serm. i.

† Voltaire. ‡ Bentham, *Preuves Judiciaires*, liv. viii.

Biography.

can hardly be denied. In the earlier Religion it was substantially the same, though from the preparatory nature of the dispensation, a less enlarged view was given of the divine counsels. The express purpose of the Jewish Miracles is to confirm the natural evidence of one God, the Creator of all things, to display his attributes and will with distinctness and authority, and to enforce the obligation of Religious observances, and show the sin of idolatrous worship.* Whether we turn to the earlier or latter Ages of Judaism, in the plagues of Egypt; in the parting of Jordan, and the arresting of the Sun's course by Joshua; in the harvest thunder at the prayer of Samuel; in the rending of the altar at Bethel; in Elijah's sacrifice on Mount Carmel; and in the cure of Naaman by Elisha; we recognise this one grand object throughout. Not even in the earliest ages of the Scripture history are Miracles wrought at random, or causelessly, or to amuse the fancy, or for the sake of mere display: nor prodigally, for the mere conviction of individuals, but for the most part on a grand scale, in the face of the world, to supply whole nations with evidence concerning the Deity. Nor are they strewn confusedly over the face of the history, being with few exceptions reducible to three eras; the formation of the Hebrew Church and Polity, the reformation in the times of the idolatrous Kings of Israel, and the promulgation of the Gospel. Let it be observed, moreover, that the power of working them, instead of being assumed by any classes of men indiscriminately, is described as a prerogative of the occasional Prophets to the exclusion of the Priests and Kings; a circumstance which, not to mention its remarkable contrast to the natural course of an imposture, is deserving attention from its consistency with the leading design of Miracles already specified. For the respective claims of the Kings and Priests were already ascertained, when once the sacred office was limited to the family of Aaron, and the regal power to David and his descendants; whereas extraordinary messengers, as Moses, Samuel, and Elijah, needed some supernatural display of power to authenticate their pretensions. In corroboration of this remark we may observe the unembarrassed manner of the Prophets in the exercise of their professed gift; their disdain of argument or persuasion, and the confidence with which they appeal to those before whom they are said to have worked their Miracles.

These and similar observations do more than invest the *separate* Miracles with a dignity worthy of the Supreme Being; they show the *coincidence* of them *all* in one common and consistent object. As parts of a system, the Miracles recommend and attest each other, evidencing not only general *wisdom*, but a digested and extended *plan*. And while this appearance of design connects them with the acknowledged works of a Creator, who is in the natural world chiefly known to us by the presence of final causes, so, again, a plan conducted as this was, through a series of ages, evinces not the varying will of successive individuals, but the steady and sustained purpose of one Sovereign Mind. And this remark especially applies to the coincidence of views observable between the Old and New Testament; the latter of which, though written after a long interval of silence, the breaking up of the former system, a revolution in Religious discipline, and the introduction of Oriental tenets into the popular Theology, still unhesitatingly takes up and maintains the ancient principles of Miraculous interposition.

Apollonius Tyanæus. — Miracles.

An additional recommendation of the Scripture Miracles is their appositeness to the times and places in which they were wrought; as, *e. g.* in the case of the plagues of Egypt, which, it has been shown,* were directed against the prevalent superstitions of that country. Their originality, beauty, and immediate utility, are further properties falling in with our conceptions of divine agency. In their general character we discover nothing indecorous, light, or ridiculous; they are grave, simple, unambiguous, majestic. Many of them, especially those of the later dispensation, are remarkable for their benevolent and merciful character; others are useful for a variety of subordinate purposes, as a pledge of the certainty of particular promises, or as comforting good men, or as edifying the Church. Nor must we overlook the Moral instruction conveyed in many, particularly in those ascribed to Christ, the Spiritual interpretation which they will often bear, and the exemplification which they afford of particular doctrines.†

Accepting then what may be called Hume's canon, that *no work can be reasonably ascribed to the agency of God, which is altogether different from those ordinary works from which our knowledge of him is originally obtained*, we have shown that the Miracles of Scripture, far from being exceptionable on that account, are strongly recommended by their coincidence with what we know from nature of *his Providence and Moral attributes*. That there are some few among them in which this coincidence cannot be traced, it is not necessary to deny. As a whole they bear a determinate and consistent character, being great and extraordinary means for attaining a great, momentous, and extraordinary object.

Tests, derived from our knowledge of the divine attributes, by which all but Scripture Miracles are excluded.

We shall not however dismiss this criterion of the antecedent probability of a Miracle with which Hume has furnished us, without showing that it is more or less detrimental to the pretensions of *all* professed Miracles *but* those of the Jewish and Christian Revelations:—in other words, that none else are likely to have occurred, because none else can with any probability be referred to the agency of the Deity, the only known cause of miraculous interposition. We exclude then

1. *Those which are not even referred by the workers of them to divine agency.*

Miracles not from God.

Such are the extraordinary works attributed by some to Zoroaster; and, again, to Pythagoras, Empedocles, Apollonius, and others of their School; which only claim to be the result of their superior wisdom, and were quite independent of a Supreme Being.‡ Such are the supposed effects of witchcraft or of magical charms, which profess to originate with Spirits and Demons; for, as these agents, supposing them to exist,

* *Exod.* ch. iii.—xiv. xx. v. 22, 23; ch. xxxiv. v. 6—17. *Deut.* ch. iv. v. 32—40. Josh. ch. ii. v. 10, 11; ch. iv. v. 23, 24. 1 Sam. ch. v. v. 3, 4; ch. xii. v. 18. 2 Sam. ch. vii. v. 23. 1 *Kings*, ch. viii. v. 59, 60; ch. xviii. v. 36, 37; ch. xx. v. 28. 2 *Kings*, ch. xix. v. 15—19, 35. 2 *Chron.* ch. xx. v. 29. Is. ch. vi. v. 1—5; ch. xix. v. 1; ch. xliii. v. 10—12.

* See Bryant.

† Jones, *on the Figurative Language of Scripture*, lect. 10. Farmer, *on Miracles*, ch. iii. sec. 6, 2.

‡ See, in contrast, *Gen.* ch. xl. v. 8; ch. xli. v. 16. Dan. ch. ii. 27—30, 47. *Acts*, ch. iii. v. 12—16; ch. xiv. v. 11—18; a contrast sustained, as these passages show, for 1500 years.

did not make the world, there is every reason for thinking they cannot of themselves alter its arrangements.* And those, as in some accounts of apparitions, which are silent respecting their origin, and are referred to God from the mere necessity of the case.

2. *Those which are unworthy of an All-wise Author.*

Miracles unworthy of God.

As, for example, the Miracles of Simon Magus, who pretended he could assume the appearance of a serpent, exhibit himself with two faces, and transform himself into whatever shape he pleased.† Such are most of the Miracles recorded in the apocryphal accounts of Christ:‡ e. g. the sudden ceasing of all kinds of motion at his birth, birds stopping in the midst of their flight, men at table with their hands to their mouths yet unable to eat, &c.; his changing, when a child, his playmates into kids, and animating clay figures of beasts and birds; the practice attributed to him of appearing to his disciples sometimes as a youth, sometimes as an old man, sometimes as a child, sometimes large, sometimes less, sometimes so tall as to reach the Heavens; and the obeisance paid him by the military standards when he was brought before Pilate. Of the same cast is the story of his picture presented by Nicodemus to Gamaliel, which when pierced by the Jews gave forth blood and water. Under this head of exception fall many of the Miracles related by the fathers;§ *e. g.* that of the consecrated bread changing into a live coal in the hands of a woman, who came to the Lord's supper after offering incense to an idol; of the dove issuing from the body of Polycarp at his martyrdom; of the petrifaction of a fowl dressed by a person under a vow of abstinence; of the exorcism of the demoniac camel; of the stones shedding tears at the barbarity of the persecutions; of inundations rising up to the roofs of churches without entering the open doors; and of pieces of gold, as fresh as from the mint, dropt from heaven into the laps of the Italian Monks. Of the same character are the Miracles of the Romish Breviary; as the prostration of wild beasts before the martyrs they were about to devour; the Miraculous uniting of two chains with which St. Peter had been at different times bound; and the burial of Paul the Hermit by lions. Such again are the Rabbinical Miracles, as that of the flies killed by lightning for settling on a Rabbi's paper. And the Miracles ascribed by some to Mohammed, as that the trees went out to meet him, the stones saluted him, and a camel complained to him.‖ The exorcism in the Book of Tobit must here be mentioned, in which the Evil Spirit who is in love with Sara is driven away by the smell of certain perfumes.¶ Hence the Scripture accounts of Eve's temptation by the serpent; of the speaking of Balaam's ass; of Jonah and the whale; and of the Devils sent into the herd of swine, are *by themselves* more or less improbable, being unequal in dignity to the rest. They are then supported by the system in which they are found, as being a few out of a multitude, and therefore but exceptions (and, as we suppose, but *apparent* exceptions) to the general rule. In some of them, too, a further purpose is discernible, which of itself reconciles us to the strangeness of their first appearance, and suggests the possibility of similar reasons, though unknown, being assigned in explanation of the rest. As the Miracle of the swine, the object of which may have been to prove to us the reality of demoniacal possessions.*

Miracles of mere power, even when connected with some ultimate object, are often improbable for the same general reason, viz. as unworthy of an All-wise Author. Such as that ascribed to Zoroaster,† of suffering melted brass to be poured upon his breast without injury to himself. Unless indeed their immediate design be to exemplify the greatness of God, as in the descent of fire from heaven upon Elijah's sacrifice, and in Christ's walking on the sea,‡ which evidently possess a dignity fitting them to be works of the Supreme Being. The propriety indeed of the Christian Miracles, contrasted with the want of decorum observable in those elsewhere related, forms a most striking evidence of their divinity.

Here, too, *ambiguous* Miracles find a place, it being antecedently improbable that the Almighty should rest the credit of his Revelation upon events which but obscurely implied his immediate presence.

And, for the same reason, those are in some measure improbable *which are professed by different Religions;* because from a divine agent may be expected distinct and peculiar specimens of divine agency. Hence the claims to supernatural power in the primitive Church are in general questionable, as *resting* upon the exorcism of Evil Spirits, and the cure of diseases; works, not only less satisfactory than others, as evidence of a Miraculous interposition, but suspicious from the circumstance, that they were exhibited also by Jews and Gentiles of the same Age.§ In the plagues of Egypt and Elijah's sacrifice, which seem to be of this class, there is a direct contest between two parties; and the object of the divine messenger is to show his own superiority in the very point in which his adversaries try their powers. Our Saviour's use of the clay in restoring sight has been accounted for on a similar principle, such external means being in repute among the Heathen in their pretended cures.

3. *Those which have no professed object.*

Miracles without object.

Hence a suspicion is thrown on all Miracles ascribed by the Apocryphal Gospels to Christ in his *infancy;*

* Sometimes charms are represented as having an inherent virtue, independent of invisible agents, as in the account given by Josephus of Eleazar's drawing out a Devil through the nostrils of a patient by means of a ring, which contained in it a drug prescribed by Solomon. Joseph. *Antiq.* viii. 2, sec. 5. See *Acts*, ch. viii. v. 19.

† Lavington, *Enthusiasm of Meth. and Papists comp.* part iii. sec. 43.

‡ Jones, *on the Canon*, part iii.

§ Middleton, *Free Inquiry.*

‖ The offensiveness of these, and many others above instanced, consists in attributing *moral* feelings to inanimate or irrational beings.

¶ It seems to have been a common notion that possessed persons were beloved by the Spirit that distressed them. See Philostr. iv. 25.—*Gospel of the Infancy*, xiv.—xvi. xxxiii. Justin Martyr, *Apol.* p. 113, ed. Thirlb. We find nothing of this kind in the account of the Scripture demoniacs

* *Divine Legation*, book ix. ch. v.

† Brucker, vol. i. p. 147.

‡ Power over the elements conveyed the most striking proof of Christ's mission from the God of nature, who in the Old Testament is frequently characterised as ruling the sea, winds, &c. *Ps.* lxv. v. 7; lxxvii. v. 19. Job, ch. xxxviii. v. 11, &c. It is said, that a drawing of feet upon the water was the hieroglyphic for impossibility. Christ moreover designed, it appears, to make trial of his disciples' faith by this Miracle. See Matt. ch. xiv. v. 28—31. Mark, ch. vi. v. 52. We read of the power to "move mountains," but evidently as a proverbial expression. The transfiguration, if it need be mentioned, has a *doctrinal* sense, and seems besides to have been intended to lead the minds of the Apostles to the consideration of the Spiritual Kingdom. One of Satan's temptations was to induce our Lord to work a Miracle of mere power. Matt. ch iv. v. 6, 7. See *Acts*, ch. x. v. 38, for the general character of the Miracles.

§ Middleton. Stillingfleet, *Orig. Sacr.* ii. 9, sec. 1.

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for, being prior to his preaching, they seem to attest no doctrine, and are but distantly connected with any object.—Those again on which an object seems to be *forced*. Hence many harmonizing in one plan arrest the attention more powerfully than a detached and solitary Miracle, as converging to one point, and pressing upon our notice the end for which they are wrought. This remark, as far as it goes, is prejudicial to the Miracle wrought (as it is said) in Hunneric's persecution, long after the real age of Miracles was past; when the Athanasian confessors are reported to have retained the power of speech after the loss of their tongues.

Those, too, must be viewed with suspicion *which are disjoined from human instruments, and are made the vehicle of no message*;* since, according to our foregoing view, Miracles are only then divested of their *à priori* improbability when furthering some great Moral end, such as authenticating a divine communication. It is an objection then to those ascribed to relics generally, and in particular to those attributed to the tomb of the Abbé Paris, that they are left to tell their own story, and are but distantly connected with any object whatever. As it is, again, to many tales of apparitions, that they do not admit of a meaning, and consequently demand at most only an *otiose* assent, as Paley terms it. Hence there is a difficulty in the narrative contained in the first verses of John, v.; because we cannot reduce the account of the descent of the angel into the water to give it a healing power under any known arrangement of the divine economy. We receive it, then, on the general credit of the Revelation of which it forms part.†

For the same reason, viz. the want of a declared object, a prejudice is excited *when the professed worker is silent, or diffident as to his own power;* since our general experience of Providence leads us to suppose that Miraculous powers will not be committed to an individual who is not also prepared for his office by secret inspiration. This speaks strongly against the cures ascribed by Tacitus to Vespasianus, and would be an objection to our crediting the prediction uttered by Caiaphas, if separated from its context, or prominently brought forward to rest an argument upon. It is in general a characteristic of the Scripture system, that Miracles and inspiration go together.‡—With a view to specify the object distinctly, some have required that the Miracle should be wrought *after* the delivery of the message.§ A message delivered an indefinite time after the Miracle, while it cannot but excite attention from the general reputation of the messenger for an extraordinary gift, is not so expressly stamped with divine authority, as when it is ushered in by his claiming, and followed by his displaying, supernatural powers. For if a Miracle, once wrought, ever after sanctions the doctrines taught by the person exhibiting it, it must be attended by the gift of infallibility; a sustained Miracle is inconsistent with that frugality in the application of power which is observable in the general course of Providence.‖ On the other hand, when an unambiguous Miracle, having been first distinctly announced, is wrought with the professed object of sanctioning a message from God, it conveys an irresistible evidence of its divine origin. Accident is thus excluded, and the final cause indissolubly connected with the supernatural event. We may remark that the Miracles of Scripture were generally wrought on this plan.* In conformity to which, we find moreover that the Apostles, &c. could not work Miracles *when they pleased*;† a circumstance more consistent with our ideas of the divine government, and connecting the extraordinary acts more clearly with specific objects than if the supernatural gift were unlimited and irrevocable.

Apollonius Tyanæus. — Miracles.

Lastly, under this head we may notice Miraculous accounts, *which*, as those concerning Apollonius, *may be separated from a narrative without detriment to it.* The prodigies of Livy, *e. g.* form no part in the action of the history, which is equally intelligible without them.‡ The Miraculous events of the Pentateuch, on the contrary, or of the Gospels and Acts, though of course they may be rejected *together with* the rest of the narrative, can be rejected in no other way; since they form its substance and groundwork, and, like the figure of Phidias on Minerva's shield, cannot be erased without spoiling the entire composition.§

4. *Those which are exceptionable as regards their object.*

Miracles with insufficient object.

If the professed object be *trifling and unimportant;* as in many related by the Fathers, *e. g.* Tertullian's account of the vision of an Angel to prescribe to a female the exact length and measure of her veil, or the divine admonition which Cyprian professes to have received to mix water with wine in the Eucharist, in order to render it efficacious.‖ Among these would be reckoned the directions given to Moses relative to the furnishing of the Tabernacle, and other regulations of the ceremonial law, were not further and important objects thereby affected; such as, separating the Israelites from the surrounding nations, impressing upon them the doctrine of a particular Providence, prefiguring future events, &c.

Miracles wrought for the gratification of mere *curio-*

* Farmer, *on Miracles*, ch. v.

† The verse containing the account of the Angel is wanting in many MSS. of authority, and is marked as suspicious by Griesbach. The mineral spring of Bethesda is mentioned by Eusebius as celebrated even in his day.

‡ Douglas's *Criterion*. Warburton, *Serm. on Resurrection*.

§ Fleetwood, Farmer, and others.

‖ The idea is accordingly discountenanced, Matt. ch. vii. v. 22, 23. *Heb.* ch. vi. v. 4—6. *Gal.* ch. ii. v. 11—14.

* St. Mark ends his Gospel by saying, that the Apostles "went forth and preached everywhere, the Lord working with them, and *confirming the word by signs* FOLLOWING." ch. xvi. v. 20. See also *Exod.* ch. iv. v. 29, 30. 1 *Kings*, ch. xiii. v. 2, 3. 2 *Kings*, ch. xx. v. 8—11. *Acts*, ch. xiv. v. 3, &c.

† *E. g. Acts*, ch. xx. v. 22, 23. *Phil.* ch. ii. v. 27. 2 Tim. ch. iv. v. 20. In the Book of *Acts* we have not a few instances of the Apostles acting under the immediate direction of the Holy Spirit. The gift of tongues is an exception to the general remark, as we know it was abused; but this from its nature was, when once given, possessed as an ordinary talent, and needed no fresh divine influence for subsequent exercise of it. It may besides be viewed as a *medium* of conveying the message, as well as being the seal of its divinity, and as such needed not in every instance to be marked out as a supernatural gift. Miracles in Scripture are not done by *wholesale*, i. e. indiscriminately and at once, without the particular will and act of the gifted individual; the contrary was the case with the cures at the tomb of the Abbé Paris. *Acts*, ch. xix. v. 11, 12 perhaps forms an exception; but the Miracles there mentioned are expressly said to be *special*, and were intended to put particular honour on the Apostle. Cf. Luke, ch. vi. v. 19; ch. viii. v. 46, which seem to illustrate John, ch. iii. v. 34.

‡ *E. g.* he says "ADJICIUNT *miracula huic pugnæ*," ii. 7.

§ Whereas other extraordinary accounts are like the statue of the Goddess herself, which could readily be taken to pieces, and resolved into its constituent parts, the precious metal and the stone. For the Jewish Miracles, see Graves, *on the Pentateuch*, part i. It has been observed, that the *discourses* of Christ so constantly grow out of his *Miracles*, that we can hardly admit the former without admitting the latter also. But his *discourses* form his *character*, which is by no means an obvious or easy one to imagine, had it never existed.

‖ Middleton, *Free Inquiry*.

sity are referable to this head of objection. Hence the triumphant invitations which some of the Fathers make to their heathen opponents to attend their exorcisms excite an unpleasant feeling in the mind, as degrading a solemn spectacle into a mere popular exhibition.

Those, again, which have a *political or party object;* as the cures ascribed to Vespasianus, or as those attributed to the tomb of the Abbé Paris, and the Eclectic prodigies—all which, viewed in their best light, tend to the mere aggrandizement of a particular Sect, and have little or no reference to the good of Mankind at large. It tells in favour of the Christian Miracles, that the Apostles, generally speaking, were not enabled to work them for their own personal convenience, to avoid danger, escape suffering, or save life. St. Paul's preservation from the effects of the viper's bite on the Isle of Melita is a solitary exception to this remark, no mention being made of his availing himself of this Miracle to proselyte the natives to the Christian faith.*

For a similar reason, those bear a less appearance of probability which are wrought *for the conviction of individuals.* We have already noticed the contrary character of the Scripture Miracles in this respect: *e. g.* St. Paul's Miraculous conversion did not end with itself, but was followed by momentous and inestimable consequences.† Again, Miracles attended the conversions of the Æthiopian Eunuch, Cornelius, and Sergius Paulus; but these were heads and first fruits of different classes of men who were in time to be brought into the Church.‡

Miracles *with a bad or vicious object* are laden with an extreme antecedent improbability; for they cannot at all be referred to the only known cause of supernatural power, the agency of God. Such are most of the fables concerning the heathen Deities; not a few of the professed Miracles of the primitive Church, which are wrought to sanction doctrines opposed not only to Scriptural truth but to the light of nature;§ and some related in the Apocryphal Gospels, especially Christ's inflicting death upon a schoolmaster who threatened to strike him, and on a boy who happened to run violently against him.|| Here must be noticed several passages in Scripture, in which a Miraculous gift seems at first sight to be exercised to gratify revengeful feelings, and which are, therefore, received on the credit of the system.¶

Unnecessary Miracles are improbable; as, those wrought for an object attainable without an exertion, or with less exertion, of extraordinary power.** Of this kind, we contend, would be the writing of the Gospel on the skies, which some unbelievers have proposed as but an adequate attestation to a Revelation; for, *supposing* the recorded fact of their once occurring be sufficient for a rational conviction, a perpetual Miracle becomes superfluous.* —Such, again, would be the preservation of the text of Scripture in its verbal correctness, which many have supposed necessary for its infallibility as a standard of Truth.—The same antecedent objection presses on Miracles wrought *in attestation of truths already known.* We do not, *e. g.* require a Miracle to convince us that the Sun shines, or that Vice is blameable. The Socinian scheme is in a great measure chargeable with bringing the Miracles of the Gospel under this censure; for it prunes away the Christian system till little is left for the Miracles to attest. On this ground an objection has been taken to the Miracle wrought in favour of the Athanasians in Hunneric's persecution, as above mentioned; inasmuch as it merely professes to authorize a comment on the sacred text, *i. e.* to sanction a truth which is not *new*, unless Scripture be *obscure.*†—Here, too, may be noticed Miracles wrought *in evidence of doctrines already established;* such as those of the Papists, who seem desirous of answering the unbeliever's demand for a perpetual Miracle. Popish Miracles, as has often been observed, occur in Popish countries, where they are least wanted; whereas, if real, they would be invaluable among Protestants. Hence the primitive Miracles become suspicious, in proportion as we find Christianity established, not only from the increasing facility of fraud, but moreover from the apparent needlessness of the extraordinary display. And hence, admitting the Miracles of Christ and his followers, future Miracles with the same end are somewhat improbable. For enough have been wrought to *attest* the doctrine; and *attention*, when once excited by supernatural means, may be kept alive by a standing Ministry, just as inspiration is supplied by human learning.

We proceed to notice *inconsistency in the objects proposed*, as creating a just prejudice against the validity of Miraculous pretensions. This applies to the claims of the Romish Church, in which Miracles are wrought by hostile Sects in support of discordant tenets.‡ It constitutes some objection to the bulk of the Miracles of the primitive Church, when viewed as a *continuation* of the original gift, that they differ so much in manner, design, and attendant circumstances, from those recorded in Scripture. "We see," says Middleton, (in the ages subsequent to the Christian era) "a dispensation of things ascribed to God, quite different from that which we meet with in the New Testament. For in those days, the power of working Miracles was committed to none but the Apostles, and to a few of the most eminent of the other disciples, who were particularly commissioned to propagate the Gospel and preside in the Church of Christ. But upon the pretended revival of the same powers in the following Ages, we find the administration of them committed, not to those who were intrusted with the government of the Church, not to the successors of the Apostles, to the Bishops, the Martyrs, nor to the principal champions of the Christian

* Rev. J. Blanco White, *against Catholicism*, let. 6. The Breviary Miracles form a striking contrast to the Christian in this point.

† *Acts*, ch. xxvi. v. 16.

‡ Ibid. ch. viii. v. 26, 39; ch. x. v. 3, &c.; ch. xiii. v. 12. These three classes are mentioned together in prophecy. Is. ch. lvi. v. 4—8.

§ *E. g.* to establish Monachism, &c.

|| Jones, *on the Canon*, part iii.

¶ *Gen.* ch. ix. v. 24—27. *Judg.* ch. xvi. v. 28—30. 2 *Kings*, ch. ii. v. 24. 2 *Chron.* ch. xxiv. v. 22.

** It does not follow, because all Miracles are equally *easy* to an Almighty author that all are equally *probable;* for, as has been often remarked, a frugality in the application of power is observable throughout his works.

* Dr. Graves observes, of the Miraculous agency in the Age of Moses and Joshua, that "God continued it *only so long as* was indispensably necessary to introduce and settle the Jewish nation in the land of their inheritance, and establish this dispensation so as to answer the purposes of the divine economy. After this, he gradually withdrew his supernatural assistance; he left the nation collectively and individually to act according to their own choice," &c. *Lectures on the Pentateuch*, part iii. lect. 2.

† See Maclaine's note on the subject, Mosheim, *Eccl. Hist.* cent. v. part ii. ch. v.

‡ Douglas, *Criterion*, p. 105, note, (8vo edit. 1807.)

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cause; but to *boys*, to *women*, and, above all, *to private and obscure laymen*, not only of an inferior but sometimes also of a *bad character.*"*—Hence, to avoid the charge of inconsistency in the respective objects of the Jewish and Christian Miracles, it is incumbent upon believers in them to show that the difference between the two systems is a difference in appearance only, and that Christ came not to destroy but to fulfil the Law. Here, *as far as its antecedent appearance is concerned*, the Miracle said to have occurred on Julian's attempt to rebuild the Jewish Temple is seen to great advantage. The object was great, the time critical, its consequences harmonize very happily with the economy of the Mosaic dispensation and the general spirit of the Prophetical writings, and the fact itself has some correspondence with the prodigies which preceded the final destruction of Jerusalem.†

Again, Miracles *which do not tend to the accomplishment of their proposed end* are open to objection; and those *which have not effected what they had in view.* Hence some kind of argument might be derived against the Christian Miracles, were they not accompanied by a prediction of their *temporary* failure in effecting their object; or, to speak more correctly, were it not their proposed object *gradually* to spread the doctrines which they authenticate.‡ There is nothing, however, to break the force of this objection when directed against the Miracles ascribed to the Abbé Paris; since the Jansenist interest, instead of being advanced in consequence of them, soon after lost ground, and was ultimately ruined.§

These Miracles are also suspicious, *as having been stopped by human authority;* it being improbable that a divine agent should permit any such interference with his plan. The same objection applies to the professed gift of exorcising demoniacs in the primitive Church; which was gradually lost after the decree of the Council of Laodicea confined the exercise of it to such as were licensed by the Bishop.‖ And lastly, to the supernatural character of Prince Hohenlohe's cures, which were stopped at Bamberg by an order from authority, that none should be wrought except in the presence of Magistrates and Medical practitioners.¶

The foregoing tests neither disprove,

These are the most obvious objections which may be fairly made to the antecedent probability of miraculous narratives. It will be observed, however, that none of them go so far as to deprive testimony for them of the privilege of being heard. Even where the nature of the facts related forbids us to refer the Miracle to divine agency, as when it is wrought to establish some immoral principle, still it is not more than extremely improbable and to be viewed with strong suspicion. Christians at least must acknowledge that the *à priori* view which Reason takes would in some cases lead to an erroneous conclusion. A Miracle, *e.g.* ascribed to an Evil Spirit is, prior to the information of Scripture, improbable; and if it stood on its own merits would require very strong testimony to establish it, as being referred to an unknown cause. Yet, on the authority of Scripture, we admit the occasional interference of agents short of divine with the course of nature. This, however, only shows that these *à priori* tests are not decisive. Yet if we cannot always ascertain what Miracles are improbable, at least we can determine what are not so; moreover, it will still be true that the *more* objections lie against any professed Miracle, the greater suspicion justly attaches to it, and the less important is the fact even if proved.

Apollonius Tyanæus.

Miracles.

Nor prove, any professed Miracle to have occurred.

On the other hand, even when the external appearance is altogether in favour of the Miracle, it must be recollected, nothing is thereby *proved* concerning the fact of its occurrence. We have done no more than recommend to notice the evidence, whatever it may be, which is offered in its behalf. Even, then, could Miracles be found with as strong an antecedent case as those of Scripture, still direct testimony must be produced to substantiate their claims on our belief. At the same time, since there are none such, a fair prepossession is indirectly created in favour of the latter, over and above their intrinsic claims on our attention.

They are injurious to some few of the Scripture Miracles.

Some few indeed of the Scripture Miracles are open to exception; and have accordingly been noticed in the course of our remarks as *by themselves* improbable. These, however, are seldom such in more than *one* respect; whereas the other Miracles which came before us were open to *several or all of the specified objections at the same time.* And, further, as they are but a few in the midst of an overpowering majority pointing consistently to one grand object, they must not be torn from their Moral context, but, on the credit of the rest, they must be considered but apparent exceptions to the rule. It is obvious that a large system must consist of various parts of unequal utility and excellence; and to expect each particular occurrence to be complete in itself, is as unreasonable as to require the parts of some complicated machine, separately taken, to be all equally finished and fit for display.*

Conclusion of the antecedent question.

Let these remarks suffice on the question of the antecedent probability or improbability of a Miraculous narrative. Enough, it may be hoped, has been said, to separate the Miracles of Scripture from those else-

* Scripture *sometimes* attributes Miraculous gifts to men of bad character; but we have no reason for supposing such could work Miracles at pleasure, (see *Numb.* ch. xxii. v. 18; ch. xxiii. v 3, 8, 12, 20; ch. xxiv. v. 10—13,) or attest any doctrine but that which Christ and his Apostles taught; nor is our faith *grounded* upon their preaching. Moreover, their power may have been given them for some further purpose; for though to attest a divine message be the *primary* object of Miracles, it need not be the only object. "It would be highly ridiculous," says Mr. Penrose in his recent work on Miracles, "to erect a steam engine for the mere purpose of opening and shutting a valve; but the engine being erected is very wisely employed both for this and for many other purposes, which, comparatively speaking, are of very little significance."

† See Warburton's *Julian.*

‡ See Parables in Matt. ch. xiii. v. 3, 24, 31, 33, 47; ch. xxiv. v. 12. *Acts*, ch. xx. v. 29, 30. 2 *Thes.* ch. ii. v. 3. 2 Tim. ch. iii. v. 1—5, &c.

§ Paley, *Evidences*, part i. prop. 2.

‖ It had hitherto been in the hands of the meaner sort of the Christian laity. After that time, "few or none of the clergy, nor indeed of the laity, were any longer able to cast out devils; so that the old Christian exorcism or prayer for the energumens in the church began soon after to be omitted as useless." Whiston, in Middleton.

¶ Bentham, *Preuves Judiciaires*, liv. viii. ch. x.

* In thus refusing to admit the existence of *real* exceptions to the general rule, in spite of *appearances*, we are not exposing ourselves to that charge of excessive systematizing which may justly be brought against those who, with Hume, reject the very notion of a Miracle, as implying an interruption of physical regularity. For the *Revelation* which we admit, on the authority of the general system of Miracles, imparts such accurate and extended information concerning the attributes of God, over and above the partial and imperfect view of them which the world affords, as precludes the supposition of *any* work of his being evil or useless. Whereas there is no *voice* in the mere analogy of nature which expressly denies the possibility of real exceptions to its general course.

where related, and to invest them with an importance exciting in an unprejudiced mind a just interest in their behalf, and a candid attention to the historical testimony on which they rest; inasmuch as they are ascribed to an adequate cause, recommended by an intrinsic dignity, and connected with an important object, while all others are more or less unaccountable, unmeaning, extravagant, and useless. And thus, viz. on the ground of this utter dissimilarity between the Miracles of Scripture and other prodigies, we are enabled to account for the incredulity with which believers in Revelation listen to any extraordinary account at the present day; and which sometimes is urged against them as inconsistent with their assent to the former. It is *because* they admit the Scripture Miracles. Belief in these has preoccupied their minds, and created a fair presumption against those of a different class;—the prospect of a recurrence of supernatural agency being in some measure discountenanced by the Revelation already given; and, again, the weakness and insipidity, the want of system and connection, the deficiency in the evidence, and the transient repute of marvellous stories ever since, creating a strong and just prejudice against those similar accounts which from time to time are noised abroad.

§ III. *On the Criterion of a Miracle, considered as a Divine Interposition.*

It has sometimes been asked, whether Miracles are a *sufficient evidence* of the interposition of the Deity? under the idea that *other* causes, besides divine agency, might be assigned for their production. This is obviously the converse objection to that we have as yet considered, which was founded on the assumption that they could be referred to *no* known cause whatever. After showing, then, that the Scripture Miracles *may* be ascribed to the Supreme Being, we proceed to show that they *cannot* reasonably be ascribed to those other causes which have been sometimes assigned, *e. g.* to unknown laws of nature, or to the secret agency of Spirits.

Miracles cannot reasonably be referred to the power of Spirits,

1. Now it is evidently unphilosophical to attribute them to the power of invisible Beings, short of God; because, independently of Scripture, (the truth of which, of course, must not be assumed in this question,) we have no evidence of the existence of such Beings. Nature attests, indeed, the being of a God, but not of a race of intelligent creatures between Him and Man. In assigning a Miracle, therefore, to the influence of Spirits, an hypothetical cause is introduced merely to remove a difficulty. And even did analogy lead us to admit their possible existence, yet it would tend rather to disprove than to prove their power over the visible Creation. They may be confined to their own province, and though superior to Man, still may be unable to do many things which he can effect; just as Man in turn is superior to Birds and Fishes, without having, in consequence, the power of flying or of inhabiting the water.*

Even though Scripture informs us of their power.

Still it may be necessary to show, that *on our own principles* we are not open to any charge of inconsistency. For it has been questioned, whether, in admitting the existence and power of Spirits on the authority of Revelation, we are not in danger of invalidating the evidence upon which that authority rests. For the cogency of the argument from Miracles depends on the assumption, that interruptions in the course of nature must ultimately proceed from God; which is not true, if they may be effected by other Beings without his sanction. And it must be conceded, that explicit as Scripture is in considering Miracles as signs of divine agency, it still does seem to give created Spirits some power of working them; and even, in its most literal sense, intimates the possibility of their working them in opposition to the true doctrine.* With a view of meeting this difficulty, some writers have attempted to make a distinction between *great* and *small*, *many* and *few* Miracles; and have thus inadvertently destroyed the intelligibility of any, as the *criterion* of a divine interposition.† Others, by referring to the nature of the *doctrine* attested, for determining the author of the Miracle, have exposed themselves to the plausible charge of adducing, first, the Miracle to attest the divinity of the doctrine, and then, the doctrine to prove the divinity of the Miracle.‡ Others, on the contrary, have thought themselves obliged to *deny* the power of Spirits altogether, and to explain away the Scripture accounts of Demoniacal possessions, and the narrative of our Lord's Temptation.§ Without, however, having recourse to any of these dangerous modes of answering the objection, it may be sufficient to reply, that, *since*, agreeably to the antecedent sentiment of reason, God has adopted Miracles as the seal of a divine message, we believe he will never suffer them to be so counterfeited as to deceive the humble inquirer. Thus the information given by Scripture in nowise undoes the original conclusions of Reason; for it anticipates the objection which itself furnishes, and by revealing the express *intention* of God in Miraculous displays, guarantees to us that he will allow no interference of created power to embarrass the proof thence resulting, of his special interposition.‖ It is unnecessary to say

* Campbell, *on Miracles*, part ii. sec. 3. Farmer, ch. ii. sec. 1.

* *Deut.* ch. xiii. v. 1—3. Matt. ch. xxiv. v. 24. 2 *Thess.* ch. ii. v. 9—11.

† More or less, Sherlock, Clarke, Locke, and others.

‡ Prideaux, Clarke, Chandler, &c. seem hardly to have guarded sufficiently against the charge here noticed. There is an appearance of doing honour to the Christian doctrines in representing them as *intrinsically* credible, which leads many into supporting opinions which, carried to their full extent, (as they were by Middleton,) supersede the need of Miracles altogether. It must be recollected, too, that they who are allowed to *praise* have the privilege of *finding fault*, and may reject, according to their *à priori* notions, as well as receive. Doubtless the divinity of a clearly immoral doctrine could not be evidenced by Miracles; for our belief in the Moral attributes of God is much stronger than our conviction of the negative proposition, that *none but* He can interfere with the system of nature. But there is always the danger of extending this admission beyond its proper limits, of supposing ourselves adequate judges of the *tendency* of doctrines, and, because unassisted Reason informs us what is Moral and immoral *in our own case*, of attempting to decide on the *abstract* Morality of actions: e. g. many have rejected the Miraculous narrative of the Pentateuch, from an unfounded and unwarrantable opinion, that the means employed in settling the Jews in Canaan were in themselves *immoral*. These remarks are in nowise inconsistent with using (as was done in a former section) our *actual knowledge* of God's attributes, obtained from a survey of nature and human affairs, in determining the probability of certain professed Miracles having proceeded from Him. It is one thing to *infer* from the *experience* of life, another to *imagine* the character of God from the *gratuitous conceptions* of our own minds. From *experience* we gain but general and imperfect ideas of wisdom, goodness, &c. enough (that is) to bear witness to a Revelation when given, not enough to supersede it. On the contrary, our *speculations* concerning the divine attributes and designs, professing as they do to decide on the truth of Revealed doctrines, in fact go to supersede the necessity of a Revelation altogether.

§ Especially Farmer.

‖ Fleetwood, *on Miracles*, disc. 2. p. 201. Van Mildert's *Boyle Lectures*, serm. 21.

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more on this subject; and questions concerning the existence, nature, and limits of Spiritual agency will find their place when Christians are engaged in settling among themselves the doctrines of Scripture. We take it, therefore, for granted, as an obvious and almost undeniable principle, that real Miracles, i. e. interruptions in the course of nature, cannot reasonably be referred to any power but divine: because it is natural to refer an alteration in the system to its original author, and because Reason does not inform us of any other Being but God exterior to nature; and lastly, because in the particular case of the Scripture Miracles, the workers of them confirm our previous judgment by expressly attributing them to Him.

For to unknown laws of nature.

2. A more subtle question remains, respecting the possible existence of causes in nature, to us unknown, by the supposed operation of which the apparent anomalies may be reconciled to the ordinary laws of the system. It has already been admitted, that some difficulty will at times attend the discrimination of Miraculous from merely uncommon events; and it must be borne in mind, that in this, as in all questions from which demonstration is excluded, it is impossible, from the nature of the case, absolutely to *disprove* any, even the wildest, hypothesis which may be framed. It may freely be granted, moreover, that some of the Scripture Miracles, if they stood alone, might reasonably be referred to natural principles of which we were ignorant, or resolved into some happy combination of accidental circumstances. For our purpose, it is quite sufficient if there be a *considerable number* which no sober judgment would attempt to deprive of their supernatural character, by any supposition of our ignorance of natural laws, or of exaggeration in the narrative. Raising the dead and giving sight to the blind by a word, feeding a multitude with the casual provisions which an individual among them had with him, healing persons at a distance, and walking on the water, are facts, even separately taken, far beyond the conceivable effects of artifice or accident; and much more so, when they meet together in one and the same history. And here Hume's argument from general experience is in point, which at least proves that the *ordinary* powers of nature are unequal to the production of works of this kind. It becomes, then, a balance of opposite probabilities, whether gratuitously to suppose a *multitude* of perfectly *unknown* causes, and these, moreover, *meeting* in one and the same history, or to have recourse to *one*, and that a *known* power, then Miraculously exerted for an extraordinary and worthy object. We may safely say no sound reasoner will hesitate on which alternative to decide. While, then, a fair proportion of the Scripture Miracles are indisputably deserving of their name, but a weak objection can be derived from the case of the few which, owing to accidental circumstances, bear, at the present day, less decisive marks of supernatural agency. For, be it remembered, (and it is a strong confirmatory proof that the Jewish and Christian Miracles are really what they profess to be,) that though the Miraculous character of *some* of them is more doubtful in one Age than in another, yet the progress of Science has made no approximation to a *general* explication of them on natural principles. While discoveries in Optics and Chemistry have accounted for a host of apparent Miracles, they hardly touch upon those of the Jewish and Christian systems. Here is no phantasmagoria to be detected, no analysis or synthesis of substances, ignitions, explosions, and other customary resources of the juggler's art.*—But, as before, we shall best be able to estimate their character in this respect, by contrasting them with other occurrences which have sometimes been considered Miraculous. Thus, too, a second line of difference will be drawn between them and the mass of rival prodigies, whether Religious or otherwise, to which they are often compared.

Apollonius Tyanæus.

Miracles.

A Miracle then, as far as it is an evidence of divine interposition, being an ascertained anomaly in an established system, or an event without assignable Physical cause, those facts of course have no title to the name—

Tests between real and apparent Miracles deduced from the definition of the term.

1. *Which may be referred to misstatement in the narration.*

Natural events misstated.

Such are many of the prodigies of the Heathen Mythology and History, which have been satisfactorily traced to an *exaggeration of natural events:* e. g. the fables of the Cyclops, Centaurs, of the annual transformation of a Scythian nation into wolves, as related by Herodotus, &c. Or *natural facts allegorized*, as in the fable of Scylla and Charybdis.—Or where the fact may be explained by *supplying a probable omission;* as we should account for a story of a man sailing in the air, by supposing a balloon described.† —Or where the Miracle is but *verbal*, as the poetical prodigy of thunder without clouds; which is little better than a play upon words, for, supposing it to occur, it would not be called thunder.—Or as when Herodotus speaks of wool growing on trees; for, even were it in substance the same as wool, it could not be called so without a contradiction in terms.—Or where the Miracle is one simply of *degree*, for then exaggeration is more easily conceivable;—thus many supposed visions may have been but natural dreams.—Or where it depends on the combination of a multitude of distinct circumstances, each of which is necessary for the proof of its supernatural character, and where, as in fine experiments, a small mistake is of vast consequence. As those which depend on a *coincidence of time*, which it is difficult for any persons to have ascertained; *e. g.* the exclamation which Apollonius is said to have uttered concerning the assassination of Domitianus at the time of its taking place; and, again, the alleged fact of his appearing at Puteoli on the same morning in which he was tried at Rome. Such, too, in some degree is the professed revelation made to St. Basil, who is said to have been Miraculously informed of the death of the Emperor Julian at the *very moment* that it took place.‡ Here we may instance many stories of apparitions; as the popular one concerning the appearance of an individual to the club he used to frequent *at the moment after his death*, who was afterwards discovered to have escaped from his nurses in a fit of delirium *shortly before* it took place, and actually to have joined his friends. We may add the case related to M. Bonnet, of a woman who pretended to know what was passing at a given time at any part of the globe; and who was detected by the simple expedient of accurately marking the time, and comparing her account with the fact.§ In the same class must be reckoned not a few of the answers of the Heathen Oracles, if it be worth while to

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* See Farmer, ch. i. sec. 3.

† Bentham, *Preuves Judiciaires*, liv. viii. ch. x.

‡ Middleton, *Free Inquiry*.

§ Bentham, *Preuves Judiciaires*, liv. viii. ch. x.

allude to them; as that which informed Crœsus of his occupation at a certain time agreed upon. In the Gospel, the nobleman's son begins to amend at the very time that Christ speaks the word; but this circumstance does not constitute, it merely increases the Miracle.—The argument from Prophecy is in this point of view somewhat deficient in simplicity and clearness; as implying the decision of many previous questions, *e. g.* as to the existence of the professed prediction before the event, the interval between the Prophecy and its accomplishment, the completeness of its accomplishment, &c. Hence Prophecy affords a more learned and less popular proof of divine interposition than Physical Miracles, and, except in cases where it contributes a very strong evidence, is commonly of inferior cogency.

2. Those which from suspicious circumstances attending them may not unfairly be referred to an unknown Physical cause.

Events referrible to an unknown cause.

As those which take place in departments of nature little understood, *e. g.* Miracles of Electricity.—Again, an assemblage of Miracles confined to *one* line of extraordinary exertion in some measure suggests the idea of a cause short of divine. For while their number evinces a wish to display, their similarity argues a defect in, power. This remark is prejudicial to the Miracles of the primitive Church, which consisted almost entirely of exorcisms and cures; to the Pythagorean, which were principally Miracles of sagacity; and again, to the wonders of the tomb of the Abbé Paris, which were limited to cures, and cures too of particular diseases. While the Miracles of Scripture are frugally dispensed as regards *their object and seasons*, they are endlessly varied in their *nature;* like the work of one who is not wasteful of his riches, yet can be munificent when occasion calls for it.

Here we may notice *tentative* Miracles, as Paley terms them, *i. e.* where out of many trials only some succeed; for inequality of success seems to imply *accident*, in other words, the combination of *unknown Physical causes.* Such are the cures of scrofula by the King's touch, and those effected in the Heathen Temples;* and again, those of the tomb of the Abbé Paris, there being but eight or nine well authenticated cures out of the multitude of trials that were made.† One of the peculiarities of the cures ascribed to Christ is his invariable success.‡

Here, for a second reason, *diffidence in the agent* casts suspicion on the reality of professed Miracles; for at least we have the sanction of his own opinion for supposing them to be the effect of accident or unknown causes.

Temporary Miracles also, as many of the Jansenist and other extraordinary cures,§ may be similarly accounted for; for if ordinary causes can *undo*, it is not improbable they may be able originally to *effect*. The restoration of Lazarus and the rest were restorations to *their former condition*, which was mortal; their subsequent dissolution, then, in the course of nature, does not interfere with the completeness of the previous Miracle.

The Jansenist cures are also unsatisfactory, as being *gradual*, and, for the same reason, the professed liquefaction of St. Januarius's blood; a *progressive* effect being a characteristic, as it seems, of the operations of nature. Hence, those Miracles are most perspicuous which are wrought *at the word of command;* as those of Christ and his Apostles. For this as well as other reasons, *incomplete* Miracles, as imperfect cures, are no evidence of supernatural agency; and here, again, we have to instance the cures effected at the tomb of the Abbé Paris.

Again, the *use of means* is suspicious; for a Miracle may almost be defined to be an event *without means*. Hence, however miraculous the production of ice might appear to the Siamese considered *abstractedly*, they would hardly so account it in an actual *experiment*, when they saw the preparation of nitre, &c. which in that climate must have been used for the purpose. In the case of the Steam-vessel or the Balloon, which, it has been sometimes said, would appear Miraculous to persons unacquainted with Science, the Chemical and Mechanical apparatus employed could not fail to rouse suspicion in intelligent minds.—Hence professed Miracles are open to suspicion, if *confined to one spot;* as were the Jansenist cures. For they then become connected with *a necessary condition*, which is all we understand by a *means: e. g.* such may often be imputed to a *confederacy*, which (as is evident) can from its nature seldom shift the scene of action. "The Cock-lane ghost could only knock and scratch in one place;"* the Apostles, on the contrary, are represented as dispersed about, and working Miracles in various parts of the world.† These remarks are of course inapplicable in a case where the apparent means are known to be inadequate, and are not constantly used; as our Lord's *occasional* application of clay to the eyes, which, while it proves that he did not need its instrumentality, convey also an intimation, that all the efficacy of means is derived from his appointment.

3. Those which may be referred to the supposed operation of a cause known to exist.

Events referrible to the supposed operation of a known cause.

Professed Miracles of *knowledge* or *mental ability* are often unsatisfactory for this reason; being in many cases referrible to the ordinary powers of the intellect. Of this kind is the boasted elegance of the style of the Koran, alleged by Mohammed in evidence of his divine mission. Hence most of the Miracles of Apollonius, consisting, as they do, in knowing the thoughts of others, and predicting the common events of life, are no criterion of a supernatural gift; it being only under certain circumstances that such power can clearly be discriminated from the natural exercise of acuteness and sagacity. Accordingly, though a knowledge of the hearts of men is claimed by Christ, it seems to be claimed rather with a view to prove to *Christians* the *doctrine* of his divine nature, than to *attest* to the *world* his authority as a messenger from God. Again, St. Paul's prediction of shipwreck on his voyage to Rome was intended to *prevent* it; and so was the prediction of Agabus concerning the same Apostle's approaching perils at Jerusalem.‡ For a second reason, then, the argument from Prophecy is a less *simple* and *striking* proof of divine agency than a display of Miracles; it

* Stillingfleet, *Orig. Sacr.* book ii. ch. x. sec. 9.

† Douglas, *Criterion*, p. 133.

‡ Ibid. p. 260, cites the following texts: Matt. ch. iv. v. 23, 24; ch. viii. v. 16; ch. ix. v. 35; ch. xii. v. 15; ch. xiv. v. 12; Luke, ch. iv. v. 40; ch. vi. v. 19.

§ Douglas, *Criterion*, p. 190. Middleton, *Free Inquiry*, iv. sec. 3.

* Hey's *Lectures*, book i. ch. xvi. sec. 10.

† Douglas, *Criterion*, p. 337.

‡ *Acts*, ch. xxi. v. 10—14; ch. xxvii. v. 10, 21.

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being impossible *in all cases* to show that the things foretold were certainly beyond the ordinary faculties of the mind to have discovered. Yet *when this is shown*, Prophecy is one of the most powerful of conceivable evidences; strict fore-knowledge being a faculty not only above the powers but even above the comprehension of the human mind.

And much more fairly may apparent Miracles be attributed to the supposed operation of an existing Physical cause, when they are *parallel to its known effects;* as Chemical, Meteorological, &c. phenomena. For though the cause may not perhaps appear in the particular case, yet it is known to have acted in others similar to it. For this reason, no stress can be laid on accounts of luminous crosses in the air, human shadows in the clouds, appearances of men and horses on hills, and spectres when they are speechless, as is commonly the case, ordinary causes being assignable in all of these; or, again, on the pretended liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius, or on the exorcism of demoniacs, which is the most frequent Miracle in the primitive Church.—The remark applies moreover to cases of healing, *so far* as they are not instantaneous, complete, &c.; conditions which exclude the supposition of natural means being employed, and which are strictly fulfilled in the Gospel narrative.—Again, some cures are known as possible effects of an *excited imagination;* particularly when the disease arises from obstruction and other disorders of the blood and spirits, as the cures which took place at the tomb of the Abbé Paris.* We should be required to add those cases of healing in Scripture, where the *faith* of the petitioners was a necessary condition of the cure, were not these comparatively few, and some of them such as no imagination could have effected, (*e. g.* the restoration of sight,) and some wrought on persons *absent;* and were not faith often required, *not* of the patient, but of the relative or friend who brought him to be healed.† The force of imagination may also be alleged to account for the supposed visions and voices which some enthusiasts have believed they saw and heard: *e. g.* the trances of Montanus and his followers, the visions related by some of the Fathers, and those of the Romish Saints; lastly, Mahomet's pretended night-journey to Heaven: all which, granting the sincerity of the reporters, may not unreasonably be referred to the effects of disease or of an excited imagination. Such, it is obvious, *might* be some of the Scripture Miracles, *e. g.* the various appearances of Angels to individuals, the vision of St. Paul when he was transported to the third Heaven, &c. which accordingly were wrought, as Scripture professes, for purposes distinct from that of *evidencing* the doctrine, viz. in order to become the medium of a Revelation, or to confirm faith, &c. In other cases, however, the supposition of imagination is excluded by the vision having been witnessed by more than one person, as the Transfiguration; or by its correspondence with distinct visions seen by others, as in the circumstances which attended the conversion of Cornelius; or by its connection with a permanent Miracle, as the appearance of Christ to St. Paul on his conversion, with the blindness in consequence, which remained three days.*

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Much more inconclusive are those which are actually *attended by a Physical cause known or suspected to be adequate to their production.* Some of those who were cured at the tomb of the Abbé Paris were at the time making use of the usual remedies; the person whose inflamed eye was relieved was, during his attendance at the sepulchre, under the care of an eminent oculist; another was cured of a lameness in the knee by the mere effort to kneel at the tomb.† Arnobius challenges the Heathens to produce one of the pretended Miracles of their Gods performed without the application of some prescription.‡ Again, Hilarion's cures of wounds, as mentioned by Jerome, were accompanied by the application of consecrated oil.§ The Apostles indeed made use of oil in some of their cures, but they more frequently healed without a medium of any kind.‖ A similar objection might be urged against the narrative of Hezekiah's recovery from sickness, both on account of the application of the figs and the slowness of the cure, were it anywhere stated to have been Miraculous.¶ Again, the dividing of the Red Sea, accompanied as it was by a strong east wind, would not have been clearly Miraculous, had it not been effected at the word of Moses. Much suspicion, too, is (as some think) cast upon the *miraculous* nature of the fire, &c. which put a stop to Julian's attempt to rebuild the Temple at Jerusalem, by the possibility of referring it to the operation of Chemical principles.—Lastly, answers to prayer, however *providential*, are not *Miraculous;* for in granting them, God acts *by means of*, not *out of*, his usual system, making the ordinary course of things *subservient* to a gracious purpose. Such events, then, instead of *evidencing* the divine approbation to a certain cause, must be *proved* from the goodness of the cause to be what they are interpreted to be. Yet by supposed answers to prayer, appeals to Heaven, pretended judgments, &c. enthusiasts in most ages have wished to sanction their claims to divine inspiration. By similar means the pretensions of the Romish hierarchy have been supported.

Miracles.

Here we close our remarks on the *criterion* of a Miracle; which, it has been seen, is no one definite peculiarity, applicable to all cases, but the combined force of a number of varying circumstances determining our judgment in each particular instance. It might even be said, that a determinate criterion is almost inconceivable. For when once settled, it might appear, as was above remarked, to be merely the Physical antecedent of the extraordinary fact; while, on the other hand, from the direction thus given to the ingenuity of impostors, it would soon itself need a criterion to distinguish it from its imitations. Certain it is, that the great *variety* of circumstances under which the Christian Miracles were wrought, furnishes an evidence for their divine origin, in addition to that derived from their publicity, clearness, number, instantaneous production, and completeness.—The exorcism of demoniacs, however, has already been noticed as being, perhaps, in every case deficient in the proof of its Miraculous nature.

Observations on the foregoing tests.

* Douglas, *Criterion*, p. 172.

† Mark, ch. x. v. 51, 52. Matt. ch. viii. v. 5—13. See Douglas, *Criterion*, p. 258. "Where persons petitioned themselves for a cure, a declaration of their faith was often required, that none might be encouraged to try experiments out of curiosity, in a manner which would have been very indecent, and have tended to many bad consequences." Doddridge, *on Acts*, ch. ix. v. 34.

* Paley's *Evidences*, part i. prop. 2.

† Douglas, *Criterion*, p. 143, 184, *note.*

‡ Stillingfleet, book ii. ch. x. sec. 9.

§ Middleton, *Free Inquiry*, iv. sec. 2.

‖ Mark, ch. vi. v. 13. ¶ 2 *Kings*, ch. xx. v. 4—7.

Accordingly, this class of Miracles seems not to have been intended as a *primary* evidence of a divine mission, but to be addressed to those who *already* admitted the existence of Evil Spirits, in proof of the power of Christ and his followers over them.* To us, then, it is rather a *doctrine* than an *evidence*, manifesting our Lord's *power*, as other doctrines instance his *mercy*.—With regard to the argument from Prophecy, which some have been disposed to abandon on account of the number of conditions necessary for the proof of its supernatural character, it should be remembered, that inability to fix the exact boundary of natural sagacity is no objection to such Prophecies as are undeniably beyond it; and that the mere inconclusiveness of some in Scripture, as proofs of divine prescience, has no positive force against others contained in it, which furnish a full, lasting, and in many cases, growing evidence of its divinity.†

§ IV. *On the direct Evidence for the Christian Miracles.*

Important as are the inquiries which we have hitherto prosecuted, it is obvious that they do not lead to any positive conclusion, whether certain Miraculous accounts are true or not. However necessary a direct anomaly in the course of nature may be to rouse *attention*, and an important final cause to excite *interest* and *reverence*, still the quality of the testimony on which the accounts rest can alone determine our *belief* in them. The preliminary points, however, have been principally dwelt upon, because objections founded on them form the strong ground of unbelievers, who seem in some degree to allow the strength of the direct evidence for the Scripture Miracles. Again, an examination of the direct evidence is less necessary here, because, though antecedent questions have not been neglected by Christian writers,‡ yet the evidence itself, as might be expected, has chiefly engaged their attention.§ Without entering, then, into a minute consideration of the facts and arguments on which the credibility of the Sacred History rests, we proceed to contrast the *evidence* generally with that produced for other Miraculous narratives; and thus to complete a comparison which has been already instituted, as regards the *antecedent probability* and the *criterion* of Miracles.

The Scripture Miracles have

For the present, then, we forego the advantage which the Scripture Miracles have gained in the preceding sections over all professed facts of a similar nature. In reality, indeed, the very same evidence which would suffice to prove the former, might be inadequate when offered in behalf of those of the Eclectic School or the Romish Church. For the Miracles of Scripture, and no other, are unexceptionable and worthy of a divine agent; and Bishop Butler has clearly shown, that, in a practical question, as the divinity of a professed Revelation must be considered, even the weakest reasons are decisive when not counteracted by any opposite arguments.* Whatever evidence, then, is offered for them is *entirely* available to the proof of their actual occurrence; whereas evidence for the truth of other similar accounts, supposing it to exist, would be *first* employed in overcoming the objections which attach to them all from their very character, circumstances, or object. If, however, we show that the Miracles of Scripture as far surpass all others in their *direct evidence*, as they excel them in their *à priori probability*, a much stronger case will be made out in their favour, and an additional line of distinction drawn between them and others.

far stronger evidence in their favour than other Professed Miracles, though they do not require evidence equally strong.

The credibility of Testimony arises from the belief we entertain of the character and competency of the witnesses; and this is true, not only in the case of Miracles, but when facts of any kind are examined into. It is obvious, that we should be induced to distrust the most natural and plausible statement when made by an individual whom we suspected of a wish to deceive, or of relating facts which he had no sufficient means of knowing. Or if we credited his narrative, we should do so, not from dependence on the reporter, but from its intrinsic likelihood, or from circumstantial evidence. In the case of *ordinary* facts, therefore, we think it needless, as indeed it would be endless, to inquire rigidly into the credibility of the Testimony by which they are conveyed to us, because they in a manner speak for themselves. When, however, the information is *unexpected*, or *extraordinary*, or *improbable*, our only means of determining its truth is by considering the credit due to the witnesses; and then, of course, we exercise that right of scrutiny which we before indeed possessed, but did not think it worth while to claim. A Miracle, then, calls for no *distinct species* of Testimony from that offered for other events, but for a Testimony strong in proportion to the improbability of the particular fact attested; and it is as impossible to draw any line, or to determine *how much* is required, as to define the quantity and quality of evidence necessary to prove the occurrence of an earthquake, or the appearance of any meteoric phenomenon. Everything depends on those attendant circumstances, of which we have already spoken, the object of the Miracle, the occasion, manner, and human agent employed. If, *e. g.* a Miracle were said to be wrought for an immoral object, then of course the fact would rest on the credibility of the Testimony alone, and would challenge the most rigid examination. Again, if the object be highly interesting to us, as that

What kind of testimony is to be required for a Miracle.

* See *Div. Leg.* book ix. ch. v. Hence the exercise of this gift seems almost to have been confined to Palestine. At Philippi St. Paul casts out a spirit of divination *in self-defence*. *Acts*, ch. xvi. v. 16—18. In the transaction related *Acts*, ch. xix. v. 11—17, Jews are principally concerned.

† Some unbelievers have urged the irrelevancy of St. Matthew's citations from the Old Testament Prophecies in illustration of the events of Christ's life, *e. g.* ch. ii. v. 15. It must be recollected, however, that what is evidence in one age is often not so in another. That certain of the texts adduced by the Evangelist furnish *at the present day* no proof of divine prescience, is very true; but, unless some kind of argument could have been drawn from them *at the time* the Gospel was written, from traditional interpretations of their sense, we can scarcely account for St. Matthew's introducing them. The question is, has there been a *loss* of what was evidence formerly, (as is often the case,) or did St. Matthew bring forward as a Prophetical evidence what was manifestly *not* so, as if to hurt the effect of those other passages, as ch. xxvii. v. 35, which have every appearance of being real predictions?—It has been observed, that Prophecy in general *must* be obscure, in order that the events spoken of may not be understood before their accomplishment.

‡ Especially by Vince, in his valuable Treatise *on the Christian Miracles*; and Hey, in his *Lectures*.

§ As Paley, Lyttleton, Leslie, &c.

* The only fair objection that can be made to this statement is, that it is antecedently *improbable* that the Almighty should work Miracles with a view to *general conviction*, without furnishing *strong evidence* that they really occurred. This was noticed above, when the antecedent probability of Miracles was discussed. That it is *unsatisfactory* to decide on scanty evidence is no objection, as in other most important practical questions we are constantly obliged to make up our minds and determine our course of action on insufficient evidence.

iography. professed by the Scripture Miracles, we shall naturally be careful in our inquiry, from an anxious fear of being deceived. But in any case the Testimony cannot turn out to be *more* than that of competent and honest men; and an inquiry must not be prosecuted under the idea of finding something beyond this, but to obtain proofs of this. And since the existence of competency and honesty may be established in various ways, it follows that the credibility of a given story may be proved by distinct considerations, each of which, separately taken, might be sufficient for the purpose. It is obvious, moreover, as indeed is implied by the very nature of Moral evidence, that the proof of its credibility may be weaker or stronger, and yet in both cases be a *proof;* and, hence, that no limit can be put to the conceivable accumulation of evidence in its behalf. Provided, then, the existing evidence be sufficient to produce a rational conviction, it is nothing to the purpose to urge, as has sometimes been alleged against the Scripture Miracles, that the extraordinary facts might have been proved by different or more overpowering evidence. It has been said, for instance, that no Testimony can fairly be trusted which has not passed the ordeal of a legal examination. Yet, calculated as that mode of examination undoubtedly is to elicit truth, surely Truth may be elicited by *other* ways also. Independent and circumstantial writers may confirm a fact as satisfactorily as witnesses in Court. They may be questioned and cross-questioned, and moreover brought up for reexamination in any succeeding Age; whereas, however great may be the talents and experience of the individuals who conducted the legal investigation, yet when they have once closed it and given in their verdict, we believe upon *their credit*, and we have no means of examining for ourselves. To say, however, that this kind of evidence might have been *added* to the other, in the case of the Christian Miracles,* is merely to assert that the proof of the credibility of Scripture might have been *stronger than it is;* which we have already allowed it might have been, without assignable limit.

The credibility, then, of a Testimony depending on the evidence of *honesty* and *competency* in those who give it, it is prejudicial to their character for *honesty*.

ests relaːe to the onesty of itnesses. ain, &c.

1. If desire of *gain, power*, or other *temporal advantage* may be imputed to them. This would detract materially from the authority of Philostratus, even supposing him to have been in a *situation* for ascertaining the truth of his own narrative; as he professes to write his account of Apollonius at the instance of his patroness, the Empress Julia, who is known to have favoured the Eclectic cause. Again, the account of the Miracle performed on the door-keeper at the cathedral at Saragossa, on which Hume insists, rests principally upon the credit of the Canons, whose interest was concerned in its establishment. This remark, indeed, obviously applies to the Romish Miracles generally. The Christian Miracles, on the contrary, were attested by the Apostles, not only without the prospect of assignable worldly advantage, but with the certainty and after the experience of actual suffering.

Party spirit. 2. When there is room for suspecting *party spirit* or *rivalry;* as in the Miraculous biographies of the Eclectic philosophers; in those of Loyola and other Saints of the rival orders in the Romish Church; and in the present Mohammedan accounts of the Miracles of Mohammed, which, not to mention other objections to them, are composed with an evident design of rivalling those of Christ.* Apollonius Tyanæus. — Miracles.

3. Again, a tale once told may be persisted in from *shame of retracting*, after the motives which first gave rise to it have ceased to act, even at the risk of suffering. This remark cannot apply to the case of the Apostles, until some reason is assigned for their getting up their Miraculous story in the first instance. If necessary, however, it could be brought with force against any argument drawn from the perseverance of the witnesses for the cures professedly wrought by Vespasianus, "*postquam nullum mendacio pretium;*" for, as they did not suffer for persisting in their story, had they retracted they would have gratuitously confessed their own want of principle. Shame.

4. *A previous character for falsehood* is almost fatal to the credibility of a witness of an extraordinary narrative, *e. g.* the notorious insincerity and frauds of the Church of Rome in other things, are in themselves enough to throw a strong suspicion on its Testimony to its own Miracles. The primitive Church is in some degree open to a charge of a similar nature.† Or *an intimacy with suspicious characters, e. g.* Prince Hohenlohe's connection with the Romish Church and that of Philostratus with the Eclectics, since both the Eclectic and Romish Schools have countenanced the practice of what are called pious frauds. Character for falsehood.

5. *Inconsistencies* or *prevarications* in the Testimony, *marks of unfairness, exaggeration, suppression of particulars, &c.* Of all these we convicted Philostratus, whose memoir forms a remarkable contrast to the artless and candid narratives of the Evangelists. The Books of the New Testament, containing as they do separate accounts of the same transactions, admit of a minute cross-examination, which terminates so decidedly in favour of their fidelity, as to recommend them highly on the score of honesty, even independently of the known sufferings of the writers. Marks of unfairness.

6. Lastly, witnesses may be objected to who have the *opportunity* of being dishonest; as those who write at a distance from the time and place of the professed Miracle, or without mentioning particulars, &c. But on these points we shall speak immediately in a different connection. Facilities for dishonesty.

Secondly, witnesses must be, not only *honest*, but *competent* also, *i. e.* such as have *ascertained* the facts which they attest, or who report *after examination.* Here then we notice, Tests of competency of witnesses

1. Deficiency of examination implied in the *circumstances of the case.* As when it is first published in an *age or country remote from the professed time and scene of action;* for in that case room is given to suspect failure of memory, imperfect information, &c.; whereas to write in the presence of those who know the circumstances of the transactions, is an appeal which increases the force of the Testimony by associating them in it. Accounts, however, whether Miraculous or otherwise, possess very little *intrinsic* authority, when written so far from the time or place of the transactions recorded, as the Biographies of Pythagoras, Apollonius, from the circumstances of the case:

* Some of our Saviour's Miracles, however, *were* subjected to judicial examination. See John, ch. v. and ix. In v. 16 the measures of the Pharisees are described by the technical word, διώκειν.

* See Professor Lee's Persian Tracts, p. 446, 447.

† Hey, *Lectures*, book i. ch. xii. sec. 15.

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Gregory Thaumaturgus, Mohammed, Loyola, or Xavier.* The opposite circumstances of the Christian Testimony have often been pointed out. Here we may particularly notice the providential dispersion of the Jews over the Roman Empire before the Age of Christ; by which means the Apostle's Testimony was given in Heathen countries, as well as in Palestine, in the face of those who had both the will and the power to contradict it if incorrect.

While the Testimony of contemporaries is necessary to guarantee the truth of ordinary History, Miracles require the Testimony of *eye-witnesses*. For ordinary events are believed in part *from their being natural*, but *Testimony* being the main support of a Miraculous narrative must in that case be the best of its kind. Again, we may require the Testimony to be *circumstantial* in reference to dates, places, persons, &c.; for the absence of these seems to imply an imperfect knowledge, and at least gives less opportunity of inquiry to those who wish to ascertain its fidelity.†

Miracles which are *not lasting* do not admit of adequate examination; as visions, extraordinary voices, &c. The cure of diseases, on the other hand, is a *permanent* evidence of a divine interposition; particularly such cures of bodily imperfections as are undeniably Miraculous in their nature, as well as permanent; to these, then, our Lord especially appeals in evidence of his divine mission.‡ Lastly, statements are unsatisfactory in which the Miracle is described as wrought before a very *few;* for room is allowed for suspecting mistake, or an understanding between the witnesses. Or, on the other hand, those wrought *in a confused crowd;* such are many standing Miracles of the Romanists, which are exhibited with the accompaniment of imposing pageants, or on a stage, or at a distance, or in the midst of candles and incense. Our Saviour, on the contrary, bids the lepers he had cleansed *show* themselves to the Priests, and make the customary offering as a *memorial* of their cures.§ And when he appeared to the Apostles after his Resurrection, he allowed them to *examine* his hands and feet.‖ Those of the Scripture Miracles which were wrought before few, or in a crowd, were *permanent;* as cures,¶ and the raising of Jairus's daughter; or were of so *vast a nature*, that a crowd could not prevent the witnesses from ascertaining the fact, as the standing still of the Sun at the word of Joshua.

From the character of the witnesses.

2. Deficiency of examination implied in the *character, &c. of the witnesses:* e. g. if there be any suspicion of their *derangement*, or if there be an evident *defect in bodily or mental faculties* which are necessary for examining the Miracle, as when the intellect or senses are impaired. *Number* in the witnesses refutes charges of this nature; for it is not conceivable that many should be deranged or mistaken at once, and in the same way.

Derangement.

Enthusiasm, or credulity.

Enthusiasm, ignorance, or *habitual credulity,* are defects which no number of witnesses removes. The Jansenist Miracles took place in the most ignorant and superstitious district of Paris.** Alexander Pseudomantis practised his arts among the Paphlagonians, a barbarous people. Popish Miracles and the juggles of the Heathen Priests have been most successful in times of ignorance.

Apollonius Tyanæus. — Miracles.

Yet while we reasonably object to gross ignorance or besotted credulity in witnesses for a Miraculous story, we must guard against the opposite extreme of requiring the Testimony of men of Science and general knowledge. Men of Philosophical minds are often too fond of inquiring into the causes and mutual dependence of events, of arranging, theorizing, and refining, to be accurate and straightforward in their account of extraordinary occurrences. Instead of giving a plain statement of facts, they are insensibly led to *correct* the evidence of their senses with a view to account for the phenomenon; as Chinese painters, who, instead of drawing in perspective, give lights and shadows their supposed meaning, and depict the prospect as they think it *should be*, not as *it is*.* As Miracles differ from other events only when considered *relatively* to a general system, it is obvious that the same persons are competent to attest Miraculous facts who are suitable witnesses of corresponding natural ones. If a peasant's Testimony be admitted to the phenomenon of meteoric stones, he may evidence the fact of an unusual and unaccountable darkness. A Physician's certificate is not needed to assure us of the illness of a friend; nor is it necessary to attest the simple fact that he has instantaneously recovered. It is important to bear this in mind, for some writers argue as if there were something intrinsically defective in the Testimony given by ignorant persons to Miraculous occurrences.† To say, that unlearned persons are not judges of the fact of a Miraculous event, is only so far true as all Testimony is fallible and liable to be distorted by prejudice. Every one, not only superstitious persons, is apt to interpret facts his own way. If the superstitious see too many prodigies, men of Science may see too few. The facility with which the Japanese ascribed the ascent of a balloon, which they witnessed at St. Petersburgh, to the powers of Magic, (a circumstance which has been sometimes urged against the admission of unlearned Testimony,‡) is only the conduct of theorists accounting for a novel phenomenon on the principles of their own system.

Whether the Testimony of educated men is necessary.

It may be said, that ignorance prevents a witness from *discriminating* between natural and supernatural events, and thus weakens the authority of his *judgment* concerning the Miraculous nature of a fact. It is true; but if the fact be recorded, *we* may judge for *ourselves* on that point. Yet it may be safely said, that not even before persons in the lowest state of ignorance could any great variety of professed Miracles be displayed without their distinguishing rightly *on the whole* between the effects of nature and those of a power exterior to it; though in particular instances they doubtless might be mistaken. Much more would this be the case with the lower ranks of a *civilized* people. Practical intelligence is insensibly diffused from class to class; if the upper ranks are educated, numbers besides them, without any formal and systematic knowledge, almost instinctively

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* Paley, *Evidences*, part i. prop. 2.

† The vagueness of the accounts of Miraculous interpositions related by the Fathers is pointed out by Middleton. (*Free Inquiry*, ii. p. 22.)

‡ Matt. ch. xi. v. 5. § Luke, ch. v. v. 14; ch. xvii. v. 14.

‖ Luke, ch. xxiv. v. 39, 40. ¶ Mark, ch. viii. v. 22—26.

** The Fauxbourg St. Marcel. Less.

* It is well known, that those persons are accounted the best transcribers of MSS. who are ignorant of the language transcribed; the habit of *correcting* being almost involuntary in men of letters.

† Hume, *on Miracles*, part ii. reason 1.

‡ Bentham, *Preuves Judiciaires*, liv. viii. ch. ii.

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discriminate between natural and supernatural events. Here Science has little advantage over common sense; a peasant is quite as certain that a resurrection from the dead is Miraculous as the most able physiologist.*

Character of the original witnesses of the Christian Miracles.

The original witnesses of our Saviour's Miracles were very far from a dull or ignorant race. The inhabitants of a maritime and border country, as Galilee was, engaged, moreover, in commerce, composed of natives of various countries, and therefore from the nature of the case acquainted with more than one language, have necessarily their intellects sharpened and their minds considerably enlarged, and are of all men least disposed to acquiesce in marvellous tales.† Such a people must have *examined* before they suffered themselves to be excited in the degree the Evangelists describe.‡ But even supposing that those among them who were in consequence *convinced* of the divine mission of Christ, were of a more superstitious turn of mind than the rest, still this is not sufficient to account for their conviction. For superstition, while it might facilitate the bare *admission* of Miraculous events, would at the same time weaken their *practical influence*. Miracles ceasing to be accounted *strange*, would cease to be *striking* also. Whereas the conviction wrought in the minds of these men was no bare and indolent *assent* to facts which they might have thought antecedently probable or not improbable, but a *conversion* in principles and mode of life, and a consequent sacrifice of all that nature holds dear, to which none would submit except after the fullest examination of the authority enjoining it. If additional evidence be required, appeal may be made to the multitude of Gentiles in Greece and Asia, in whose principles and mode of living, belief in the Miracles made a change even more striking and complete than was effected in the case of the Jews. In a word, then, the *conversion* which Christ and his Apostles *effected* invalidates the charge of blind *credulity* in the witnesses; the *practical* nature of the belief produced proving that it was founded on an *examination* of the Miracles.

Influence of superiors.

Again, it weakens the authority of the witnesses, if their belief can be shown to have been promoted by the *influence of superiors;* for then they virtually cease to be themselves witnesses, and report the facts on the authority (as it were) of their patrons. It is observable, that the national conversions of the middle Ages generally *began* with the Princes and *descended* to their subjects; those of the Apostolic Age obviously proceeded in the reverse order.§

Miracles wrought in support of an established Religion.

It is almost fatal to the validity of the Testimony, if the Miracle attested coincides with a *previous system*, or supports a *cause already embraced* by the witnesses. Men are always ready to believe what flatters their own opinions, and of all prepossessions those of Religion are the strongest. There is so much in the *principle* of all Religion that is true and good, so much conformable to the best feelings of our nature, which perceives itself to be weak and guilty, and looks out for an unseen and superior being for guidance and support; and the particular worship in which each individual is brought up, is so familiarized to him by habit, so endeared to his affections by the associations of place and the recollections of past years, so connected too with the ordinary transactions and most interesting events of life, that even should that form be irrational and degrading, still it will in most cases preserve a strong influence over his mind, and dispose him to credit upon slight examination any arguments adduced in its defence. Hence an account of Miracles in confirmation of their own Religion will always be favourably received by men whose creed has already lead them to expect such interpositions of superior beings. This consideration invalidates at once the testimony commonly offered for Pagan and Popish Miracles, and in no small degree that for the Miracles of the primitive Church. The professed cures of Vespasianus were performed in honour of Serapis in the midst of his worshippers; and the people of Saragossa, who attested the miracle wrought in the case of the door-keeper of the Cathedral, had previous faith in the virtues of holy oil.*

Apollonius Tyanæus.

Miracles.

No Miracles but those recorded in Scripture have introduced a Religion.

Here the evidence for the Scripture Miracles is unique. In other cases the previous system has supported the Miracles, but here the Miracles introduced and upheld the system. The Christian Miracles in particular† were received on their own merits; and the admission of them became the turning point in the creed and life of the witnesses, which thenceforth took a new and altogether different direction. But, moreover, as if their own belief in them were not enough, the Apostles went out of their way to debar any one from the Christian Church who did not believe them as well as themselves.‡ Not content that men should be converted on any ground, they fearlessly challenged refutation, by excluding from their fellowship of suffering any who did not formally assent, as a necessary condition of admittance and first article of faith, to one of the most stupendous of all the Miracles, their Master's Resurrection from the dead;—a procedure this, which at once evinces their own unqualified conviction of the fact, and associates, too, all their converts with them as believers in a Miracle contemporary with themselves. Nor is this all—a Religious creed necessarily *prejudices* the mind *against* admitting the Miracles of hostile Sects, in the very same proportion in which it

* It has been observed, that more suitable witnesses could not be selected of the fact of a Miraculous draught of fishes than the fishermen of the lake wherein it took place.

† See Less, *Opuscul.*

‡ If, on the other hand, we would see with how unmoved an unconcern men receive accounts of Miracles, when they believe them to be events of everyday occurrence, we may turn to the conduct of the African Christians in the Age of Austin, whom that Father in vain endeavoured to interest in Miraculous stories of relics, &c. by formal accounts and certificates of the cures wrought by them. See Middleton, p. 138. The *stir*, then, which the Miracles of Christ made in Galilee implies, that they were not received with an *indolent* belief. It must be noticed, moreover, in opposition to the statement of some unbelievers, that great numbers of the Jews were *converted. Acts*, ch. ii. v. 41; ch. iv. v. 4; ch. v. v. 13, 14; ch. vi. v. 7; ch. ix. v. 35; ch. xv. v. 5; ch. xxi. v. 20. On this subject, see Jenkin, *on the Christian Religion*, vol. ii. ch. xxxii.

§ Mosheim, *Eccl. Hist.* cent. vi. viii. ix.

* It has been noticed as a suspicious circumstance in the testimony to the reported Miracle wrought in the case of the Confessors in the persecution of the Arian Hunneric, that Victor Vitensis, one of the principal witnesses, though writing in Africa when it professedly took place, and where the individuals thus distinguished were then living, *yet* refers only to *one* of them, who was then living at the *Athanasian* Court at *Constantinople*, and held in particular honour by Zeno and the Empress.—"If any one doubt the fact, let him go—to *Constantinople*." See the whole evidence in Milner's *Church History*, cent. v. ch. xi.; who, however, strongly defends the Miracle. Gibbon pretends to do the same, with a view to provide a rival to the Gospel Miracles.

† Not to mention those of Moses and Elijah.

‡ Campbell, *on Miracles*, part ii. sec. 1.

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leads it to *acquiesce* in such as support its own dogmas.* The Christian Miracles, then, have the strongest of conceivable attestations, in the conversion of many who at first were prejudiced against them, and in the extorted confession of enemies, who, by the embarassment which the admission occasioned them, showed at least that they had not made it till after a full and accurate investigation of the extraordinary facts.

Whether the doctrine of a future life, and not the Miracles, induced the first converts to embrace Christianity.

It has been sometimes objected, that the minds of the first converts might be wrought upon by the doctrine of a future state which the Apostles preached, and be thus persuaded to admit the Miracles without a rigorous examination.† But, as Paley well replies, evidence of the *truth* of the promise would still be necessary; especially as men rather demand than dispense with proof when some great and unexpected good is reported to them. Yet it is more than doubtful, whether the promise of a future life would excite this interest: for the desire of immortality, though a natural, is no permanent or powerful feeling, and furnishes no principle of action. Most men, even in a Christian country, are too well satisfied with this world to look forward to another with any great and settled anxiety. Supposing immortality to be a good, it is one too distant to warm or influence. Much less are they disposed to sacrifice present comfort, and strip themselves of former opinions and habits, for the mere contingency of future happiness. The hope of another life, grateful as it is *under* affliction, will not induce a man to *rush into* affliction for the sake of it. The inconvenience of a severe complaint is not outbalanced by the pleasure of a remedy. On the other hand, though we know gratuitous declarations of coming judgments and divine wrath may for a time frighten weak minds, they will neither have effect upon strong ones, nor produce a *permanent* and *consistent* effect upon any. Persons who are thus wrought upon in the *present* day, believe the denunciations *because* they are in Scripture, not Christianity because it contains them. The authority of Revealed Religion is taken for granted both by the preacher and his hearers. On the whole, then, it seems inconceivable, that the promise or threat of a future life should have supplied the place of previous belief in Christianity, or have led the witnesses to admit the Miracles on a slight examination.

Love of the marvellous.

Lastly, *love of the marvellous, of novelty, &c.* may be mentioned as a principle influencing the mind to acquiesce in professed Miracles without full examination. Yet such feelings are more adapted to exaggerate and circulate a story than to invent it. We can trace their influence very clearly in the instances of Apollonius and the Abbé Paris, both of whom had excited attention by their eccentricities *before* they gained reputation for extraordinary power.‡ Such principles, moreover, are not in general practical, and have little power to sustain the mind under continued opposition and suffering.*

Apollonius. Tyanæus.

Miracles.

Observations on the foregoing tests.

These are some of the obvious points which will come into consideration in deciding upon the authority of Testimony offered for Miracles; and they enable us at once to discriminate the Christian story from all others which have been set up against it. With a view of simplifying the argument, the evidence for the Jewish Miracles has been left out of the question;† because, though strong and satisfactory, it is not at the present day so *directly* conclusive as that on which the Christian rest. Nor is it necessary, we conceive, to bring evidence for more than a fair proportion of the Miracles; supposing, that is, those which remain unproved are shown to be similar to them, and indissolubly connected with the same system. It may be even said, that if the single fact of the Resurrection be established, quite enough will have been proved for believing all the Miracles of Scripture.

View of the complete evidence for the Scripture Miracles.

Of course, however, the argument becomes far stronger when it is shown that there *is* evidence for the great bulk of the Miracles, though not equally strong for some as for others; and that the Jewish, sanctioned as they are by the New Testament, may also be established on distinct and peculiar grounds. Nor let it be forgotten, that the Christian story itself is supported, over and above the evidence that might fairly be required for it, by several bodies of Testimony quite independent of each other.‡ By *separate* processes of reasoning it may be shown, that if Christianity was established without Miracles, it was, to say the least, an altogether singular and unique event in the history of mankind; and the extreme improbability of so many distinct and striking peculiarities uniting (as it were) by chance in one and the same case, raises the proof of its divine origin to a moral certainty. In short, it is only by being made unnatural that the Christian narrative can be deprived of a supernatural character; and we may safely affirm, that the strongest evidence we possess for the most certain facts of other history, is weak compared to that on which we believe that the first preachers of the Gospel were gifted with Miraculous powers.

Union of testimony with antecedent probability.

And thus a case is established so strong, that even were there an antecedent improbability in the facts attested, in most judgments it would be sufficient to overcome it. On the contrary, we have already shown their intrinsic character to be exactly such as our pre-

* Campbell, *on Miracles*, part i. sec. 4.

† Gibbon particularly, ch. xv.

‡ See above, the memoir of Apollonius.—Of the Abbé, Mosheim says, "*Diem vix obierat*, voluntariis cruciatibus et pœnis exhaustus, *mirabilis iste homo, quum immensa hominum multitudo ad ejus corpus confluereut; quorum alii pedes ejus osculabantur, alii partem capillorum abscindebant, quam* sancti loco pignoris *ad mala quævis averruncanda servarent, alii libros et lintea quæ attulerant, cadavcri admovebant*, quod virtute quâdam divinâ plenum esse putabant. Et statim *vis illa mirifica, quâ omne, quod in terrâ hâc reliquit, præditum esse fertur, apparebat*," *&c. Inquisit. in verit. Miraculor.* F. de Paris, sec. 1.

* Paley, *Evidences*, part i. prop. 2.

† The truth of the Mosaic narrative is proved from the *genuineness* of the Pentateuch, as written to contemporaries and eye-witnesses of the Miracles; from the *predictions* contained in the Pentateuch; from the *very existence* of the Jewish system, (Sumner's *Records*;) and from the *declarations of the New Testament writers*. The Miracles of Elijah and Elisha are proved to us by the *authority of the Books* in which they are related, and by *means of the New Testament*.

‡ The fact of the Christian Miracles may be proved, first, by the sufferings and consistent story of the original witnesses; secondly, from the actual conversion of large bodies of men in the Age in which they are said to have been wrought; thirdly, from the institution, at the time, of a day commemorative of the Resurrection, which has been observed ever since; fourthly, by collateral considerations, such as the tacit assent given to the Miracles by the adversaries of Christianity, the Eclectic imitations of them, and the pretensions to Miraculous power in the primitive Church. These are *distinct* arguments, no one of them absolutely *presupposes* the genuineness of the Scripture narrative, though the force of the whole is much increased when it is proved.

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vious knowledge of the divine attributes and government would lead us to expect in works ascribed to him. Their grandeur, beauty, and consistency; the clear and unequivocal marks they bear of superhuman agency; the importance and desirableness of the object they propose to effect, are in correspondence to the variety and force of the evidence itself.

Such, then, is the contrast they present to all other professed Miracles, from those of Apollonius downwards—which have all been shown, more or less, to be improbable from the circumstances of the case; inconclusive when considered as marks of divine interference; and quite destitute of good evidence for their having really occurred.

Apollonius Tyanæus. — Miracles. Conclusion.

Lastly, it must be observed, that the proof derived from interruptions in the course of nature, though a principal, is yet but *one* out of *many* proofs on which the cause of Revealed Religion rests; and that even supposing (for the sake of argument) it were altogether inconclusive at the present day, still the other evidences,* as they are called, would be fully equal to prove to us the divine origin of Christianity.

* Such as, the system of doctrine, marks of design, gradual disclosure of unknown truths, &c. connecting together the whole Bible as the work of one mind:—Prophecy:—the character of Christ:—the Morality of the Gospel:—the wisdom of its doctrines, displaying at once knowledge of the human heart and skill in engaging its affections, &c.